Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fit between decision mode and processing style predicts subjective value of chosen alternatives

Intuition is associated with a global processing style, whereas deliberation is associated with a local processing style. Drawing on previous research on the effects of decisional fit on the subjective value attached to chosen alternatives, we examined the possibility that a fit between processing style and decision mode results in greater subjective value than a lack of fit. In three experiments employing various combinations of naturally occurring and experimentally manipulated processing styles and decision modes, we found that when congruence was high (i.e., global processing style and intuitive judgment, or local processing style and deliberative judgment), participants judged their chosen item to be more expensive than when congruence was low. These findings indicate that increased fit resulted in higher estimated value. We discuss implications for judgment and decision‐making.     

The effect of global versus local processing styles on assimilation versus contrast in social judgment

The authors propose a global/local processing style model (GLOMO) for assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment. GLOMO is based on Schwarz and Bless' (1992, 2007) inclusion-exclusion model, which suggests that when information is included into a category, assimilation occurs, whereas when information is excluded from a category, contrast occurs. According to GLOMO, inclusion versus exclusion should be influenced by whether people process information globally or locally. In 5 experiments, using both disambiguation and social comparison, the authors induced local versus global processing through perceptual tasks and time perspective and showed that global processing produced assimilation, whereas local processing produced contrast. The experiments showed that processing styles elicited in one task can carry over to other tasks and influence social judgments. Furthermore, they found that hemisphere activation and accessibility of judgment-consistent knowledge partially mediated these effects. Implications for current and classic models of social judgment are discussed.     

Effects of processing style on responsiveness to affective stimuli and processing fluency

In the present study, we provide direct evidence for effects of global versus local processing on responsiveness to and reliance on affective information in judgement and decision-making. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed an increased responsiveness to affective stimuli among participants in a global processing mode. Experiment 3 showed similar effects for processing fluency; participants adopting a global processing style showed an increased reliance on fluency. Experiment 4 replicated our findings in a more mundane judgement task in which participants judged apartments. We discuss our findings in relation to the distinction between intuitive versus deliberative modes of thinking.     

Effects of awe on consumer preferences for healthy versus unhealthy food products

This research investigates how a discrete positive emotion (awe) impacts consumers' decisions on food choices. We probe and demonstrate that the experience of awe enhances consumer preferences for healthy versus unhealthy products. In a series of three studies, we find that awe, compared with a neutral emotion, increases consumers' likelihood to choose healthy products over unhealthy products (Study 1). Consumers' processing styles drive the observed awe effect (Study 2), whereby awe increases reliance on analytic processing, which leads to preferences for healthy products. Moreover, the experience of awe exerts a stronger influence on product choices among consumers with a chronic intuitive rather than analytic processing style (Study 3). Theoretical contributions to the research on awe, information processing, and healthy food preference, as well as practical implications for consumers and marketers, are discussed.     

How global versus local perception fits regulatory focus

We propose a reciprocal relation between regulatory-focus systems and global versus local processing styles-specifically, that global processing fits a promotion focus on advancement, whereas local processing fits a prevention focus on security. In Study 1, participants were shown large letters made of small letters and decided if either of two specific letters appeared on the screen. Strength of promotion focus was positively correlated with speed of processing global letters and negatively correlated with speed of processing local letters, whereas the reverse was true for strength of prevention focus. In Study 2, participants first worked on a global or local task and later chose between two objects. Consistent with our fit proposal, participants who had performed the global task assigned a higher price to their chosen object if they had chosen it in a promotive, eager manner than if they had chosen it in a preventive, vigilant manner, whereas the reverse was true for participants who had performed the local task.     

The Perils of Pondering: Intuition and Thin Slice Judgments

Intuitive processing is critical for effective social and interpersonal interactions. Previous work has found that people are able to form accurate impressions that predict certain ecologically valid outcomes from brief observations or “thin slices” of behavior. This article discusses theoretical and empirical work showing that thin slice judgments are intuitive and efficient. Thin slice judgments can be made accurately even under conditions of distraction. Moreover, such judgments are impeded by tasks that interfere with the intuitive process. Thin slice judgments are impeded by tasks involving deliberation such as reasons analyses tasks. Thus, impressionistic, evaluative thin slice judgments seem to be intuitive.     

On the speed of intuition: Intuitive judgments of semantic coherence under different response deadlines

Intuition is the ability to judge stimulus properties on the basis of information that is activated in memory but not consciously retrieved. We investigated one central feature of intuitive judgments--namely, their speed. Participants judged whether or not three clue words were coherent in the sense that they were weakly associated with a common fourth concept. To restrict the time available for conscious deliberation of possible solution words, participants had to synchronize their judgments with a response signal appearing at different lags after the clue words. In two experiments, participants discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance, even when they did not consciously retrieve the solution word and the lag between clue words and response signal was as short as 1.5 sec. Results indicate that intuitive judgments can indeed be made very fast and without extended conscious deliberation. Possible mechanisms underlying intuitive judgments are discussed.     

Cognitive consequences of motivational orientation: perceived similarity between objects

Recent findings suggest that the unconscious activation of the motivational orientations of approach and avoidance is accompanied by the adoption of a more global and a more local processing style, respectively. A global processing style, in turn, is assumed to instigate a focus on similarities whereas a local processing style is assumed to instigate a focus on differences. Integrating these two ideas, the present research examines the hypothesis that participants under approach perceive objects as more similar to each other than participants under avoidance. To test this assumption, we induced the two motivational orientations and elicited judgments of similarities (Experiments 1 and 2) and differences (Experiment 2) for pairs of pictures. Results confirmed the hypothesis. We propose that the relative attunement to similarities/differences under approach/avoidance is functional because it allows for a flexible conceptualization of the environment/an ability to discern slight deviations from what is expected.     

Can cognitive psychological research on reasoning enhance the discussion around moral judgments?

In this article we will demonstrate how cognitive psychological research on reasoning and decision making could enhance discussions and theories of moral judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-process models of moral judgments and describe selected studies which support these approaches. However, we will also present data that contradict the model predictions, suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be more complex. In the second part, we will show how cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we will highlight approaches addressing the interaction between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g., harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes, such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations of harm caused.     

Can intuition improve deception detection performance?

Two studies examined the role of processing style (intuitive vs. deliberative processing) in a deception detection task. In the first experiment, a thin slicing manipulation was used to demonstrate that intuitive processing can lead to more accurate judgments of deception when compared with traditional deliberative forms of processing. In the second experiment, participants who engaged in a secondary (concurrent) task performed more accurately in a deception detection task than participants who were asked to provide a verbal rationale for each decision and those in a control condition. Overall, the results converge to suggest that intuitive processing can significantly improve deception detection performance.     

Processing fluency affects behavior more strongly among people higher in trait mindfulness

Processing fluency is the ease of processing information about a stimulus, which people can attribute to the experience of enjoyment. Despite consistent findings that processing fluency can affect self-reported judgments, little research has examined whether processing fluency or its interactions with personality traits can affect behavior. The current studies demonstrate that processing fluency is more likely to affect behavior among people higher in trait mindfulness. We manipulated processing fluency with rhyming versus nonrhyming maxims in Study 1 and with regulatory fit versus nonfit in Study 2. Participants higher in mindfulness showed a stronger positive effect for processing fluency on the dependent variable: the number of ideas they listed in a task they continued for as long as they enjoyed it.     

Intuition versus analysis: Strategy and experience in complex everyday problem solving

Research on dual processes in cognition has shown that explicit, analytical thought is more powerful and less vulnerable to heuristics and biases than is implicit, intuitive thought. However, several studies have shown that holistic, intuitive processes can outperform analysis, documenting the disruptive effects of hypothesis testing, think-aloud protocols, and analytical judgments. To examine the effects of intuitive versus analytical strategy and level of experience on problem solving, 1st- through 4th-year undergraduates solved problems dealing with college life. The results of two studies showed that the appropriateness of strategy depends on the problem solver's level of experience. Analysis was found to be an appropriate strategy for more experienced individuals, whereas novices scored best when they took a holistic, intuitive perspective. Similar effects of strategy were found when strategy instruction was manipulated and when participants were compared on the basis of strategy preference. The implications for research on problem solving, expertise, and dual-process models are discussed.     

Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles

A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful.     

Moral judgments and the role of social harm: Differences in automatic versus controlled processing

The social intuitionist model has served as an important corrective to the earlier dominance of rational deliberation in moral psychology. Yet the relationship between intuition and deliberation in moral judgments remains largely unexplored. Three studies were conducted to explore the role of automatic and controlled processes in moral judgments. Results suggest that controlled processing is attuned to instances of social harm. Immoral acts (i.e., cases of serious academic dishonesty) that involved diffuse harm in the form of flouting societal rules did not result in increased moral censure under deliberation. In contrast, similar dishonest acts that involved direct social harm to others resulted in harsher, more punitive moral judgments under deliberation, providing evidence of augmentation of automatic responses under controlled processing. The results suggest that the intuitionist sensitivity to direct physical harm has parallels in the controlled processing system, which seems sensitive to non-physical instances of social harm, such as over-benefiting the self at the expense of deserving others.     

Discrimination of painting style and quality: pigeons use different strategies for different tasks

Birds have visual cognition as well developed as humans. Sometimes, the birds show visual discrimination similar to humans, but the birds may use different cues. Previous reports suggest that global configuration cues are salient for humans, whereas local elemental cues are salient for pigeons. I analyzed the discriminative behavior of pigeons with scrambled images because scrambled images keep the local elemental cues of the original images but lose the global configuration cues. If pigeons use local elemental cues, then, they should show transfer of discrimination from the original images to their scrambled images and also transfer from the scrambled images to their original images. In Experiment I, I trained pigeons on painting style discrimination (Japanese paintings vs. Western impressionist paintings) using either the original or scrambled images and found that the pigeons showed bidirectional transfer. In Experiment II, I trained pigeons on discrimination of “good” versus “bad” paintings using children’s paintings. The birds showed poor transfer from the original images to their scrambled images and vise versa. Thus, the pigeons discriminated good and bad paintings based mostly on global configuration cues in this case. These results suggest that the pigeons use different cues for different discriminations.     

When any Worx looks typical to you: Global relative to local processing increases prototypicality and liking

Two studies examine novelty categorization theory's (Förster, Marguc & Gillebaart, 2010) assumption that global compared to local processing styles enhance typicality judgments of atypical objects and thereby enhance liking. We used an artificial category of figures for an alleged computer game including a prototype and three exemplars that varied with respect to similarity with it. Results show that when primed with a global processing style, participants find atypical objects more typical, like them better and process them faster than participants under a local processing style. Mediation analyses show that typicality mediates the effects of processing styles on liking, and that ease of categorization mediates the effect of processing styles on prototypicality. Mood, measured via self report did not influence effects. The studies reflect the fact that judged typicality and its effects are context dependent.     

Gender Effects in Information Processing on a Nonverbal Decoding Task

Women typically outperform men on the ability to assess other people??s nonverbal behavior. This difference might occur because women are taught to be more sensitive to emotional and nonverbal cues at a very early age compared to men. As a consequence, women might use a more favorable cognitive processing style than men during nonverbal decoding. The present study investigated whether this gender difference is due to the use of different cognitive information processing styles (global or local). Participants (N?=?137) were Swiss undergraduate students that were randomly assigned to either a global (focusing on the whole) or a local (focusing on details) priming of information processing style, or to a control group. They then performed a nonverbal decoding task. Results showed that compared to the control group, local priming had beneficial and global priming detrimental effects for nonverbal decoding accuracy. This was due to an improved performance in men after the local priming; women??s performance was not significantly affected by the local priming. Global priming increased nonverbal decoding accuracy in men and decreased performance in women. We conclude that women already use the more beneficial local processing style by default and that men??s performance can be boosted when providing them a processing strategy.     

Female sexual orientation is perceived accurately, rapidly, and automatically from the face and its features

Whereas previous work has shown that male sexual orientation can be accurately and rapidly perceived from the human face and its individual features, no study has examined the judgment of female sexual orientation. To fill this gap, the current work examined the accuracy, speed, and automaticity of judgments of female sexual orientation from the face and from facial features. Study 1 showed that female sexual orientation could be accurately judged from the face and from just eyes without brows and limited to the outer canthi. Study 2 then examined the speed and efficiency of these judgments, showing that judgments of the faces following very brief, near subliminal (40 ms) exposures were significantly better than chance guessing. Finally, Study 3 tested the automaticity of judgments of female sexual orientation by examining the effects of deliberation on accuracy. Participants who made snap judgments of female sexual orientation were significantly more accurate than participants who made thoughtful and deliberated judgments. These data therefore evidence a robust, reliable, and automatic capacity for extracting information about female sexual orientation from nonverbal cues in the face.