“发现”康德先天观念综合与商品交换关系现实抽象的关联——索恩-雷特尔《脑力劳动与体力劳动》初解

索恩-雷特尔第一次明确提出用历史唯物主义的方式重新解读康德的"认识论革命",在他这里,康德的认识论构架本身是商品生产中发生的特定历史结果,知识的形式能够先验于感性世界,恰恰因之于脑力劳动从体力劳动中的历史性挣脱和分离。这种分离遮蔽了劳动创造性关系在商品交换活动的现实抽象所生成的一种构序社会存在的客观的社会先验性,而这种社会先验才是康德-黑格尔先验观念的真正根据。索恩-雷特尔第一次指认了商品交换中发生的现实抽象并不仅仅是主观思维的活动机制,作为概念生成的真正劳作工地是发生于社会存在中的一种客观抽象,恰恰是这种现实抽象建构了先验的社会生活形式,并由此规制了思维形式的主观抽象活动以生成思维形式。     

论康德的消极自由与积极自由——兼与柏林两种自由概念的比较

康德的文本表明康德在自由概念上区分了消极自由与积极自由。康德消极自由的基本内涵是意志的实践法则独立于经验质料的先天形式;而先验层面的分析则表明康德消极自由指的是独立于自然因果法则的自由因果性。消极自由与积极自由的关系在一定意义上说明了康德自由观念内在的融贯性和统一性。相比于伯林两种自由概念的经验性本质,康德自由的先验特性与之形成了鲜明的对比,但这种差异应在康德与伯林迥然不同的哲学背景之中予以把握。     

先验论证

先验论证是一类非常独特和不常见的哲学论证。康德的知识论中首次出现了这类论证的较为成熟的形式。自本世纪中叶斯特劳森（P．Strawson）的著作发表以来,先验论证引起了哲学家的浓厚兴趣。但是,对为之着迷者来说,一些特定的问题,如它们在康德哲学中的地位如何,和一些一般的问题,如它们是否具有共同的结构和特点,仍是一项艰难的工作。因此,探讨这些问题有双重意义,既关系到对康德哲学的理解和评价,又关系到它们是否有助于解决传统上深远的哲学问题。尽管从西方古代哲学著作中我们也可以找到先验论证的痕迹,然而,是康德首次将它…     

康德哲学的先验逻辑及其意义

先验逻辑作为康德认识理论的核心内容,其意义不仅超越了逻辑学,而且超越了认识论,成为康德清算旧形而上学、实现形而上学革命的关键环节,也是康德哲学通过形而上学的意义转换贯通古代哲学与现代哲学的关键环节。探讨康德哲学的先验逻辑,对于理解西方哲学的演进具有十分重要的意义。一、先验逻辑的基本内容先验逻辑属于康德以感性认识为基础的(广义的)理性认识学说,包括知性认识和(狭义的)理性认识两个阶段。康德认为,先验逻辑与形式逻辑既有联系又有区别:就其联系而言,它们都能提供真理的消极条件(必要条件),因为形式逻辑像先验逻辑一样属于…     

存在、实践和理性──德国先验哲学的发展

德国先验哲学的发展，是从费希特、谢林到黑格尔完成的。它肇始于康德哲学以“物自体”为中心环节的二无论体系中的唯心主义方面，正是这个方面成为德国先验哲学的起点。康德的“自在之物”的感性经验如何与先验形式相统一，以及理论理性与实践理性相统一，这些重大问题在康德那里还是悬案。很明显，要克服康德的困境，归根到底还是要推倒那个引发这个困境的巨大障碍“自在之物”。于是，康德只是作为设想的“灵知世界”、“超感性有机体”的“统一”，在先验哲学那里便由“设想”变为了“存在”，发展出一整套理论。费希特的思辨的形而上学…     

康德的先验对象概念

先验对象是感性直观杂多具有概念的统一性的先天根据,康德也称之为纯粹知性的客体。比较康德《纯粹理性批判》两版中关于先验对象的有关论述和修改,在第一版中,康德把依据概念的统一性和意识的统觉的统一性等同起来,先验对象作为感性杂多统一性的根据,不仅包括知性概念的一种纯粹运用,也包括先验主体,由此,这一概念的内涵比较模糊。在第二版中,康德并没有真正删除这一概念,而是用消极意义的本体取而代之,这一修改不仅取消了先验对象与先验主体的同一,同时也使先验对象的内涵得以明确。     

感性的曲行性和心智的本质:黑格尔的现代知识批判

本文基于古典知识经验和现代知识经验的区分,讨论了康德先验哲学中所蕴含的知识之曲行性特征与感性直观构想间的裂隙,并在此基础上,将黑格尔哲学解释为对康德先验哲学的彻底推进。黑格尔论证了:1.经验的一切形态都是经由概念中介了的;概念构成了经验对象和对象经验的先验根据;2.不同的经验基于不同的先验概念框架,诸概念框架间存在着逻辑层级关系;3.随着先验概念框架的"升级",相应的经验对象和对象经验也会"升级",并且对象的特性越复杂,经验也会越自觉其自由、并自由地经验。黑格尔哲学可以被视为当代某种心智理论的先驱。     

寻求哲学的合法性--从西方哲学的现代转型看文德尔班价值哲学的理论旨趣

文德尔班开创的新康德主义价值哲学,是对黑格尔之后以危机形式表现出的“哲学合法性’’的探求,在这种探求中,文氏继承了洛采的价值思想,并将其置于康德先验哲学的框架中,从而建构了独具特色的先验价值哲学。     

重构道德法则的先验演绎——对康德伦理学两次演绎的考察

在《道德形而上学的奠基》与《实践理性批判》中,康德伦理学有两次不同的先验演绎。在《道德形而上学的奠基》,这一先验演绎是康德论证"一项定言命令式如何可能"的关键环节。而在《实践理性批判》,康德否定了先验演绎的必要性与可能性,并将其归咎于我们无法对自由理念作出理论阐明。然而,作为道德法则的先验演绎的替代方案,《实践理性批判》的"理性事实"并不令人信服。本文将考察两版演绎问题,进一步重构一个新的先验演绎,它将以《道德形而上学的奠基》的演绎为基础,通过"目的王国"概念联结道德法则与理性存在者;《实践理性批判》的"敬重情感"可以为这一新的演绎提供情感意义上的动机。这将形成一个《道德形而上学的奠基》与《实践理性批判》互补的解释,目的是通过构建新的道德法则的先验演绎,尝试阐明康德的道德法则如何可以运用于现实的人。     

康德的先验感性论对数学的奠基意义

对于数学来说,康德在《纯粹理性批判》的"先验感性论"部分对时空观念进行先验研究的意义在于,此框架不仅可以为现实的数学成就提供一种哲学辩护,而且还确立了某种主体性的认知结构对于数学结构的奠基关系。康德之后的一些哲学家对其数学哲学的批评某种程度上来源于对感性论与数学关系的误解,但康德本人也有一定责任。先验哲学可以从认知主体的角度为数学的实际形态提供某种必要性的解释,这条进路直至今日仍具有生命力。     

Kant on the normativity of taste: The role of aesthetic ideas

For Kant, the form of a subject's experience of an object provides the normative basis for an aesthetic judgement about it. In other words, if the subject's experience of an object has certain structural properties, then Kant thinks she can legitimately judge that the object is beautiful—and that it is beautiful for everyone. My goal in this paper is to provide a new account of how this ‘subjective universalism’ is supposed to work. In doing so, I appeal to Kant's notions of an aesthetic idea and an aesthetic attribute, and the connection that Kant makes between an object's expression of rational and the normativity of aesthetic judgements about it.     

Kant on Construction,Apriority, and the Moral Relevance of Universalization

This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant’s practical project, according to which maxims are made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant’s theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we are (viz., uncaused causes). This solves the neglected puzzle of why there are passages in Kant’s works suggesting robust analogies between mathematics and ethics, since to universalize a maxim is to test a priori whether a practical object with that particular content can be constructed. An apparent problem with this hypothesis is that the medium of practical sensibility (feeling) does not play a role analogous to the medium of theoretical sensibility (intuition). In response I distinguish two separate Kantian accounts of mathematical apriority. The thesis that maxim universalization is a species of construction, and thus a priori, turns out to be consistent with the account of apriority that informs Kant’s understanding of actual mathematical practice.     

Kant on justification in transcendental philosophy

Kant's claim that the justification of transcendental philosophy is a priori is puzzling because it should be consistent with (1) his general restriction on the justification of knowledge, that intuitions must play a role in the justification of all nondegenerate knowledge, with (2) the implausibility of a priori intuitions being the only ones on which transcendental philosophy is founded, and with (3) his professed view that transcendental philosophy is not analytic. I argue that this puzzle can be solved, that according to Kant transcendental philosophy is justified a priori in the sense that the only empirical information required for its justification can be derived from any possible human experience. Transcendental justification does not rely on any more particular or special observations or experiments. Philip Kitcher's general account of apriority in Kant captures this aspect of a priori knowledge. Nevertheless, I argue that Kitcher's account goes wrong in the link it specifies between apriority and certainty.     

The Subjective Basis of Kant's Judgment of Taste

Kant claims that the basis of a judgment of taste is a merely subjective representation and that the only merely subjective representations are feelings of pleasure or displeasure. Commentators disagree over how to interpret this claim. Some take it to mean that judgments about the beauty of an object depend only on the state of the judging subject. Others argue instead that, for Kant, the pleasure we take in a beautiful object is best understood as a response to its qualities, and that, accordingly, feelings of pleasure or displeasure are no different from other representations, such as colors or smells. While I agree that the judgment of taste is best understood as asserting a claim about an object's qualities, I argue that the distinction Kant makes between feelings of pleasure or displeasure and other representations should not be ignored. I show that one's liking or disliking for an object is merely subjective in the sense that its significance depends on what one has made of oneself through one's aesthetic education. The judgment of taste, then, is merely subjective because one must first become the kind of person whose feelings have the right significance at the right time before one can determine whether an object's qualities make it beautiful.     

Is “space” a concept? Kant,Durkheim, and French Neo-Kantianism

According to Kant, all humans share a basic form of spatial representation—space is an “a priori intuition.” Durkheim felt that Kant's a priori stance blocked the kind of empirical inquiry that would show human spatial representation to be, on the contrary, quite diverse. Durkheim's claim raises the issues in intellectual history and philosophy addressed in this paper. First, the paper traces Durkheim's reading of Kant through the nineteenth-century French neo-Kantians Renouvier and Hamelin. Second, it argues that Kant's and Durkheim's projects are not, after all, genuine competitors. The result is to reassert the sharp distinction between epistemological and sociological approaches to spatial representation that Durkheim and others tried to collapse. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

IV—Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic

This paper gives an interpretation of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant's concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I argue that Kant's notion of intuition needs to be understood as a kind of representation which involves the presence to consciousness of the object it represents, and that this means that a priori intuition cannot present us with a mind-independent feature of reality.     

The shield of pallas: The virtual contemplation of the human soul: The aesthetic of Fr. Arthur Little S.J. (1887–1949)

This paper explores the extreme but well-argued-for thesis that the indirect object of an aesthetic experience of serious art is the human soul of the person having the experience. The author of the thesis was Fr. Arthur Little S.J. a mid twentieth-century Irishman, professional philosopher and philosophical popularizer. The paper treats Little’s thesis seriously: comparisons are drawn with Kant, which may be of interest even to those hostile to Little’s central assertion. Little makes a brilliant analysis of a ‘free-beauty’, making the sharpest contrast between this and the most serious art, tragedy. Tragedy, Little holds Kant not able to cope with. One agrees. The people who cry before my pictures are having the same religious experience I had when I painted them. Mark Rothko This book is a development of a series of lectures given to the Study Club of the Central Catholic Library in Dublin. The view of art that it proposes is, for reasons explained in the book, more exactly called Aristotelean than Thomistic. But where it has been necessary to base conclusions in aesthetics on philosophical presuppositions outside of that science the philosophy presupposed will be Thomism. Even so, however, the Thomistic doctrine, that must be accepted by anyone who will assent to the book’s thesis, is consistent with most philosophical positions that are not openly or latently materialistic. Anyone who believein the spirituality of the soul can accept that thesis… Arthur Little S.J.     

Kant on geometry and spatial intuition

I use recent work on Kant and diagrammatic reasoning to develop a reconsideration of central aspects of Kant??s philosophy of geometry and its relation to spatial intuition. In particular, I reconsider in this light the relations between geometrical concepts and their schemata, and the relationship between pure and empirical intuition. I argue that diagrammatic interpretations of Kant??s theory of geometrical intuition can, at best, capture only part of what Kant??s conception involves and that, for example, they cannot explain why Kant takes geometrical constructions in the style of Euclid to provide us with an a priori framework for physical space. I attempt, along the way, to shed new light on the relationship between Kant??s theory of space and the debate between Newton and Leibniz to which he was reacting, and also on the role of geometry and spatial intuition in the transcendental deduction of the categories.     

不同维度特征的共存对归类不确定性特征推理的影响

探讨在归类不确定的情境下,目标特征和预测特征的共存对特征推理的影响。共包括了三个实验,其中实验1、2考察了非靶类别中目标特征和预测特征的共存性对特征推理的影响,实验3考察了靶类别中目标特征和预测特征的共存性对特征推理的影响。三个实验五个分实验的结果一致支持了修正后的Bayesian规则,排除了“单类说”、“综合条件概率模型”的假设,并进一步修正了Bayesian规则为：     

Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity

I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience.