Do Irrelevant Sounds Impair the Maintenance of All Characteristics of Speech in Memory?

Several studies have shown that maintaining in memory some attributes of speech, such as the content or pitch of an interlocutor??s message, is markedly reduced in the presence of background sounds made of spectrotemporal variations. However, experimental paradigms showing this interference have only focused on one attribute of speech at a time, and thus differ from real-life situations in which several attributes have to be memorized and maintained simultaneously. It is possible that the interference is even greater in such a case and can occur for a broader range of background sounds. We developed a paradigm in which participants had to maintain the content, pitch and speaker size of auditorily presented speech information and used various auditory distractors to generate interference. We found that only distractors with spectrotemporal variations impaired the detection, which shows that similar interference mechanisms occur whether there are one or more speech attributes to maintain in memory. A high percentage of false alarms was observed with these distractors, suggesting that spectrotemporal variations not only weaken but also modify the information maintained in memory. Lastly, we found that participants were unaware of the interference. These results are similar to those observed in the visual modality.     

Interference in Immediate Spatial Memory: Shifts of Spatial Attention or Central executive Involvement?

Interference in serial spatial memory was investigated in six experiments. Experiment 1 replicated Experiment 2 by Smyth and Scholey (1994) in showing that listening to tones that originated from different directions interfered with spatial memory. Experiment 2 showed, however, that the effect of mere listening was not observed when this was the only interference condition experienced by the subject. In Experiment 3, a binary pitch discrimination task performed on spatially separated tones impaired recall performance to the same extent as did left-right decisions. The same disrupting effect was also observed when the tones were presented from the same direction in the pitch discrimination task (Experiment 4) as well as in a binary loudness discrimination task (Experiment 5). Finally, repeating heard words did not interfere, whereas a pitch discrimination performed on these same words disrupted recall (Experiment 6). It is argued that the disrupting effects reflect not a specifically spatial interference, but a central executive involvement in the rehearsal process in serial spatial memory.     

For the Sake of a Stone? Inanimate Things and the Demands of Morality

Everyday inanimate things such as stones, teapots and bicycles are not objects to which moral agents could have direct duties; they do not have moral status. It is usually assumed that there is therefore no reason to think that a morally good person would, on account of her goodness, be disposed to treat them well for their own sakes. I challenge this assumption. I begin by showing that to act for the sake of an entity need not be to suppose that it has moral status, but simply to regard it as an end in itself. Having done this, I argue that it is not, as is conventionally assumed, implausible to suppose that to be morally good is to be disposed to treat at least some inanimate things gently, and to do so, moreover, for the sake of those things, rather than for some other reason.     

Memory Development or the Development of Memory?

For 30 years, the question "What is memory development the development of?" has guided research on children's memory. As theories and research paradigms have evolved over this period, so too has knowledge of the surprising mnemonic competence of young children and of age-related differences in memory performance. Never the less, there are serious limits to current understanding of the development of memory. Indeed, there have been few investigations of changes over time in the memory skills of individual children, and researchers have yet to shed much light on the more difficult question of "What are the forces that propel the development of skilled remembering?" From our perspective, the answer to this question will require movement toward longitudinal research designs that illuminate the mechanisms that bring about developmental change.     

How Are Different Properties of a Scene Encoded in Visual Memory?

Recent studies in scene perception suggest that much of what observers believe they see is not retained in visual memory. Depending on the roles they play in organizing the perception of a scene, different visual properties may require different amounts of attention to be incorporated into a mental representation of the scene. The goal of this study was to compare how three visual properties of scenes, colour, object position, and object presence, are encoded in visual memory. We used a variation on the change detection “flicker” task and measured the time to detect scene changes when: (1) a cue was provided regarding the type of change; and, (2) no cue was provided. We hypothesized that cueing would enhance the processing of visual properties that require more attention to be encoded into scene representations, whereas cueing would not have an effect for properties that are readily or automatically encoded in visual memory. In Experiment 1, we found that there was a cueing advantage for colour changes, but not for position or presence changes. In Experiment 2, we found the same cueing effect regardless of whether the colour change altered the configuration of the scene or not. These results are consistent with the idea that properties that typically help determine the configuration of the scene, for example, position and presence, are better encoded in scene representations than are surface properties such as colour.     

Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context‐Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects

According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory‐motor features activate sensory‐motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a word's meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a word's meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a word's meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.     

What is the Normativity of Meaning?

There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle a dispute among proponents of the claim that meaning is normative, it should be of interest to those who challenge it. After all, before one takes aim, one’s target needs to be in clear view.     

What is the Meaning of Proofs?

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The origins of proof-theoretic semantics lie in the question of what constitutes the meaning of the logical connectives and its response: the rules of inference...     

Counting to Infinity: Does Learning the Syntax of the Count List Predict Knowledge That Numbers Are Infinite?

By around the age of 5½, many children in the United States judge that numbers never end, and that it is always possible to add 1 to a set. These same children also generally perform well when asked to label the quantity of a set after one object is added (e.g., judging that a set labeled “five” should now be “six”). These findings suggest that children have implicit knowledge of the “successor function”: Every natural number, n, has a successor, n + 1. Here, we explored how children discover this recursive function, and whether it might be related to discovering productive morphological rules that govern language-specific counting routines (e.g., the rules in English that represent base-10 structure). We tested 4- and 5-year-old children’s knowledge of counting with three tasks, which we then related to (a) children’s belief that 1 can always be added to any number (the successor function) and (b) their belief that numbers never end (infinity). Children who exhibited knowledge of a productive counting rule were significantly more likely to believe that numbers are infinite (i.e., there is no largest number), though such counting knowledge was not directly linked to knowledge of the successor function, per se. Also, our findings suggest that children as young as 4 years of age are able to implement rules defined over their verbal count list to generate number words beyond their spontaneous counting range, an insight which may support reasoning over their acquired verbal count sequence to infer that numbers never end.     

Are Preferences in Emotional Processing Affected by Distraction? Examining the Age-Related Positivity Effect in Visual Fixation within a Dual-Task Paradigm

ABSTRACT

Recent research has suggested that age-related positivity effects are eliminated under conditions of dual-task load (Knight et al., 2007 Knight, M., Seymour, T. L., Gaunt, J. T., Baker, C., Nesmith, K. and Mather, M. 2007. Aging and goal directed emotional attention: Distraction reverses emotional biases. Emotion, 7: 705–714. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Emotion, 7, 705; Mather & Knight, 2005 Mather, M. and Knight, M. 2005. Goal directed memory: The role of cognitive control in older adults' emotional memory. Psychology and Aging, 20: 554–570. [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Psychology and Aging, 20, 554), because the cognitive control resources necessary to enact such preferences are not available when individuals are distracted by competing information. We further examined how older adults' emotional information processing preferences are affected by distracting information by utilizing a within-subjects dual-task measure. Younger and older adults viewed a series of positive, negative, and neutral images both in conditions of full and divided attention. Fixation preferences to valenced images were assessed through eye tracking. Regardless of whether images were viewed in full or divided attention conditions, older adults demonstrated a preference in their fixation for positive and neutral in comparison to negative images. These results provide evidence that older adults' positive fixation preferences may not always necessitate full, cognitive control.     

Distraction and facilitation--two faces of the same coin?

Unexpected and task-irrelevant sounds can capture our attention and may cause distraction effects reflected by impaired performance in a primary task unrelated to the perturbing sound. The present auditory-visual oddball study examines the effect of the informational content of a sound on the performance in a visual discrimination task. The informational content was modulated by varying the sound-target interval and the probability of target occurrence. Effects of informational content were examined with two types of distractors: a burst of white noise (deviant) and environmental sounds (novel). Behavioral results reveal the following. (1) Novel and deviant sounds do not necessarily cause behavioral distraction effects when they are uninformative with respect to both time and probability of occurrence of a visual target. (2) Novel, but not deviant, sounds cause an unspecific bias toward facilitation. (3) The informational content of task-irrelevant sounds speeds reaction times, indicating the use of information not directly related to the task for enhancing performance. (4) It is suggested that performance in deviant and novel trials is the sum of the costs of attentional orienting and benefits of information as well as benefits of unspecific activation for novels.     

Is the Meaning of Life Also the Meaning of Death? A Terror Management Perspective Reply

The human quality of self-awareness makes individuals aware of their inventible death. How does this knowledge influence meaning in life and is influenced by it? Four studies examined the association between meaning in life and awareness of death, through a Terror Management Theory perspective. Study 1 assessed the effects of a mortality reminder on self-reports of meaning in life, while exploring the moderating role of self-esteem. The findings indicate a trend in which after a mortality salience induction, high self-esteem individuals tend to view their lives as more meaningful. Studies 2 and 3 examined the effect of thinking about the meaning of life on death-thought accessibility, and found it to be higher in both the mortality and meaning salience conditions, as compared to a control condition. Study 4 sought to discover whether reminders of one’s meaning in life would yield cultural worldview validation, and indeed revealed a more severe perception of social transgressions following both mortality and meaning salience. Findings highlight the understanding that meaning in life is a basic existential concept closely related to awareness of death’s inevitability.     

An Unintentional Defense of the Indeterminacy of Meaning?

Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.

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How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act

The Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper, 1989a) has identified five components of an apology speech act set: five strategies that speakers use to apologize. This study examines the effects of four of those strategies (illocutionary force indicating device, expression of responsibility, promise of forebearance, and offer of repair) on the judgments made by hearers about the speaker and about the apology. Each of the strategies is shown to have an independent effect in improving reactions to the speaker. Further, the magnitude of these effects appear to be roughly similar for each of the strategies. The things people say to apologize do seem to be effective in accomplishing the self-presentational goals of apologizers.     

Commentary: What is the Meaning and Utility of the Psychopathy Concept?

The concept and measurement of psychopathy in young people is discussed with respect to five key issues: (1) the respective merits of self-reports and ratings by others; (2) whether callous/unemotional (CU) features may be more appropriately tapped by physiological measures; (3) the possible utility of genetic studies; (4) the distinctiveness of CU from other risk factors for antisocial behavior; and (5) the homogeneity of CU as a construct.     

Can a Survey of British False Memory Society Members Reliably Inform the Recovered Memory Debate?

Gudjonsson has conducted a timely and welcome survey of BFMS members, who are to be commended for their frank responses. However, their answers can provide only partial information about the nature, circumstances and consequences of recovered memories. Attention is drawn to features of the way the data are presented that could result in potentially misleading conclusions. The unsystematic inclusion and exclusion of missing values has resulted in inflated frequencies when missing data are excluded from overall proportions. Furthermore, nearly a third of respondents were not sure, or denied, that recovered memories were involved in the accusations. The data are presented with no distinction between these respondents and respondents reporting clear recovered memory accusations. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Automatic Imitation and Spatial Compatibility Mediated by Different Processes?

Automatic imitation or “imitative compatibility” is thought to be mediated by the mirror neuron system and to be a laboratory model of the motor mimicry that occurs spontaneously in naturalistic social interaction. Imitative compatibility and spatial compatibility effects are known to depend on different stimulus dimensions—body movement topography and relative spatial position. However, it is not yet clear whether these two types of stimulus–response compatibility effect are mediated by the same or different cognitive processes. We present an interactive activation model of imitative and spatial compatibility, based on a dual‐route architecture, which substantiates the view they are mediated by processes of the same kind. The model, which is in many ways a standard application of the interactive activation approach, simulates all key results of a recent study by Catmur and Heyes (2011) . Specifically, it captures the difference in the relative size of imitative and spatial compatibility effects; the lack of interaction when the imperative and irrelevant stimuli are presented simultaneously; the relative speed of responses in a quintile analysis when the imperative and irrelevant stimuli are presented simultaneously; and the different time courses of the compatibility effects when the imperative and irrelevant stimuli are presented asynchronously.     

What is the Meaning of Greening? Cultural Analysis of a Southern Baptist Environmental Text

Scholars and journalists alike interpreted “A Southern Baptist Declaration on the Environment and Climate Change”, a document released in 2008 by a group of American Southern Baptists, as evidence that American evangelicals were becoming increasingly concerned about the environment. Using the tools of textual analysis, I show that this was not the only interpretation of the document at play. While journalists and scholars understood the Declaration as addressing the need to halt climate change, for a group of key Southern Baptist signatories, the document expressed a need for Southern Baptists to engage more actively in the public environmental discourse, lest they relinquish this domain to secular and liberal voices. Critically, the latter group viewed the Declaration as compatible with climate scepticism. My analysis shows how cultural context informs climate change attitudes, while also suggesting socio-historical factors—particularly evangelicals’ embattled mentality—that may support climate change scepticism in Southern Baptist circles.