Parallel processing in visual perception and memory: What goes where and when?

This article begins with reviews of parallel processing models in the areas of visual perception and memory, pointing out kinds of information purported to be processed in each, and the overlap in the physiological substrates involved. Next, some pertinent literature having to do with the linkage between perception and memory is reviewed (e.g., visual memory for what or where), concluding that there exists a serious lack of research and knowledge of how different perceptual processes may lead to facilitated, distorted or impaired memory in different forms of storage. Some possible scenarios are presented concerning how perceptual information might be interfaced with memorial mechanisms, and some working hypotheses are considered. Finally, a new paradigm is outlined that examines the linkage between local and global perceptual processing and explicit and implicit learning. This paradigm combines the global precedence paradigm of Navon (1977; 1981) and the sequence learning paradigm of Nissen and Bullemer (1987). Convincing arguments indicate that global stimuli are mediated more quickly via one perceptual stream (the M-cell pathway), but can be processed more slowly by another (the P-cell system). Local aspects of the stimuli are exclusively mediated by the P-cell system. The results of two experiments employing iterations of stimulus sequence, in which sequence learning is possible and measurable in terms of reaction time changes over trials are presented. The second experiment indicates that information thought to be mediated by the M-cell pathway results in incidental sequential learning, while other information thought to be mediated by the P-cell pathway does not. Spatial filtering of the visual stimuli reveals that low spatial frequencies are necessary for sequence learning to occur. The issue of whether this learning is implicit or explicit is also discussed. Ideas for future research, exploring this new area of interest, are proposed. Current knowledge of perceptual and memorial deficits in special populations are considered in an attempt to identify new areas of investigation.     

The ‘If’ in the ‘What If’

In this paper, I defend the view that any good account of the logical form of thought experiments should contain a conditional. Moreover, there are some reasons to think it should be a counterfactual conditional. First, I defend Williamson’s account of the logical form of thought experiments against a competing account offered by Ichikawa and Jarvis. The two accounts have a similar structure, but Williamson’s posits a counterfactual conditional where Ichikawa and Jarvis’ posits a strict conditional. Williamson’s motivation is related to the problem of deviant realizations, and Ichikawa and Jarvis propose to take care of this problem by enriching the content of the thought experiment in the way we enrich the content of a text of fiction. However, this sort of enrichment is also compatible with Williamson’s account. I then consider a different view, defended by Malmgren, on which a complex possibility claim exhausts our reasoning on typical thought experiments. I argue that this account, leaving out a conditional, fails to represent an important part of our reasoning with thought experiments. This is brought out by reflection on the relationship between thought experiments and similar actual cases and by reflection on the requirement, formulated by Malmgren herself, that our reasoning should have an adequate level of generality.

     

The ‘Two Worlds’ Theory in the Phaedo

At least in some dialogues, Plato has been thought to hold the so-called Two Worlds Theory (TW), according to which there can be belief but not knowledge about sensibles, and knowledge but not belief about forms. The Phaedo is one such dialogue. In this paper, I explore some key passages that might be thought to support TW, and ask whether they in fact do so. I also consider the related issue of whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at all, we can have it only when discarnate.     

‘Warm’ and ‘cold’ personality factors in human sexuality

Human sexual responsiveness in the coital relationship has been found to vary between sexual partners. The present study was conducted to determine: (1) the affect of ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ personalities of the sexual partners on foreplay, afterplay, pre- and post-communication, and (2) ‘warmness’ or ‘coldness’ demonstrated in acts of these criteria in the sexual relationship. Significant differences were found in each instance.     

Mathematical modeling of the effects of ‘capability’ and ‘intent’ on the stability of a competitive international system

In international relations theory, there is a long history of Richardson-like modeling of the evolution of military capability. Usually, such models are deterministic and predictive and do not allow for the representation of the transition from competitive peace to shooting war. More recently, models have been developed which attempt to represent the evolution of relationship between nations. The relationship between nations, varying from friendship to hostility, is taken to be synonymous with the intent of nations towards each other, varying from good will to malice. Generally, these relationship models do not include capability though common sense would indicate that capability and mutual intent should profoundly influence each other. A model is presented here which combines these two fundamental attributes of international relations and attempts to represent the outbreak of war in the world system by the onset of deterministic chaos in the extended model.On leave 1994–95 at U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. 20451, U.S.A.     

What’s the object of object working memory in infancy? Unraveling ‘what’ and ‘how many’

Infants have a bandwidth-limited object working memory (WM) that can both individuate and identify objects in a scene, (answering ‘how many?’ or ‘what?’, respectively). Studies of infants’ WM for objects have typically looked for limits on either ‘how many’ or ‘what’, yielding different estimates of infant capacity. Infants can keep track of about three individuals (regardless of identity), but appear to be much more limited in the number of specific identities they can recall. Why are the limits on ‘how many’ and ‘what’ different? Are the limits entirely separate, do they interact, or are they simply two different aspects of the same underlying limit?We sought to unravel these limits in a series of experiments which tested 9- and 12-month-olds’ WM for object identities under varying degrees of difficulty. In a violation-of-expectation looking-time task, we hid objects one at a time behind separate screens, and then probed infants’ WM for the shape identity of the penultimate object in the sequence. We manipulated the difficulty of the task by varying both the number of objects in hiding locations and the number of means by which infants could detect a shape change to the probed object. We found that 9-month-olds’ WM for identities was limited by the number of hiding locations: when the probed object was one of two objects hidden (one in each of two locations), 9-month-olds succeeded, and they did so even though they were given only one means to detect the change. However, when the probed object was one of three objects hidden (one in each of three locations), they failed, even when they were given two means to detect the shape change. Twelve-month-olds, by contrast, succeeded at the most difficult task level.Results show that WM for ‘how many’ and for ‘what’ are not entirely separate. Individuated objects are tracked relatively cheaply. Maintaining bindings between indexed objects and identifying featural information incurs a greater attentional/memory cost. This cost reduces with development. We conclude that infant WM supports a small number of featureless object representations that index the current locations of objects. These can have featural information bound to them, but only at substantial cost.     

‘Serving Two Masters’: Protestant Churches in Korea and Money

Materialism or religio-economic entrepreneurship has been a primary impetus for the explosive growth of Protestant churches in Korea, especially since the 1960s, when rapid industrialisation began to propel Korean society into tremendous economic prosperity. However, since the early 1990s, there has been stagnation, even decline. The primary aim of this article is to identify the most pressing problems facing the Korean Protestant churches and show how these problems have begun to render them less vibrant and possibly to bring about decline in their membership. More specifically, the article identifies how materialism, having deeply penetrated Korean Christianity, led it first to grow and then decline; thus robbing it of its requisite or intrinsic organisational characteristics – being the light and salt of the world.     

Motivation for reward as a function of required effort: Dissociating the ‘liking’ from the ‘wanting’ system in humans

Recent studies investigating the neurobiology of reward motivation in animals have begun to deconstruct reward into separable neural systems involving the ‘liking’ of a reward (hedonic enjoyment of consumption) versus the ‘wanting’ of a reward (incentive salience to obtain reward). To date, however, it is unclear whether these systems are also separable in humans. We examined this question by manipulating the effort (clicking on a moving square) required for participants to obtain a reward (humorous versus non-humorous cartoon). Overall, as the required effort to view a humorous cartoon increased, participants were less likely to choose this reward. Moreover, individual differences in cartoon preference predicted cartoon choice at low levels of required effort, but not at high levels of required effort. These findings suggest that manipulating effort may be a valid method for dissociating the ‘liking’ from ‘wanting’ components of reward motivation in humans.

On Two Versions of ‘the Surprise Examination Paradox’

In this paper, I consider a popular version of the clever student’s reasoning in the surprise examination case, and demonstrate that a valid argument can be constructed. The valid argument is a reductio ad absurdum with the proposition that the student knows on the morning of the first day that the teacher’s announcement is fulfilled as its reductio. But it would not give rise to any paradox. In the process, I criticize Saul Kripke’s solution and Timothy Williamson’s attack on a key step of the student’s reasoning. I then consider the condemned prisoner case in W. V. Quine’s paper ‘On a So-Called Paradox’. I argue that the prisoner’s reasoning as conceived by Quine is more relevant and reasonable than the student’s argument in the popular version of the surprise examination case. I also argue that Quine’s criticism of the prisoner’s reasoning is correct, and therefore that the condemned prisoner case, and the surprise examination case as well, would not generate any paradox.     

Reiteration: The ‘Imperative of the Word’ and Echoing the ‘Significative Terms’

Abstract

The act of reiteration is viewed as a therapeutic reply that is especially responsive in the face of what Lacan (1977) and Heidegger (1927/1962) respectively refer to as “empty speech” and “idle talk.” By hearing and selecting those key signifiers and phrasings that bear the client's story of distress, the act of reiteration allows us to focus and address the “subject who speaks” rather than the commonsense storyline itself. As an active and continuing punctuation of the client's direct discourse at the level of the word, the act of reiteration is only the first moment of a more complete narrative reply. But in keeping the therapist ever grounded in the client's direct expressions, it is this first moment of reiteration that leaves the therapist positioned to be responsive to the client's discourse of “rhetorical displacements,” of intimation and allusion, as these “echo” from “elsewhere.”     

‘Exploding the Limits of Law’: Judgment and Freedom in Arendt and Adorno

In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the obvious problems encountered in attempts to offer legally valid and morally meaningful judgments of those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt communities. Following Norrie, this article argues that Arendt’s conclusions in Eichmann are equivocal and incoherent. Exploring her perspectival theory of judgment, the article suggests that Arendt remains trapped within certain Kantian assumptions in her philosophy of history, and as such sees the question of freedom in a binary way. The article argues that Adorno’s philosophy of freedom provides the resources to diagnose and overcome Arendt’s shortcomings. Adorno’s position provides a way of embracing the antinomical character of judgment, by emphasising the need for elements of reason and nature in the phenomenon of freedom. In Adorno’s lights, judgment becomes an attempt to express a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the tragic status of the potentially free but actually unfree subject of modernity.

Midstream Modulation in Biotechnology Industry: Redefining What is ‘Part of the Job’ of Researchers in Industry

In response to an increasing amount of policy papers stressing the need for integrating social and ethical aspects in Research and Development (R&D) practices, science studies scholars have conducted integrative research and experiments with science and innovation actors. One widely employed integration method is Midstream Modulation (MM), in which an ‘embedded humanist’ interacts in regular meetings with researchers to engage them with the social and ethical aspects of their work. While the possibility of using MM to enhance critical reflection has been demonstrated in academic settings, few attempts have been made to examine its appropriateness in industry. This paper describes the outcomes of a case study aiming to find out firstly whether MM can effectively be deployed to encourage and facilitate researchers to actively include social and ethical aspects in their daily R&D practice, and secondly to what extent the integration activities could form an integral part of the engaged industrial researchers’ professional activities. Our data show that after MM, researchers display increased reflexive awareness on the social and ethical aspects of their work and acknowledge the relevance and utility of such aspects on their daily practice. Also, all participants considered actively reflecting on social and ethical aspects to be part of their work. Future research on the role of MM in industrial settings could focus on how to embed social and ethical integration as a regular part of innovation practice. We suggest that one possibility would be through aligning social and ethical aspects with innovation Key Performance Indicators.     

‘Necessity’ and ‘provability’ in the later wittgenstein

I present a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic and mathematics. This interpretation, like others, emphasizes Wittgenstein's attempt to reconcile platonistic and constructivistic approaches. But, unlike other interpretations, mine explains that attempt in terms of Wittgenstein's position about the relations between our concepts of necessity and provability. If what I say here is correct, then we can rescue Wittgenstein from the charge of naive relativism. For his relativism extends only to provability, and not to necessity.