BLAME AND RESPONSIVENESS TO MORAL REASONS: ARE PSYCHOPATHS BLAMEWORTHY?

Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or ‘psychopathic,’ agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents can express the relevant blame‐grounding attitudes insofar as these agents possess the capacity to make judgments about non‐moral reasons.     

Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest

I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument is based on the observation that even when a blameworthy wrongdoer could have responded to moral considerations, this is often not relevant to her blameworthiness. Finally, I argue against the view that because blame communicates moral demands, only agents who can be reached by such communication are properly blamed. I contend that a person victimized by a wrongdoer with an impaired capacity for moral understanding may protest her victimization in a way that counts as a form of moral blame even though it does not primarily express a moral demand or attempt to initiate moral dialogue.     

A cybernetic theory of morality and moral autonomy

Human morality may be thought of as a negative feedback control system in which moral rules are reference values, and moral disapproval, blame, and punishment are forms of negative feedback given for violations of the moral rules. In such a system, if moral agents held each other accountable, moral norms would be enforced effectively. However, even a properly functioning social negative feedback system could not explain acts in which individual agents uphold moral rules in the face of contrary social pressure. Dr. Frances Kelsey, who withheld FDA approval for thalidomide against intense social pressure, is an example of the degree of individual moral autonomy possible in a hostile environment. Such extreme moral autonomy is possible only if there is internal, psychological negative feedback, in addition to external, social feedback. Such a cybernetic model of morality and moral autonomy is consistent with certain aspects of classical ethical theories.     

Psychopaths and Symmetry: A Reply to Nelkin

Philosophia - An agent is morally competent if she can respond to moral considerations. There is a debate about whether agents are open to moral blame only if they are morally competent, and Dana...     

Using Insights from Applied Moral Psychology to Promote Ethical Behavior Among Engineering Students and Professional Engineers

In this essay I discuss a novel engineering ethics class that has the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood that students (and professionals) will inadvertently or unintentionally act unethically in the future. This class is different from standard engineering ethics classes in that it focuses on the issue of why people act unethically and how students (and professionals) can avoid a variety of hurdles to ethical behavior. I do not deny that it is important for students to develop cogent moral reasoning and ethical decision-making as taught in traditional college-level ethics classes, but as an educator, I aim to help students apply moral reasoning in specific, real-life situations so they are able to make ethical decisions and act ethically in their academic careers and after they graduate. Research in moral psychology provides evidence that many seemingly irrelevant situational factors affect the moral judgment of most moral agents and frequently lead agents to unintentionally or inadvertently act wrongly. I argue that, in addition to teaching college students moral reasoning and ethical decision-making, it is important to: 1. Teach students about psychological and situational factors that affect people’s ethical judgments/behaviors in the sometimes stressful, emotion-laden environment of the workplace; 2. Guide students to engage in critical reflection about the sorts of situations they personally might find ethically challenging before they encounter those situations; and 3. Provide students with strategies to help them avoid future unethical behavior when they encounter these situations in school and in the workplace.     

Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.     

Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief

John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility.     

A Strawsonian look at desert

P.F. Strawson famously argued that reactive attitudes and ordinary moral practices justify moral assessments of blame, praise, and punishment. Here we consider whether Strawson's approach can illuminate the concept of desert. After reviewing standard attempts to analyze this concept and finding them lacking, we suggest that to deserve something is to justifiably receive a moral assessment in light of certain criteria – in particular, eligibility criteria (a subject's properties that make the subject principally eligible for moral assessments) and assignment criteria (particulars about the subject, act, and circumstances that justify assessments such as blame in a particular case). Strawson's analysis of the ordinary attitudes and practices of moral assessment hints at these criteria but does not unequivocally ground a notion of desert. Following Strawson's general naturalistic approach, we show that recent psychological research on folk concepts and practices regarding freedom, moral responsibility, and blame illuminates how people actually arrive at moral assessments, thus revealing the very eligibility criteria and assignment criteria we suggest ground a concept of desert. By pushing the Strawsonian line even further than Strawson did, by empirically investigating actual moral practice and folk understandings, we can illuminate desert and lend credence to Strawson's general anti-metaphysical position.     

Ethical evaluation of "retainer fee" medical practice

This article examines the reasons that some physicians have recently opted to reduce the size of their practice rosters to allow more time for each patient in exchange for a retainer fee from patients. These physicians also offer supplementary, nonmedical amenities to patients as part of their service. Because physicians have reduced the size of their practice rosters and have increased the price tag for their services, some patients have lost access to their care. We have tried to assess the ethical propriety of such a change in the design of medical practices by weighing plausible, ethically relevant arguments favoring and opposing RFMP. Physicians are ethically obligated first and foremost to promote and protect the health of their patients. RFMP fulfills this duty directly by ensuring prompt and ample professional time for the care of patients. It does so indirectly by allowing time for physicians' continuing education, which in turn should upgrade the quality of care. It also advances the ethical goals of autonomy as it allows patients to choose their own physicians and to spend their money as they please. On the other hand, these ethical positives are offset by the cost of retainer fees that may exclude access of patients to their physicians' care. Even if ethical tradition obligates physicians primarily to patients under their specific care, as professionals and as private citizens, they also have a responsibility to support the health of the entire community. RFMP does little to advance this cause, except that by optimizing the conditions under which their own private patients receive healthcare, they call attention to shortcomings in prevailing public healthcare policies, which by comparison fall short of that standard. An assumption that health is not properly a market commodity, and that all people should receive healthcare on equal terms, would expose RFMP to moral reproof. From an ethical perspective, we find sufficient cause for concern and caution in this innovative style of practice. Nevertheless, the weight of arguments presented here does not seem to justify unequivocal moral condemnation of RFMP. As neither pro nor con views seem to have settled the ethical question, definitive moral judgment on RFMP will probably depend on the outcome of future experience and ongoing evaluation. The implications of RFMP for any future healthcare system are not clear, at least to us.     

Moral obligations towards future generations in African thought

Given the importance of being able to account for moral obligations towards future generations, especially in the light of the problem of global climate change, I argue that there are under-appreciated notions in African thought that are able to significantly contribute to the on-going discourse with respect to inter-generational moral obligations. I identify two related African notions, both springing from the prominent belief that ancestors who have died – but continue to have a presence – are entitled to respect, which upon secular refinement are promising in terms of grounding a claim that we do have moral obligations to future generations. These conceptions are that the environment is a communal resource, shared across generations, and that the present generation should express gratitude to its predecessors for preserving the environment on its behalf, by emulating its predecessors and preserving the environment for future generations. I argue that these two conceptions present plausible grounds for thinking that we have moral obligations to posterity, partly because they go some way towards overcoming some of the theoretical concerns generally associated with the notion of moral obligations towards unidentifiable, contingent future persons.     

Naturalistic Moral Realism and Moral Disagreement: David Copp’s Account

To enhance the plausibility of naturalistic moral realism, David Copp develops an argument from epistemic defeaters aiming to show that strongly a priori synthetic moral truths do not exist. In making a case for the non-naturalistic position, I locate Copp??s account within the wider literature on peer disagreement; I identify key points of divergence between Copp??s doctrine and conciliatorist doctrines; I introduce the notion of ??minimal moral competence??; I contend that some plausible benchmarks for minimal moral competence are grounded in substantive moral considerations; and I discuss two forms of spinelessness that Copp??s moral naturalism could result in.     

Wanton Responsibility

Mainstream accounts of responsible agency either overlook or discount wanton agents as plausible candidates for responsible agency. This is largely due to the compatibilist project of such accounts, and to their deemphasis of historical and modal considerations. I argue that wantons – those who are indifferent to the desires that move them to act – can and ought to be counted as responsible agents. Indeed, they deserve special blame for the acts of wrong doing that issue from their wanton behavior.     

Revenge without responsibility? Judgments about collective punishment in baseball

Many cultures practice collective punishment; that is, they will punish one person for another's transgression, based solely on shared group membership. This practice is difficult to reconcile with the theories of moral responsibility that dominate in contemporary Western psychology, philosophy and law. Yet, we demonstrate a context in which many American participants do endorse collective punishment: retaliatory “beaning” in baseball. Notably, individuals who endorse this form of collective punishment tend not to hold the target of retaliation to be morally responsible. In other words, the psychological mechanisms underlying such “vicarious” forms of collective punishment appear to be distinct from the evaluation of moral responsibility. Consequently, the observation of collective punishment in non-Western cultures may not indicate the operation of fundamentally different conceptions of moral responsibility.     

Biased recipients encounter biased sources: Effect of ethical (dis‐)agreement between recipient and author on evaluating scientific claims

Scientific claims that are connected to ethical concerns are frequently brought forward by communicators who are not ethically neutral. This study investigated how far recipients' evaluation of such claims is guided by vigilance toward a potential ethical source bias rather than their own ethical bias. One hundred ten individuals opposed to capital punishment read a topic‐related text by an ethically positioned source. A scientific claim in the text either supported or did not support the recipient's ethical stance; in addition, the source either shared or opposed their stance. Results showed that recipients are guided to some extent by their own ethically motivated reasoning: They agree more consistently with sources sharing their ethical stance and consider these sources to be more credible. Recipients appear to be principally aware that a source's ethical stance may bias its scientific message, but this vigilance seems to depend on their own ethical disagreement with the source.     

Toward a hermeneutic model of ethical decision making in clinical practice

Documented ethical violations and empirical research have demonstrated that, despite professional standards and formal training in ethical principles, some psychotherapists engage in unethical behaviors that compromise the welfare of clients. It appears that competing values and interests that emerge in the therapeutic endeavor can interfere with therapists' considerations of ethical standards and their willingness to act ethically. Expanding current models of ethical decision making, this article offers a hermeneutic model that recognizes that in addition to moral reasoning, the context of the therapeutic relationship and the therapist's subjective responses are fundamental considerations in the interpretation and application of ethical interventions. Implications for understanding and training of ethics in psychotherapy in this broader context are explored.     

Toward a Hermeneutic Model of Ethical Decision Making in Clinical Practice

Documented ethical violations and empirical research have demonstrated that, despite professional standards and formal training in ethical principles, some psychotherapists engage in unethical behaviors that compromise the welfare of clients. It appears that competing values and interests that emerge in the therapeutic endeavor can interfere with therapists' considerations of ethical standards and their willingness to act ethically. Expanding current models of ethical decision making, this article offers a hermeneutic model that recognizes that in addition to moral reasoning, the context of the therapeutic relationship and the therapist's subjective responses are fundamental considerations in the interpretation and application of ethical interventions. Implications for understanding and training of ethics in psychotherapy in this broader context are explored.     

"伦理经营"诠释

伦理经营观念是企业经营哲学历史发展的逻辑结论,也是企业伦理学家们对市场经济条件下企业经营管理活动的伦理学总结。在我国,企业行为失范、坚持科学发展观和构建社会主义和谐社会、参与经济全球化进程、生态环境的恶化态势等因素决定了企业必须坚持伦理经营价值观。伦理经营既是一种守法经营,也是一种合德经营。经营法规、人性化管理、诚信交易、绿色营销、积极负责等,是伦理经营价值观体系的构成要素。     

Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers

For many philosophers, bad‐history wrongdoers are primarily interesting because of what their cases might tell us about the interaction of moral responsibility and history. However, philosophers focusing on blameworthiness have overlooked important questions about blame itself. These bad‐history cases are complicated because blame and sympathy are both fitting. When we are careful to consider the rich natures of those two reactions, we see that they conflict in several important ways. We should see bad‐history cases as cases about whether and how we should blame, rather than as cases giving us ready insight into the nature of moral responsibility.