将分析哲学奠定在实用主义的基础上——布兰顿的语言实用主义述评

继奎因、罗蒂、普特南之后,当代实用主义进入了一个新的发展时期,布兰顿的语言实用主义①是新实用主义的最新代表:它用理性建构的方式,从一个不同的视角,将实用主义与分析哲学紧密结合在一起,以一种更加精确的哲学语言展示了实用主义的当代学术价值。本文旨在阐明布兰顿的语言     

当代社会心理学发展的双重走向论评

本文以社会心理研究的不同学科取向、文化取向和方法论取向做为三条主要线索,对当代社会心理学发展的多元化道路和整合社会心理学的努力进行了分析评价。认为社会心理学发展的多元化道路主要是由于社会心理的多质性和社会心理学的边缘学科性质所决定的,社今心理学发展过程中的整合努力则主要是由于社会心理的整体性和社会心理学的学科统一性所决定的。分化与整合作为当代社会心理学研究和发展的一对予盾统一体,伴随了社会心理学发展的百年进程,推动着当代社会心理学新的发展。     

时代精神与当代心理学

时代精神是一个历史时期的社会、哲学和科学发展的总体思潮,即一个时代的意识形态。它影响着一个时期的学术思想倾向。在心理学的发展史中,时代精神的影响是明显的。文章从时代精神的视角对20世纪心理学的发展做出概述,谈到20世纪初行为主义如何顺应了美国的实用主义思想而产生和发展。20世纪下半叶,知识经济的时代精神孕育了认知心理学的诞生。当前的时代精神可以称为世界的全球化,这带来了心理学的广泛交流——心理学的国际化。文章最后讨论了心理学的现代特点及可能远景。     

拓展经验：论舒斯特曼在当前实用主义中的地位

作者在本文中梳理了当代实用主义史,通过把实用主义区分为语言实用主义和身体实用主义,指出舒斯特曼在目前身体实用主义中所处的地位。他通过研究舒斯特曼的实用主义关学,在参照实用主义整体视野的前提下,得出了舒斯特曼的实用主义是对古典实用主义者,特别是杜威等人的经验概念的继承和发展的思想。他认为,舒斯特曼的实用主义美学,着意强调身体美学之“经验”的基础地位,他的实用主义是把经验和实践中的至善论相结合的身体实用主义。     

论当代中国油画的审美价值

随着我国经济的快速发展,人们的生活水平日益提高,在精神层面上也有了新的需求。油画在我国的发展已经有近百年的历史,它在我国绘画艺术上的地位,已经逐渐趋向于中国画,是我国现代艺术中非常重要的一个艺术形式,对于我国绘画艺术的发展有着十分重要的意义。中国油画的复苏,主要开始于上世纪八十年代,中国油画在发展过程中逐渐形成了多元化的格局;当代中国油画的多元化发展,主要体现在新表现、新具象、新古典以及抽象等方面,当代中国油画多元化的发展,代表着中国油画艺术逐渐走向成熟。针对当代中国油画的审美价值进行深入的分析,探究当代中国油画的发展现状以及审美方面具有的价值,有利于促进当代中国油画艺术的发展。     

符号、意义与心理学的文化取向——兼以符号及其意义为中心比较当代三种心理学取向

文化取向心理学以符号及其意义为研究重心,着重研究符号及其意义与人的心理和行为的关系,从符号及其意义生成与演变的角度探讨人的心理的形成与发展。这一重心与当代整个心理学的总的重心是一致的,体现出当代心理学研究重心的转变。不过,它与其它取向心理学的研究目的、侧重点和意义观并不完全相同。为更好地了解它,有必要从比较的角度进一步探究。通过比较,可以引发人们新的思考。     

历史的总结 革新的构想——评潘菽教授的《心理学简札》

我国著名心理学家潘菽教授的巨著《心理学简札》(以下简称《简札》)问世了。这不仅是我国理论心理学界的喜事,而且也是整个心理学界的喜事。这部著作是潘老几十年来研究心理学基本理论的总结;是力图以马克思主义为指导,改造旧心理学,建立具有中国特点的心理学体系的重大尝试;是促使我国心理学实现现代化的战略性思考。它必将对我国当代心理学的发展产生深远的影响。因此,它既有很高的学术价值,又对我国心理学发展的方向和道路具有十分重要的指导意义。     

认知心理学的实用性转向

认知心理学实用性转向的根本涵义在于强调认知对于行动的效用与价值。传统认知心理学视认知系统的主要工作是怎样精确地 “表征” 世界，以便在大脑中建立一个外部世界的心理模型。实用性转向则强调认知系统的主要工作不是 “表征” 或 “反映”，而是指导有机体更有效地行动，认知是有 “效用” 的，它的效用就在于指导有机体适应和改造环境的活动。认知产生于行动、服务于行动，与行动水乳交融。这些理论观点来源于实用主义哲学。詹姆斯、杜威等人的经典实用主义对行动和效果的强调深刻影响了部分认知心理学家，促使他们放弃表征为中心的认知观而转向行动导向的认知观。在作者看来，由于这种转向强调了认知的 “效用”，因而对于认知心理学的健康发展将产生积极影响。     

文化心理学的启示意义及其发展趋势

心理学的研究对象乃是一种文化现象,是与人类文化互相创生发展的过程。心理学研究对象的独特性质决定着,心理学研究不可能脱离具体的文化背景。文化心理学的兴起适时地满足了当代心理学发展的要求。作为心理学研究的一种重要视角,文化心理学蕴涵着对心理学的研究对象、研究方法、研究目标及学科性质的独特理解。由于文化心理学兴起的时间较短,它必然还要不断吸取各种养分,实现内部取向的不断整合,提出更加明确的研究纲领。     

实用主义认识论观点的演变

认识论是实用主义哲学的一个重要方面,内容甚为丰富。本文不准备全面系统地探讨实用主义在认识论方面的各种观点,只着重考察从古典实用主义者到新实用主义者对认识的性质、方法和基础,知识的标准和类型,以及心灵与世界的关系这三个问题的看法,比较这些看法之间的异同,梳理它们的演变线索,分析这些演变由以发生的原因。一、认识的性质、方法和基础关于认识的性质,实用主义者提出几种不同的观点。詹姆斯(又译詹姆士)从他的心理学出发,把认识看作一种意识作用,他说:“认识是一种意识作用;因此,它所包含的第一个因素就是一种能够产生认识的意识…     

Well-being Monism Defended

Journal of Happiness Studies - In “Well-Being and Pluralism” (2021), Polly Mitchell and Anna Alexandrova defend conceptual pluralism about well-being. Conceptual pluralism about...     

How do teachers think about pluralism in a Jewish Community School?

Pluralism is a notion that regularly appears in education literature regarding social injustice or teaching for democracy. Over the last decade, a new type of Jewish Day School has emerged, the Jewish Community School. These Jewish Community Schools distinguish themselves by adopting pluralism as one of their core values. What is unclear is how teachers within such a school think about the notion of pluralism. This case study describes and analyses the way that members of a Jewish Studies faculty in one Jewish Community High School thinks about pluralism and the pedagogical implications of this thinking.     

Ecumenical alethic pluralism

Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP) is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as it involves a reconfiguration of the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists.     

Dialectical pluralism: A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology

A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology called dialectical pluralism is proposed in this paper. It is argued that this approach provides an effective and efficient basis for scientific progress in psychology. Three primary components of dialectical pluralism are developed. First, drawing on Royce's constructive dialectics, it is contended that tension between competing theories should be sustained in the hope of producing evaluative or integrative solutions. Second, the unity-disunity debate in psychology is reframed as a continuum and it is argued that oscillating periods of convergent and divergent pluralism would provide a productive model for scientific progress. Finally, intercontextualism is discussed as the underlying philosophical foundation for dialectical pluralism. This alternative to both mainstream psychology's positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as competing positions that may be more contextualist in orientation, is expounded as the justification for this new conceptualization. In particular, the limits of a methodological unity based on positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as of a pragmatic pluralism based on contextualist foundations, are both addressed by intercontextualism. As a result, dialectical pluralism may provide a middle ground between these two distinctive factions within psychology, while alleviating the fragmentation of the discipline.     

A vision of dialogical pluralism in psychology

This paper argues for dialogical approach to pluralism in psychology. We argue that human psychology is both ontologically and epistemologically pluralistic and advocate an integrated approach to disciplinary pluralism based on mutual, dialogical engagement among psychology's diverse traditions. A framework for such dialogical engagement is developed from the standpoint of a hermeneutic understanding of pluralism. Some possibilities for implementing a dialogical approach to pluralism, in terms of intra-disciplinary boundary-work and oppositional contrasts among psychology's diverse traditions, are then considered as ways of promoting disciplinary integration through dialogue.     

Unity and Diversity in American Political Culture: An Exploratory Study of the National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity

Drawing on participant observation and quantitative analysis, this paper investigates the National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity, a series of local conversation projects organized by the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1995 and 1996. After linking this program to debates about American political culture, the paper analyzes the observational and survey data in light of five hypotheses about the conversations. The conversations reveal fundamental, unresolved dilemmas regarding the compatibility between American identity and ethnic pluralism, although the participants sometimes cope with these dilemmas in culturally creative ways.     

Christian God‐Talk While Listening to Atheists,Pluralists, and Muslims

In the global conversation over religious ideas, a de facto debate is raging between atheism, pluralism, and Islam. Pluralism respects the claim of every religion. Atheism respects the claim of no religion. Islam respects the claim of its own religion. How should a Christian theologian construct a doctrine of God that benefits from listening to this conversation yet stresses what is important in the gospel, namely, that the God of Jesus Christ is gracious in character? What is recommended here is to (1) investigate the truth question; (2) avoid putting God in the equations; (3) affirm what is essential; and (4) practice charity.     

Ontology and scientific explanation: Pluralism as an a priori condition of psychology

The field of psychology can be understood in terms of general accounts of mental life that differ over time and between cultures or in terms of an academic discipline. For the former, pluralism is an a priori condition because history and culture produce necessarily and universally varying accounts of human subjectivity that are embedded in local practices and traditions. This argument is traced to the nature of psychological objects and events that are of a cultural-historical kind. For Psychology as an academic discipline it is argued that pluralism depends on varying ontological levels, ranging from natural to cultural-historical kinds. The same argument of varying levels applies to the concept of explanation. It is shown that important accounts in the discipline do not provide natural-scientific explanations but rather hermeneutic interpretations that afford high levels of pluralism. Based on the idea of a necessary and universal pluralism in the field of psychology, conditions for the possibility of integration are provided. It is argued that the first step of integration includes recognition of pluralistic accounts of mental life. Instead of assimilation, the accommodation of new ideas is recommended.     

科学划界视域下心理学学科焦虑与学科自觉

心理学科学划界是心理学发展史上的根本问题,构成了心理学发展历史研究的出发点和逻辑起点。心理学科学划界观点多样,争论不休,导致心理学处于学科焦虑当中。当前,心理学需要以文化文思促进学科自觉,这其中隐含的不仅仅是对心理学科学化追求道路的深入思考,同时,也是实现心理学话语方式转换以及与科学关系的深刻把握。     

What logical pluralism cannot be

Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.