科学无神论与信仰自由

坚持科学无神论的思想导向,存在两个思想障碍:一是无神论能解决信仰需求吗?另一是宣传无神论能保护信仰自由吗?本文就此提出,要准确理解马克思主义关于保护公民信仰自由问题;要深刻理解马克思主义在信仰问题上的突破和创新;要把共同理想的培育和个人信仰的引导有机结合起来。     

Power becomes you: The effects of implicit and explicit power on the self

Some power cues are explicit, obvious and salient, while others are implicit, subtle and harder to detect. Drawing from research demonstrating that people assimilate to implicit cues and contrast from explicit ones, we suggest that implicit and explicit power cues have different effects on people. Two laboratory experiments found that when power cues were implicit, people in high power conditions assimilated to stereotypes of power; they had relatively higher independent self construals, and they were more likely to see themselves as autonomous from, rather than connected to, others. The opposite effect emerged when power cues were explicit. These effects were replicated in a third study, where working adults rated their own power at work and the explicitness of power cues in their workplaces. We also found that power and cue explicitness predicted co-worker support, and that this effect was mediated by self construals. These results suggest that the way power is conveyed and expressed can influence important outcomes in organizations.     

The effects of implicit and explicit security priming on creative problem solving

Attachment theory is a theory of affect regulation as it occurs in the context of close relationships. Early research focused on regulation of emotions through maintenance of proximity to supportive others (attachment figures) in times of need. Recently, emphasis has shifted to the regulation of emotion, and the benefits of such regulation for exploration and learning, via the activation of mental representations of attachment figures (security priming). We conducted two studies on the effects of implicit and explicit security priming on creative problem solving. In Study 1, implicit security priming (subliminal presentation of attachment figures' names) led to more creative problem solving (compared with control conditions) regardless of dispositional attachment anxiety and avoidance. In Study 2, the effects of explicit security priming (recalling experiences of being well cared for) were moderated by anxiety and avoidance. We discuss the link between attachment and exploration and the different effects of implicit and explicit security priming.     

Elaboration effects in implicit and explicit memory tests

Dissociation effects in explicit and implicit tests of memory were examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1 serial-position effects were studied. Results showed that the standard primacy effect found in free recall is absent in an implicit word-stem completion test. In Experiment 2 a dissociation was found for the effect of high- and low-frequency words in free recall and word-stem completion tests. Both findings are explained in terms of a modified and extended version of the activation-elaboration learning account, which was inspired by attempts to simulate dissociation effects in connectionist models. The relationship between this account and two other leading accounts of dissociation effects in implicit and explicit memory is discussed, and a model to integrate aspects of all three accounts is suggested.     

The non-epistemic explanation of religious belief

Conclusion The preceding two sections have considered, respectively, the discreditation of psychological belief, and of propositional belief, which begins with the claim that a belief possessed by some person is non-epistemically explicable and ends with the claim that that person is unreasonable or that that belief is (probably) false. Obviously, only certain strategies of discreditation were discussed, and those only partially. But if the examples of discrediting strategies were representative, and the remarks made about them were correct, what, if anything, follows?It seems clear that the sheer fact that a person's belief is non-epistemically explicable entails very little if anything about the person's reasonability in holding it or the probable falsehood of the belief in question. Nor does the fact that a basic belief is held without reason or grounds seem to speak against the rationality of its believer - not at least with respect to the sort of propositions we called structural. It does not follow that one cannot rationally assess competing structural beliefs - that is another, and given the present argument an entirely open, question. It does seem correct that the more restrictive axioms of the ethics of properly held basic beliefs are ill-suited to deal responsibly with the acceptance of structural propositions. And at least some religious propositions - God exists among them - seem to me to be of that sort. Of course, that raises the question of what, exactly, a structural proposition is - which, again, is another topic.If the argument of this essay is correct, the shift from considering whether some particular (and perhaps idiosyncratic) person is reasonable in accepting some proposition, in cases where this is an interesting and debateable matter, to whether (on the whole) this proposition is one that can be accepted without rendering oneself unreasonable, seems to be an issue usually not capable of rational resolution without engaging in some sort of direct assessment of the proposition believed, and the strategy of trying to escape this by considering whether a person's acceptance of that proposition can be non-epistemically explained seems, on the whole, not a profitable enterprise. Further, often, at least, it can be countered in one or another of the ways we considered in the preceding two sections. So I am inclined to view the attempt to settle interesting debates about whether a person is reasonable in accepting a proposition by arguing that his acceptance is non-epistemically explicable as, on the whole, a failure.If anything, things are worse, so far as I can see, for attempts to argue from the fact that a person's belief is non-epistemically explicable to the conclusion that it is probably false. For, again, this argument has force only if the fact that this person's acceptance of it is non-epistemically explicable is not idiosyncratic, and this is establishable, often at least, only by appealing to the results of a direct assessment of the proposition believed (or by offering a judgment on this matter without benefit of any assessment, which of course is worthless). Nor, of course, is the nonepistemic explicability of a person's belief that P sufficient to discredit the person, let alone P, and the sorts of properties that are often alleged to accompany non-epistemically explicable beliefs seem either in fact not to accompany them, or to accompany only a basically irrelevant and uninteresting sub-set of them, or not to be such as to make falsehood of the propositions whose belief they accompany probable.A final comment These remarks, at best, scratch the surface of a difficult and complex topic. It is a topic on which, so far as I am aware, not a great deal has been written. My hope is that what I have said here may stimulate sufficient interest in the topic for others to provide a further exploration of the issues that I have here only been able to highlight.     

The effects on speeded classification of implicit and explicit instructions regarding redundant dimensions

Two experiments were run in which speed of sorting decks of stimulus cards was measured. Stimuli were constructed from two dichotomous dimensions, used either alone or perfectly correlated. The lack of evidence for a selective serial processing (SSP) strategy (in which S sorts by his most preferred dimension whenever the dimensions are correlated) in a similar study by Garner and Felfoldy (1970) was thought to be due to Ss’ failure to notice that the dimensions were correlated, and thus that SSP would be effective. Ss in the present experiment therefore received either implicit instructions concerning the existence of the correlated deck (by seeing only decks in which there were just two different stimuli), or explicit instructions that on some trials the two dimensions would be correlated and S could sort by any means he preferred. When dimensions of size of circle and angle of diameter were of unequal discriminability, implicit instructions produced partial use of the SSP strategy, while explicit instructions produced nearly total use of SSP by all Ss. When the Munsell dimensions of value and chroma were varied in two separate color chips and were equally discriminable on the average, evidence for a small amount of SSP was found in both the implicit and explicit conditions. With neither pair of dimensions did implicit or explicit instructions regarding the correlated task produce integration of information.     

Effects of implicit memory on explicit recall: Set size and word-frequency effects

PIER was designed to explain findings related to tasks involving an encoding phase and a testing phase in which retrieval cues prime the recovery of what has been encoded. The model assumes that retrieval cues initiate the sampling of associated memories linked to the encoded information and that sampled memories are subjected to a recognition check to determine whether they meet criteria specified by the purpose of the retrieval. The model explains how the number of implicitly activated associates linked to a studied word affects its later recovery and predicts that words infrequently experienced will be recovered with greater likelihood than words frequently experienced. This prediction was tested and confirmed in two experiments in which the associative set size and the frequency of the studied words were manipulated. Implications for the study of implicit memory are considered.     

Method matters: effects of explicit versus implicit social comparisons on activation, behavior, and self-views

The authors investigated the impact of explicit versus implicit social comparisons. Simply being primed with a superior or inferior standard (implicit comparison) produced contrast as evidenced by accessibility of self-knowledge (Study 2), intellectual performance (Study 3), and self-ratings (Study 4), inconsistent with the standard. However, when participants were explicitly asked to compare, increased accessibility of a similarity focus (Study 1) and self-knowledge, behavioral performance, and self-ratings congruent with the standard were obtained more easily, indicative of assimilation. Explicit comparisons produced assimilation when the self was seen as mutable (rather than immutable; Study 4), when behavioral consequences were measured immediately after the comparison (rather than later; Study 3), and when the participants described (rather than ranked) their intelligence (Study 5). These findings support the interpretation comparison model. Implications for resolution of empirical inconsistencies in the social comparison literature are discussed.     

The effects of mortality salience on political preferences: The roles of charisma and political orientation

Research has shown that mortality salience (MS) heightens liking for certain political candidates. Yet the particular qualities that make candidates more appealing after MS has been subject to debate. This study tested three possibilities: MS increases liking for charismatic candidates independent of participants’ or candidates’ political orientation; MS increases liking for conservative candidates independent of participants’ or candidates’ political orientation; and MS increases liking only for charismatic candidates who support the individual’s pre-existing political orientation, whether liberal or conservative. Following a MS manipulation, liberal and conservative participants evaluated two hypothetical gubernatorial candidates who differed both in their political orientation and level of charisma. MS heightened liking of charismatic candidates who shared the perceiver’s political orientation, whether liberal or conservative. In contrast, MS reduced liking for uncharismatic and opposing-orientation candidates. Results thus indicated that MS heightens regard for same-political orientation charismatic candidates, rather than just any charismatic candidate or conservative candidates. Implications for the influence of death-related concerns on political preference are briefly discussed.     

The projection of implicit and explicit goals

In 3 studies, the authors analyzed whether projection occurs for both conscious and nonconscious goals. In Experiment 1, participants who were predisposed to hold a learning goal over a performance goal rated others as possessing more of a learning goal. In Experiment 2, participants who were either implicitly primed with or explicitly assigned to have the goal to compete perceived others as striving for competitive goals more than control participants. In Experiment 3, the authors demonstrated that it was the actual goal to compete rather than the trait construct of competitiveness that was projected. The control of automatic goal projection effects is discussed, and interpersonal consequences of goal projection are delineated.     

The effects of implicit and explicit affiliation motives on vagal activity in motive-relevant situations

We investigated the independent and interactive effects of the implicit need for affiliation (nAFF) and the explicit self-attributed need for affiliation (sanAFF) on parasympathetic vagal activity (indexed via heart rate variability) in three motive-relevant situations: in a socioevaluative stress situation (N = 49), in a socially ambiguous situation (N = 50), and during socially supported recovery from stress (both subsamples). Vagal activity has been linked with self-regulation and social engagement. Vagal withdrawal has been found to accompany stress responses, whereas vagal advance has been found to accompany attenuated stress and affiliative behavior. Response surface analyses in the current study revealed additive but opposite effects on vagal activity for nAFF (vagal advance) and sanAFF (vagal withdrawal) during the socioevaluative stress situation, high nAFF and low sanAFF incongruence predicted vagal withdrawal in the socially ambiguous situation, and sanAFF predicted vagal advance during socially supported recovery from stress. We suggest that assessing reactions to motive-relevant stress situations represents a profitable approach for investigating the differential effects of implicit and explicit motives.     

Environmental context effects in conceptual explicit and implicit memory

Previous research has found environmental context effects for both conceptual explicit and conceptual implicit memory (Parker, Gellatly, & Waterman, 1999). The research presented here challenges these findings on methodological grounds. Experiment 1 assessed the effects of context change on category-exemplar generation (conceptual implicit memory test) and category-cued recall (conceptual explicit memory test). Experiment 2 assessed the effects of context change on word association (conceptual implicit memory test) and word associate cued recall (conceptual explicit memory test). In both experiments, study-test changes in environmental context were found to influence performance only on tests of explicit memory. It is concluded that when retrieval cues across explicit and implicit tests are matched, and the probability of explicit contamination is reduced, then only conceptual explicit test performance is reduced by study-test changes in environmental context.     

No atheists in foxholes: arguments for (but not against) afterlife belief buffers mortality salience effects for atheists

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that people cope with mortality concerns via symbolic immortality (e.g., secular cultural beliefs that outlast death) and/or literal immortality (afterlife belief). However, what happens when these two forms of immortality conflict, as in atheism? Would atheists' mortality concerns be better assuaged by affirming an afterlife, or by affirming their literal immortality-denying worldview? Drawing on an untested TMT hypothesis, we predicted that atheists would be buffered from mortality concerns if their atheistic worldview - no life after death - was challenged, but not if it was supported. Results confirmed the hypothesis and were also found for theists and agnostics. These findings support TMT's claim that literal immortality is of paramount importance in ameliorating death concerns.     

Cognitive biases explain religious belief,paranormal belief,and belief in life’s purpose

Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropomorphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological thinking. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthropomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs. Alternative theoretical models were tested but did not find empirical support.     

When animals attack: The effects of mortality salience, infrahumanization of violence, and authoritarianism on support for war

Terror management theory (TMT) suggests that people are motivated to elevate themselves above other animals as a way of denying their creatureliness and mortality. Based on this reasoning, the present study assessed whether infrahumanizing violence by emphasizing its similarities to animal aggression would lead to reduced support for war, especially when mortality is salient. This hypothesis was supported among participants high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), who are especially prone to infrahumanize outgroup members and are generally more supportive of military action against outgroups. RWA was associated with greater support for war against Iran, except when primed with thoughts of death and violence as an infrahuman behavior. These data suggest that by portraying violence as something instinctual and creaturely, it may be possible to reduce inter-group hostility and aggression among individuals who tend to be more dispositionally aggressive, particularly in the context of the death awareness that often exacerbates inter-group conflict.