Using the Verifiability lie Detection Approach in an Insurance Claim Setting

In this experiment, we tested the verifiability approach in an insurance claim setting. Core of the verifiability approach is that truth tellers give more details that can be verified than liars. Fifty undergraduate students took part, who produced true and false insurance claim statements related to theft, loss, or damage. These statements were coded in terms of verifiability (the number of details that could be checked by an investigator) and witness factors (friends, police, other officials and CCTV cameras). Truth tellers provided more verifiable details than liars and liars provided more unverifiable details than truth tellers. In addition, truth tellers (versus liars) more frequently informed their friends about the incident or referred to CCTV footage of the incident. The potential and limitations of using the verifiability approach in insurance settings are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence

A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.     

Did Somebody See It? Applying the Verifiability Approach to Insurance Claim Interviews

We examined the application of the verifiability approach to insurance claim interviews. The verifiability approach states that truth tellers and liars differ from each other in terms of the number of details they give that can be verified. Eighty‐three true and false insurance claim statements, related to damage, theft, or loss, were coded in terms of ‘witnesses’ (was the incident witnessed by others) and ‘verifiability’ (the number of perceptual and contextual details provided that could be checked by the investigator). We found that the majority of liars, compared with half the truth tellers, described unwitnessed incidents. This difference between the groups allowed for the detection of liars only. Discrimination between liars and truth tellers based on the verifiability of details was not possible. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Visuospatial counter‐interrogation strategies by liars familiar with the alibi setting

This study examines counter‐interrogation strategies employed by liars giving false alibis. Participants (N = 144) visited a restaurant to buy a sandwich (truth‐tellers) or to use it as a false alibi (liars). Half of the liars were informed they might be asked for a drawing of the alibi setting if interviewed (informed liars). Participants spent either 10 min (high familiarity condition) or 30 s (low familiarity condition) in the restaurant. All participants were asked to provide two visuospatial statements, which were assessed for salient details, nonsalient details, between‐statement consistency, and statement‐alibi setting consistency. Informed liars provided significantly more salient and nonsalient details than uninformed liars and truth‐tellers, particularly in the high familiarity condition. No differences emerged for statement consistency types. The results suggest that liars are more concerned than truth‐tellers about making a positive impression on the interviewer, and they fail to accurately reflect on truth‐tellers' visuospatial statements.     

Using story contexts to bias children’s true and false memories

The effects of embedding standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists into stories whose context biased interpretation either toward or away from the overall themes of the DRM lists on both true and false recognition were investigated with 7- and 11-year-olds. These biased story contexts were compared with the same children’s susceptibility to false memory illusions using the standard DRM list presentation paradigm. The results showed the usual age effects for true and false memories in the standard DRM list paradigm, where 11-year-olds exhibited higher rates of both true and false recognition compared with the 7-year-olds. Importantly, when DRM lists were embedded in stories, these age effects disappeared for true recognition. For false recognition, although developmental differences were attenuated, older children were still more susceptible to false memory illusions than younger children. These findings are discussed in terms of current theories of children’s false memories as well as the role of themes and elaboration in children’s memory development.     

Counter‐Interrogation Strategies when Anticipating Questions on Intentions

The present experimental study adds to the emerging line of psycholegal research focusing on true and false intentions. It is the first to examine mock suspects' (N = 120) counter‐interrogation strategies in investigative interviews in which they anticipate questions on their intentions. As planning is an inherent part of many intentions, mock suspects were, in addition to questions on their intentions, asked a set of questions that pertained to the planning phase in which they formed their intentions. Besides ratings of the anticipation and difficulty of the questions, participants were asked to provide their principal strategy for being perceived as truthful. Both truth tellers and liars perceived the questions on the planning phase as significantly more unanticipated than the questions on their intentions. Furthermore, liars perceived the questions on the planning phase as more difficult to answer than did truth tellers. Liars and truth tellers differed with respect to their principal strategy employed for being perceived as truthful. Liars' most commonly used strategy was to stick to the cover story, whereas truth tellers' most common strategy was to be honest. The results are discussed in relation to the unanticipated questions approach and psychological concepts such as the illusion of transparency. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collective interviewing of suspects

When people are interviewed about possible wrongdoing that has been committed in groups, they typically are interviewed separately. Yet, in several settings it would be more intuitive and convenient to interview suspects together. Importantly, such collective interviews could yield verbal cues to deception. This is the first deception experiment to investigate collective interviewing. Twenty-one pairs of truth tellers and 22 pairs of liars were interviewed pair-wise about having had lunch together in a restaurant. Given that truth tellers adopt a “tell it all” strategy in the interviews while, in contrast, liars prefer to keep their stories simple, we predicted that pairs of truth tellers would (i) interrupt and (ii) correct each other more, and would (iii) add more information to each other's answers than pairs of liars. The results supported these hypotheses. Theory-driven interventions to elicit more cues to deception through simultaneous interviewing are discussed.     

When vying reveals lying: the timed antagonistic response alethiometer

Two experiments tested a new computer‐based lie‐detection technique. The Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer (TARA) manufacturers a situation in which, if respondents lie, they must perform two incompatible tasks, whereas if they tell the truth, they can perform two compatible ones. Both tasks involve repeatedly classifying target and control statements as true or false. The incompatible task combination, being more difficult, takes longer to complete correctly; hence, slower responses diagnose dishonesty. Experiment 1 found that, while concurrently classifying control statements honestly, participants invariably took longer to classify target statements dishonestly than honestly. Exploiting this effect, Experiment 2 found that separate groups of liars and truth‐tellers could be distinguished with about 85% accuracy. The properties and potential of the technique are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using the Reality Interview improves the accuracy of the Criteria‐Based Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring

Active interviewing approaches can exploit the verbal differences between truthtellers and liars, thus improving detecting deception. One such method is the Reality Interview (RI) aimed to facilitate recall from truthtellers, while increasing the difficulty for liars. This study investigated whether the RI could improve the diagnostic accuracy of the Reality Monitoring and the Criteria‐Based Content Analysis. Liars and truthtellers were either asked to freely recall an event or interviewed with the RI. As hypothesized, the RI improved the discriminability of Reality Monitoring and Criteria‐Based Content Analysis over Free Recall. Honest responses were longer, and the RI increased the word count difference between honest and false statements. However, after correcting for word count, results were no longer significant, showing its importance for deception detection. Nonetheless, the RI increased verbal differences between truthtellers and liars, demonstrating that using the RI with verbal credibility assessment tools is a powerful combination for investigative interviewing.     

Guessing versus choosing – and seeing versus believing – in false belief tasks

Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested using videos of puppets in various versions of a theory of mind change‐of‐location situation, in order to answer several questions about what children are doing when they pass false belief tests. To investigate whether children were guessing or confidently choosing their answer to the test question, a condition in which children were forced to guess was also included, and measures of uncertainty were compared across conditions. To investigate whether children were using simpler strategies than an understanding of false belief to pass the test, we teased apart the seeing‐knowing confound in the traditional change‐of‐location task. We also investigated relations between children's performance on true and false belief tests. Results indicated that children appeared to be deliberately choosing, not guessing, in the false belief tasks. Children performed just as well whether the protagonist gained information about the object visually or verbally, indicating that children were not using a simple rule based on seeing to predict the protagonist's behaviour. A true belief condition was significantly easier for children than a false belief condition as long as it was of low processing demands. Children's success rate on the different versions of the standard false belief task was influenced by factors such as processing demands of the stories and the child's verbal abilities.     

The inhibitory spillover effect: Controlling the bladder makes better liars

The Inhibitory-Spillover-Effect (ISE) on a deception task was investigated. The ISE occurs when performance in one self-control task facilitates performance in another (simultaneously conducted) self-control task. Deceiving requires increased access to inhibitory control. We hypothesized that inducing liars to control urination urgency (physical inhibition) would facilitate control during deceptive interviews (cognitive inhibition). Participants drank small (low-control) or large (high-control) amounts of water. Next, they lied or told the truth to an interviewer. Third-party observers assessed the presence of behavioral cues and made true/lie judgments. In the high-control, but not the low-control condition, liars displayed significantly fewer behavioral cues to deception, more behavioral cues signaling truth, and provided longer and more complex accounts than truth-tellers. Accuracy detecting liars in the high-control condition was significantly impaired; observers revealed bias toward perceiving liars as truth-tellers. The ISE can operate in complex behaviors. Acts of deception can be facilitated by covert manipulations of self-control.     

Fictional Truth and Make-Believe

The statement “Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” seems true in Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice (even though it may not actually appear in the text) while the statement “Mr. Darcy is a detective” seems false. One explanation for this intuition is that when we read or talk about fictional stories, we implicitly employ the fictional operator “It is fictional that” or “It is part of the story that.” “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” expresses a true proposition while “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy is a detective” does not. Fictive statements can be abbreviated as “In F, P”. Determining what statements are fictionally true in a story requires providing truth conditions for statements of the form “In F, P.” This paper proposes an analysis of truth in fiction and examines the notion of make-believe.     

When Photographs Create False Memories

ABSTRACT— Photographs help people illustrate the stories of their lives and the significant stories of their society. However, photographs can do more than illustrate events; in this article, we show that photographs can distort memory for them. We describe the course of our "false-memory implantation" research, and review recent work showing that photographs can sometimes increase—while other times decrease—false memories. First, we discuss research showing that a doctored photo, showing subjects taking a completely fictitious hot-air-balloon ride, can cultivate false memories for that experience. We hypothesize that the photograph helps subjects to imagine details about the event that they later confuse with reality. Second, we show that although photographs are indeed powerful sources of influence on memory, they are not necessarily as powerful as narrative. In fact, in certain circumstances, photographs might constrain imagination. Third, we discuss research showing that true photographs can also cultivate false memories. Finally, we present recent work showing that photographs can create false memories for current events.     

Fabrication deflation? The mixed effects of lying on memory

This study explored what happens when participants lie in order to convince others that false stories are true. Participants' memories were assessed by comparing their likelihood ratings for the events before and after lying about them. Results showed that most participants rated the events as less likely to have happened after lying about them. Therefore, the most common result of lying seems to be a strengthening of, not a distortion of, the truth. This decrease in likelihood rating for the statement lied about is termed ‘fabrication deflation’. In both studies, however, there were 10–16% of the participants who indicated maximum belief that the lie item was true. Whether this increase in likelihood rating for a lied about event is evidence of memory creation or the triggering of an actual memory is discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Slowing presentation speed increases illusions of knowledge

Prior research on false memories has shown that suggestibility is often reduced when the presentation rate is slowed enough to allow monitoring. We examined whether slowing presentation speed would reduce factual errors learned from fictional stories. Would subjects use the extra time to detect the errors in the stories, reducing reproduction of these errors on a later test? Surprisingly, slowing presentation speed increased the production of story errors on a later general knowledge test. Instructing the reader to mark whether each sentence contained an error, however, did decrease suggestibility. Readers appear to passively accept information presented in stories and need a constant reminder to monitor for errors. These results highlight differences between typical episodic false memories and illusions of knowledge (such as learning from fiction). Manipulations that reduce suggestibility for episodic false memories do not always reduce suggestibility for illusions of knowledge.     

Does Practice Make the Perfect Liar? The Effect of Rehearsal and Increased Cognitive Load on Cues to Deception

Recent studies have explored ways to increase cognitive load in liars to identify cues to deception. This study used a driving simulator as a load‐inducing technique to explore differences between truth‐tellers and liars during an investigative interview scenario and also investigated the effect of rehearsing lies in this context. Deception affected driving performance. Truth‐tellers drove more slowly compared with their own baseline, whereas unrehearsed liars sped up. There was no difference in speed between truth‐tellers and rehearsed liars. In addition, truth‐tellers had significantly faster reaction times compared with their own baseline, than both rehearsed and unrehearsed liars. During the interviews, truth‐tellers provided significantly more visual and auditory details and mentioned significantly fewer cognitive operations than liars. The findings add to the body of literature exploring the optimal relationship between cognitive load and secondary task performance to identify cues to deception.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social influence and mental routes to the production of authentic false memories and inauthentic false memories

Two studies assessed the extent to which people incorporated false facts provided by bogus others into their own recognition memory reports, and how these false memory reports were affected by: (a) truth of the information in others’ summaries supporting the false facts, (b) motivation to process stories and summaries, (c) source credibility, and (d) ease of remembering original facts. False memory report frequency increased when false facts in a summary were supported by true information and varied inversely with the ease with which original facts could be remembered. Results from a measure probing participants’ memory perceptions suggest that some false memories are authentic: People sometimes lack awareness of both the incorporation of false facts into their memory reports and where the false facts came from. However, many false memories are inauthentic: Despite reporting a false memory, people sometimes retain knowledge of the original stimulus and/or the origin of false facts.