Measures of feeling-of-knowing accuracy: A new look at an old problem

Two ordinal measures of feeling-of-knowing performance appropriate for n × n data arrays are reviewed. Goodman and Kruskal's gamma provides a measure of association between recognition performance and feeling-of-knowing judgements. The Hamann coefficient provides a measure of agreement accuracy. The relative strengths and weaknesses of each measure are compared at length. A proof is provided, which reveals a lack of one-to-one relation between the two and suggests that they may be independent under most circumstances. It is concluded that both measures should be reported together as complementary indices as each captures a different facet of feeling-of-knowing performance. Alternative measures for gamma and the Hamann coefficient are considered and a number of recommendations are made for future research.     

Response-rate differences in variable-interval and variable-ratio schedules: An old problem revisited

In Experiment 1, a variable-ratio 10 schedule became, successively, a variable-interval schedule with only the minimum interreinforcement intervals yoked to the variable ratio, or a variable-interval schedule with both interreinforcement intervals and reinforced interresponse times yoked to the variable ratio. Response rates in the variable-interval schedule with both interreinforcement interval and reinforced interresponse time yoking fell between the higher rates maintained by the variable-ratio schedule and the lower rates maintained by the variable-interval schedule with only interreinforcement interval yoking. In Experiment 2, a tandem variable-interval 15-s variable-ratio 5 schedule became a yoked tandem variable-ratio 5 variable-interval x-s schedule, and a tandem variable-interval 30-s variable-ratio 10 schedule became a yoked tandem variable-ratio 10 variable-interval x-s schedule. In the yoked tandem schedules, the minimum interreinforcement intervals in the variable-interval components were those that equated overall interreinforcement times in the two phases. Response rates did not decline in the yoked schedules even when the reinforced interresponse times became longer. Experiment 1 suggests that both reinforced interresponse times and response rate–reinforcement rate correlations determine response-rate differences in variable-ratio 10 and yoked variable-interval schedules in rats. Experiment 2 suggests a minimal role for the reinforced interresponse time in determining response rates on tandem variable-interval 30-s variable-ratio 10 and yoked tandem variable-ratio 10 variable-interval x-s schedules in rats.     

Empirical moral rationalism and the social constitution of normativity

Philosophical Studies - Moral rationalism has long been an attractive position within moral philosophy. However, among empirical-minded philosophers, it is widely dismissed as scientifically...     

An epistemological problem for evolutionary psychology

This article draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain‐specific modules. Although they do not explicitly deny the existence of domain‐general processes, it will be shown that their methodology commits them to the assumption that only domain‐specific cognitive processes are capable of producing useful outputs. The resultant view limits the scope of biologically possible cognitive accomplishments and these limitations, it will be argued, are such as to deny us epistemic capacities that evolutionary psychology presupposes in its pursuit of an objective, comprehensive account of human nature.     

Neuropragmatism, old and new

Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of John Dewey or independently developed positions similar to it. I review these developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well before the Churchlands and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century European philosophers’ views on cognition to whom many present day philosophers refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Dewey’s work provides useful tools for evading or overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind. In this introductory review, I distinguish between three waves among neurophilosophers that revolve around the import of evolution and the degree of brain-centrism. Throughout, I emphasize and elaborate upon Dewey’s dynamic view of mind and consciousness. I conclude by introducing the consciousness-as-cooking metaphor as an alternative to both the consciousness-as-digestion and consciousness-as-dancing metaphors. Neurophilosophical pragmatism—or neuropragmatism—recognizes the import of evolutionary and cognitive neurobiology for developing a science of mind and consciousness. However, as the cooking metaphor illustrates, a science of mind and consciousness cannot rely on the brain alone—just as explaining cooking entails more than understanding the gut—and therefore must establish continuity with cultural activities and their respective fields of inquiry. Neuropragmatism advances a new and promising perspective on how to reconcile the scientific and manifest images of humanity as well as how to reconstruct the relationship between science and the humanities.     

Shedding new light on an old problem: The estimation of shadow sizes in children and adults

Two experiments using the 'projection of shadows' paradigm investigated multidimensional reasoning, implicit and explicit knowledge, and the nonlinearity concept in 5-, 9-, and 13-year-olds and adults. Participants estimated the resulting shadow lengths of differently sized objects, placed at varying distances from a light source. Experiment 1 (N=80) revealed that, on the group level, 5-year-olds took both object size and light-object distance into account when estimating shadow size. Moreover, half of the children in this age group even considered the subordinate distance dimension. In addition, we found a large discrepancy between implicit and explicit knowledge about shadows in 5-year-olds that decreased with age. Finally, only a minority of older participants and very few younger children recognized the nonlinear relationship between light-object distance and shadow size, suggesting domain dependence of the nonlinearity concept. Experiment 2 (N=20) predominately replicated the findings for 5-year-olds using slightly different stimuli.     

Everyday problem solving in adulthood and old age

We examined everyday problem solving in adulthood and compared it with traditional measures of cognitive abilities. In the first phase of the research, we describe the construction of an inventory to assess problem solving in situations that adults might encounter in everyday life and examine raters' judgments of effective responses to the problems. In the second phase, adults (N = 126) between the ages of 20 and 78 were administered the inventory and tests of verbal and abstract problem-solving abilities. Results indicated modest but significant positive correlations between performance on the inventory and traditional ability tests. The examination of age differences revealed that performance on the Everyday Problem-Solving Inventory and verbal ability test increased with age, whereas performance on a traditional problem-solving test declined after middle age. In addition, education was unrelated to everyday problem solving, highly related to verbal ability, and moderately related to traditional problem solving. Results are discussed in relation to pluralistic conceptions of intelligence and theories of adult intellectual development.     

美国人的反思及对我们的启示——感受科学理性与世俗人文主义的新脉动

本文从美国世俗人文主义者意欲恢复科学理性的视角,将第十二届探索中心世界大会上部分发言人的观点呈现出来。主要涉及对美国布什8年执政进行了反思,分析了当前国际上科学阻力与非理性运动发展,发出了对科学理性与世俗人文主义的呼唤。这些有助于我们了解当代国际非宗教运动发展情况。     

Learning new meanings for old words: effects of semantic relatedness

Changes to our everyday activities mean that adult language users need to learn new meanings for previously unambiguous words. For example, we need to learn that a "tweet" is not only the sound a bird makes, but also a short message on a social networking site. In these experiments, adult participants learned new fictional meanings for words with a single dominant meaning (e.g., "ant") by reading paragraphs that described these novel meanings. Explicit recall of these meanings was significantly better when there was a strong semantic relationship between the novel meaning and the existing meaning. This relatedness effect emerged after relatively brief exposure to the meanings (Experiment 1), but it persisted when training was extended across 7?days (Experiment 2) and when semantically demanding tasks were used during this extended training (Experiment 3). A lexical decision task was used to assess the impact of learning on online recognition. In Experiment 3, participants responded more quickly to words whose new meaning was semantically related than to those with an unrelated meaning. This result is consistent with earlier studies showing an effect of meaning relatedness on lexical decision, and it indicates that these newly acquired meanings become integrated with participants' preexisting knowledge about the meanings of words.