The meaning of indifference in choice behavior: Asymmetries in adjustments embodied in matching

Measuring and assessing people’s preferences is an intricate task that can be realized by different methods. Evidently, the different methods do not necessarily yield consistent results. In the present paper we examine the matching procedure and demonstrate inconsistencies within the method itself. It is shown that the inconsistencies stem from: (1) asymmetry in upward and downward matching (i.e., matching options by increasing or lowering values do not yield the same tradeoffs) and (2) participants’ tendency to match (adjust) the options such that they become more similar, eventually facilitating the choice process. Matching is the most straightforward method of eliciting indifference. Hence, the observed inconsistencies, encapsulated in the matching procedure, have direct implications for the construction of indifference curves (equal-utility contours) that are examined in the final section.     

From brand aversion or indifference to brand attachment: Authors' response to commentaries to Park,Eisingerich, and Park's brand attachment–aversion model

The primary purpose of our target article was to theoretically argue and empirically demonstrate that it is possible to elevate the customer–brand relationships to the desired level of human relationships by offering three types of self-relevant benefits. In this response, we discuss the major comments provided by each set of commentators, which are insightful and thought-provoking. It is our hope that this dialogue will open up a new avenue for future research regarding the nature and management of customer–brand relationships.     

Estimation of indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle a direct test of the “fanning out” hypothesis

The ongoing debate on the correct modelling of economic behaviour under risk makes heavy expositional use of the 'Marschak-Machina Triangle'. This has also been used when constructing tests of the various competing theories. In this paper, we adopt a more direct approach - by estimating subjects' indifference maps in the Triangle. Employing an interview technique, we find that most subjects have maps which are nearly consistent with those implied by Subjective Expected Utility theory.     

The collapse argument

Philosophical Studies - We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories and Higher-Order theories. Like all Higher-Order theories, many First-Order...     

The elimination argument

Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.     

The copredication argument

The standard view of truth-conditional semantics is that it is world-involving in the sense that a theory that specifies truth conditions eo ipso is a theory that specifies the way the world must be if the target sentences are to be true. It would appear to follow that the semantic properties of expressions, such as nominals, specify the very worldly objects that make true or false the sentences that host the nominals. Chomsky and others have raised a fundamental complaint against this thought: perfectly quotidian nominals, such as London or book, may occur copredicatively as a single argument of categorically mismatched predicates, which prima facie preclude a coherent uniform construal of the nominal argument. The argument has hitherto been presented via examples that challenge the standard view. My aim here is to present the argument explicitly, defend it against some likely counterclaims, and resolve what might appear to be a decisive consideration against the conclusion of the argument, viz., if nominals as copredicatively occurring do not contribute uniform worldly entities, then how can the copredicative constructions be counted as true?     

The small improvement argument

It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense. The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’     

The argument from surprise

I develop an account of productive surprise as an epistemic virtue of scientific investigations which does not turn on psychology alone. On my account, a scientific investigation is potentially productively surprising when (1) results can conflict with epistemic expectations, (2) those expectations pertain to a wide set of subjects. I argue that there are two sources of such surprise in science. One source, often identified with experiments, involves bringing our theoretical ideas in contact with new empirical observations. Another, often identified with simulations, involves articulating and bringing together different parts of our knowledge. Both experiments and simulations, then, can surprise.