The Contribution of Professor Ninian Smart to Religious Education

Religious Experience Reconsidered was premised on the idea that experience is a site of contested meaning and value for subjects (and scholars). Although the concept of specialness has drawn considerable attention, my goal in writing the book was to update efforts to use attribution theory to bridge between religious studies and the psychology of religion. I intended the focus on micro-social processes to complement analysis at the macro-social level. The need for a broader, more generic second order term, such as specialness, emerged in the context of working out an attributional approach and can and should be extended more broadly. While anything can be set apart as special and an analysis of the politics of deeming is essential, we can still ask if there is empirical evidence to suggest that humans are more likely to set some things apart than others within or across cultures. When we take experience as a site for study, we do not have to limit ourselves to describing the range of views held by our subjects, but can also legitimately seek to explain experience in terms that make sense to us as researchers. The breaking of taboos against explaining experience in naturalistic terms will only have apocalyptic consequences if we assume a special/ordinary binary; viewed on a continuum, we can still find special meaning and value in experiences that are not protected by taboos.     

Magic feathers, Wittgensteinian boxes and the politics of deeming

Religious Experience Reconsidered offers an “attribution theory of religion” which builds out from Emile Durkheim’s intuition that the sacred is just some aspect of the world that has been set apart. Despite this theoretical pedigree, however, the book violates the central Durkheimian insight when it goes on to ask whether some things are more likely to be set apart than others. I argue that this impulse is motivated by an unfortunate metaphysical desire to determine if some things really are special. Throwing my hat in with Durkheim, I maintain that the academic study of religion should rest content with analyzing the contested politics of “deeming” something special.     

The Limits of Social Construction: Commentary on Paper by Cynthia Dyess and Tim Dean

The insufficiencies that Joan Copjec finds in the work of Judith Butler are the same kind Dyess and Dean want to alert us to in relational psychoanalysis. Two dangers of this nature are reification (that is, the relational position's becoming “the Book”) and a flirtation with superficiality (a potential outcome of believing that all experience can be understood in the terms of social relatedness). Theorizing “the impossibility of meaning” may be a first step in addressing these problems without having to limit the terms of the discussion to nature and nurture, or essence and social construction. But the idea of the Real is inextricably interrelated with, and mutually defined by, other parts of Lacan's theory. And so, if we simply import into relational psychoanalysis Lacan's conception of the Real, we are mixing apples and oranges and thereby risking conceptual confusion. We should instead use Lacan's idea as inspiration for the construction of a conception of “the impossibility of meaning” that can be used in theorizing the particular kind of problems relational psychoanalysis sets itself.     

Detecting and constructing meaning in life events

Three studies examined the meaning ascribed to events varying in intensity and valence and how meaning detection and construction relate to the experience of meaning in life events. In Study 1, participants were more likely to expect meaning to emerge from major life events particularly if they are negative, while trivial events were expected to be meaningful if they were positive. Study 2 showed that constructed meaning was more likely to occur in response to negative events while detected meaning was more likely to be associated with positive events. Study 3 showed that this ‘match’ between valence and meaning strategy predicted enhanced experience of meaning in those events. These studies suggest that the more subtle experience of meaning detection may provide a way to understand the meaning that emerges from positive events and experiences.     

Something-We-Know-Not-What,Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley,Meaning and Minds

It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea of it, then one cannot speak meaningfully of it. But if this is Berkeley’s position, then there is a puzzle, because Berkeley also explicitly claims that it is impossible to perceive/have ideas of minds. So if he is relying on a criterion on which terms get their meaning by referring to ideas, then, just as Berkeley rejects talk of material substance, so, too, must he reject talk of mental substance. Famously, however, Berkeley insists that there is no parity between the cases of material and mental substance. It is typically suggested that the disparity between matter and minds rests on the fact that although one cannot strictly speaking perceive minds, nonetheless Berkeley thinks that one can have experiential access to minds via reflection, and that this access allows for meaningful talk of minds. Of course, one can only have reflective experience of one’s own mind. But what of other minds, which one cannot reflectively experience? Here the usual tactic is to suppose that, although one cannot have direct reflective experience of other minds, nonetheless one can indirectly experience such minds via analogy to our own minds, and that this indirect experience grounds the meaningfulness of talk of other minds. In this paper, I argue that the reasoning behind Berkeley’s ‘likeness principle,’ that an idea can only be like another idea, can be generalized to argue against this experience-based account of our access to other minds. I claim instead that Berkeley allows for the meaningfulness of talk of other minds by expanding the criterion of meaning in a different way. I argue that Berkeley holds a criterion of meaning on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies either an object of experience or an object that one has reason to posit on the basis of experience, i.e., an object that is necessary to explain our experiences. When an object is neither experienced nor explains our experiences, then and only then is Berkeley willing to reject it as meaningless. Thus he writes of “the word matter,” that “it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us: and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about we know not what, and we know not why” (Principles, §77.) The word is not meaningless merely because we do not know what matter might be; it is meaningless because we also do not know why it should be. Correspondingly, I argue that the term ‘mind’ is meaningful because although we have no experience of minds, nonetheless they play an important role in explaining our experiences.     

Suffering, meaning, and bioethics.

Suffering evokes moral and metaphysical reflection, the bioethics of suffering concerns the proper ethos of living with suffering. Because empirical and philosophical explorations of suffering are imprisoned in the world of immanent experience, they cannot reach to a transcendent meaning. Even if religious and other narratives concerning the meaning of suffering have no transcendent import, they can have aesthetic and moral significance. This understanding of narratives of suffering and of their custodians has substantial ecumenical implications: chaplains can function as general custodians of narratives and sustainers of a generic religious meaning. This understanding is contrary to traditional Christianity, which discloses a transcendent significance of human suffering found in a very particular history involving particular persons: Christ as the second Adam through the submission of the second Eve has taken on our nature so that we can be united with God. Human suffering is tied to human sin, not simply as a punishment for sin, much less as an opportunity to discharge a supposed temporal punishment due to sin. Human suffering is the result of our rebellious free choices. It provides an opportunity for humility and submission, so that, united to the cross of Christ, sin can be forgiven and suffering set aside in the Resurrection. Knowledge of this framing context for all human suffering is accessible not through rational argument. It is a knowledge garnered through repentance, purification of the heart, illumination by God's grace, and unification with God. Christian bioethics is embedded in the narrative of suffering, which is part of the history of salvation and which encompasses and places all of medicine in its terms.     

Critical individualism: Whitehead's metaphysics and critique of liberalism

Conclusion Whitehead's metaphysics contains an accurate portrayal of concrete human existence - one which can serve as a ground for criticizing the abstractions into which liberalism has fallen. His critical individualism, his insistence both on the individual as the seat of all value and on our essential connectedness to one another in modern society, is a call for liberalism to restore concrete meaning to its fundamental notions of individuality and freedom. However, his suggestions that the core values of liberalism can be actualized if we but reaffirm Plato's ancient equation of knowledge with virtue rests on an optimism that is difficult to sustain apart from a compensatory metaphysical dogma. We can appropriate Whitehead's criticism of liberalism, but if we can no longer convince ourselves of a metaphysical vision that supports faith in Plato's equation, we must look elsewhere for suggestions as to how liberalism can be revitalized.     

Parental experience of childhood cancer using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

Whilst survival rates for childhood cancer have improved dramatically over the past three decades, it is still a devastating diagnosis for family members and an illness which severely disrupts the lifestyle of the family unit. Developing an understanding of the impact of the illness on the family is crucial to better support families' deal with the demands of the illness. In this study nine families in which a child was diagnosed with cancer were interviewed twice over a 12 month period, approximately 6 months apart. Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, a semi-structured interview was used to explicate parent's experience of childhood cancer. The results revealed five super-ordinate themes; (1) a pivotal moment in time, (2) the experience of adaptation in relation to having a sick child, (3) the nature of support, (4) re-evaluation of values during a critical life experience and (5) the experience of optimism and altruism. Findings indicate that parents express both negative and positive experiences as they re-evaluate the meaning and purpose of life, seek to redefine themselves, often in terms of priorities, relationships, sense of community and achieve degrees of optimism and altruism. Implications for addressing the needs of parents and for further research are discussed.     

FOCUS: ComplexityandPsychology Guest Editors: Giuseppe Mininni and Mauro Maldonato

Recently the complexity of discursive practices has been widely acknowledged by the humanities and social sciences. In fact, to know anything is to know in terms of one or more discourse. The “discursive turn” in psychology may be considered as a new paradigm oriented to a correct study of (wo)man only if it is able to grasp the semiotical ground of psychic experience both as an “effort after meaning” and as a “struggle over meaning.” In this sense the notion of “diatext” has been proposed as a contribution in working out a psychosemiotical approach to understand how the discursive practices assign subject-positions to the agents of each interlocution scenario.     

Beauty in the blink of an eye: The time course of aesthetic experiences

Under normal circumstances, perception runs very fast and seemingly automatic. In just a few ms, we go from sensory features to perceiving objects. This fast time course does not only apply to general perceptual aspects but also to what we call higher-level judgements. Inspired by the study on ‘very first impressions’ by Bar, Neta, and Linz (2006, Emotion, 6 , 269) the current research examined the speed and time course of three aspects of the aesthetic experience, namely beauty, specialness, and impressiveness. Participants were presented with 54 reproductions of paintings that covered a wide variety of artistic styles and contents. Presentation times were 10, 50, 100 and 500 ms in Experiment 1 and 20, 30 and 40 ms in Experiment 2. Our results not only show that consistent aesthetic judgements can be formed based on very brief glances of information, but that this speed of aesthetic impression formation also differs between different aesthetic judgements. Apparently, impressiveness judgements require longer exposure times than impressions of beauty or specialness. The results provide important evidence for our understanding of the time course of aesthetic experiences.     

Husserl and the Problem of Abstract Objects

One major difficulty confronting attempts to clarify the epistemological and ontological status of abstract objects is determining the sense, if any, in which such entities may be characterised as mind and language independent. Our contention is that the tolerant reductionist position of Michael Dummett can be strengthened by drawing on Husserl's mature account of the constitution of ideal objects and mathematical objectivity. According to the Husserlian position we advocate, abstract singular terms pick out weakly mind‐independent sedimented meaning‐contents. These meaning‐contents serve as the ‘thin’ referents of abstract singular terms, but are ultimately founded in prior acts of meaning‐constitution.     

Psychoanalysis and Child Rearing

In this article we suggest that current controversies around the psychoanalytic concepts of narcissism, omnipotence, specialness, and so forth derive from reliance on a single-track developmental model. A single-track model, used implicitly or explicitly by almost all psychoanalytic theorists, posits that normal infants and children function in ways that would be considered pathological in later life. This way of thinking is contradicted by modern infant and developmental research. Additionally, it contradicts common-sense experience and is, therefore, not a useful model for parenting. On the other hand, Freud and many other writers also posited a dual-track model, which simultaneously allows for both healthy and pathological choices throughout life. In this article, we describe some of the ways in which a dual-track model, which we have elaborated as two systems of self-regulation, can be usefully applied to theory, technique, and applications with all those involved with children.     

Call combinations in monkeys: compositional or idiomatic expressions?

Syntax is widely considered the feature that most decisively sets human language apart from other natural communication systems. Animal vocalisations are generally considered to be holistic with few examples of utterances meaning something other than the sum of their parts. Previously, we have shown that male putty-nosed monkeys produce call series consisting of two call types in response to different events. They can also be combined into short sequences that convey a different message from those conveyed by either call type alone. Here, we investigate whether ‘pyow-hack’ sequences are compositional in that the individual calls contribute to their overall meaning. However, the monkeys behaved as if they perceived the sequence as an idiomatic expression rather than decoding the sequence. Nonetheless, while this communication system lacks the generative power of syntax it enables callers to increase the number of messages that can be conveyed by a small and innate call repertoire.     

The role of imagery,analogy, and instantiation in proverb comprehension

The role of imagery, analogy, and instantiation in understanding proverbs was examined in the light of the Conceptual Base Theory (CBT). The CBT proposes that proverb comprehension involves four phases and that (a) after Problem Recognition, imagery is often used during the Literal Transformation Phase with the intention of constructing a figurative meaning but that imagery does not enter into this meaning; (b) figurative meaning is the solution to a four-part, a:b::c:d, analogy, which occurs during the Figurative Phase; (c) the Instantiation Phase can be entered only if a figurative meaning is constructed, but once instantiation occurs it serves to refine this meaning. A transfer paradigm was used to test these hypotheses. During acquisition, the subjects were presented proverbs and given rating tasks in connection with one of the following: pictures that illustrated the literal proverb information (picture groups), instructions to image the literal proverb information (imagery groups), or analogies involving literala andb terms drawn from the proverb andc andd terms that constituted an interpretation of the proverb (analogy group), concrete verbal instances that illustrated the proverbs' figurative meanings (instance group), or an analogy and an instance (analogy-instance group). During transfer, all subjects attempted to distinguish between novel sentences that were either positive or negative instances of the figurative meaning of the acquisition proverbs. The picture and imagery groups, which were assumed to have used imagery without the intention of constructing a figurative meaning, performed at chance. The analogy group performed above chance and on a par with the instance group subjects, who theoretically had constructed and solved an implicit analogy. The analogy-instance group showed superior performance. Discussion centered on the pattern of the results in relation to the CBT and on the role of imagery and analogy in understanding proverbs as opposed to metaphors.The authors wish to thank Suzanne Leake for help in designing the experiment, preparing materials, and running subjects.     

Parental experience of childhood cancer using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

Whilst survival rates for childhood cancer have improved dramatically over the past three decades, it is still a devastating diagnosis for family members and an illness which severely disrupts the lifestyle of the family unit. Developing an understanding of the impact of the illness on the family is crucial to better support families’ deal with the demands of the illness. In this study nine families in which a child was diagnosed with cancer were interviewed twice over a 12 month period, approximately 6 months apart. Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, a semi-structured interview was used to explicate parent's experience of childhood cancer. The results revealed five super-ordinate themes; (1) a pivotal moment in time, (2) the experience of adaptation in relation to having a sick child, (3) the nature of support, (4) re-evaluation of values during a critical life experience and (5) the experience of optimism and altruism. Findings indicate that parents express both negative and positive experiences as they re-evaluate the meaning and purpose of life, seek to redefine themselves, often in terms of priorities, relationships, sense of community and achieve degrees of optimism and altruism. Implications for addressing the needs of parents and for further research are discussed.     

Reality and Philosophy: Reflections on Cora Diamond's Work

The publication of Cora Diamond's important 2002 “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” (in Philosophy and Animal Life) stimulated the writing of this essay. “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” attempted to show that there are experiences of reality (recounted especially in literature like John Coetzee's novels and Ted Hughes' poetry) in relation to which philosophical concepts and words encounter difficulty. The experiences resist conceptualization. By examining several of Diamond's earlier writings, I try to show that the difficulty of philosophical conceptualization of reality is due to the fact that reality does not exist external to experience. Reality being internal to experience means that reality contains an unfixed set of possibilities. Being experiential, reality is historical. The historical dimension of reality – such as the reality of animal life suffering – makes the words through we describe this reality too weak, i.e. they are not powerful enough to capture reality, hence the difficulty. Consequently, as I argue, for Diamond, the weakness of words means that words are never complete concepts. The meaning of them seems always still to come since reality seems always to have a surplus of possibilities. I suggest that because of this always still “to come” aspect of the meaning of words, we might characterise Diamond's thought as a messianism.     

Sensory awareness versus sensory impression: Affect and attention interact to produce somatic meaning

Abstract

Contrary to the assumptions of common sense—and of some research—focusing on one's physical sensations does not necessarily make them more unpleasant. Rather, attention and affect interact to produce somatic meaning. Fifty-six male subjects exercised at 60% of their aerobic capacity with either no instructions, or instructions to closely monitor their somatic sensations. Half of each group thought they might receive an electric shock while they exercised. Subjects then listed the sensations they perceived, and indicated their degree of noticeability, their subjective unpleasantness, and their presumed cause. Monitoring subjects reported the same number of physical sensations as did the no-instruction subjects, and rated them as noticeable to the same degree. Nonetheless, monitoring produced a more negative interpretation of one's sensations under threat, but a more positive one under no threat. The findings support and extend the view of somatic experience as inherently plastic. The results also suggest that sensory attention can influence the meaning of somatic information—in both a positive and a negative direction—without necessarily imparting more of it.     

Consciousness during dreams

Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes.     

The Relationship between Mindfulness and Subjective Well-Being: Examining the Indirect Effects of Self-Connection and Meaning in Life

Over the past decade, support for the relationship between mindfulness and happiness has increased dramatically. The consensus is that people who are mindful also experience greater happiness. However, little is still known about how and why greater mindfulness leads one to be happier. The current research calls on recent theorizing to help understand the process by which this occurs. In particular, we studied the indirect effects of both self-connection and meaning in life on the relationship between mindfulness and subjective well-being. To this end, we compiled data collected in our lab over the past 3 years. A total of 2,929 participants provided cross-sectional data while 465 participated in longitudinal studies. Across both samples, the data supported our proposed model. Self-connection and meaning in life combined to mediate the relationship between mindfulness and the various aspects of subjective well-being. In all, it is clear that, although mindfulness is important, self-connection and meaning in life play key roles in one’s subjective well-being. This suggests that more research and interventions should focus on ways to increase self-connection and meaning in life as ways to help people experience greater happiness.