Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity

In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence.     

Intragroup dissonance: Responses to ingroup violation of personal values

The present research draws on cognitive dissonance theory [Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press] and social identity theory [Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1978). Differentiation between social groups. London: Academic Press] to examine how group members respond to discrepancies between their personal values and the behavior of an ingroup. In two experiments we manipulated whether participants’ ingroup violated a personal value (providing basic healthcare in Experiment 1 and self-reliance in Experiment 2) and measured participants’ emotional responses and strategies for reducing discomfort. As expected, individuals experienced psychological discomfort (but not negative self-directed emotion), when an ingroup, but not when an outgroup, violated a personal value, and this discomfort mediated participants’ disidentification with their group (Experiment 1) and value-adherence activism (Experiment 2).     

A qualitative study into the experience of mandatory personal therapy during training

A small scale qualitative study was carried out to investigate the experiences of attendees of a Masters Degree in counselling. The study used an in depth semi‐structured group interview and analysed the data using a form of grounded theory. The key findings suggest that personal therapy for trainees can be a positive experience and can enhance the process of becoming a professional counsellor. The findings are put forward in terms of a model illustrating how therapy can be of use to trainees. This involves the trainee experiencing the emergence of four key processes: reflexivity, growth, authenticity and prolongation.     

The essential moral self

It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits—more than any other mental faculty—are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits.     

Metaphysics as interpretation of conscious life: some remarks on D. Henrich’s and D. Kolak’s thinking

In this article, I discuss the manner in which Dieter Henrich’s theory of subjectivity has emerged from the fundamental questions of German Idealism, and in what manner and to what extent this theory effects a reinstatement of metaphysics. In so doing, I shall argue that Henrich’s position represents a viable refutation of the attempt of the physicalist explanation of the world to prove the concept of the subject to be superfluous. Henrich’s metaphysics of subjectivity is primarily focused on the ‘ultimate questions’ which also compose “the deep levels of our subjectivity” and concern the factors that should promote stability in our emotional, moral and intellectual life. I argue with Henrich that the indisputable facticity of our conscious life is worthy of our special consideration and interpretation, explanation and clarification, just as the deeper meaning (the individual and collective subconscious structure) hidden beneath the layers of apparent comprehensibility calls for urgent investigation. Such interpretation and elucidation of life’s meaning has a tripartite character: first, it consists of clarification of the totality of human experience together with the realities playing a part in it; second, it builds on the process by which the contents of experience are cognized, and the knowledge thereof which results; thirdly, it embraces the transcendental precondition enabling each and every one of us to consciously lead our lives—for life, in a human sense, does not merely happen to one. Henrich’s metaphysical foundation of subjectivity is compared with Kolak‘s position, according to which individual consciousness is not insular, but integrated into the totality of overall unity that some have called “the Universal Self”, “the Noumenal Self”.     

Once upon a time…: Using fairy tales as a form of vicarious contact to prevent stigma-based bullying among schoolchildren

We conducted a vicarious contact intervention with the aim of promoting bystanders' intentions to react to stigma-based bullying among schoolchildren. Participants were Italian primary schoolchildren (N = 117 first to third graders); the outgroup was represented by foreign children. Vicarious contact was operationalized with story reading, creating fairy tales on stigma-based bullying where minority characters were bullied by majority characters. Once a week for 3 weeks, participants were read fairy tales in small groups by an experimenter and engaged in reinforcing activities. Results revealed that the intervention increased intergroup empathy (but not intergroup perspective-taking) and anti-bullying peer norms and fostered contact intentions. The intervention also had indirect effects via intergroup empathy on helping and contact intentions and on bystanders' reactions to stigma based-bullying. We discuss theoretical and practical implications, also in terms of the relevance of the present results for school policy. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement .     

Who they are and what de se: Burge on quasi-memory

Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.

Age-related differences in affective and cognitive empathy: self-report and performance-based evidence

The correlation between age and empathy is not clear, with prior findings yielding mixed and inconsistent results. Here, we distinguished between two aspects of empathy and respectively investigated the effects of age on the affective and cognitive facets of empathy using a self-report measure (interpersonal reactivity index, IRI) and performance-based tasks (viewing films). The results showed that older adults manifested age-related deficits in both trait and state cognitive empathy, with the latter being positively associated with memory. Otherwise, the overall affective empathy increased in the elderly, but the age-related differences in affective empathy may be qualified by the valence of the film clips. Specifically, older participants showed more empathic concern (EC) and less personal distress (PD) to other people’s emotions than the younger participants for the distress film. Interestingly, for the amusing film, older participants demonstrated more EC and PD. Overall, the two aspects of empathy have different development trajectories.     

社会责任感调节群际替代性排斥中旁观者第三方惩罚

为了考察群体身份对替代性排斥中旁观者惩罚行为的影响,并考察旁观者社会责任感的调节作用,采用数量估计任务对58名不同社会责任感大学生创设群体身份,观看网络掷球游戏形成群际替代性排斥,随后评估游戏中各玩家的愤怒情绪,并采用第三方惩罚来表达对各玩家表现的愤怒。结果发现高社会责任旁观者对替代性排斥体验到更强愤怒情绪,并对排斥者施加更高惩罚;高社会责任感个体对排斥组内成员的组外排斥者惩罚强度高于组内排斥者,而低社会责任感个体对排斥组外成员的组外排斥者惩罚强度显著高于组内排斥者。结果表明旁观者社会责任感调节其在群际替代性排斥中的第三方惩罚。     

道德认同对大学生亲社会行为倾向的影响：共情的中介作用和正念的调节作用

采用道德认同量表、人际反应指针量表、亲社会行为倾向量表和五因素正念度量表对533名大学生进行调查,探讨道德认同对大学生亲社会行为倾向的影响机制。结果表明：（1）道德认同的两个维度—道德认同内化和道德认同符号化均能正向预测大学生亲社会行为倾向;（2）共情在道德认同内化和符号化对大学生亲社会行为倾向的影响过程中起部分中介作用;（3）正念在道德认同内化和符号化通过共情对大学生亲社会行为倾向的影响过程中起调节作用,正念减弱了道德认同符号化对亲社会行为倾向的正向影响,增强了共情对亲社会行为倾向的正向影响。