Parfit's unified theory of morality

Conclusions Insofar as much of commonsense morality is solely rights-focused, insofar as our commonsense duties to our M-relations often involve comparative and not noncomparative goods, and insofar as commonsense morality is a morality of rule following, to those extents Parfit's claim that commonsense morality is self-defeating does not apply. Furthermore, even if Parfit's claim that morality is self-defeating does have a substantive basis and so we amend M as Parfit recommends, because Parfit's revisions of M fail to move M toward C we will be as far from a unification of M and C as we were at the beginning of the project. In short, although there may be a unity to morality, Parfit has not uncovered it.     

PHILOSOPHY AS ART IN ARISTOTLE’S PROTREPTICUS

Observing certain affinities with Plato’s Alcibiades, this paper argues that a distinction between care (epimeleia) of the soul and philosophy as its art (technê) is reflected in Aristotle’s Protrepticus. On the basis of this distinction, it claims that two notions of philosophy can be distinguished in the Protrepticus: philosophy as epistêmê and philosophy as technê. The former has the function of contemplating the truth of nature, and Aristotle praises it as the natural telos of human beings; whereas philosophy as technê helps nature to accomplish the end it designed for human beings. It emerges that according to Aristotle in the Protrepticus philosophy is the art of making oneself coincide with one’s nature as a human being.     

Calibrating Study and Learning as Hermeneutic Principles Through Greco-Christian Seeing,Rabbinic Hearing,and Chinese Yijing Observing

Study is recently re-invoked as an alternative educational formation to disrupt the learning trap and trope. This paper calibrates study and learning as two hermeneutic principles and correlates them with seeing, hearing, and observing as three onto-epistemic modes that respectively underpin Greco-Christian, Rabbinic, and ancient Chinese exegetical traditions. Linking study and learning with the hermeneutic issues of language, text, meaning, and reality, my calibration unfolds in four steps. First, I introduce an epistemic aporia encountered in interpreting some Chinese educational “wind” texts, exposing our naturalized reasoning of learning along a representational enclosure. Second, turning to Susan Handelman’s writing, I trace this learning-as-representation enclosure as being conditioned upon the Greco-Christian exegetical mode of seeing, meanwhile correlating study back with the Rabbinic hearing hermeneutic. Third, I move on to explicate an onto-cosmological Yijing observing, proffering a study hermeneutic as a movement of observing, following, and attuning to wendao, literally put, “a crisscrossing pattern that (re-)turns with dao.” Finally, I re-observe and study the crisscrossing Chinese educational “wind” texts, evoking a Chinese “wind-teaching” sensibility so far rarely discerned through representational thinking and learning.

     

On the use of the term ‘frequency’ in applied behavior analysis

There exists a terminological problem in applied behavior analysis: the term frequency has been used as a synonym for both rate (the number of responses per time) and count (the number of responses). To guide decisions about the use and meaning of frequency, we surveyed the usage of frequency in contemporary behavior‐analytic journals and textbooks and found that the predominant usage of frequency was as count, not rate. Thus, we encourage behavior analysts to use frequency as a synonym for count.     

How Japanese Language Has Been Used and Transformed—Focused on Social-cultural Context and the Use in Communication

In this paper I address that flexibility and vagueness of mimic word, especially Gitai-go, can provide the communication with tension leading us to the continuous process of meaning construction, focused on the history of Japanese characters as the core of mimic words. I present that Hiragana, as the character for Gitai-go, was started to use by people viewed as of no public authority such as women at that time while Kanji had a position as an official characters. As unofficial character, Hiragana was received and transformed by common people as the character which is more flexible and vague suited to express persons’ experience than Kanji. Most of Gitai-go is written in Hiragana, and people can also create original and personalized one based on their experience. We can be driven by necessity to search the meanings of Gitai-go when we meet unknown one, through its vagueness. This undifferentiated nature and indefinite feature of Gitai-go provide us with tension of communication.     

Sorai and the will oftian

Conclusion My purpose has been more negative than positive. That is, I have challenged the view that Sorai understoodtian as an intentional agent. At minimum, Sorai’s philosophical views do not depend upon such a conception oftian, and he refrains from characterizingtian in such terms when he discusses the concept oftian directly. However, I do not claim to have proven that Sorai’s view oftian was completely naturalistic, or even that Sorai did not—at some level—believe thattian had intentions. I have, I hope, shown thatthe case that Sorai viewedtian as intentional has not been convincingly made. Further, something closer to a dynamic and indeterminate naturalistic view is a reasonable alternative. On my reading, Sorai steers a course between the Song Confucian view oftian as static and knowable (a view that he explicitly rejects) and a view oftian as intentional (a view he never unequivocally expresses)—indeed, he rejects the idea of personifyingtian. When Sorai speaks of thexin or “mind”of tian, he is best understood as employing a metaphor that implies complexity, mystery, activity, and perhaps moral structure, but not intentionality in the normal sense. The complexity, indeterminacy, and dynamism oftian, as these are expressed in Sorai’s writings, do not necessarily imply willful intent on the part oftian, for they are all consistent with the Xunzian interpretation oftian as a natural process, even iftian’s regularities have a moral character.     

Sankara's fatal mistake

Sankara's philosophy fails definitively at the point where he leaves the human experience—’sinning and suffering‘—unaccounted for. What in each of us, he asks, sins and suffers? Is it the antahkarana, the ‘mental organ’ giving rise to the series of mental states (buddins) that file by illumined by the atman? Impossible, he says, for the antahkarana by itself is material (jada,) and therefore unconscious (acit). Then is it the ātman, upon which the antahkarana is superimposed? Inconceivable, he says, for the atman is identical with Brahman, and Brahman is by definition pure bliss‐consciousness, as far removed from sin and suffering as can be imagined. Then is the atman in conjunction with the antahkarana—a partnership that Sankara calls the jiva (or soul)—the sinner and sufferer? Yes, he says, as long as you remember that the sin and suffering are ultimately illusory, as illusory as the antahkarana itself. I show why Sankara's answer fails and what the failure implies, then suggest a fruitful way to approach Sankara and teach his philsophy to our students.     

The Propriety of Confucius: A Sense-of-Ritual

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept li is both central and elusive. While it is often translated ‘ritual’ or ‘the rites,’ I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which li is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss li as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well as Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external aspect of li, although reasonably understood under the rubric of ‘traditional norms,’ may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of li.     

GORGIAS' DEFENSE: PLATO AND HIS OPPONENTS ON RHETORIC AND THE GOOD

This paper explores in detail Gorgias' defense of rhetoric in Plato's Gorgias (456c–7c), noting its connections to earlier and later texts such as Aristophanes' Clouds, Gorgias' Helen, Isocrates' Nicocles and Antidosis, and Aristotle's Rhetoric. The defense as Plato presents it is transparently inadequate; it reveals a deep inconsistency in Gorgias' conception of rhetoric and functions as a satirical precursor to his refutation by Socrates. Yet Gorgias' defense is appropriated, in a streamlined form, by later defenders of rhetoric such as Isocrates and Aristotle. They present it as an effective reductio against a critique of rhetoric that depends on the “harm criterion.” This is puzzling, since Plato's own critique of rhetoric does not depend on the harm criterion. On the other hand, Plato does seem to embrace the harm criterion as a more general principle—as if pre‐emptively embracing the reductio—in his arguments about the good in the Meno and Euthydemus. Nonetheless, Isocrates and Aristotle seem to be deliberately misreading Plato on rhetoric: where he intends to criticize its intrinsic nature, they respond as if he were merely complaining about its contingent effects.     

Patterns of abduction

This article describes abductions as special patterns of inference to the best explanation whose structure determines a particularly promising abductive conjecture (conclusion) and thus serves as an abductive search strategy (Sect. 1). A classification of different patterns of abduction is provided which intends to be as complete as possible (Sect. 2). An important distinction is that between selective abductions, which choose an optimal candidate from given multitude of possible explanations (Sects. 3–4), and creative abductions, which introduce new theoretical models or concepts (Sects. 5–7). While selective abduction has dominated the literature, creative abductions are rarely discussed, although they are essential in science. The article introduces several kinds of creative abductions, such as theoretical model abduction, common cause abduction and statistical factor analysis, and illustrates them by various real case examples. It is suggested to demarcate scientifically fruitful abductions from purely speculative abductions by the criterion of causal unification (Sect. 7.1).     

The Disarticulation of Time: the Zeitbewußtsein in Phenomenology of Perception

In an effort to reassess the status of Phenomenology of Perception and its relation to The Visible and the Invisible, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Husserl's text and his discussion of the “field of presence” in La temporalité are intended to think through the field in which time makes its appearance as one of passage. Time does not show itself as presence or in the present but manifests itself as Ablauf, as lapse or flow, an écoulement that is simultaneously an explosion, an éclatement. Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality in these pages is thus legible as recovering the primordial experience of time as a self-differentiating déhiscence in its dual power of articulation and erosion. Time is thus simultaneously the vehicle of the world's appearance and of its “disarticulation”, the passage of a rhythm of affirmation and disintegration.     

Nonverbal cues to sex-role attitudes

This study explored the relationship between self-reported attitudes toward “masculinity-femininity” and nonverbal behavior as judged by peers. Subjects (Ss) were preselected using an Mf questionnaire into: high-“feminine” males (N = 16) and females (N = 15) and low-feminine males (N = 16) and females (N = 15). The 62 Ss were videotaped in a 5-min standardized interview. Peer-age judges (Js) then viewed the videotapes without sound and asked to check which of the 170 adjectives describe Ss. Some Js were asked to rate average college male and female. A large number of adjectives discriminated the sexes (91 out of 170). Women were more often seen as warm, affable, oversocialized, emotional, and unstable. Men were seen as forceful, dominant, and detached. Sixty-two adjectives discriminated high- and low-feminine women. Feminine women were seen as warm, affable, oversocialized, and submissive, while low-feminine women were seen as dominant. High-feminine men were described as impulsive, dominant, and socially uneasy, while low-feminine men were seen as oversocialized and conventional.     

Transparent and Opaque Performance Personas

Jeanette Bicknell has argued that a singer's public persona is relevant to the aesthetic evaluation of that singer's public performances of popular song. Here, I distinguish varieties of personas: those which are transparent (such as when a singer performs more or less as that singer) and those which are opaque (such as when a singer performs more or less as a fictional character). I also distinguish between performance personas and song personas. After introducing and elucidating these distinctions, I discuss ways in which they further inform aesthetic evaluation of such performances.     

A Posteriori Necessity as Restricted Necessity

I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I take Sidelle’s defence of the conventionalist explanation of a posteriori necessity against the contingency problem as the starting point. Sidelle construes a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity and then argues that a posteriori necessity is to be considered under a fixed convention (meaning) and is thus irrelevant to the contingent nature of our linguistic conventions. I offer a different solution to the contingency problem. I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity based upon a use-based meta-semantic picture. Restricted necessity is contingent in a broader sense and does not conflict with the contingency of conventions. My solution allows conventionalists to explain a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I show that the realist’s arguments for a posteriori necessity are unconvincing in regard to real modal features and a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity. We thus have good reason to continue to accept a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity under the conventionalist explanation.

     

No Future

The difficulties with formalizing the intensional notions necessity, knowability and omniscience, and rational belief are well-known. If these notions are formalized as predicates applying to (codes of) sentences, then from apparently weak and uncontroversial logical principles governing these notions, outright contradictions can be derived. Tense logic is one of the best understood and most extensively developed branches of intensional logic. In tense logic, the temporal notions future and past are formalized as sentential operators rather than as predicates. The question therefore arises whether the notions that are investigated in tense logic can be consistently formalized as predicates. In this paper it is shown that the answer to this question is negative. The logical treatment of the notions of future and past as predicates gives rise to paradoxes due the specific interplay between both notions. For this reason, the tense paradoxes that will be presented are not identical to the paradoxes referred to above.     

The ontology of intentionality II: dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics

This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence.     

The Ancient Argumentative Game: τóπoι and loci in Action

In classical logic and rhetoric the strategies of argumentation known as topoi played a crucial role. Yet, topoi refer there to different kinds of strategies that this study intends to explain synoptically. Main focus will be on passages from Aristotle and Cicero. Indeed, these sources contain examples and theoretical considerations, which provide the basis for a general investigation of the complex phenomenon of topoi in the ancient world. Four main types of topoi will be juxtaposed and discusses comparatively as a way to inspire historical reconstructions of the system of topoi, as well as modern theory formation on argumentation where topoi still receive much attention.     

Insincerity and disloyalty

Insincerity is the intentional conflict between a state of mind and a synchronic linguistic act. Three cases have to be distinguished: lying, as the opposition of belief and assertion (the act is untruthful); dishonesty, as the opposition of will and declaration of will (act empty); and simulation, as the opposition of emotion and exclamation (act ungenuine). One of the problems arising is: Are there insincere commands, and if not, why?

Disloyalty, on the other hand, is a diachronic inconsequence, the breach of a linguistic action (act unredeemed) which was binding for the future (such as, e.g. a promise). There is a cross-connection to dishonesty, which can be seen as the will to be disloyal.

     

What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences?

This article discusses the meaning of epistemological violence in the empirical social sciences. It is argued that the concept is closer to personal than to structural violence in that it has a subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical: the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. Using a hypothetical example, the problem of interpretation in empirical research on the Other is discussed. Epistemological violence refers to the interpretation of social-scientific data on the Other and is produced when empirical data are interpreted as showing the inferiority of or problematizes the Other, even when data allow for equally viable alternative interpretations. Interpretations of inferiority or problematizations are understood as actions that have a negative impact on the Other. Because the interpretations of data emerge from an academic context and thus are presented as knowledge, they are defined as epistemologically violent actions. Problems, consequences, and practices surrounding this concept are discussed.