儿童经济学认知的发展

儿童经济学认知发展的研究是儿童认知发展研究中的新领域。文章主要介绍了发展心理学家在皮亚杰“阶段论”和目前新兴的“朴素理论”两大理论阵营中的研究成果和进展,并从理论和实践两方面阐述了开展儿童经济学认知研究的重要意义。     

儿童经济学认知的发展

儿童经济学认知发展的研究是儿童认知发展研究中的新领域。章主要介绍了发展心理学家在皮亚杰“阶段论”和目前新兴的“朴素理论”两大埋论阵营中的研究成果和进展,并从理论和实践两方面阐述了开展儿童经济学认知研究的重要意义。     

意识、当代神经科学与哲学

意识问题一直是个古老的哲学和心理学问题。20世纪以来随着科学和技术的发展特别是神经科学和技术的发展,意识研究已受到国际学术界的广泛关注。现已有大量意识产生的假说提出,艾克尔斯、克里克、艾德尔曼等都提出了自己的理论。目前的研究主要集中于克里克的“视觉意识”。但是除了实验科学方法之外,意识的研究还需要依赖哲学思维方法的帮助,如此的“二元论”将对于意识的研究大有裨益。     

西方心理学中两种文化的分裂及其整合

金布尔的研究证实西方心理学中的“科学”与“人文”两种文化倾向的存在。科学主义的盛行和对经的不满与反动,实证主义,现象学和释义学的影响,学派和组织的门户之见是心理不中形成两种文化的主要原因;自然科学模式与人文科学模式的对立,方法中心对问题中心,价值中立说对价值负荷说是心理学中两种文化对立和分裂的主要表现。     

中外两种推理理论的实验比较研究

通过两个实验对中国学者提出的“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”和Evans提出的“双重加工理论”进行了实验比较研究。实验一通过两种评定方法对相应性质命题进行评定后所得实验结果表明Evans等(1983)有关“信念效应”研究中的“结论可信性”变量可以视为与胡竹菁等(1996)实验中的“内容正确性”变量是同一性质的变量; 实验二根据“形式正确性”和“内容正确性”两个自变量设计的推理实验结果与Evans等(1983)的研究结果基本一致; 但增加“内容熟悉性”这一自变量设计的推理实验结果表明“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”比Evans提出的“双重加工理论”能更好地解释推理者对性质三段论的推理结果。     

儿童核心领域朴素"理论"的研究进展

核心领域朴素“理论”是目前儿童发展心理学研究中的前沿课题之一。学前儿童已获得丰富的关于客观世界的知识,并且大量的实验证明4岁儿童已经拥有心理理论,但是他们是否还具有其他核心领域朴素“理论”,这些朴素“理论”的发展是否具有同步性等问题,仍然是发展心理学领域中争论的焦点。该文介绍了核心领域朴素“理论”的研究新进展,并提出了有待进一步探讨的问题。     

儿童攻击行为与"心理理论"关系的研究

本研究采用自然观察法评定177名3—4岁儿童的攻击行为。以攻击行为平均分为指标从被观察儿童中选取93名为被试．采用“意外转移”和“欺骗外表”两种实验任务,比较各类攻击儿童的心理理论。本研究得出主要结论：总体而言．攻击儿童与无攻击儿童的心理理论不存在显著差异。间接攻击儿童的心理理论显著高于身体攻击儿童。各类儿童的表征变化不存在显著差异。研究结果支持了我们提出的攻击行为“类型特殊性”假说。     

科学实践哲学视野中的物理学哲学问题:以物理学实验涉及的问题为例

今日的物理学哲学大多讨论和研究量子力学哲学问题,然而组成物理学哲学的还有许多其他议题与论旨。近年来,由于科学哲学中的实践转向以及计算能力、认知能力与视觉化的强化,使得科学哲学对于科学仪器、实验室等议题的关心倍增,也给似乎无法列入物理学哲学的实验哲学带来了新的研究生机。在科学实践哲学视野下,讨论物理学实验与一般实验室研究中各类角色的作用,将特别涉及如下问题:物理学实验研究中有何角色发挥作用;物理学实验对象的本体论问题,特别是物理学实验中的“自然物/人工物”的关系;物理学实验的认识论问题,如实验和实验室是否可以产生“事物知识”。     

现代认知心理学在具体研究中的几个问题

现代认知心理学,亦称信息加工心理学,是近二,三十年来出现在西方心理学界的一个颇有影响的新流派。它在具体研究中的一个特点是十分强调实验室中的实验研究。目前,两方的实验心理学已几乎被它所取代,在各类心理学杂志上发表的现代认知心理学的实验报告的数量相当可观。无可否认,这类具体研究丰富了心理学的内容,对心理学的发展有着积     

条件推理:“演绎”与“概率”两种实验研究范式之比较

本研究通过推理心理学研究中的“演绎”和“概率”两种实验范式设计对同一个班级的大学生参与者(实验一中N=57,实验二中N=43)进行先后两次有关条件推理的实验研究后,得出如下主要结果:(1)推理者在对不同的“纯形式条件命题本身的认可度”以及对由它们各自建构的同类型推理题的推理结果之间的作答反应模式之间的差异都很小且具有较高的一致性;(2)对由不同的“含具体内容的假言命题”本身的认可度之间以及由它们建构的同类型条件推理题的推理结果之间具有较大的差异性;(3)推理者对“演绎”和“概率”两种不同实验范式分别建构的内容近似的推进题进行推理时具有大致相同的作答反应趋势。由此可以推论推理者在“概率推理实验范式”中的作答或推理结果可以被视为只是对“演绎推理实验范式”的相应推理题给出“概率解”的心理加工过程。     

Intuitive knowledge

In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? A natural idea about perception is that a perception makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you sensorily aware of the concrete objects it is about. The analogous idea about intuition is that an intuition makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you intellectually aware of the abstract objects it is about. I expand both ideas into fuller accounts of perceptual and intuitive knowledge, explain the main challenge to this sort of account of intuitive knowledge (i.e. the challenge of making sense of intellectual awareness), and develop a response to it.     

0―1.5岁婴儿表征能力的研究概述

就0-1.5岁婴儿的知识表征方面,该文主要介绍了国外的一些研究成果,指出婴儿的表征能力由感知表征向意义表征发展.即使很小的婴儿都已经有了相当复杂的表征能力,能初步感知典型的变化,识别不同种类物体的物体,表征事物与事物之间的空间关系、数量关系、因果关系等,对动因有一定的理解,并逐渐形成概念和图示     

The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity

The paper compares ontic structural realism in quantum physics with ontic structural realism about space–time. We contend that both quantum theory and general relativity theory support a common, contentful metaphysics of ontic structural realism. After recalling the main claim of ontic structural realism and its physical support, we point out that both in the domain of quantum theory and in the domain of general relativity theory, there are objects whose essential ways of being are certain relations so that these objects do not possess an intrinsic identity. Nonetheless, the qualitative, physical nature of these relations is in the quantum case (entanglement) fundamentally different from the classical, metrical relations treated in general relativity theory.     

Origins of knowledge.

Experiments with young infants provide evidence for early-developing capacities to represent physical objects and to reason about object motion. Early physical reasoning accords with 2 constraints at the center of mature physical conceptions: continuity and solidity. It fails to accord with 2 constraints that may be peripheral to mature conceptions: gravity and inertia. These experiments suggest that cognition develops concurrently with perception and action and that development leads to the enrichment of conceptions around an unchanging core. The experiments challenge claims that cognition develops on a foundation of perceptual or motor experience, that initial conceptions are inappropriate to the world, and that initial conceptions are abandoned or radically changed with the growth of knowledge.     

Assessing the concreteness of relational representation

Research has shown that people's ability to transfer abstract relational knowledge across situations can be heavily influenced by the concrete objects that fill relational roles. This article provides evidence that the concreteness of the relations themselves also affects performance. In 3 experiments, participants viewed simple relational patterns of visual objects and then identified these same patterns under a variety of physical transformations. Results show that people have difficulty generalizing to novel concrete forms of abstract relations, even when objects are unchanged. This suggests that stimuli are initially represented as concrete relations by default. In the 2nd and 3rd experiments, the number of distinct concrete relations in the training set was increased to promote more abstract representation. Transfer improved for novel concrete relations but not for other transformations such as object substitution. Results indicate that instead of automatically learning abstract relations, people's relational representations preserve all properties that appear consistently in the learning environment, including concrete objects and concrete relations.     

Social Understanding at the End of the First Year of Life

Social behaviors, such as joint attention, social referencing, and protocommunicative acts, which emerge toward the end of the first year of life, have commonly been taken as evidence of considerable social understanding, even an "implicit" theory of mind. We identify the theoretical assumptions that this "commonsense view" entails and argue against this view of these behaviors by suggesting that the phenomena are entirely compatible with an account which does not attribute to the infant an understanding that others have psychological relations to objects or that self and others are equivalent in their potential for such psychological relations. We end by arguing that the account we propose potentially provides a developmental solution to the problem of how the child develops a theory of mind that is equally applicable to self and other without postulating the existence of considerable innate knowledge.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

The intuitive case for naïve realism

Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.