Generosity: Between Love and Desire

“Safe sex” discourse attempts to protect women from dangers assumed inherent in erotic life, such as domination, submissiveness, and loss of freedom and self-control. However, Beauvoir's and Merleau-Ponty's revision of Sartre's ontology suggests that erotic life involves a kind of generosity that transforms existence; sex neither liberates personal existence nor poses a necessary threat to women's freedom. 1 also reconsider the conditions under which sex is assumed to involve a violation of being.     

Reclaiming Desire: Love Is Not Enough

How may desire be disrupted in a person's life and how may it be reclaimed in treatment? To what degree are the dynamics of therapeutic action predicated on the relational aspects of treatment versus time-honored understandings of the reconfiguration of dynamic forces within the psyche? These questions are considered in the context of a discussion of a detailed clinical case. The paper suggests that although much may be gained in the love and the “new outcome” experienced in treatment, an essential function of interpretation is to enable desire to be reclaimed from entrapment in relational demands and obligations from the past and within the treatment relationship. In this manner, analytic treatment mirrors a developmental a trajectory that begins in complex relational exchanges, but from which emerges—in the best of circumstances—an individual whose possession of his or her own mind and desire has derived from, and yet is independent of, the specific relational foundations in which desire was shaped.     

Love,Desire, Jouissance: Two out of Three Ain't Bad

The author demonstrates in this paper the different dynamics of love, desire, and jouissance. This impossible affair of loving whom one does not desire and desiring whom one does not love is analyzed through the writings of Jacques Lacan and Stephen Mitchell. The author illustrates Lacan's use of the “objeta” as the fragment in the Other that gives the desiring individual the illusion of completeness whereas the desired Other has no notion for whom or what she or he is desired. Desire is unmasked as this hide-and-seek game of narcissistic illusions where one is wanted for what one does not have and one desires what one cannot have. Both Lacan and Mitchell suggest that love is a far more risky encounter because all narcissistic illusions risk to be jettisoned. Although Mitchell suggests that it is only through the Other that one can discover the otherness in oneself, Lacan states that to love is to give nothing of oneself and to accept the emptinessin the Other. Texts from popular culture are used to illustrate the dynamics of live and desire and the limits of jouissance.     

Emerging Perspectives on Distinctions Between Romantic Love and Sexual Desire

Abstract— Although sexual desire and romantic love are often experienced in concert, they are fundamentally distinct subjective experiences with distinct neurobiological substrates. The basis for these distinctions is the evolutionary origin of each type of experience. The processes underlying sexual desire evolved in the context of sexual mating, whereas the processes underlying romantic love—or pair bonding—originally evolved in the context of infant-caregiver attachment. Consequently, not only can humans experience these feelings separately, but an individual's sexual predisposition for the same sex, the other sex, or both sexes may not circumscribe his or her capacity to fall in love with partners of either gender. Also, the role of oxytocin in both love and desire may contribute to the widely observed phenomenon that women report experiencing greater interconnections between love and desire than do men. Because most research on the neurobiological substrates of sexual desire and affectional bonding has been conducted with animals, a key priority for future research is systematic investigation of the coordinated biological, behavioral, cognitive, and emotional processes that shape experiences of love and desire in humans.     

Desire,Domination, Sadism,and the Degradation of Love: Reply to Commentaries by Joyce Slochower and Christopher Bonovitz

In her response to commentaries by Joyce Slochower and Christopher Bonovitz, the author further clarifies her understanding of countertransferential sadism and how it compares to other enactments. She addresses Slochower’s concern about psychoanalytic restraint in the relational frame. The author responds to Bonovitz, who used a Fairbairnian perspective to comment on the clinical material she presented, and she considers how Fairbairn’s concepts of the libidinal ego, the rejecting object and the internal saboteur apply to analytic sadism. Finally, she contemplates whether the sadistic enactments described in her paper can be viewed as a prelude to the expansion of analytic love.     

Love from Afar: Distance,Intimacy and the Theology of Love

Proceeding from Jean‐Luc Marion's The Erotic Phenomenon, this article discusses how the Christian concept of love can manifest intimacy. While most theological concepts of love spell out the requirement of distance, they do not pay sufficient attention to the intimate variants of love. The article argues that a full‐fledged theological account should make room for love's different economic and donative variants, as well as for love's advance from ‘distance’ to ‘visibility’ and, finally, ‘intimacy’. Concrete examples of intimate love include mystical union, transforming hospitality, fidelity and love that is as strong as death.     

Desire,patriotism, and Sikh subjectivity

Post-9/11 era is marked by the resurgence of white American nationalisms across the country. Members of Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities experienced hate crimes, anti-immigrant sentiments, and government surveillance due to suspicions of being ‘terrorist-monsters’. Since 2001, Sikh advocacy groups participated in the nationalist discourse to express their desire for legitimacy as national subjects while distancing themselves from the ‘terrorist-other’. This article explores the politics embedded within the thrusts of these desires. I examine the disciplining nature of these groups and the possible ways they homogenize and foreclose Sikh subjectivities through a rather violent love for the nation.     

Love,That Indispensable Supplement: Irigaray and Kant on Love and Respect

Is love essential to ethical life, or merely a supplement? In Kant's view, respect and love, as duties, are in tension with each other because love involves drawing closer and respect involves drawing away. By contrast, Irigaray says that love and respect do not conflict because love as passion must also involve distancing and we have a responsibility to love. I argue that love, understood as passion and based on respect, is essential to ethics.     

Recognition,Desire, and Unjust Sex

In this article I will revisit the question of what I term the continuum of heteronormative sexual interactions, that is, the idea that purportedly ethically acceptable heterosexual interactions are conceptually, ethically, and politically associated with instances of sexual violence. Spurred by recent work by psychologist Nicola 11 , I conclude that some of my earlier critiques of Catharine MacKinnon's theoretical linkages between sexual violence and normative heterosex are wanting. In addition, neither MacKinnon's theory nor my critique of it seem up to the task of providing an ethical account of the examples of “unjust sex” that Gavey has described. I come to the conclusion that an ethical analysis of sexual interactions requires a focus on sexual desire, but that desire cannot take on the by now heavily criticized role of consent. Rather than looking for the presence or absence of sexual desire prior to sexual encounters as a kind of ethical certification of them, we ought instead to focus on the efficacy of that sexual desire, that is, its ability (or lack thereof) to shape an encounter in substantial and meaningful ways.     

Desire satisfaction,death, and time

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.     

Pleasure,Desire and Practical Reason

This paper examines the role of stability in the constitution of pleasure and desire, its relevance to the intimate ways the two are related and to their role in the constitution of practical reason.     

『新时代舟山宗教工作』系列之九:普陀山 爱国爱教 服务社会

普陀山佛教事业近年来取得了可喜的成绩,离不开"信、解、行、证"四个字,即:深入学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想,党的十九大及十九届二中、三中、四中全会精神,全国宗教工作会议精神与新修订《宗教事务条例》;正信指导正行。     

God, The Mind's Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking

Book reviewed:
God, The Mind's Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking by Paul D. Janz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) xi + 232 pp. Reviewed by Michael Hanby Baylor University One Bear Place #97144 Waco, TX 76798-7144 USA     

Desire, Judgment, and Reason: Exploring the Path not Taken

At the outset of The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel charts two paths out of the fundamental dilemma confronting metaethics. The first path rejects the claim that a persuasive account of the motivational backing of ethical judgments must involve an agent’s desires. But it is the second path, a path that Nagel charts but does not himself take, that is the focus of this essay. This path retains the standard account, upon which all motivation involves desire, but denies that desires are given prior to reason. Instead, these attitudes that motivate are themselves open to rational assessment. One reason for this focus is that many philosophers, including Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, have come to reject the claim Nagel takes to block this path – that desires are somehow given prior to reason, hence are not in the relevant way proper objects of rational assessment. A second reason is that unlike the first path, this second does not require the rejection of the belief-desire theory, only the rejection of one assumption about the nature of conative attitudes. Unlike Nagel’s chosen path, then, the second holds out the prospect of reconciling ethical objectivity, internalism, and the belief-desire theory within a unified account. I argue that the account of desire found in Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, augmented by aspects of Davidson’s account of propositional attitudes, yields a coherent account of the involvement of reason even in basic desires, an account that is well suited to Nagel’s intriguing path not taken. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at UC Santa Barbara and the University of Michigan. I am grateful to members of those audiences for helpful comments, in particular to Stephen Darwall, David Velleman, Kevin Toh, Voula Tsouna, and Tony Anderson. I have also benefited from helpful discussions of these arguments with Peter Thielke, Ted Hinchman, Dion Scott-Kakures, and Charles Young.