Revisiting Snodgrass and Vanderwart's object pictorial set: the role of surface detail in basic-level object recognition

Theories of object recognition differ to the extent that they consider object representations as being mediated only by the shape of the object, or shape and surface details, if surface details are part of the representation. In particular, it has been suggested that color information may be helpful at recognizing objects only in very special cases, but not during basic-level object recognition in good viewing conditions. In this study, we collected normative data (naming agreement, familiarity, complexity, and imagery judgments) for Snodgrass and Vanderwart's object database of 260 black-and-white line drawings, and then compared the data to exactly the same shapes but with added gray-level texture and surface details (set 2), and color (set 3). Naming latencies were also recorded. Whereas the addition of texture and shading without color only slightly improved naming agreement scores for the objects, the addition of color information unambiguously improved naming accuracy and speeded correct response times. As shown in previous studies, the advantage provided by color was larger for objects with a diagnostic color, and structurally similar shapes, such as fruits and vegetables, but was also observed for man-made objects with and without a single diagnostic color. These observations show that basic-level 'everyday' object recognition in normal conditions is facilitated by the presence of color information, and support a 'shape + surface' model of object recognition, for which color is an integral part of the object representation. In addition, the new stimuli (sets 2 and 3) and the corresponding normative data provide valuable materials for a wide range of experimental and clinical studies of object recognition.     

Visual mental representations supporting object drawing: How naming a novel object with a novel count noun impacts on young children's object drawing

Object drawing can be supported by a number of cognitive resources, each making available visual information about the object being drawn. These resources include perceptual input, short-term visual memory, and long-term visual memory. Each of these resources has the potential to make available distinct forms of visual representation, including viewpoint-specific and viewpoint-independent representations, object-specific and category representations, and separate representations of object colour. We review neuropsychological and developmental evidence supporting these claims, including evidence that the same drawing can reflect the influence of multiple forms of visual representation. Seven experiments are then reported, investigating object drawing by 4- to 6-year-old children, to confirm the support for drawing provided by different forms of visual representation. Young children are selected for investigation because their drawing is relatively unconstrained by culturally determined norms which, in our culture, dictate that objects should be drawn just as they appear from the vantage point of the drawer. To distinguish the support provided by object and category representations, the experiments exploit the privileged links between count nouns as object labels, and representations of object categories. In addition, pre-established representations, visual or otherwise, are precluded from influencing drawing by asking the children to draw novel objects, and by creating novel count nouns with which to label the objects. The results reveal how viewpoint-specific perceptual representations, object-specific representations of shape and of colour, and category representations of shape can each impact on object drawing, and in some circumstances on the same drawing. It appears that simple drawing tasks have the potential to reveal some of the distinct types of representation able to support visual cognition.     

Testing the embodied account of object naming: A concurrent motor task affects naming artifacts and animals

Embodied theories of object representation propose that the same neural networks are involved in encoding and retrieving object knowledge. In the present study, we investigated whether motor programs play a causal role in the retrieval of object names. Participants performed an object-naming task while squeezing a sponge with either their right or left hand. The objects were artifacts (e.g. hammer) or animals (e.g. giraffe) and were presented in an orientation that favored a grasp or not. We hypothesized that, if activation of motor programs is necessary to retrieve object knowledge, then concurrent motor activity would interfere with naming manipulable artifacts but not non-manipulable animals. In Experiment 1, we observed naming interference for all objects oriented towards the occupied hand. In Experiment 2, we presented the objects in more ‘canonical orientations’. Participants named all objects more quickly when they were oriented towards the occupied hand. Together, these interference/facilitation effects suggest that concurrent motor activity affects naming for both categories. These results also suggest that picture-plane orientation interacts with an attentional bias that is elicited by the objects and their relationship to the occupied hand. These results may be more parsimoniously accounted for by a domain-general attentional effect, constraining the embodied theory of object representations. We suggest that researchers should scrutinize attentional accounts of other embodied cognitive effects.     

The negative priming effect: Inhibitory priming by ignored objects

A priming paradigm was employed to investigate the processing of an ignored object during selection of an attended object. Two issues were investigated: the level of internal representation achieved for the ignored object, and the subsequent fate of this representation. In Experiment 1 a prime display containing two superimposed objects was briefly presented. One second later a probe display was presented containing an object to be named. If the ignored object in the prime display was the same as the subsequent probe, naming latencies were impaired. This effect is termed negative priming. It suggests that internal representations of the ignored object may become associated with inhibition during selection. Thus, selection of a subsequent probe object requiring these inhibited representations is delayed. Experiment 2 replicated the negative priming effect with a shorter inter-stimulus interval. Experiment 3 examined the priming effects of both the ignored and the selected objects. The effect of both identity repetition and a categorical relationship between prime and probe stimuli were investigated. The data showed that for a stimulus selected from the prime display, naming of the same object in the probe display was facilitated. When the same stimulus was ignored in the prime display, however, naming of it in the probe display was again impaired (negative priming). That negative priming was also demonstrated with categorically related objects suggests that ignored objects achieve categorical levels of representation, and that the inhibition may be at this level.     

Acquiring experiential traces in word-referent learning

In two experiments, we investigated the activation of perceptual representations of referent objects during word processing. In both experiments, participants learned to associate pictures of novel three-dimensional objects with pseudowords. They subsequently performed a recognition task (Experiment 1) or a naming task (Experiment 2) on the object names while being primed with different types of visual stimuli. Only the stimuli that the participants had encountered as referent objects during the training phase facilitated recognition or naming responses. New stimuli did not facilitate the processing of object names, even if they matched a schematic or prototypical representation of the referent object that the participants might have abstracted during word-referent learning. These results suggest that words learned by way of examples of referent objects are associated with experiential traces of encounters with these objects.     

How different spatial representations interact in virtual environments: the role of mental frame syncing

This experiment is aimed at understanding how egocentric experiences, allocentric viewpoint-dependent representations, and allocentric viewpoint-independent representations interact when encoding and retrieving a spatial environment. Although several cognitive theories have highlighted the interaction between reference frames, it is less clear about the role of a real-time presentation of allocentric viewpoint-dependent representation on the spatial organization of information. Sixty participants were asked to navigate in two virtual cities to memorize the position of one hidden object. Half of the participants had the possibility to visualize the virtual city with an interactive aerial view. Then, they were required to find the position of the object in three different experimental conditions (“retrieval with an interactive aerial view” vs. “retrieval on a map” vs. “retrieval without an interactive aerial view”). Results revealed that participants were significantly more precise in retrieving the position of the object when immersed in an egocentric experience with the interactive aerial view. The retrieval of spatial information is facilitated by the presence of the interactive aerial view of the city, since it provides a real-time allocentric viewpoint-dependent representation. More participants with high preference for using cardinal points tend to be more accurate when they were asked to retrieve the position of the object on the map. As suggested by the mental frame syncing hypothesis, the presence of an allocentric viewpoint-dependent representation during the retrieval seems to ease the imposition on a specific viewpoint on the stored abstract allocentric viewpoint-independent representation. Our findings represent another significant step toward the comprehension of the organization of spatial representations of our environment.     

Does the brain's ventral visual pathway compute object shape?

A rich behavioral literature has shown that human object recognition is supported by a representation of shape that is tolerant to variations in an object's appearance. Such 'global' shape representations are achieved by describing objects via the spatial arrangement of their local features, or structure, rather than by the appearance of the features themselves. However, accumulating evidence suggests that the ventral visual pathway – the primary substrate underlying object recognition – may not represent global shape. Instead, ventral representations may be better described as a basis set of local image features. We suggest that this evidence forces a reevaluation of the role of the ventral pathway in object perception and posits a broader network for shape perception that encompasses contributions from the dorsal pathway.     

Hierarchies, similarity, and interactivity in object recognition: "category-specific" neuropsychological deficits.

Category-specific impairments of object recognition and naming are among the most intriguing disorders in neuropsychology, affecting the retrieval of knowledge about either living or nonliving things. They can give us insight into the nature of our representations of objects: Have we evolved different neural systems for recognizing different categories of object? What kinds of knowledge are important for recognizing particular objects? How does visual similarity within a category influence object recognition and representation? What is the nature of our semantic knowledge about different objects? We review the evidence on category-specific impairments, arguing that deficits even for one class of object (e.g., living things) cannot be accounted for in terms of a single information processing disorder across all patients; problems arise at contrasting loci in different patients. The same apparent pattern of impairment can be produced by damage to different loci. According to a new processing framework for object recognition and naming, the hierarchical interactive theory (HIT), we have a hierarchy of highly interactive stored representations. HIT explains the variety of patients in terms of (1) lesions at different levels of processing and (2) different forms of stored knowledge used both for particular tasks and for particular categories of object.     

Colour specificity in episodic and in perceptual object recognition with enhanced colour impact

In three experiments we investigated the perceptual specificity of explicit (old-new object recognition) and implicit memory (word-picture matching) for colour. In order to enhance the impact of colour on processing, we increased the number of colours per object and we impaired shape information. We presented multicoloured pictures (Experiment 1), blurred and partially occluded pictures (Experiment 2) and coloured line drawings in visual noise (Experiment 3). Experiments 1 and 2 had an intentional study phase; the study phase of Experiment 3 was an incidental colour or category naming task. Changing colour from study to test always had negative effects on episodic recognition although colour was irrelevant. In contrast, in the matching task old pictures were generally matched faster than new ones independent of their colour congruence. In Experiment 3, an additional small advantage of congruent colours and of semantic processing occurred. We conclude that two different memory representations contribute to these tasks. Changes of an achromatic, more abstract representation, that is used in normal object recognition, and a representation of the specific exemplar that includes colour. This latter token is used in episodic recognition as well as in unusual perceptual tasks (Experiment 3).     

The development of numerical estimation: evidence for multiple representations of numerical quantity

Abstract - We examined children's and adults' numerical estimation and the representations that gave rise to their estimates. The results were inconsistent with two prominent models of numerical representation: the logarithmic-ruler model, which proposes that people of all ages possess a single, logarithmically spaced representation of numbers, and the accumulator model, which proposes that people of all ages represent numbers as linearly increasing magnitudes with scalar variability. Instead, the data indicated that individual children possess multiple numerical representations; that with increasing age and numerical experience, they rely on appropriate representations increasingly often; and that the numerical context influences their choice of representation. The results, obtained with second graders, fourth graders, sixth graders, and adults who performed two estimation tasks in two numerical contexts, strongly suggest that one cause of children's difficulties with estimation is reliance on logarithmic representations of numerical magnitudes in situations in which accurate estimation requires reliance on linear representations.     

The role of representational volatility in recognizing pre- and postchange objects

Theories relating attention to change blindness (CB) imply that representations of objects in the focus of attention are stable and coherent. However, CB occurs for objects in the focus of attention. Here, we explore this apparent contradiction and the possibility that changes can be detected without having a complete and stable representation of the prechange object. The first experiment required observers to recognize a prechange object and a postchange object after viewing arrays of various sizes in which the prechange object was replaced by the postchange object after a brief delay. Results indicated that the representation of the prechange object was strong enough to cue a change but not strong enough to support accurate recognition. The remaining experiments demonstrated that the representation of the prechange object is volatile in that a shift in the display or the presence of a postchange object can disrupt the representation. These findings add to current theories of attention and representations by showing that attention may result in volatile representations that can support change detection without supporting accurate recognition.     

Object representation and predictive action in infancy

Previous research has shown that 6‐month‐old infants extrapolate object motion on linear paths when they act predictively on fully visible moving objects but not when they observe partly occluded moving objects. The present research probed whether differences in the tasks presented to infants or in the visibility of the objects account for these findings, by investigating infants’ predictive head tracking of a visible object that moves behind a small occluder. Six‐month‐old infants were presented with an object that moved repeatedly on linear or nonlinear paths, with an occluder covering the place where all the paths intersected. The first time infants viewed an object’s motion, their head movements did not anticipate either linear or nonlinear motion, but they quickly learned to anticipate linear motion on successive trials. Infants also learned to anticipate nonlinear motion, but this learning was slower and less consistent. Learning in all cases concerned the trajectory of the object, not the specific locations at which the object appeared. These findings suggest that infants form object representations that are weakly biased toward inertial motion and that are influenced by learning. The findings accord with the thesis that a single system of representation underlies both predictive action and perception of object motion, and that occlusion reduces the precision of object representations.     

Clarifying the role of shape in children's taxonomic assumption.

When asked to find a new referent of a novel label children tend to ignore thematic relations (e.g., the relation between a spider and its web) and focus instead on taxonomic relations (e.g., the relation between a spider and a snake). The precise nature of children's taxonomic assumption has not been clear, however. One possibility is that the taxonomic assumption reduces to a "similar-shape rule": perhaps children tend to select objects of the same taxonomic kind when asked to extend new labels simply because these objects are more similar in shape than objects which are only thematically related. Sixty children between 3 and 5 years of age participated in three studies which examined children's attention to thematic relations, similarity of shape, and taxonomic relations when extending novel object labels. The findings indicated that shape has some primacy in children's expectations about object label reference, yet when shape is not available as a guide, children also take taxonomic kind into consideration when searching for new referents of novel labels. Thus children make use of a relatively rich and somewhat varied set of expectations to guide their inferences about object label reference.     

A word-order constraint on phonological activation

Word-order rules impose major constraints on linguistic behavior. For example, adjectives appear before nouns in English, and after nouns in French. This means that constraints on word order must be language-specific properties upheld on-line by the language system. Despite the importance of these rules, little is known about how they operate. We report an influence of word order on the activation of phonological representations. Participants were presented with colored objects and asked to name either the colors or the objects; the phonological similarity between the object and color names was manipulated. French speakers showed a phonological congruency effect in color naming, but not in object naming. English participants yielded the opposite pattern: a phonological effect in object naming, but not in color naming. Differences in the typical order of nouns and adjectives in French and English provide a plausible account for this cross-linguistic contrast. More generally, these results provide direct evidence for the operation of word-order constraints during language production.     

A One-to-One Bias and Fast Mapping Support Preschoolers' Learning About Faces and Voices

A multimodal person representation contains information about what a person looks like and what a person sounds like. However, little is known about how children form these face-voice mappings. Here, we explored the possibility that two cognitive tools that guide word learning, a one-to-one mapping bias and fast mapping, also guide children's learning about faces and voices. We taught 4- and 5-year-olds mappings between three individual faces and voices, then presented them with new faces and voices. In Experiment 1, we found that children rapidly learned face-voice mappings from just a few exposures, and furthermore spontaneously mapped novel faces to novel voices using a one-to-one mapping bias (that each face can produce only one voice). In Experiment 2, we found that children's face-voice representations are abstract, generalizing to novel tokens of a person. In Experiment 3, we found that children retained in memory the face-voice mappings that they had generated via inference (i.e., they showed evidence of fast mapping), and used these newly formed representations to generate further mappings between new faces and voices. These findings suggest that preschoolers' rapid learning about faces and voices may be aided by biases that are similar to those that support word learning.     

Re-visiting the competence/performance debate in the acquisition of the counting principles

Advocates of the "continuity hypothesis" have argued that innate non-verbal counting principles guide the acquisition of the verbal count list (Gelman & Galistel, 1978). Some studies have supported this hypothesis, but others have suggested that the counting principles must be constructed anew by each child. Defenders of the continuity hypothesis have argued that the studies that failed to support it obscured children's understanding of counting by making excessive demands on their fragile counting skills. We evaluated this claim by testing two-, three-, and four-year-olds both on "easy" tasks that have supported continuity and "hard" tasks that have argued against it. A few noteworthy exceptions notwithstanding, children who failed to show that they understood counting on the hard tasks also failed on the easy tasks. Therefore, our results are consistent with a growing body of evidence that shows that the count list as a representation of the positive integers transcends pre-verbal representations of number.     

Whose DAM account? Attentional learning explains Booth and Waxman

Booth and Waxman (Cognition 84 (2002) B11) have recently shown that linguistic cues to animacy affect children's novel name extensions. They argue that this demonstration contradicts two central tenets of our attentional learning account of object naming, which Booth and Waxman characterize as the "dumb attentional mechanism" or "DAM" account. In the present article, we show that the first of these tenets has never been a feature of the attentional learning account, and that the second tenet, which is central to our account, is not addressed by Booth and Waxman's findings. We suggest that the debate about the nature of children's language and cognition would profit from an increased awareness of the different levels of analysis at which different researchers are working.     

Monolingual and bilingual children's use of mutual exclusivity in the naming of whole objects

In two experiments, the use of mutual exclusivity in the naming of whole objects was examined in monolingual and bilingual 3- and 6-year-olds. Once an object has a known name, then via principles of mutual exclusivity it is often assumed that a new name given to the object must refer to some part, substance, or other property of the object. However, because bilingual children must suspend mutual exclusivity assumptions between languages, they may be more willing to accept two names for an object within a language. In the current research, the use of mutual exclusivity in the naming of whole objects was found across monolingual and bilingual children, although older bilingual children were significantly less inclined to use mutual exclusivity than were older monolingual children. These results are discussed in terms of differences in monolingual and bilingual children's word learning.     

Temporally unfolding neural representation of pictorial occlusion

The human visual system possesses a remarkable ability to reconstruct the shape of an object that is partly occluded by an interposed surface. Behavioral results suggest that, under some circumstances, this perceptual process (termed amodal completion) progresses from an initial representation of local image features to a completed representation of a shape that may include features that are not explicitly present in the retinal image. Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that the completed surface is represented in early visual cortical areas. We used fMRI adaptation, combined with brief, masked exposures, to track the amodal completion process as it unfolds in early visual cortical regions. We report evidence for an evolution of the neural representation from the image-based feature representation to the completed representation. Our method offers the possibility of measuring changes in cortical activity using fMRI over a time scale of a few hundred milliseconds.     

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.