Crossed-categorization, evaluation, and face recognition

We investigated the relationship between evaluative intergroup bias and biased errors in intergroup face recognition after crossed-categorization (the combination of two social categories in defining a target of perception). Although evaluative bias and recognition bias often operate in parallel, we draw on two previously unconnected literatures to predict a divergence between these two processes after crossed-categorization. We tested this hypothesis by assessing participants’ evaluations of and recognition of targets who shared two ingroups with participants, targets who shared only one ingroup with participants, and targets who shared neither ingroup. Consistent with predictions, targets’ shared and unshared group memberships combined additively to affect evaluation, but targets who shared two ingroup memberships were better recognized than all other category combinations. These results document the relationship between evaluative bias and recognition bias after crossed-categorization and indicate that crossed-categorization affects evaluative bias and recognition bias in different ways.     

Are emotionally intelligent people less prejudiced? The importance of emotion management skills for outgroup attitudes

People vary in their ability to understand, process, and manage information about one's own and others’ emotions, a construct known as Emotional Intelligence (EI). Past research highlighted the importance of EI in interpersonal relations as well as the key role of emotions underlying outgroup prejudice. Remarkably, hardly any research has investigated the associations between EI and outgroup prejudice. In three studies (total N = 922) conducted in Spain and the United Kingdom, we measured emotional intelligence using self-report and performance tests and prejudice toward a variety of outgroups. Results showed that those with stronger performance-based emotion management skills expressed lower generalized ethnic prejudice (Studies 1–3), more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Study 2a) and refugees (Study 2b), and less homophobic attitudes (Study 3). This negative association between emotion management and prejudice was found with different performance-based EI measures and held after controlling for self-perceived EI (Study 1) and self-reported abilities to regulate emotions (Study 3). Study 3 further demonstrated that higher empathy partly accounted for the association between emotion management and prejudice. The findings suggest that emotion management abilities play an important, but so far largely neglected role in generalized prejudice.     

Group identification moderates emotional responses to perceived prejudice

Two studies tested the prediction that group identification (importance of the group in the self-concept) moderates the impact of perceived discrimination on self-evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem). In Study 1, women low in gender identification experienced less depressed emotion and higher self-esteem if a negative evaluation was due to sexism than when it was not. The self-evaluative emotions of women high in gender identification were not buffered by attributions to sexism. In Study 2, ethnic identification and depressed emotions were positively related when Latino-Americans read about pervasive prejudice against the ingroup but were negatively related when they read about prejudice against an outgroup. Both studies demonstrated that for highly group identified individuals, prejudice against the ingroup is a threat against the self. Thus, the self-protective strategy of attributing negative feedback to discrimination may be primarily effective for individuals who do not consider the group a central aspect of self.     

Avoiding affect in intergroup relations: The roles of dispositional and intergroup empathy in the relationship between alexithymia and prejudice

Alexithymia, that is, difficulties in recognizing, communicating, and processing one's own emotions, is associated with poorer interpersonal relations. Emotional processes are key drivers and mechanisms of prejudice and its reduction, and alexithymia is thought to influence individuals' empathic responses. This research examined the relationship between alexithymia and prejudice, and the role of empathy in this relationship. Three studies were conducted in three intergroup contexts to test whether alexithymia is also associated with poorer intergroup relations with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender+ individuals (Study 1, N = 126 heterosexual late adolescents) and Asian British people (Study 3, N = 300 White adults) in the United Kingdom, and immigrants in Italy (Study 2, N = 381 Italian adults). Participants completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), measures on dispositional and intergroup empathic concern (EC) and perspective taking (PT) as well as measures of prejudice (anti-outgroup hostility, anti-outgroup attitudes, and anti-outgroup behavioral intentions). Lower dispositional EC (Studies 1, marginal effect in Study 2) and intergroup EC and PT (Study 3) mediated the relationship between the Externally Oriented Thinking subscale of the TAS-20 (i.e., avoiding emotions and affective thinking) and greater prejudice. The findings are important for understanding the challenges of late adolescents and adults with alexithymia in intergroup relations, highlighting the role of dispositional and intergroup empathy for individual differences such as alexithymia in endorsing prejudice.     

The Collective Preference for Shared Information

Decision-making groups prefer to discuss shared information that all members know instead of unshared information that a single member knows. This bias toward discussing shared information can lead groups to make suboptimal decisions when unshared information is critical for good decision making. This preference for discussing shared information may stem from group members' positive evaluations of each other's task capabilities when shared information is communicated. Members who already are perceived as capable (i.e., those high in status, experts, and leaders) need not bolster their image by communicating shared information. Instead, they discuss unshared information more than members perceived as less capable. As members low in status gain respect by communicating shared information, they may risk mentioning unshared information later during discussion. Assigning group leaders, informing members of their expert roles, and allowing ample time for discussion may increase groups' discussion of unshared information.     

Direct and indirect intergroup friendship effects: testing the moderating role of the affective-cognitive bases of prejudice

Direct friendship with outgroup members and the knowledge of ingroup-outgroup friendships (indirect friendship) can both reduce outgroup prejudice. Three correlational studies (Ns = 338, 141, and 798) tested the moderating role of the affective-cognitive bases of prejudice, assessing whether the size of the friendship- prejudice relationship depends on the extent to which emotions (vs. thoughts) are relevant to the prejudiced attitudes at stake. In Study 1, direct friendship effects were larger with outgroups generating stronger affective responding than with outgroups generating stronger cognitive responding, whereas indirect friendship effects were larger with cognitive than with affective outgroups. Study 2 detected a similar pattern but with prejudice basis assessed in terms of individual differences. Study 3 replicated Study 2's indirect friendship-cognitive basis moderation in a context of historically polarized intergroup relations and on two new outcome variables, intergroup trust and negative action tendencies.     

Expectations about the future and the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice

Three studies tested the hypothesis that possessing a pessimistic outlook on life moderates the effects of perceiving sexism on emotions and self-esteem. Across all studies, a pessimistic outlook on life (either dispositionally held or experimentally induced) served as a source of emotional vulnerability among women (Studies 1-3) and men (Study 1) faced with evidence of sexism directed against their gender group. Study 3 demonstrated that one's outlook on life influences emotional adjustment to prejudice through the cognitive appraisal process. Relative to optimists, pessimists appraised sexism as more stressful and believed they possessed fewer resources for coping with it. This research emphasizes the importance of examining sources of vulnerability and resilience in understanding emotional responses to prejudice.     

Specific emotions as mediators of the effect of intergroup contact on prejudice: findings across multiple participant and target groups

Emotions are increasingly being recognised as important aspects of prejudice and intergroup behaviour. Specifically, emotional mediators play a key role in the process by which intergroup contact reduces prejudice towards outgroups. However, which particular emotions are most important for prejudice reduction, as well as the consistency and generality of emotion–prejudice relations across different in-group–out-group relations, remain uncertain. To address these issues, in Study 1 we examined six distinct positive and negative emotions as mediators of the contact–prejudice relations using representative samples of U.S. White, Black, and Asian American respondents (N?=?639). Admiration and anger (but not other emotions) were significant mediators of the effects of previous contact on prejudice, consistently across different perceiver and target ethnic groups. Study 2 examined the same relations with student participants and gay men as the out-group. Admiration and disgust mediated the effect of past contact on attitude. The findings confirm that not only negative emotions (anger or disgust, based on the specific types of threat perceived to be posed by an out-group), but also positive, status- and esteem-related emotions (admiration) mediate effects of contact on prejudice, robustly across several different respondent and target groups.     

Religion as a source of variation in the experience of positive and negative emotions

In a series of three studies, we examined the ways in which religion informs the individual experience and valuation of emotions. In Study 1, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish participants (N = 7231) in 49 nations reported the frequency with which they experienced nine discrete emotions. Results indicate group level differences in the frequency with which different emotions are experienced. Study 2 examined whether the patterns of emotional experiences found in Study 1 replicated in the valuation of those emotions by the adherents of those different religious traditions. Study 3 experimentally manipulated the salience of religious identity to examine the effect of religion on the current experience of emotions. Across the studies, findings provide evidence that religion (e.g., Christianity, Buddhism, etc) is related to the experience of, and beliefs about, emotional states. Implications for the study of happiness and positive psychology are discussed in light of the findings.     

The effect of information distribution on collaborative inhibition

Two experiments examined collaborative memory for information that was studied by all group members (shared items) and information that was studied by only a subset of group members (unshared items). In both experiments significant collaborative inhibition (reduced output of the collaborative groups relative to the pooled output of individuals) was obtained for both shared and unshared information. In Experiment 1 the magnitude of collaborative inhibition was larger for unshared items than for shared items, possibly because unshared items were less likely to be acknowledged and thus incorporated into the groups’ recall. In Experiment 2 the magnitude of collaborative inhibition for shared and unshared information was equivalent once all participants were provided with the category name associated with the shared and unshared items. The results of the experiments are discussed in relation to the retrieval strategy disruption hypothesis of collaborative inhibition and the role of social process variables, such as acknowledgement, in influencing collaborative inhibition across situations involving memory of shared and unshared information.     

The role of threat,emotions, and prejudice in promoting collective action against immigrant groups

In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group‐based emotions (angst, fear, and anger), and prejudice on people's willingness to engage in collective action against immigrant groups. In Study 1 (N = 222) White British participants were either informed that in the next 40 years the proportion of immigrants in the UK is unlikely to change (control condition) or that there will be more immigrants than White British people living in Britain (threat condition). We obtained support for a sequential multiple mediator model in which threat predicted British people's willingness to engage in collective action via the emotions first and then prejudice. This finding was replicated in Study 2 with an Italian sample (N = 283). These results enhance understanding of when and why advantaged groups undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that distinctiveness threats and emotions promote such actions.     

When do the stigmatized stigmatize? The ironic effects of being accountable to (perceived) majority group prejudice-expression norms

How do frequently stigmatized individuals feel about and respond to members of other potentially stigmatizable groups? Four studies demonstrated that perceptions of majority group norms regarding prejudice expression can shape how minority individuals respond to minority individuals from other groups. Study 1 revealed that Black and White men and women have somewhat different perceptions of Whites' norms regarding prejudice expression. Study 2 manipulated whether evaluations of Native American job candidates were to remain private or to be made public to unfamiliar Whites upon whom the evaluators were dependent: Black men used a strategy of publicly (but not privately) denigrating the minority target to conform to presumed prejudice-expression norms. Study 3, in which the authors explicitly manipulated prejudice-expression norms, and Study 4, in which they manipulated audience race, further supported the role of such norms in eliciting public discrimination against minority group members by other minority group members. The desire to avoid being targeted for discrimination, in conjunction with the perception that the majority endorses discrimination, appears to increase the likelihood that the often-stigmatized will stigmatize others.     

The impact of submissive versus dominant authoritarianism and negative emotions on prejudice

The two present studies tested the relationships between the negative emotions of fear, anger, and sadness and the social attitudes of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). It was hypothesized that these specific emotions interact with the social attitudes exerting an influence on prejudice toward outgroups with varying status levels. The emotions studied reflected general predispositions to experience particular affective states (Study 1) or were evoked by the activation of various emotionally-laden episodic memories (Study 2). The results revealed that anger increases RWA based prejudice and fear increases SDO based prejudice when a low status outgroup is considered. Sadness enhances both RWA and SDO based prejudice when a high status outgroup is targeted.     

The effect of information distribution on collaborative inhibition

Two experiments examined collaborative memory for information that was studied by all group members (shared items) and information that was studied by only a subset of group members (unshared items). In both experiments significant collaborative inhibition (reduced output of the collaborative groups relative to the pooled output of individuals) was obtained for both shared and unshared information. In Experiment 1 the magnitude of collaborative inhibition was larger for unshared items than for shared items, possibly because unshared items were less likely to be acknowledged and thus incorporated into the groups' recall. In Experiment 2 the magnitude of collaborative inhibition for shared and unshared information was equivalent once all participants were provided with the category name associated with the shared and unshared items. The results of the experiments are discussed in relation to the retrieval strategy disruption hypothesis of collaborative inhibition and the role of social process variables, such as acknowledgement, in influencing collaborative inhibition across situations involving memory of shared and unshared information.     

Self-reflection and feelings of self-worth: When Rosenberg meets Heisenberg

The more people think about their attitude toward some issue, the stronger their attitude becomes. The present research examined whether this strengthening effect also applies to self-evaluative attitudes. In four studies, we had some participants complete a self-evaluation measure before rating their momentary feelings of self-worth (Studies 1, 2, and 4) or implicit self-feelings (Study 3). In all four studies, evaluative self-reflection led low self-esteem participants to feel worse about themselves and high self-esteem participants to feel better about themselves. We did not find this self-esteem polarization effect when more general emotions of happiness and sadness were measured (Study 2) or when participants reflected on non-evaluative aspects of themselves (Study 4). These findings suggest that evaluative self-reflection has different consequences for low self-esteem people than for high self-esteem people, and that order effects in personality research may represent actual changes in self-feelings rather than methodological confounds.     

Attraction, personality, and prejudice: liking none of the people most of the time

Unfavorable evaluations of others reflect both specific prejudice and generalized negativity. Study 1 examined self-reported norms and personal endorsement of prejudices to various social groups. Study 2 used judgments of overweight persons to examine links among prejudice, personality, and prosocial motives. Study 3 examined negative evaluations and social distancing during interpersonal interaction. Study 4 observed the translation of negative evaluations into overt discrimination. Study 5 experimentally manipulated the behavior of the target and observed its interactive effects with weight, personality, and prosocial motives. Results suggest that prejudice can emerge from otherwise unprejudiced persons when situations permit justification. Patterns in negative evaluations are linked distinctively to (a) the Big Five dimension of Agreeableness, (b) proximal social cognition and motives, and (c) discrimination.     

Prejudice from thin air: The effect of emotion on automatic intergroup attitudes

Two experiments provide initial evidence that specific emotional states are capable of creating automatic prejudice toward outgroups. Specifically, we propose that anger should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition, whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state. Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted, results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these findings for emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in particular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.     

Affect,Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation

Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect (3d3; 3 General Definition of the Affects), desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns the priority of desires and evaluative judgements. While 3p9s and 3p39s suggest that evaluative judgements are (necessarily) posterior to desires, Andrew Youpa has recently argued that passages in Ethics 4 indicate that rational evaluative judgements can give rise to, rather than arise out of, desires. I aim to offer solutions to these problems that reveal the elegance and coherence of Spinoza's account of motivation. Ultimately, I argue that whereas emotions and desires stand in a non-reductive, symmetrical relationship to one another, evaluative judgements must be understood as asymmetrically dependent on, and reducible to, emotions or desires. This interpretation sheds light on our understanding of Spinoza's cognitivist account of emotion. For Spinoza, while emotions are representational, they are not underpinned by evaluative judgements. Rather than inflating emotions to include evaluative judgements, he deflates evaluative judgements, treating them as emotions, or valenced representations, and nothing more.     

The Unmaking of Prejudice: How Christian Beliefs Relate to Attitudes Toward Homosexuals

We propose that the internalization of orthodox Christian beliefs serves as a basis for a personal moral standard that discourages prejudice against others as well as for self-critical emotions that follow upon behaving in a discriminatory manner. Two correlational studies tested hypotheses derived from our theory. Study 1 demonstrated that to the extent people endorse orthodox Christian beliefs, they report an internal motivation to respond without prejudice toward homosexuals. Study 2 demonstrated that, when controlling for the effects of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), endorsement of orthodox Christian beliefs was related to positive attitudes toward homosexuals as individuals or as a group, but not toward homosexuality as a behavior or lifestyle.