Protecting Nature for the Sake of Human Beings

It is often assumed that to say that nature should be protected for the sake of human beings just is to say that it should be protected because it is a means to one or more anthropocentric ends. I argue that this assumption is false. In some contexts, claims that a particular natural X should be protected for our sakes mean that X should be protected, not because it is a means to anthropocentric ends, but because it is part of something about human life that is of value: because, that is, its value is anthropocentric and constitutive rather than anthropocentric and instrumental. It follows, I suggest, that one does not need to endorse the non‐anthropocentric claim that nature should be protected for its own sake in order to challenge the instrumentalist notion that it should be protected simply because it is a means to anthropocentric ends (as, say, a provider of ecosystem services). To make my case, I consider the UK Government's failed attempt to sell off England's publicly‐owned forests.     

Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: new procedures and recommendations

Mediation is said to occur when a causal effect of some variable X on an outcome Y is explained by some intervening variable M. The authors recommend that with small to moderate samples, bootstrap methods (B. Efron & R. Tibshirani, 1993) be used to assess mediation. Bootstrap tests are powerful because they detect that the sampling distribution of the mediated effect is skewed away from 0. They argue that R. M. Baron and D. A. Kenny's (1986) recommendation of first testing the X --> Y association for statistical significance should not be a requirement when there is a priori belief that the effect size is small or suppression is a possibility. Empirical examples and computer setups for bootstrap analyses are provided.     

The dead donor rule: lessons from linguistics?

American society traditionally has assumed a univocal notion of "death," largely because we have only one word for it and, until recently, have not needed a more nuanced notion. The reality of death-processes does not preclude the reality of death events. Linguistically, "death" can be understood only as an event; there are other words for the process. Our death vocabulary should expand to reflect multiple events along the process from sickness to decomposition. Depending on context, some death-related events may constitute a more obvious discontinuity than others and more justifiably may be considered "death" within that context. There is no reason to assume a priori that there must be an overarching, unitary concept of death from which all diagnostic criteria must derive. Regarding organ transplantation, the relevant question is not "Is the patient dead?" but rather "Can organs X, Y, Z ... be removed without causing or hastening death or harming the patient?"     

Configural learning without reinforcement: integrated memories for correlates of what, where, and when

In 2 experiments we examined the ability of rats to form configural memories of what auditory stimulus (X or Y) was presented where (Context A or B) and when (morning or afternoon). In both experiments, rats received morning presentations of X in Context A and Y in Context B and afternoon presentations of X in B and Y in A. Subsequently, at midday the rats were exposed to trials where X was paired with footshock whereas Y was not. We then assessed the degree of contextual fear in A and B in the morning and the afternoon. In the morning, rats showed more fear in A than in B, and in the afternoon they showed more fear in B than in A. These results indicate that rats can form configural memories that represent what (X or Y) was presented, where (A or B), and when (morning or afternoon).     

Configural learning without reinforcement: Integrated memories for correlates of what,where, and when

In 2 experiments we examined the ability of rats to form configural memories of what auditory stimulus (X or Y) was presented where (Context A or B) and when (morning or afternoon). In both experiments, rats received morning presentations of X in Context A and Y in Context B and afternoon presentations of X in B and Y in A. Subsequently, at midday the rats were exposed to trials where X was paired with footshock whereas Y was not. We then assessed the degree of contextual fear in A and B in the morning and the afternoon. In the morning, rats showed more fear in A than in B, and in the afternoon they showed more fear in B than in A. These results indicate that rats can form configural memories that represent what (X or Y) was presented, where (A or B), and when (morning or afternoon).     

Causal agency and the perception of force

In the Michotte task, a ball (X) moves toward a resting ball (Y). In the moment of contact, X stops und Y starts moving. Previous studies have shown that subjects tend to view X as the causal agent (“X launches Y”) rather than Y (“Y stops X”). Moreover, X tends to be attributed more force than Y (force asymmetry), which contradicts the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Recent theories of force asymmetry try to explain these findings as the result of an asymmetrical identification with either the (stronger) agent or the (weaker) patient of the causal interaction. We directly tested this assumption by manipulating attributions of causal agency while holding the properties of the causal interaction constant across conditions. In contrast to previous accounts, we found that force judgments stayed invariant across conditions in which assignments of causal agency shifted from X to Y and that even those subjects who chose Y as the causal agent gave invariantly higher force ratings to X. These results suggest that causal agency and the perception of force are conceptually independent of each other. Different possible explanations are discussed.     

Verifying environmental relationships

In two experiments, subjects first learned the locations of objects in a 21 x 21 ft room and then were timed as they verified, from memory, statements about the spatial relationships of the objects to certain features (e.g., the outside walls, the center of the room, subdividing partitions). The statements were of the form “X is (not) close to (far from) F” in Experiment 1 and “X is farther from (closer to) F than Y is” in Experiment 2, where X and Y are specific objects and F is a feature. While some of the latencies varied directly with the magnitudes of the distances between objects and features named in the sentences, there were several instances in which sentences associated with equivalent distances led to different latencies or sentences associated with different distances led to equivalent latencies. The possible cognitive operations underlying the latency pattern are discussed.     

有中介的调节变量和有调节的中介变量

研究了有中介的调节效应模型和有调节的中介效应模型,两种模型都涉及到中介变量和调节变量。分别讨论了这两种模型的分析方法,两者基本上都是按中介效应模型的分析步骤,但其中都有一步要做调节效应的分析。还讨论了同时包含有中介的调节变量和有调节的中介变量的混合模型。最后,作为示范例子,用混合模型分析儿童行为对同伴关系的影响,结果发现,如果混合模型中的调节都设定是线性的,那么调节变量对因果关系是二次调节     

Transfer between contextual conditional discriminations: an examination of how stimulus conjuctions are represented

In 2 experiments, when rats were placed in 1 pair of contexts, A and B, 2 relationships were in force (X --> food and Y --> no food), and when they were placed in another pair of contexts, C and D, the complementary relationships were operative (Y --> food and X --> no food). In Experiment 1, rats then received a 2nd discrimination that was either contextually congruent (in A and B, Y --> food and X --> no food; in C and D, X --> food and Y --> no food) or contextually incongruent (in A and D, Y --> food and X --> no food; in C and B, X --> food and Y --> no food) with the 1st discrimination. In Experiment 2, the 1st discrimination, involving X and Y, was interleaved with a 2nd discrimination, involving V and W, that was again either congruent (in A and B, V --> food and W --> no food) or incongruent (in A and D, V --> food and W --> no food) with the 1st discrimination. The congruent discriminations were acquired more readily than were the incongruent discriminations.     

The Double Content of Perception

Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y′(X′) as a higher level of content, which data does not itself provide lower level X-related content, but only an aspectually encoded form of such data. Hence the relevant perceptual data Y′(X′) must be ’de-contextualized’ or decoded to arrive at the X-related content X′, resulting in a double content structure for perceptual data, that persists in higher-order conscious perceptual content. Some implications and applications of this DC view are also discussed.     

Influencing food preferences of children by ‘if-then’ type instructions

Three experiments were conducted to examine the effects which ‘if-then’ instructions of the type ‘if you eat X’, then you will get Y, have on the evaluation of the foods addressed in the ‘if’ and the ‘then’ parts of the instructions, respectively. Based on research on intrinsic motivation it was hypothesized that liking for food X that one is induced to eat by means of ‘if-then’ instructions will be impaired, whereas liking for food Y offered as a reward for the consumption of X will be enhanced. Experiment 1 revealed an enhancement of liking effect for the ‘then’food lasting for at least six weeks, but no impairment of liking for the ‘if’ food. Experiment 2 explored the possibility of reducing children's dislike for foods by means of paradoxical ‘if-then’ instructions presenting the disliked food in the ‘then’ position as a reward for the consumption of another food. No significant effects were obtained in this study. Experiment 3 examined the effects of introducing yet unknown foods to children by means of ‘if-then’ instructions. Results revealed that liking for the new food is impaired when it is the ‘if’food, but is enhanced when it is offered in the ‘then’ position. Discussion is centered on the possibility that the effects of ‘if-then’ instructions are more pronounced in single trial compared to multi-trial treatment conditions.     

Encoding specific associative memory: evidence from behavioral and neural manipulations

Within-subjects procedures with rats assessed the associative structures acquired during conditioning trials in which the interval between the stimuli and food was either short or long (i.e., A-10 s→food and B-40 s→food). In Experiments 1 and 2, after these conditioning trials, A and B served as second-order reinforcers for 2 further stimuli (i.e., X→A and Y→B); whereas Experiment 3 used a sensory preconditioning procedure in which X→A and Y→B trials occurred before the conditioning trials, and rats were finally tested with X and Y. In each experiment, Y elicited greater responding at test than did X. This finding supports the contention that the long-lived trace of B (associated with food on B-40 s→food trials) is more similar to the memory of B that was associatively provoked by Y, than is the short-lived trace of A (associated with food on A-10 s→food trials) to the memory of A that was associatively provoked by X. These conclusions were reinforced by the effects of a neural manipulation that disrupted discrimination learning involving the short traces of stimuli but not the long traces of the same stimuli.     

Acquired equivalence and distinctiveness of cues: I. Exploring a neural network approach

Rats were placed in 4 contexts (A, B, C, D) where they received 2 auditory stimuli (X, Y); in A and B, presentations of X were paired with food and those of Y were not, and in C and D, Y was paired with food and X was not. Rats then received combinations of contexts that had provided congruent (AB, CD) or incongruent (AD, CB) information about X and Y's relationship to food. Responding was more variable during congruent than incongruent trials (Experiment 1) and was systematically increased and decreased during congruent (relative to incongruent) trials by the presentation of food or no food, respectively (Experiment 2). These results support a connectionist approach to acquired changes in stimulus distinctiveness.     

Pure Time Preference: Reply to Johansson and Rosenqvist

Johansson and Rosenqvist reject our argument for the rational permissibility of pure time preferences (PTP). Johansson and Rosenqvist's main objection is that where two options, X and Y, have equal intrinsic value, there will be a reason to be indifferent between X and Y, and therefore a reason to not hold a PTP for X or Y. In this reply, we argue that if two options have equal intrinsic value, it does not follow that you have a reason to be indifferent. Rather, the two equally large intrinsic values cancel each other out, like two equal weights on kitchen scales.     

Effects of similarity and repetition on memory: registration without learning?

We investigated judgments of the frequency of test items (Y) that were highly similar to studied items (X) to test a prediction made by several memory models: that the judged frequency of Y should be proportional to the judged frequency of X. Whether stimuli were pictures or words, judged frequency of Y was bimodally distributed with 1 mode at zero, suggesting that frequency judgments involve a 2-stage process in which a zero judgment is made if there is a mismatch between retrieved information and the test item. Nonzero judgements, taken by themselves, were consistent with the prediction of proportionality. In 2 experiments, the percentage of zero judgments made to Y increased with repetition of X, but in 2 others the percentage did not change beyond frequency = 1. The percentage of "new" judgments in recognition memory followed this same pattern. Because the judged frequency of X increased even as X-Y discrimination showed no improvement, we characterize the result as "registration without learning."     

Overshadowing and associability change

Three appetitive Pavlovian conditioning experiments with rats examined the associability of stimuli A and B that had a history of compound conditioning (AB+), relative to stimuli X and Y that had a history of conditioning in isolation (X+, Y+). Following this training, Experiment 1 revealed that conditioned responding was higher to X and Y than to A and B (overshadowing). In a subsequent AY+, AX-, BY- test discrimination, the AY/BY discrimination was solved more readily than the AY/AX discrimination. In Experiment 2, following AB+, X+, Y+ training, A and Y were presented as a compound and signaled the availability of reinforcement upon the performance of an instrumental response. Test trials in which A and Y were presented alone, and in extinction, revealed that A acquired greater control of instrumental responding than Y. Experiment 3 revealed that following AB+, X+, Y+ training, A and B served as more effective discriminative stimuli for instrumental responding than X and Y. Overall, these results imply that the associability of stimuli conditioned in compound is higher than stimuli conditioned in isolation. These results are discussed in terms of attentional theories of associative learning.     

Just World Beliefs Are Associated With Lower Levels of Metabolic Risk and Inflammation and Better Sleep After an Unfair Event

This study's goal was to conduct a preliminary test of the theory that just world beliefs can buffer against negative physiological outcomes after people experience certain types of negative life events by testing associations between just world beliefs and physiological outcomes among people with different life event histories. In a sample of 247 adults (M_age = 46.01; 24.31% men; 60.78% White), this research investigated the relationship between just world beliefs and metabolic symptoms, inflammation, and sleep among people who had recently experienced an unfair event, another type of negative event, or no negative event. Stronger just world beliefs correlated with lower metabolic risk, lower inflammation, and better sleep among people who had recently experienced an unfair event, but not among those in the other two event groups. These findings suggest that people's beliefs about the world may interact with their life experiences in ways that have implications for health‐relevant outcomes.     

Memory strength affects reporting of misinformation

A model of long-term retention was used to examine whether and how the strength of original information (differences in learning and testing time) and the strength of misleading information (differences in timing and frequency) influence 3- to 5-year-olds' memory for an event. In three experiments, preschoolers viewed a slide presentation depicting an event, some of them were asked misleading questions, and memory for event details was tested. There was little evidence of memory impairment, but exposure to misleading information encouraged reporting of this information. Differences in learning influenced reporting in that children exposed to the event once reported more misled details than those who saw the event multiple times. Furthermore, preschoolers who saw the event once were just as susceptible to misleading information whether exposed to misinformation once or three times; however, preschoolers who had seen the event multiple times were susceptible only to repeated presentations of misinformation. Given that the reporting of misinformation is determined by the degree of integrity of both the original and misleading information, it is important to control for differences in trace strength for both types of information in future research.     

Analyzing the accuracy of probability judgments for multiple events: An extension of the covariance decomposition

The probability score (PS) can be used to measure the overall accuracy of probability judgments for a single event, e.g., “Rain falls,” or “This patient has cancer.” It has been shown previously how a “covariance decomposition” of the mean of PS over many occasions indexes several distinct aspects of judgment performance (J. F. Yates, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 30, 132–156 (1982)). There are many situations in which probability judgments are reported for sample space partitions containing more than one event and its complement, e.g., medical situations in which a patient might suffer from Disease X, Disease Y, or Disease Z, or testing situations in which the correct answer to an item might be any one of alternatives (a) through (e). The probability score for multiple events (PSM) serves as a measure of the overall accuracy of probability judgments for the events in partitions of any size. The present article describes and interprets an extension of the covariance decomposition to the mean of PSM. The decomposition is illustrated with data from two contexts, medicine and education.