Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy

People who believe in the paranormal have been found to be particularly susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The present research examines whether the same is true of people who endorse conspiracy theories. Two studies examined the association between conspiracist ideation and the number of conjunction violations made in a variety of contexts (neutral, paranormal and conspiracy). Study 1 found that participants who endorsed a range of popular conspiracy theories more strongly also made more conjunction errors than participants with weaker conspiracism, regardless of the contextual framing of the conjunction. Study 2, using an independent sample and a generic measure of conspiracist ideation, replicated the finding that conspiracy belief is associated with domain‐general susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The findings are discussed in relation to the association between conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs, the representativeness heuristic and the tendency to infer underlying causal relationships connecting ostensibly unrelated events. © 2014 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

阴谋论信念的产生机制——社会认知视角的三种解释

社会心理学将阴谋论视作一种意识形态上的信念,并定义为人们将重大的政治或社会事件归因为有权力的群体或个人暗中预谋以达成其目的的解释倾向。社会认知视角为个体这种阴谋论信念的产生提供了三种解释。错觉模式感知导致人们认知上倾向于在不相关的事件之间建立联系;敏感性动因觉察影响人们过度感知并假定事件背后的动因、目的和意图等;投射是将自己愿意参与阴谋的意图归因于事件中的他人。     

Investigating the Links Between Cultural Values and Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Key Roles of Collectivism and Masculinity

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation-level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross-sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual-level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta-analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.     

Statistical Bias and Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories

Previous research proposes that endorsement of anomalous beliefs is associated with proneness to conjunction error. This supposition ignores important differences between belief types. Correspondingly, the present study examined the degree to which components of statistical bias predicted conspiratorial ideation and belief in the paranormal. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling revealed that conjunction error was associated with conspiratorial ideation, whilst perception of randomness most strongly predicted belief in the paranormal. These findings opposed the notion that anomalous beliefs, by virtue of possession of common characteristics, relate similarly to conjunction error. With regard to conspiracy, conjunction‐framing manipulations produced only minor variations in relationship strength. This supported the notion that conspiratorial ideation was associated with a domain‐general susceptibility to conjunction error. Framing, however, did influence the relationship between belief in the paranormal and conjunction; whilst paranormal conjunctions were generally easier to solve, performance declined as level of paranormal belief increased.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Frame Problem and Theories of Belief

The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief.     

Some Dare Call It Conspiracy: Labeling Something a Conspiracy Theory Does Not Reduce Belief in It

“Conspiracy theory” is widely acknowledged to be a loaded term. Politicians use it to mock and dismiss allegations against them, while philosophers and political scientists warn that it could be used as a rhetorical weapon to pathologize dissent. In two empirical studies conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I present an initial examination of whether this concern is justified. In Experiment 1, 150 participants judged a list of historical and speculative theories to be no less likely when they were labeled “conspiracy theories” than when they were labeled “ideas.” In Experiment 2 (N = 802), participants who read a news article about fictitious “corruption allegations” endorsed those allegations no more than participants who saw them labeled “conspiracy theories.” The lack of an effect of the conspiracy‐theory label in both experiments was unexpected and may be due to a romanticized image of conspiracy theories in popular media or a dilution of the term to include mundane speculation regarding corruption and political intrigue.     

信念修正的理论与方法

信念修正的理论大约产生于20世纪70年代,最初是由哲学家和逻辑学家提出的,但很快就引起了计算机界和人工智能领域学者的浓厚兴趣,20世纪90年代成为人工智能领域的一个热点.在我国,计算机领域的学者从20世纪90年代初就开始介绍并研究信念修正的理论,近年来逻辑学界的学者也开始关注这一领域中的问题.     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.     

具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。     

具身认知视角下的概念隐喻理论

隐喻是一种常见的语言现象.概念隐喻理论认为,隐喻不仅是一种语言修辞手段,隐喻反映了人类认知的重要特征:人类的抽象概念系统是以感知觉经验和具体概念为基础发展形成的.根据概念隐喻理论,主体可以以感知运动经验对抽象概念进行体验式表征与加工.大量研究证明,抽象概念的加工同对其进行隐喻化描述的身体经验具有关联.这些研究主要涉及空间隐喻、温度隐喻、洁净隐喻、触觉隐喻等.未来的研究应探讨多重隐喻对认知的影响、探索塑造隐喻映射单向作用与相互作用的因素,并关注概念隐喻理论的应用性等问题.     

Belief in luck and luckiness: Conceptual clarification and new measure validation

Research on the dimensionality and measurement of luck beliefs has yet to produce a clear conceptual and metrical consensus. This research theorizes a bidimensional model of luck beliefs that is tested through a series of studies (total n = 1205) validating the new Belief in Luck and Luckiness Scale. Unlike existing conceptualizations and measures, this new model is applicable to both believers and non-believers in luck, and reveals belief in luck and personal luckiness to be discrete, uncorrelated, and respectively unidimensional constructs.     

概念转变理论及其发展述评

概念转变是心理与教育领域的热点问题。20多年来,研究者从不同的背景和视角研究概念转变的过程与机制,提出了基于认识论、本体论和朴素理论的多个概念转变理论,成为后续概念转变研究的理论框架。随着研究的深入,这些概念转变理论得以继承和发展,表现为融入了社会、情感等因素并具整合的趋势。本文对当前国际主流的概念转变理论及其发展加以评述,并从问题、方法和视角等方面对未来的概念转变研究加以展望,提出构建更具普适性的概念转变理论框架的设想     

Attributes of God: Conceptual Foundations of a Foundational Belief

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human properties to nonhuman entities, is often posited as an explanation for the origin and nature of God concepts, but it remains unclear which human properties we tend to attribute to God and under what conditions. In three studies, participants decided whether two types of human properties—psychological (mind‐dependent) properties and physiological (body‐dependent) properties—could or could not be attributed to God. In Study 1 (n = 1,525), participants made significantly more psychological attributions than physiological attributions, and the frequency of those attributions was correlated both with participants’ religiosity and with their attribution of abstract, theological properties. In Study 2 (n = 99) and Study 3 (n = 138), participants not only showed the same preference for psychological properties but were also significantly faster, more consistent, and more confident when attributing psychological properties to God than when attributing physiological properties. And when denying properties to God, they showed the reverse pattern—that is, they were slower, less consistent, and less confident when denying psychological properties than when denying physiological properties. These patterns were observed both in a predominantly Christian population (Study 2) and a predominantly Hindu population (Study 3). Overall, we argue that God is conceptualized not as a person in general but as an agent in particular, attributed a mind by default but attributed a body only upon further consideration.     

The Functional Independence of Skinner's Verbal Operants: Conceptual and Applied Implications

Much has been said about B. F. Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. This commentary specifically focuses on the functional independence of B. F. Skinner's verbal operants. While researchers have long been interested in this topic, the research literature on this topic has produced mixed results; it has shown that the verbal operants may be both functionally independent and functionally interdependent. This commentary considers the conceptual and applied implications of these mixed findings. The distinction between constructs and events is highlighted, with specific attention to how this distinction relates to the consideration of the verbal operants in behavior analysis. The value of further research on the functional independence of the verbal operants is considered, as well as the type of research studies that might be useful toward developing interventions for individuals with language delays. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conspiracy Accounts as Intergroup Theories: Challenging Dominant Understandings of Social Power and Political Legitimacy

Conspiracy accounting is often regarded as an atypical, pathological form of political reasoning, and little research has considered how ordinary social actors may refer to political conspiracies in the course of argument. In this article, we consider the spontaneous use of conspiracy narratives by politically engaged Greek citizens in interview discussions of the Macedonian crisis. Analysis revealed that conspiracy narratives were typically used to challenge dominant representations that attributed the Macedonian crisis to Greek xenophobic nationalism. Specifically, conspiracy accounts were used to dispute assumptions concerning Greece's majority status by representing the political opposition as a consortium rather than a single out‐group, by recasting the threat posed to Greece as a matter of realistic rather than symbolic competition, and by extending the historical frame of reference to encompass past and prospective future threats to the Greek people and the Greek state. In conclusion, we note how the use of conspiratorial reasoning may be used to construct complex causal arguments concerning intergroup relations and to challenge dominant ideological assumptions about social hierarchy and political legitimacy. In this respect, conspiratorial reasoning might be regarded as a prototypical form of intergroup representation.     

The Belief in Personal Control Scale: a measure of God-Mediated and Exaggerated Control

Combining and extending previous conceptions of the construct of perceived control, a self-report measure based on a proposed multidimensional model was developed and validated. The Belief in Personal Control Scale (BPCS), measures of locus of control, depression, mania, anxiety, self-esteem, and social desirability were administered to several samples. A factor analysis revealed three interpretable components of the control construct: a general External Control factor, an Exaggerated Internal Control factor, and a God-Mediated Control factor. The results of this article provide preliminary support for the model and for the BPCS as a multidimensional measure of perceived control with reliable and valid subscales. Consistent with the proposed model of control, the three factors correlated differentially with the various measures of psychological adjustment. Of particular interest is the positive correlation between the Exaggerated Internal Control factor and a measure of mania.     

Conceptual foundations and validation of the Pseudoscientific Belief Scale

In this study, we present the Pseudoscientific Belief Scale (PSEUDO; α = 0.90). The conceptual foundations of the scale include (a) a philosophically grounded and functional demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience; (b) an analysis of the pseudoscientific status of science denialism, which is integrated into the scale; and (c) a bibliographic justification to back up the inclusion of each item. The validation process is carried out based on two studies. Study 1 (N = 3,416) uses both exploratory factor analysis and cluster analysis: Conceptually congruent factors are not reported. Study 2 (N = 292) includes a total of 21 sociodemographic, personality, and cognitive independent variables, as well as the two thematic subscales of PSEUDO as dependent variables, in order to analyze the psychological profile of both sets of believers. Results show high similarity between both groups, confirming construct validity.     

Cognitive Theories of Depression in Children and Adolescents: A Conceptual and Quantitative Review

This paper quantitatively reviews longitudinal studies examining three central cognitive theories of depression—Beck’s theory, Hopelessness theory, and the Response Styles theory—among children (age 8–12) and adolescents (age 13–19). We examine the effect sizes in 20 longitudinal studies, which investigated the relation between the cognitive vulnerability–stress interaction and its association with prospective elevations in depression after controlling for initial levels of depressive symptoms. The results of this review suggest that across theories there is a small relation between the vulnerability–stress interaction and elevations in depression among children (pr = 0.15) and a moderately larger effect (pr = 0.22) among adolescents. Despite these important findings, understanding their implications has been obscured by critical methodological, statistical, and theoretical limitations that bear on cognitive theories of depression. The evidence base has been limited by poor measurement of cognitive vulnerabilities and over reliance on null hypothesis significance testing; these have contributed to a field with many gaps and inconsistencies. The relative paucity of research on developmental applications of such theories reveals that surprisingly little is known about their hypothesized etiologic mechanisms in children and adolescents. Ways to advance knowledge in the area of cognitive theories of depression among youth are discussed.     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.