Realization, Reduction And Psychological Autonomy

It is often thought that the computational paradigm provides a supporting case for the theoretical autonomy of the science of mind. However, I argue that computation is in fact incompatible with this alleged aspect of intentional explanation, and hence the foundational assumptions of orthodox cognitive science are mutually unstable. The most plausible way to relieve these foundational tensions is to relinquish the idea that the psychological level enjoys some special form of theoretical sovereignty. So, in contrast to well known antireductionist views based on multiple realizability, I argue that the primary goal of a computational approach to the mind should be to facilitate a translation of the psychological to the neurophysiological.     

替代性创伤与具身情绪

具身情绪是在近年来大热的具身认知领域影响下提出的便于研究情绪的理论,主要表现为情绪是由生理反应及情境等共同作用影响的; 而替代性创伤是用以描述心理工作者因长期接触创伤后患者对其进行危机干预,而出现类似的创伤反应和身心不良症状的概念。这两者在形成结构上存在相似之处。本文对这两个概念进行介绍,从具身的视角描述了替代性创伤的成因,最后结合实际对未来研究探讨与展望。     

Welfare,Autonomy, and the Autonomy Fallacy

In this article, I subject the claim that autonomous choice is an intrinsic welfare benefit to critical scrutiny. My argument begins by discussing perhaps the most influential argument in favor of the intrinsic value of autonomy: the argument from deference. In response, I hold that this argument displays what I call the ‘Autonomy Fallacy’: the argument from deference has no power to support the intrinsic value of autonomy in comparison to the important evaluative significance of bare self‐direction (autonomous or not) or what I call ‘self‐direction tout court’. I defend the claim that the Autonomy Fallacy really is a fallacy, and show that my examination of the argument from deference has wider reverberations. Once we clearly distinguish between autonomy and self‐direction tout court, it becomes much less plausible to say that autonomy of itself is an intrinsic welfare benefit.     

青少年道德情绪判断与归因特点研究

运用情境故事考察246名青少年在犯过情境中的道德情绪判断与归因特点,以年龄、犯过类别、行为者意图结果的匹配关系为因素进行对数线性分析。结果表明：犯过类别、行为者意图结果的匹配关系对青少年道德情绪判断与归因存在重要影响,青少年道德情绪判断与归因上的年龄差异主要存在于12岁组和14岁以上组之间,12岁组的情绪判断较为单一,归因上以道德定向为主,而14岁以上组出现了更多复杂情绪判断及移情定向归因。     

Mencius,the Feminine Perspective and Impartiality

In her well-known In A Different Voice, Gilligan argues that the male and female approaches to morality are fundamentally opposed to each other. The masculine approach emphasizes impartial justice, and the application of a 'hierarchy' of rules. In contrast, the feminine approach is grounded in care and concern for others, and emphasizes flexibility and attention to context when making moral decisions. This paper offers a critique of Gilligan's views through a consideration of Mencian morality. Mencius inhabits the 'feminine' perspective insofar as his morality is grounded in care and responsibility. However, he develops from this a philosophy of government which recognizes the need for impartial justice to apply among citizens. Mencius's views show that, pace Gilligan, there is no inherent incompatibility between 'feminine' care and concern and 'male' impartial justice. It is possible for the latter to be founded upon the former.     

The Interplay Of Autonomy And Relatedness In Hong Kong Chinese Single Mothers

The mediating effects of autonomy and relatedness on the relationship between self–esteem and life satisfaction were investigated among 49 single mothers. Among all tested variables in the dimension of relatedness, only network orientation (propensity to utilize one's available social support) was a mediator of the positive relationship between self–esteem and life satisfaction. No variable in the dimension of autonomy was a mediator. Three components of self–actualization contributed to the model: self–regard mediated the relationship between self–esteem and network orientation, spontaneity contributed to network orientation, self–acceptance contributed to life satisfaction directly and indirectly by contributing to self–regard. Findings suggest that Chinese single mothers' psychological adjustment can be enhanced by fostering their self–regard, self–acceptance, and readiness to seek help from trusted others.     

Autonomy,and Then

Abstract

Among the numerous conceptions of autonomy, three are particularly important: Kant's notion of humans' being subject, and subject only, to moral laws they gave themselves, Frankfurt's idea of persons' willing and acting deriving from the essential character of their wills, and the popular conception of persons' being master over whether others do or do not certain things to them. Kant's moral conception of autonomy, it is argued, is untenable because the moral character of a law and its self-givenness are incompatible. Frankfurt's idea suffers from the fact that we cannot give substance to talk of the essential character of one's will. The third conception is practically irrelevant: there is no principle requiring people to be master over what others do to them. Thus autonomy may have to be dropped from our self-conception. To some this will appear a grave loss. In fact it is not.     

Autonomy, Liberalism, and Anti-Perfectionism

John Christman has recently objected to substantive conceptions of autonomy on the grounds that they introduce unwanted perfectionism into political thinking. I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy against Christman’s critique on two fronts. First, I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy against the charge that their utilisation in political theory would result in the inappropriate exclusion from democratic respect of individuals in oppressive relations. Second, I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy from the charge that they fail the ‘endorsement constraint’, i.e. that incorporating a substantive conception of autonomy into the concept of the person at the heart of a political theory would be alienating for citizens.     

Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Autonomy

The libertarian view of freedom has attracted considerable attention in the past three decades. It has also been subjected to numerous criticisms regarding its nature and effects on society. G. A. Cohen's recent book, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, continues this attack by linking libertarian views on freedom to their view of self-ownership. This paper formulates and evaluates Cohen's major arguments against libertarian freedom and self-ownership. It contends that his arguments against the libertarian rights definition of freedom are inadequate and need modification. Similarly, Cohen's defense of restrictions on self-ownership on behalf of autonomy are also found wanting. Finally, I argue that the thesis of self-ownership (whether in its full or partial version) ought to be rejected.     

Self-Trust,Autonomy, and Self-Esteem

Self-trust is a necessary condition of personal autonomy and self-respect. Self-trust involves a positive sense of the motivations and competence of the trusted person; a willingness to depend on him or her; and an acceptance of vulnerability. It does not preclude trust in others. A person may be rightly said to have too much self-trust; however core self-trust is essential for functioning as an autonomous human being.