Explaining teacher-student interactions in early childhood: An interpersonal theoretical approach

The present study used an interpersonal theoretical perspective to examine the interactions between Dutch teachers and kindergartners. Interpersonal theory provides explanations for dyadic interaction behaviors by stating that complementary behaviors (dissimilar in terms of control, and similar in terms of affiliation) elicit and sustain each other. We observed 69 kindergarten children (M_age = 5.79 years) and their 37 regular teachers during a dyadic interaction task. Every 5 s, independent observers rated teachers' and children's behaviors along the interpersonal dimensions of control and affiliation. Teachers reported on children's shyness and the quality of the teacher-child relationship. Multilevel modeling provided correlational evidence for complementarity within and between dyads. Cross-lagged analyses revealed that teachers showed complementarity for control and that children showed complementarity for affiliation. Children also reacted complementarily with respect to control but only if they were shy or shared positive relationships with their teachers. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Psychopathy and violence: the importance of factor level interactions

The power of scales based on the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; R. D. Hare, 1980) for prediction of violent behavior is well established. Although evidence suggests that this relationship is chiefly due to the impulsive and antisocial lifestyle component (Factor 2), the predictive power of psychopathy for violence may also reflect the multiplicative effects of this component with interpersonal and unemotional traits (Factor 1). The determination of the extent to which psychopathy subcomponents interact to predict violence has theoretical and practical implications for PCL-assessed psychopathy. However, the relationship between violence and the interactive effects of psychopathy subcomponents remains largely undetermined. The authors used prospective and cross-sectional designs to examine the independent and interactive effects of the factors of PCL-assessed psychopathy in 2 samples: (a) 199 county jail inmates and (b) 863 civil psychiatric patients. The Factor 1 x Factor 2 interaction predicted violence in both samples, such that the predictive power of Factor 2 was attenuated at lower levels of Factor 1.     

Blood glucose and brain function: interactions with CNS cholinergic systems

We recently found that glucose injections attenuate amnesia and hyperactivity produced by scopolamine, a muscarinic antagonist. The present study examined whether glucose would augment behavioral effects produced by a muscarinic agonist, physostigmine. In experiment I, doses were first determined for which neither glucose (10 mg/kg) nor physostigmine (0.05 mg/kg) altered scopolamine-induced hyperactivity. However, combined glucose-physostigmine injections significantly reduced scopolamine hyperactivity. Experiment II evaluated the effects of glucose on physostigmine-induced tremors. Glucose (10, 100, and 250 mg/kg) or saline injections were given 20 min before physostigmine injections (0.4 or 0.05 mg/kg). Observations of glucose effects on the severity of physostigmine-induced tremors were then obtained at 5-min intervals for 25 min after physostigmine injections. Glucose (100 mg/kg) significantly facilitated the onset of tremors when injected before either dose of physostigmine, and augmented (at 100 and 250 mg/kg) tremor severity when injected before the lower dose of physostigmine. These findings indicate that glucose can facilitate the actions of a cholinergic agonist on two behaviors, locomotor activity and tremors, adding support to the view that circulating glucose levels can modulate central cholinergic function. More generally, the results provide additional evidence that circulating glucose levels can influence brain function.     

The effect of frame figure type and frame size on the line and the circle Ponzo illusions

Abstract:   To examine the determinants of the Ponzo illusion, we compared the perceived size of lines and circles presented within three different frames: two converging lines, two circles, and two squares. Twenty stimulus figures, consisting of two types of objects (lines/circles) × three types of frame figures (Ponzo/circles/squares) × three sizes of lower frames (small/medium/large), and two control figures were presented on a personal computer display. Twelve students performed three measurements (upper-object/lower-object/illusion) for each stimulus figure using the method of adjustment. To analyze the relationship between single object perception and the Ponzo illusion, we compared the calculated values of overestimation magnitude differences between the upper and lower objects with the actual obtained illusion values of the six object-frame conditions. The calculated values of the circle and the square frame figures corresponded to the difference between the upper single object and the lower single object. In contrast, the results of the Ponzo figure need an additional factor to explain the differences between the obtained and the calculated values. These results indicate that two factors are involved in the Ponzo illusion: (a) the framing effect affects the perceived size of the individual single objects, and (b) the comparison factor affects the comparison process of the two objects within the converging lines.     

Reflecting on the action or its outcome: Behavior representation level modulates high level outcome priming effects on self-agency experiences

Recent research suggests that one can have the feeling of being the cause of an action’s outcome, even in the absence of a prior intention to act. That is, experienced self-agency over behavior increases when outcome representations are primed outside of awareness, prior to executing the action and observing the resulting outcome. Based on the notion that behavior can be represented at different levels, we propose that priming outcome representations is more likely to augment self-agency experiences when the primed representation corresponds with a person’s behavior representation level. Three experiments, using different priming and self-agency tasks, both measuring and manipulating the level of behavior representation, confirmed this idea. Priming high level outcome representations enhanced experienced self-agency over behavior more strongly when behavior was represented at a higher level, rather than a lower level. Thus, priming effects on self-agency experiences critically depend on behavior representation level.     

Satisfaction in interpersonal interactions as a function of similarity in level of dysphoria

This study compared dysphoric and nondysphoric male and female undergraduates as they conversed with dysphoric or nondysphoric undergraduates of the same sex. Subjects rated their satisfaction with the conversation after each turn. The results showed that people in homogeneous dyads (i.e., both partners were dysphoric or both partners were nondysphoric) were more satisfied with the interaction, and their satisfaction increased as the conversation proceeded. People in mixed dyads were less satisfied, perceived each other as colder, and spoke about increasingly negative topics. Thus, in accord with other research showing that similarity leads to liking, the crucial determinant of interactional satisfaction was neither the mood of the subject nor the mood of the partner, but their similarity in mood.     

The paternal function in Winnicott: The psychoanalytical frame

My first aim has been to identify the implicit assumptions underlying Winnicott's detailed notes on a fragment of an analysis dating from 1955 and published after his death. The importance given by Winnicott to the father figure as early as 1955 is one of my discoveries; another is the deep Freudian roots of his thinking. In this essay I propose a new way of linking together the concepts of ‘paternal function’ and the ‘psychoanalytical frame’. Developing my hypothesis, I compare my reading of Winnicott and my way of reading José Bleger's study on the frame. Like Winnicott, I explore in detail a process of discovery, focusing on what the analyst and the patient are nor fully aware of …'as yet'. I am not proposing to unify Winnicott's and Bleger's thinking. My aim is to avoid the pitfall of eclecticism and, in so doing, to recognize both the related depths they sound in their thinking and their otherness. I want to share with the readers their ‘meeting’ in my mind.     

Books: Explaining the Unexplainable

You would do better to say, “Inexpressible and nameless is that which gives my soul agony and sweetness. ” May your virtue be too exalted for the familiarity of names, and if you must speak of her, then do not be ashamed to stammer of her.     

Group performance as a function of group type,task condition and scholastic level

Studied performance on a multiple-solution anagrams task by two-member nominal, pseudo, quasi, and real groups in relation to task conditions (set versus nonset) and school grades (10th, 11th, and 12th). Nominal groups were made up of individuals working alone. Pseudo groups were made up of members sitting together but working independently for individual scores. Quasi groups were made up of members who were working together for a common or shared goal but were not allowed to communicate with each other. Real groups were the usual teams of freely interacting and mutually consulting members. Five words were presented to the subjects in the set condition (unlike in the nonset co ndition) in order to channelize their problem-solving activity in particular directions. The subjects were 192 male American high school students. The most important finding was that both nominal and pseudo groups produced more errors than real groups. Also the set condition generated more errors than the nonset condition. These and other findings were discussed and interpreted in the context of previous research.     

Explaining the forgetting bias effect on value judgments: The influence of memory for a past test

People often feel that information that was forgotten is less important than remembered information. Prior work has shown that participants assign higher importance to remembered information while undervaluing forgotten information. The current study examined two possible accounts of this finding. In three experiments, participants studied lists of words in which each word was randomly assigned a point value denoting the value of remembering the word. Following the presentation of each list participants engaged in a free recall test. After the presentation of all lists participants were shown each of the words they had studied and asked to recall the point value that was initially paired with each word. Experiment 1 tested a fluency-based account by presenting items for value judgments in a low-fluency or high-fluency format. Experiment 2 examined whether value judgments reflect attributions based on the familiarity of an item when value judgments are made. Finally, in Experiment 3, we evaluated whether participants believe that forgotten words are less important by having them judge whether an item was initially recalled or forgotten prior to making a value judgment. Manipulating the fluency of an item presented for judgment had no influence on value ratings (Experiment 1) and familiarity exerted a limited influence on value judgments (Experiment 2). More importantly, participants’ value judgments appeared to reflect a theory that remembered information is more valuable than forgotten information (Experiment 3). Overall, the present work suggests that individuals may apply a theory about remembering and forgetting to retrospectively assess the value of information.     

Explaining consciousness: the hard problem

edited by Jonathan Shear, Bradford/MIT Press 1997. ￡33.95/$40.00 (vii+422 pages) ISBN 0 262 19388 4.     

Explaining with Models: The Role of Idealizations

Because they contain idealizations, scientific models are often considered to be misrepresentations of their target systems. An important question is therefore how models can explain the behaviours of these systems. Most of the answers to this question are representationalist in nature. Proponents of this view are generally committed to the claim that models are explanatory if they represent their target systems to some degree of accuracy; in other words, they try to determine the conditions under which idealizations can be made without jeopardizing the representational function of models. In this article, we first outline several forms of this representationalist view. We then argue that this view, in each of these forms, omits an important role of idealizations: that of facilitating the identification of the explanatory components within a model. Via examination of a case study from contemporary astrophysics, we show that one way in which idealizations can do this is by creating a comparison case that serves to highlight the relevant features of the target system.     

Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences

A number of writers have tackled the task of characterizing the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy. I suggest that these attempts have indeed captured the most important divergences between the two styles but have left the explanation of the differences mysterious. I argue that analytic philosophy is usefully seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn's sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches. This important opposition accounts for all those features that have rightly been held to constitute the difference between the two traditions. I finish with some reflections on the relative superiority of each tradition and by highlighting the characteristic deficiencies of each.     

Valence-specific laterality effects in vocal emotion: interactions with stimulus type, blocking and sex

Valence-specific laterality effects have been frequently obtained in facial emotion perception but not in vocal emotion perception. We report a dichotic listening study further examining whether valence-specific laterality effects generalise to vocal emotions. Based on previous literature, we tested whether valence-specific laterality effects were dependent on blocked presentation of the emotion conditions, on the naturalness of the emotional stimuli, or on listener sex. We presented happy and sad sentences, paired with neutral counterparts, dichotically in an emotion localisation task, with vocal stimuli being preceded by verbal labels indicating target emotions. The measure was accuracy. When stimuli of the same emotion were presented as a block, a valence-specific laterality effect was demonstrated, but only in original stimuli and not morphed stimuli. There was a separate interaction with listener sex. We interpret our findings as suggesting that the valence-specific laterality hypothesis is supported only in certain circumstances. We discuss modulating factors, and we consider whether the mechanisms underlying those factors may be attentional or experiential in nature.     

Representation of interpersonal interactions on the Rorschach and level of psychopathology

Recent theoretical formulations emphasize the importance of the quality of interpersonal relationships in personality development and psychopathology and have resulted in the construction of methods for assessing the representation of interpersonal experiences. The Urist Mutuality of Autonomy (MOA) Scale is one of the most frequently used methods for assessing the quality of interpersonal relationships by evaluating interactions portrayed on the Rorschach between people, animals, and/or things. This study of the relationship of the MOA scale to independent assessments of interpersonal relationships and clinical symptoms in a group of seriously disturbed adolescents and young adults recently admitted to a long-term, open, residential treatment facility revealed that the average quality of interactions portrayed on the Rorschach relates significantly to the severity of clinical symptoms and the presence of thought disorder, but not to the quality of interpersonal relations. In addition, the portrayal of at least one intensively malevolent and destructive interaction on the Rorschach is correlated primarily with measures of thought disorder and impaired reality testing, whereas not giving at least one mutual and benevolent interaction response is correlated with impaired capacity for social adaptation (e.g., inappropriate interpersonal behavior and unmodulated affect). The relative failure to give at least one mutual and benevolent response is also correlated with the severity of clinical symptoms. Though the MOA scale was developed to assess object relations, it seems more consistently to assess aspects of psychopathology, such as the severity of clinical symptoms and the extent of thought disorder, and only secondarily the quality of interpersonal relationships.     

Explaining Math: Gesturing Lightens the Load

Why is it that people cannot keep their hands still when they talk? One reason may be that gesturing actually lightens cognitive load while a person is thinking of what to say. We asked adults and children to remember a list of letters or words while explaining how they solved a math problem. Both groups remembered significantly more items when they gestured during their math explanations than when they did not gesture. Gesturing appeared to save the speakers' cognitive resources on the explanation task, permitting the speakers to allocate more resources to the memory task. It is widely accepted that gesturing reflects a speaker's cognitive state, but our observations suggest that, by reducing cognitive load, gesturing may also play a role in shaping that state.