Unwanted teenage pregnancies: incidence, interpretation, and intervention.

North American and western European cultures are more permissive than they were before World War II about the increased incidence of teen sexual activity. Societies may be more open and teens are having more premarital sex than they used to, but they surely are not using contraception as often as they should. As such, there is a great deal of unintended and unwanted teenage pregnancies, especially in the US. Even the threat of contracting and/or transmitting HIV has not caused heterosexual youths to change their sexual or contraceptive behaviors. The authors conceptualize explanations for this lack of adolescent behavioral change, including procedures designed to identify deficiencies and to bring about necessary changes in contraception-relevant information, motivation, behavioral skills, and situational constraints. Examples of successful intervention programs are outlined. Sections consider the incidence of premarital intercourse, contraceptive use, and unwanted pregnancies; contraceptive neglect; unintended and unwanted pregnancies; and why teenagers have unprotected sexual intercourse. The conceptual framework of intervening to prevent unwanted teenage pregnancies is presented in sections on providing improved contraceptive information, increasing precontraceptive motivation, improving contraceptive skills, altering situational factors which inhibit contraception, and evaluation research.     

Causal Impotence and Evolutionary Influence: Epistemological Challenges for Non-Naturalism

Two epistemological critiques of non-naturalism are not always carefully distinguished. According to the Causal Objection, the fact that moral properties cannot cause our moral beliefs implies that it would be a coincidence if many of them were true. According to the Evolutionary Objection, the fact that evolutionary pressures have influenced our moral beliefs implies a similar coincidence. After distinguishing these epistemological critiques, I provide an extensive defense of the Causal Objection that also strengthens the Evolutionary Objection. In particular, I formulate a “Master Causal Objection” featuring the controversial premise that non-naturalism can provide no adequate explanation for moral knowledge. I defend this premise by first narrowing down the range of candidate explanations to conceptual, constitutive, and evolutionary explanations, and then considering and eliminating each of these in turn.  My discussion of evolutionary explanations suggests that non-naturalists must refute the Causal Objection in order to refute the Evolutionary Objection.     

Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism

In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – byantifoundationalists and foundationalists alike.     

论责任心的类型与层级

责任心的类型多种多样,并且,自个体步入前习俗水千开始,其责任心就既不再是有与无的关系,也不是一个平面关系,而是一个呈金字塔形的层级关系。就正确责任心而言,将“他律型责任心”与“自律型责任心”、“硬角色责任心”与“软角色责任心”进行排列组合,并考虑到量的差异,就生出了发展水平高低不同的多层次责任心：其中,拥有他律型硬角色责任心,是做个有责任心之人的底线。拥有第二层次的责任心有两种典型做法：一是拥有一般水平的自律型硬角色责任心;二是拥有他律型软角色责任心。个体二旦拥有一般水平的自律型软角色责任心,其责任心就达到了第三层次。拥有第四层次的责任心有两种典型做法：拥有高水平的自律型硬角色责任心,或拥有舍小我成大我且自律型软角色责任心。拥有高水平自律型软角色责任心,是做一个有责任心之人的最高境界。     

Killing, Letting Die, and the Morality of Abortion

abstract   David Boonin, in his A Defense of Abortion, argues that abortions that involve killing the foetus are morally permissible, even if granting for the sake of argument that the foetus has a right to life. His primary argument is an argument by analogy to a 'trolley case'. I offer two lines of counterargument to his argument by analogy. First, I argue that Boonin's analogy between his trolley case and a normal unwanted pregnancy does not hold. I revise his trolley case in light of my objections. Second, I argue that Boonin's arguments for the permissibility of killing, when applied to this revised trolley case — and by extension, typical unwanted pregnancies — do not succeed in justifying killing.     

Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection

I discuss Ingmar Persson’s recent argument that the Levelling Down Objection could be worse for prioritarians than for egalitarians. Persson’s argument depends upon the claim that indifference to changes in the average prioritarian value of benefits implies indifference to changes in the overall prioritarian value of a state of affairs. As I show, however, sensible conceptions of prioritarianism have no such implication. Therefore prioritarians have nothing to fear from the Levelling Down Objection.     

Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Sanity and Weakness of Will

This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak.     

Gender and Sexual Risk-Taking Among Selected Nigerian University Students

This paper explores Nigerian undergraduate students’ perspectives of gender influence on sexual risk-taking. Participants were recruited from several peer networks with snowballing because female students initially refused to participate in a long interview about their risk-prone sexual conducts with a male investigator. Analytically, essentialist notions of gender, such as hegemonic masculinity or passive femininity, were interrogated against the backdrop that they determine women’s vulnerability to sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and unwanted pregnancies in heterosexual relationships. There were tensions and contradictions between respondents’ narrative self-presentations as knowledgeable, purposeful, and active social agents capable of elective sexual choice, and as agents whose sexualities are concurrently constrained and enabled by a cohort of interdependent societal structures, including gender, whose unitary influence on sexual risk-taking they consider weak. All respondents concede that their purposive and active pursuit of premarital heterosexual relationships, especially their maintenance with unprotected sex, is a stronger determinant of their vulnerabilities to STIs and unwanted pregnancies than the gender structure alone. Unequivocally, findings challenge essentialist notions of feminine sexual passivity and exclusive masculine sexual privilege, within premarital heterosexual relationships. Consequently, the author calls for the re-examination of gender structure on patterned behavior based on specified social interactions, such as premarital heterosexuality.     

Male and Female Recipients of Unwanted Sexual Contact in a College Student Sample: Prevalence Rates,Alcohol Use,and Depression Symptoms

It is typically assumed that acquaintance rapeand other forms of unwanted sexual contact involve malesas perpetrators and females as victims. The currentstudyinvestigated prevalence rates of experiencing as well as instigating sexual coercion, force,and other types of unwanted sexual contact for both menand women in a college Greek system. 165 men and 131women (82% Caucasian) completed 2 gender neutral measures of unwanted sexual contact, as well asassessments of alcohol use, alcohol related negativeconsequences, and depressive symptoms. Results indicatedmen were as likely to report being the recipients of sexual coercion as were women in thissample, although women were more likely to be thevictims of physical force. In addition, both men andwomen in this sample who had been the recipientsofunwanted sexual contactreported heavier alcoholconsumption and related negative consequences than didtheir peers who had nothad these experiences. Men whohad been the recipients of unwanted sexual contactreported more symptoms of depression than other men inthis sample, but there were no differences in depressionsymptoms for women who did or did not report theseexperiences.     

The Wax and the Mechanical Mind: Reexamining Hobbes's Objections to Descartes's Meditations

Many critics, Descartes himself included, have seen Hobbes as uncharitable or even incoherent in his Objections to the Meditations on First Philosophy. I argue that when understood within the wider context of his views of the late 1630s and early 1640s, Hobbes's Objections are coherent and reflect his goal of providing an epistemology consistent with a mechanical philosophy. I demonstrate the importance of this epistemology for understanding his Fourth Objection concerning the nature of the wax and contend that Hobbes's brief claims in that Objection are best understood as a summary of the mechanism for scientific knowledge found in his broader work. Far from displaying his confusion, Hobbes's Fourth Objection in fact pinpoints a key weakness of Descartes's faculty psychology: its unintelligibility within a mechanical philosophy.     

A user’s guide to the evolutionary argument against naturalism

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating, and cannot be rationally accepted. I distinguish between two different ways of understanding this argument, which I call the "probabilistic inference conception", and the "process characteristic conception". I argue that the former is what critics of the argument usually presuppose, whereas most critical responses fail when one assumes the latter conception. To illustrate this, I examine three standard objections to Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism: the Perspiration Objection, the Tu Quoque Objection, and the "Why Can't the Naturalist Just Add a Little Something?" Objection. I show that Plantinga's own responses to these objections fail, and propose counterexamples to his first two principles of defeat. I then go on to construct more adequate responses to these objections, using the distinctions I develop in the first part of the paper.     

Women's self-reported responses to abortion

The legalization of abortion in many states has allowed an alternative for women with unplanned or unwanted pregnancies who do not wish to deliver and raise their children or to place them for adoption. Of 158 women asked to recall their responses to the experience, 21% reported psychosocial satisfaction at the time of abortion, and 45% reported satisfaction several months later; over half reported an improved outlook on life, and nearly half found abortion preferable to other alternatives for future unplanned pregnancies. It may prove important to make counseling or therapy available to about 10% of women who report negative responses (guilt and confusion) to the abortion.     

The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?

According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of the luck egalitarian approach. Revising the objection in this way suggests that the Harshness Objection has been overstated by its proponents: because luck egalitarians are sensitive to the influence of unequal brute luck on individuals’ choices, it is unlikely that there will be any real world cases in which the luck egalitarian would not have to provide at least partial compensation. However, the Harshness Objection still poses problems for the luck egalitarian. First, it is not clear that partial compensation will be sufficient to avoid catastrophic outcomes. Second, the Harshness Objection raises a theoretical problem in that a consistent luck egalitarian will have to regard it as unjust if any assistance is provided to the victim of pure option luck, even if such assistance could be provided at no cost. I consider three strategies the luck egalitarian could pursue to accommodate these concerns and conclude that none of these strategies can be maintained without either violating basic luck egalitarian principles or infringing upon individual liberty.

On a Supposed Solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the suggestion that Kant offers a solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in his Metaphysics of Morals. The problem, briefly, is about how Kant can hold moral evil to be imputable when he also seems to hold that freedom is found only in moral actions. After providing a new formulation of this problem under the title ‘Objection R/S’ and describing the popular strategy for addressing it through reference to this text, the paper recounts some of the history relevant to interpreting the passage in question. The paper then argues that this strategy is not supported by the text and indeed proves to be contrary to other arguments that are central to Kant's moral thought. The closing section briefly considers other possible ways of addressing the Objection R/S.     

The revisionist's rubric: conceptual engineering and the discontinuity objection

This paper is about conceptual engineering (CE). Specifically, it discusses a common objection to CE, which I call the Discontinuity Objection. According to the Discontinuity Objection, CE leads to problematic discontinuities in subject and/or inquiry – making it philosophically uninteresting or irrelevant. I argue that a conceptual engineer can dismiss the Discontinuity Objection by showing that the pre-engineering concept persists through the proposed changes. In other words, the Discontinuity Objection does not apply if the proposal involves identity-preserving changes. Two existing views on identity-preserving changes are considered and rejected. I then argue that an identity-preserving conceptual change is one that allows the concept to continue to perform its function. A concept’s function is its job, its point and purpose, its role in a conceptual repertoire. In a slogan: Preserve a concept’s function, and you preserve the concept itself; preserve the concept, and you preserve the subject. The paper concludes by discussing some implications of this view.     

Temporary Safety Hazards

The Epistemic Objection says that certain theories of time (like the “growing block” and “moving spotlight”) imply that it is impossible to know which time is absolutely present. Standard presentations of the Epistemic Objection are elliptical—and some of the most natural premises one might fill in to complete the argument end up leading to radical skepticism. But there is a way of filling in the details which avoids this problem, using epistemic safety. The new version has two interesting upshots. First, while Ross Cameron alleges that the Epistemic Objection applies to presentism as much as to theories like the growing block, the safety version does not overgeneralize this way. Second, the Epistemic Objection does generalize in a different, overlooked way. The safety objection is a serious problem for a widely held combination of views: “propositional temporalism” (objects of belief change truth‐value) together with “metaphysical eternalism” (the world does not objectively privilege any particular time).     

A study of abortion and problems in decision-making

This paper is directed to those individuals who are sufficiently disturbed by the complex realities of problem pregnancies and who are prepared to think beyond the confines of ideology. Rigid ideological positions tend to create distance from the hard complexities surrounding concrete human situations and to limit the realities of pain and helplessness that may exist for each of the parties to an unwanted pregnancy. Pregnancy is more than a biological condition or an isolated emotional entity giving rise to joy or grief. Pregnancy introduces a new relational component to an already existing relational network, and, conversely, abortion is neither simply the evacuation of the products of conception nor an endpoint to emotional stress. It is, in actuality, a broken relationship. In the clinical experience of these authors a sense of sadness frequently accompanies a woman's choice to undergo an abortion. Some problem pregnancy counselors maintain that they have never known a woman who terminated pregnancy without sadness. This information reinforces these authors' observations that facing a decision to have an abortion is not easy, often stressful, and an occasion when a woman should feel entitled to obtain the help of her total relationship system in arriving at a decision. The decision to continue or to terminate a problem pregnancy is rooted in a complex network of relationship factors that have an effect on the decision-making process. Repeated occurrences of unwanted pregnancies in the family are more than individual and disconnected events. Relational strategies that effect decision-making in problem pregnancies are effective in the hands of helping agents who value conjoint, intergenerational reciprocity as a therapeutic paradigm.     

The World is Not Enough*

Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the “Normativity Objection,” that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non‐reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the package of semantic commitments that reductivists have typically embraced since the Kripkean revolution.     

What the Problem with Russell Isn't

Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection.