A dual-process account of digit invariance learning

Performance in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) digit invariance task was originally thought to be mediated by unconscious abstraction of a “rule” that identified the invariant feature across all study items. Subsequent explanations have suggested explicit strategy use or similarity-to-exemplar matching rather than abstraction. This paper presents data that suggest that both similarity and abstraction can be used under different task demands. Delay between study and test afforded abstraction of the invariant knowledge whereas reducing the pool of study exemplars enhanced responding based on specific similarity. These results parallel effects found in the categorization literature. Rule abstraction in this sense may be due to statistical learning of feature frequency rather than abstraction of a central tendency or a complex/conceptual rule. Categorizing responses into subjective memory states (remember/know/guess) demonstrates that neither the similarity matching nor the abstraction mechanism uses information from episodic memory. Confidence measures show that participants are more confident of responses when the prototypical representation is used but not specific similarity. Taken together, these data suggest that abstracted knowledge is not held consciously but that participants have meta-awareness of when they are using the abstracted representation.     

Associative interference in recognition memory: A dual-process account

Associative interference from overlapping word pairs (A-B, A-D) reduces recall but has inconsistent effects on recognition. A dual-process account suggests that interference conditions reduce recollection but increase familiarity. This is predicted to increase recognition false alarms but have variable effects on recognition hits, depending on the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity. In three experiments that varied materials (sentences or random nouns) and test type (associative or pair recognition), interference conditions always increased recognition false alarms, but sometimes increased and sometimes decreased recognition hits. However, remember hits always decreased and know hits always increased with interference, patterns predicted of the recollection and familiarity processes, respectively. According to the dual-process view, a manipulation that affects the component processes in opposite ways can produce inconsistent patterns of recognition performance as the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity changes across tasks.     

Individual differences in conditional reasoning: A dual-process account

Dual-process theories of conditional reasoning predict that relationships among four basic logical forms, and to intellectual ability and thinking predictions, are most evident when conflict arises between experiential and analytic processing (e.g., Stanovich & West, ). To test these predictions, 210 undergraduates were presented with conditionals for which the consequents were either weakly or strongly associated with alternative antecedents (i.e., WA and SA problems, respectively). Consistent with predictions, modus ponens inferences were not related to inferences on the uncertain forms (affirmation of the consequent, denial of the antecedent). On WA problems, modus tollens, affirmation of the consequent, and denial of the antecedent were related to each other and to verbal ability. Modus ponens was linked to verbal ability only when disabling conditions were activated. In accord with the predictions of Stanovich and West (), on most problems, thinking dispositions predicted variance in inferences independently from verbal ability. We argue that a largely automatic experiential processing system governs performance on modus ponens, unless disablers are activated. Consciously controlled analytic processing predominates on the uncertain forms and, under some conditions, on modus tollens.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

A dual-process account of female facial attractiveness preferences: Sexual and nonsexual routes

The current study conceptualizes facial attractiveness as a dual-process judgment, combining sexual and aesthetic value. We hypothesized that holistic face processing is more integral to perceiving aesthetic preference and feature-based processing is more integral to sexual preference. In order to manipulate holistic versus feature-based processing, we used a variation of the composite face paradigm. Previous work indicates that slightly shifting the top from the bottom half of a face disrupts holistic processing and enhances feature-based processing. In the present study, while nonsexual judgments best explained facial attraction in whole-face images, a reversal occurred for split-face images such that sexual judgments best explained facial attraction, but only for mate-relevant faces (i.e., other-sex). These findings indicate that disrupting holistic processing can decouple sexual from nonsexual judgments of facial attraction, thereby establishing the presence of a dual-process.     

Models of recognition: A review of arguments in favor of a dual-process account

The majority of computationally specified models of recognition memory have been based on a single-process interpretation, claiming that familiarity is the only influence on recognition. There is increasing evidence that recognition is, in fact, based on two processes: recollection and familiarity. This article reviews the current state of the evidence for dual-process models, including the usefulness of the remember/know paradigm, and interprets the relevant results in terms of the source of activation confusion (SAC) model of memory. We argue that the evidence from each of the areas we discuss, when combined, presents a strong case that inclusion of a recollection process is necessary. Given this conclusion, we also argue that the dual-process claim that the recollection process is always available is, in fact, more parsimonious than the single-process claim that the recollection process is used only in certain paradigms. The value of a well-specified process model such as the SAC model is discussed with regard to other types of dual-process models.     

A learning theory account of depression

Learning theory provides a foundation for understanding and deriving treatment principles for impacting a spectrum of functional processes relevant to the construct of depression. While behavioral interventions have been commonplace in the cognitive behavioral tradition, most often conceptualized within a cognitive theoretical framework, recent years have seen renewed interest in more purely behavioral models. These modern learning theory accounts of depression focus on the interchange between behavior and the environment, mainly in terms of lack of reinforcement, extinction of instrumental behavior, and excesses of aversive control, and include a conceptualization of relevant cognitive and emotional variables. These positions, drawn from extensive basic and applied research, cohere with biological theories on reduced reward learning and reward responsiveness and views of depression as a heterogeneous, complex set of disorders. Treatment techniques based on learning theory, often labeled Behavioral Activation (BA) focus on activating the individual in directions that increase contact with potential reinforcers, as defined ideographically with the client. BA is considered an empirically well‐established treatment that generalizes well across diverse contexts and populations. The learning theory account is discussed in terms of being a parsimonious model and ground for treatments highly suitable for large scale dissemination.     

Prejudiced learning: A connectionist account

Connectionist simulation was employed to investigate processes that may underlie the relationships between prior expectancies or prejudices and the acquisition of attitudes, under conditions where learners can only discover the valence of attitude objects through directly experiencing them. We compared contexts analogous to learners holding either false negative expectancies (‘prejudices’) about a subclass of objects that were actually good or false positive expectancies about objects that were actually bad. We introduced expectancy‐related bias either by altering the probability of approach, or by varying the rate of learning following experience with good or bad objects. Where feedback was contingent on approach, the false positive expectancies were corrected by experience, but negative prejudices resisted change, since the network avoided objects deemed to be bad, and so received less corrective feedback. These findings are discussed in relation to the effects of intergroup contact and expectancy‐confirmation processes in reducing or sustaining prejudice.     

A self-organizing learning account of number-form synaesthesia

Some people automatically and involuntarily “see” mental images of numbers in spatial arrays when they think of numbers. This phenomenon, called number forms, shares three key characteristics with the other types of synaesthesia, within-individual consistency, between-individual variety, and mixture of regularity and randomness. A theoretical framework called SOLA (self-organizing learning account of number forms) is proposed, which explains the generation process of number forms and the origin of those three characteristics. The simulations replicated the qualitative properties of the shapes of number forms, the property that numbers are aligned in order of size, that discontinuity usually occurs at the point of carry, and that continuous lines tend to have many bends.     

A dual-process account of the development of scientific reasoning: The nature and development of metacognitive intercession skills

Metacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.     

Expectancy confirmation in attitude learning: A connectionist account

Connectionist computer simulation was employed to model how learners acquire attitudes towards novel objects under conditions where (a) they are given prior expectancies that the objects as a whole are mostly good or mostly bad; and (b) they can only discover the true valence of the objects by approaching them. Expectancy confirmation was operationalized through modifying connection weights more after experiencing good than bad objects (positive bias), or more after experiencing bad than good objects (negative bias). Negative bias led the network to misclassify more good objects as bad, such negative attitudes resisting change because of the lack of corrective feedback relating to avoided objects. Conversely, positive bias encouraged approach and hence feedback leading to more accurate discrimination of good and bad objects, as well as to higher estimates of the valence of objects not presented during training. These findings suggest that expectancy confirmation may emerge “automatically” from basic learning processes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dual-process model of reactions to perceived stigma

The authors propose a theoretical model of individual psychological reactions to perceived stigma. This model suggests that 2 psychological systems may be involved in reactions to stigma across a variety of social contexts. One system is primarily reflexive, or associative, whereas the other is rule based, or reflective. This model assumes a temporal pattern of reactions to the stigmatized, such that initial reactions are governed by the reflexive system, whereas subsequent reactions or "adjustments" are governed by the rule-based system. Support for this model was found in 2 studies. Both studies examined participants' moment-by-moment approach-avoidance reactions to the stigmatized. The 1st involved participants' reactions to persons with HIV/AIDS, and the 2nd, participants' reactions to 15 different stigmatizing conditions.     

A connectionist account of asymmetric category learning in early infancy

Young infants show unexplained asymmetries in the exclusivity of categories formed on the basis of visually presented stimuli. A connectionist model is described that shows similar exclusivity asymmetries when categorizing the same stimuli presented to infants. The asymmetries can be explained in terms of an associative learning mechanism, distributed internal representations, and the statistics of the feature distributions in the stimuli. The model was used to explore the robustness of this asymmetry. The model predicts that the asymmetry will persist when a category is acquired in the presence of mixed category exemplars. An experiment with 3-4-month-olds showed that asymmetric exclusivity persisted in the presence of mixed-exemplar familiarization, thereby confirming the model's prediction.     

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.     

A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning

There are two accounts describing causal conditional reasoning: the probabilistic and the mental models account. According to the probabilistic account, the tendency to accept a conclusion is related to the probability by which cause and effect covary. According to the mental models account, the tendency to accept a conclusion relates to the availability of counterexamples. These two accounts are brought together in a dual-process theory: It is argued that the probabilistic reasoning process can be considered as a heuristic process whereas the mental models account can be seen as its analytic counterpart. Experiment 1 showed that the two processes differ on a temporal dimension: The variation in fast responses was best predicted by the variation in likelihood information, while the variation in slow responses was best predicted by variation in counterexample information. Experiments 2 and 3 validate the override principle: The likelihood conclusion can be overwritten when specific counterexamples are retrieved in time. In Experiment 2 both accounts were compared based on their difference in input. In Experiment 3 we used a verbal protocol analysis to validate the dual-process idea at the output level. The data of the three experiments provide converging support for framing the two reasoning accounts in a dual-process theory.     

A mixed Rasch model of dual-process conditional reasoning

A fine-grained dual-process approach to conditional reasoning is advocated: Responses to conditional syllogisms are reached through the operation of either one of two systems, each of which can rely on two different mechanisms. System1 relies either on pragmatic implicatures or on the retrieval of information from semantic memory; System2 operates first through inhibition of System1, then (but not always) through activation of analytical processes. It follows that reasoners will fall into one of four groups of increasing reasoning ability, each group being uniquely characterized by (a) the modal pattern of individual answers to blocks of affirming the consequent (AC), denying the antecedent (DA), and modus tollens (MT) syllogisms featuring the same conditional; and (b) the average rate of determinate answers to AC, DA, and MT. This account receives indirect support from the extant literature and direct support from a mixed Rasch model of responses given to 18 syllogisms by 486 adult reasoners.     

The dual-process turn: How recent defenses of dual-process theories of reasoning fail

In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 crosscut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses of dual-process theory face two problems. First, as pointed out by Sloman, these new dual-process theories cast the net of “reasoning” too wide. Second, and more importantly, this singular distinction cannot accomplish the explanatory work needed to support dual-process theory. These theorists must fall back on using various properties from the Standard Menu in explanations, thereby committing these accounts to a “Standard View” that they had hoped to avoid. Thus, these theorists face a dilemma: either the distinction between intuitive and reflective (or autonomous and working memory involving) falls back on using the properties of the Standard Menu, or it lacks the explanatory promise that made dual-process theory attractive.