Evaluating the Redistribution Policy and the Right to Social Welfare in Kant’s Philosophy

The notion of social welfare was created by the paradigm shift from duty-based to right-based morality, in which the satisfaction of human needs is a right in line with preserving human dignity. This paper investigates Kant’s view on social welfare in light of redistribution policy. Kant bases his political philosophy on external freedom. Notwithstanding the ethical principles of his philosophy, he is the first prominent thinker to clearly emphasize the necessity of a redistribution policy by the government toward providing for the needs of the poor and the needy. The important question remaining is whether or not the Kantian ideas of external freedom and redistribution for the sake of satisfying the right to social welfare can reach a compromise. It seems that Kant believes the redistribution policy to be not the right of the poor to be provided welfare by the state, but the right of the state, and as such, the states' right to task the people with providing for the welfare of the poor. Such a policy challenges the freedom of the wealthier class and apparently leads to an inconsistency between the two pillars of Kant’s sociopolitical philosophy. The current paper aims to find Kant’s response to this challenge by referring to his scattered arguments.     

Welfare Rights and Conflicts of Rights

The fact that welfare rights – rights to food, shelter and medical care – will conflict with one another is often taken to be good reason to exclude welfare rights from the catalogue of genuine rights. Rather than respond to this objection by pointing out that all rights conflict, welfare rights proponents need to take the conflicts objection seriously. The existence of potentially conflicting and more weighty normative considerations counts against a claim’s status as a genuine right. To think otherwise would be to threaten the peremptory force – and hence the analytical integrity – of rights. The conflicts objection is made more pressing once we have conceded that welfare rights give people entitlements to what are potentially scarce goods. I argue that welfare rights can survive the conflicts objection if, and only if, we take scarcity into account in the framing of a given welfare right. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop in Oxford and the Canadian Philosophical Association Congress 2006 at York University. I am grateful to Adam Swift, David Miller, Idil Boran, Sarah McCallum and two anonymous referees for their comments, and to the Economic and Social Research Council for research funding.     

A Human Right to Internet Access: A Gewirthian Approach

The paper aims at exploring if we have sound philosophical reason to embrace a human right to Internet access. While attempts to make Internet access a candidate for the standing of human right have become popular in both the political and legal arenas, we still lack serious philosophical reflection on this issue. The paper first evaluates the arguments made by various authors, and then moves to provide its own conclusions. Its logic is that if (i) Internet access is crucial for enabling democracy, and (ii) democracy is a basic human right, then we may have at least prima facie reason to see such a technology as a derived human right whose normativity supervenes on the right to democracy.     

Gandhi’s perspective on non-violence and animals: ethical theory and moral practice

Mahatma Gandhi’s profound theory of non-violence takes into account both human beings and animals. His fundamental thought on the subject of protecting animals is the outcome of a cluster of theories, including the non-violence of Jainism, the teachings of the Gitā, Sānkhya, Christianity, and Tolstoy. While retaining the literal meaning of non-violence i.e. non-killing, Gandhi attributes to it certain features that expand its scope and yet also determine its limitations. He suggests that non-violence does not merely imply non-hurting in thought and deed, but that it entails an extension of love and compassion. He identifies its limitation by unmistakably denying the possibility of absolute non-violence. He defends his stance on animals on the basis of a wide range of perspectives: religious, scientific, political, as well as economic. Gandhi demands protection of their lives (rights) and also enhancement of their welfare. This paper aims (a) to philosophically analyse Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violence; (b) to demonstrate how he offers solutions based on non-violence for resolving issues of animal exploitation such as human–animal conflict, meat-eating, experimentation on animals etc.; (c) to systematize his accounts of animals.     

心理福利的结构研究

通过对幸福、福利及经济福利的反思 ,提出了心理福利这一研究课题 ;结合对被试样本的问卷调查 ,经因子分析 ,分别考察了心理福利的三个维度 :自我幸福感、生活满意感和对社会的行为性评价的因子结构 ;以此为基础 ,运用 L ISREL 8构建了心理福利的二阶结构模型。结果显示 ,模型与数据拟合良好。     

Free the animals? Investigating attitudes toward animal testing in Britain and the United States

In this study, 185 British and 143 American undergraduates completed a battery of tests that measured attitudes toward animal testing and various individual difference variables. Attitudes toward animal testing factored into two interpretable factors: general attitudes toward animal testing, and animal welfare and conditions of testing. Overall, there was support for animal testing under the right conditions, although there was also concern for the welfare of animals and the conditions under which testing takes place. There were small but significant national difference on both factors (with Americans more positive about testing and less positive about animal welfare), and a significant sex difference on the first factor (women were more negative about testing). Correlation and regression analyses showed that there were few significant individual difference predictors of both factors. These results are discussed in relation to past and future work on attitudes toward animal testing.     

Who Cares If They Need Help? The Deservingness Heuristic,Humanitarianism, and Welfare Opinions

Citizens’ welfare opinions are highly susceptible to cues about welfare recipients’ deservingness. Extant research argues that this deservingness heuristic is a universal feature of human help‐giving psychology, implying that all citizens, regardless of their values, are evenly affected by deservingness cues. This article suggests that the deservingness heuristic is much more conditional than previously appreciated. Specifically, its influence on welfare opinions is conditioned by humanitarianism: the belief that others in need should be helped. The more people adhere to this value, the more they need information that signals whether others are genuinely needy. Citizens should thus rely more on the deservingness heuristic the stronger their humanitarian values are. I find support for this argument in three survey experiments (two nationally representative), where citizens are exposed to cues that welfare recipients are either lazy (undeserving) or unlucky (deserving). These findings have important implications for our understanding of citizens’ welfare opinions.     

Religion,Human Rights,and Neo‐liberalism in a Post‐Humanist Era

In a modern and secularized world, churches and religious groups that fight in the public sphere for social justice justify these actions in the name of defending human rights. This has been the path taken to express in non‐religious language what they understand to be a God‐given mission. Based on the distinction between civil rights, political rights, and social rights, which make up the set of human rights, this article analyzes the relationship between the notion of religious mission and the struggle for human rights; how neoliberal ideology, in an anti‐humanist perspective, criticizes the notion of social rights and social justice with the denial of any human right above the laws of the market; and the challenges that this neoliberal ideology poses for the justification of the social and political action of religious groups and institutions in the contemporary globalized world with a growing post/anti‐humanist culture.     

The Interplay of Empathy and Individualism in Support for Social Welfare Policies

Public support for government welfare programs is grounded in two potentially conflicting factors: a belief in individualism which undermines support for welfare assistance and the capacity for empathy which potentially enhances support. However, empathy is an expensive psychological commodity subject to pervasive up- and down-regulation. This article examines the degree to which a belief in individualism affects the expression of compassionate support for a person in need among those with the capacity for empathy. In two online survey experiments, empathic ability powerfully increases support for a welfare recipient and social welfare policies when it does not conflict with individualism. But, empathic ability decreases compassion and support for government welfare among strong individualists. Evidence that individualists down-regulate empathy for someone in need of government assistance is consistent with the conservative view that welfare promotes dependency and undermines individual agency. In contrast, charitable assistance is not associated with long-term dependency, and we find that empathy is up-regulated by strong individualists to generate charitable support for the same individual to whom they denied government assistance. The up- and down-regulation of empathy in response to someone in need of government welfare helps illuminate the sharp divisions over social welfare policy among the American public.     

The Religious Foundations of Welfare,Social Inclusion,and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe

This paper unites disparate literature to test the influence of religious belonging and behavior characteristics along with secular welfare boundaries on anti-immigrant attitudes. We suggest that welfare states varied in their religious foundations during the transition from religious-based solidarity to modern state-based solidarity and formulate a novel analytical framework to hypothesize effects across individuals and welfare regime types. Using eight waves of the European Social Survey (2002–16), we find that religious effects are strongest in welfare states with the most religious foundations, the Southern European welfare states, and weak in the universalist welfare states, which lacked historical state-church tensions. Other welfare types show a mix of religious effects, with some challenging expectations. Furthermore, Christian majority membership is often associated with heightened anti-immigrant attitudes, most consistently in contrast to the non-Christian minority. For welfare-based forms of inclusion, we find consistent institutional trust effects and two competing logics for secular boundaries: a propensity for welfare chauvinism and a culture of inclusion.     

Taking a children’s rights perspective on children’s spirituality

Abstract

The right to spiritual development has had little attention in public educational policy. This is more challenging, considering the fact of increasing religious diversity and the focus on spirituality and religion in that context, as well as the way the spiritual is mentioned in documents on children’s rights. This article traces the development from the first documents on the rights of the child and responses to these documents. It is argued that educational policy and practice should pay more attention to the way children’s spirituality is included in the documents. This is an issue of general education as well as of moral philosophy. The article concludes with a claim: spiritual development is a matter of survival and flourishing as human beings, and considering this in the framework of children’s rights could mean exploring spiritual sources in one’s own faith as well as in other faiths.     

The moral basis of liberal education

The moral right to liberal education involves issues of distribution and of content. The former issue bears on the distribution of educational resources. The latter issue bears on the issue of multiculturalism. Both issues are discussed from the standpoint of equal rights.Presented as the first Distinguished Lecture to the Association for Philosophy of Education at its meeting in New York, 28 December 1991.     

Human and peoples' rights: social representations among Cameroonian students

Social representations of human and peoples' rights were studied among Cameroonian university students (N = 666) with a questionnaire based on the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and Duties. The respondents were asked how important and how well realized they regarded the 39 human and peoples' rights to be. A 13-factor model provided the best fit with Cameroonian students' perceptions of human and peoples' rights. Taken as a whole, our results are in line with previous quantitative studies on human rights, confirming structural similarity but also country-specific variation in the aggregation of specific rights. Moreover, our data showed that Cameroonian students value human and peoples' rights highly (M = 6.18), whereas their fulfillment is not regarded as highly (M = 5.09). Same law for all, equality and freedom, and right to work and living were highly appreciated but lowly realized rights. Higher than average in importance and realization were right to education and self-fulfillment, right to marriage and property, peoples' social and political basic rights and right to life and safety. Low in importance and realization were peoples' right to their country's natural resources and independence, right to meetings, and right to express opinion. Women appreciated the rights more than men and thought of their rights as better realized compared to men. We suggest that when women say that their rights are better fulfilled than men do, it is in comparison with the older generation, who are still very dependent on men. Nowadays, thanks to education and urbanization, young women have wider choices or opportunities for marriage and jobs. Men may feel frustrated in the context of political liberalization because the freedoms are more theoretical than fulfilled; the economic crises and cultural changes have hindered their economic domination and their prerogatives.     

The role of philosophy in the contemporary abortion debate.

Inspired by Patrick Lee's "A Christian Philosopher's View of Recent Directions in the Abortion Debate," this essay raises the question of how effective philosophical arguments can be in determining the moral status of legalized abortion. On one hand, Christian philosophers have been successful in explaining both the humanity and the personhood of the unborn child, as well as exposing the incoherence of those who would deny the unborn child's humanity or personhood. Nevertheless, in order to confront the pro-abortion position in its most radical form, a much more complex philosophical argument must be given. Following thinkers such as Alasdaire MacIntyre, Christian philosophers must articulate and promote a philosophical position according to which morality is conceived in richer terms than the mere respecting of individual rights. The social dimension of human nature must be rediscovered in order that the happiness and welfare of others becomes a desirable goal in and of itself. According to a morality where individual rights is the bottom line (for example, that of Judith Jarvis Thompson), women very well may have the right to "extricate" themselves from their pregnancy even when doing so will result in the death of their child. What must be explained, therefore, is the more profound insight that social morality is equally concerned with obligations to others, including those who are most helpless and unable to speak for themselves.     

DOES HE PULL IT OFF? A THEISTIC GROUNDING OF NATURAL INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS?

This paper focuses on two key issues in Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs . It argues that Wolterstorff's theistic grounding of inherent rights is not successful. It also argues that Wolterstorff does not provide adequate criteria for determining what exactly these natural inherent rights are or criteria that can help us to evaluate competing and contradictory claims about these rights. However, most of Wolterstorff's book is not concerned with the theistic grounding of inherent rights. Instead, it is devoted to a detailed and rigorous articulation of the meaning and defense of a theory of justice as consisting of inherent rights and with showing why this theory of justice is superior to the alternative right order theories that Wolterstorff criticizes. The paper concludes that these accomplishments are not diminished even if Wolterstorff has failed to provide us with a satisfactory theistic grounding of his theory.     

Climate change,justice and the right to development

The primary human rights documents of the United Nations claim that every human has a right to development, a right that also includes continuous improvement of each person's living conditions. On one interpretation, this implies a right to a never-ending improvement of living conditions. According to the author, this interpretation faces several counterintuitive implications. First, it seems reasonable that we cannot have a right to improvement without regard to environmental sustainability; improvements must instead focus on well-being, a concept that is partially unrelated to material improvements. Second, if development is a human right, there are several distributional problems with this right. The paper discusses three different responses to the idea that everybody has a right to continuous improvement and concludes that the best solution is to reject the idea that everyone has such a right. This does not imply that we must reject a right to a certain minimum level of well-being; it just means that this right cannot include claims for never-ending improvement.     

Human dignity – the foundation of political human rights? Empirical research among youth in Germany

This article focuses on political human rights and on the empirically assessed legitimation of these rights. This research considers the rights of refugees, the active and passive right to vote, and the right of protest. Given that the research is empirical research, respondents are requested to express agreement, disagreement or neutrality. The assumption is that contextual factors influence people’s assessment of rights. One contextual factor is, firstly, the concept of human dignity. International human rights covenants regard human dignity as the very foundation of all rights. That said, the concept of human dignity is subject to different understandings and – certainly in the past – the understanding of what constitutes human dignity has varied. Dignity can be related to the appreciation of the person given by others, to the moral behaviour of a person, and it can be understood as inherently related to the individual as a human being. It is this last understanding that forms the basis of modern declarations of human rights. Furthermore, the respondents’ value orientations and religious beliefs, along with society’s socio-political perception, will be examined to ascertain whether these factors have any influence on respondents’ attitudes towards political rights. The key question is: does human dignity influence people’s view of the legitimacy of political rights and do other factors also count? The empirical analysis was undertaken done with German youth (N=2244). Findings show that the concept of inherent human dignity is a strong predictor for respondents’ attitudes towards political rights, but that it is not the unique predictor; relevant concepts are the value orientation of youth and their socio-political orientation. The significance of religious beliefs as a predictor is low.     

History, Human Rights, and Globalization

An illustrative comparison of human rights in 1948 and the contemporary period, attempting to gauge the impact of globalization on changes in the content of human rights (e.g., collective rights, women's rights, right to a healthy environment), major abusers and guarantors of human rights (e.g., state actors, transnational corporations, social movements), and alternative justifications of human rights (e.g., pragmatic agreement, moral intuitionism, overlapping consensus, cross‐cultural dialogue).     

Human and Animal Subjects of Research: The Moral Significance of Respect versus Welfare

Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit justification, it is not clear why or whether this should be the case. Ethics regulations guiding human subject research include principles such as respect for persons—and related duties—that are required as a matter of justice while regulations guiding animal subject research attend only to highly circumscribed considerations of welfare. Further, the regulations guiding research on animals discount any consideration of animal welfare relative to comparable human welfare. This paper explores two of the most promising justifications for these differences␣between the two sets of regulations. The first potential justification points to lesser moral status for animals on the basis of their lesser capacities. The second potential justification relies on a claim about the permissibility of moral partiality as␣found in common morality. While neither potential justification is sufficient to justify the regulatory difference as it stands, there is possible common ground between supporters of some regulatory difference and those rejecting the current difference.     

A life of ease and immorality: Health professionals' constructions of mothering on welfare

Mothering on welfare is often discussed as perpetuating disadvantage and discouraging individuals from meaningful social activity defined as paid employment. This is understood in the context of increasing commitment to a neo‐liberalist agenda, where people are viewed as autonomous individuals in a market economy, and unequal rewards within this economy are due to individual failings. The discourse analysis presented here examines how health professionals in New Zealand construct what it means to be a mother on welfare within the context of interviews on the health care needs of adolescent mothers. Mothering on welfare is predominantly described as transgressing social norms, where a life of ease is an indicator of immoral conduct and personal value is determined through education and employment. The welfare mother is also viewed as transgressing the norms of appropriate family structures and the sexual practices sanctioned within these structures. The legitimate work of mothering is absent in these accounts while the life of ease and plenty on welfare is made visible. These discourses draw attention to the ways in which welfare mothers are disqualified from neo‐liberal definitions of citizenship, and demonstrate how motherhood on welfare is regarded as undermining rather than contributing to society. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.