Willingness to express emotion depends upon perceiving partner care

Two studies document that people are more willing to express emotions that reveal vulnerabilities to partners when they perceive those partners to be more communally responsive to them. In Study 1, participants rated the communal strength they thought various partners felt toward them and their own willingness to express happiness, sadness and anxiety to each partner. Individuals who generally perceive high communal strength from their partners were also generally most willing to express emotion to partners. Independently, participants were more willing to express emotion to particular partners whom they perceived felt more communal strength toward them. In Study 2, members of romantic couples independently reported their own felt communal strength toward one another, perceptions of their partners’ felt communal strength toward them, and willingness to express emotions (happiness, sadness, anxiety, disgust, anger, hurt and guilt) to each other. The communal strength partners reported feeling toward the participants predicted the participants’ willingness to express emotion to those partners. This link was mediated by participants’ perceptions of the partner’s communal strength toward them which, itself, was a joint function of accurate perceptions of the communal strength partners had reported feeling toward them and projections of their own felt communal strength for their partners onto those partners.     

The effect of mood and incentives on helping: Are there some things money can't buy?

Happy, guilty, and neutral mood states were induced in participants who were then provided with an opportunity to donate blood for free, to donate in exchange for $5, or to choose between donating for free or for $5. As expected, there was a significantly higher incidence of helping when subjects felt happy and guilty as opposed to emotively neutral. Contrary to predictions, helping was unaffected by the type of incentive (donate for $5, donate for free, choose $5/free) subjects were offered in interaction with their mood state. However, the type of incentive did seem to influence the postdonation emotions of subjects: Guilty subjects who donated for money felt significantly less guilty following donation than prior to it and happy subjects felt more self-altruistic (kind and generous) following donation when they helped for free. The results are discussed in terms of Cialdini's negative state relief model (for negative moods) and the intrinsic qualities of helping (for positive moods).     

Motivated by guilt and low felt trust: The impact of negotiators' anger expressions on the implementation of negotiated agreements

Prior research has identified benefits from certain emotion tactics in negotiation, particularly expressing anger to achieve short‐term gains. We demonstrate that such tactics can be strategically problematic due to their impact on an actor's emotions and felt trust. Through five studies, we find that negotiators' use of anger tactics during a negotiation increased their feelings of guilt and reduced the extent to which they felt trusted by their counterpart following the negotiation. We found this guilt to be the result of their aggressive tone and how they treated their counterpart. The guilt and diminished felt trust in turn motivated negotiators to engage in greater cooperative behaviors during the deal implementation process that benefited their counterpart, even if doing so was costly to the negotiator. Our results demonstrate that negotiator guilt and felt trust resulting from anger tactics influence the dynamic relationship between negotiators and their counterparts. This in turn has strategic implications for negotiators, who attempt to mitigate these negative feelings during the crucial implementation phase of a negotiated agreement.     

Social cuing of guilt by anger and of shame by disgust

Scholars have proposed a conceptual structure for the self-critical moral emotions of guilt and shame and the other-critical emotions of anger and disgust. In this model, guilt is linked with anger and shame with disgust. This relationship may express itself in asymmetrical social cuing between emotions: In a social context, other people's angry facial expressions may communicate that the target should feel guilty, and other people's disgusted facial expressions may communicate that the target should feel ashamed. We conducted two experiments, one in the United Kingdom and the other in Spain, in which participants were shown pictures of faces expressing either anger or disgust. Participants rated the degree to which the faces would make them feel guilt or shame in a casual social encounter, and they answered questions about inferences concerning the emotional expressions. In both studies, angry expressions led to greater guilt and less shame than did disgusted expressions. This relationship was explained better by the type of norm violation inferred than by whether the violation was thought to involve the target's action or personality versus the target's character.     

What Do Mothers Make Adolescents Feel Guilty About? Incidents,Reactions, and Relation to Depression

We found mothers’ history of depression and symptoms of depression among their adolescent children were both associated with the type of events that mothers made adolescents feel guilty about and with the mothers’ reactions to those events. Adolescents (20 male, 23 female) described incidents in which their mothers made them feel guilty and what happened afterward. Offspring of mothers with (versus without) a history of depression more often reported guilt when not at fault and over failing to meet maternal needs; reactions did not resolve matters and involved unregulated maternal emotions. Adolescents of mothers without a depression history more often felt guilty about specific events (e.g., breaking rules, bad grades) and reactions resulted in closure (through discipline, apologies, or forgiveness). Adolescents’ depressive symptoms were more severe when incidents were unresolved and involved maternal emotions and less severe when incidents were specific. In addition, maternal use of self-serving forms of guilt induction related to adolescent and parent depression.     

Supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret

This study examined the social effects of emotions related to supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation. In a computer-simulated negotiation, participants in Experiment 1 were confronted with a disappointed or worried opponent (supplication), with a guilty or regretful opponent (appeasement), or with a nonemotional opponent (control). Compared with controls, participants conceded more when the other experienced supplication emotions and conceded less when the other experienced appeasement emotions (especially guilt). Experiment 2 replicated the effects of disappointment and guilt and showed that they are moderated by the perceiver's dispositional trust: Negotiators high in trust conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a happy one, but those with low trust were unaffected. In Experiment 3, trust was manipulated through information about the other's personality (cooperative vs. competitive), and a similar moderation was obtained.     

Moving Toward Self-Forgiveness: Removing Barriers Related to Shame,Guilt, and Regret

When people believe that they have hurt or offended someone, one potentially adaptive response would be to forgive the self. In an ideal process of self-forgiveness, an offender would accept an appropriate amount of responsibility, experience enough guilt to prompt reparative behaviors and improvements in character, and then release excess guilty feelings that no longer serve a useful function. In real life, however, this process often goes awry. Sometimes people avoid guilty feelings altogether, taking emotional shortcuts to repair their moods and self-images without accepting responsibility or repairing relational damage. Others go to the opposite extreme, getting caught up in negative feelings such as shame, excessive guilt, and regret about their offenses. This article briefly reviews research on these potentially problematic responses and suggests ways that each one could be addressed in interventions to facilitate self-forgiveness.     

How a “Reasonable Doubt” Instruction Affects Decisions of Guilt

Jurors are instructed to render a guilty verdict if they feel the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury is often told that this does not mean an absolute certainty of guilt and that even if it were possible to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is innocent, a guilty verdict may still be appropriate. Here, participants read a case summary. They were either told to say that the defendant was guilty if they believed in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or were given more detailed instruction stressing that they did not have to be absolutely certain of guilt to give a guilty verdict. In Experiment 1, participants provided “think-aloud” protocols. Content analysis revealed that those who were given this instruction often used the phrase reasonable doubt to justify their guilty verdicts by saying that although they were not certain of the defendant's guilt, their belief exceeded the reasonable doubt threshold. None of the participants in the control group did this. Experiment 2 was designed to test if the instruction affected belief in guilt and the reasonable doubt threshold quantitatively. The instruction affected both people's belief in guilt and the threshold that they used to define reasonable doubt. The implied values for reasonable doubt were 63% for those who received the instruction and 77% for the control group. Implications for jury decision making are discussed.     

The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction

In two studies we found that feelings of guilt provoke individuals to cooperate in repeated social bargaining games (a prisoner's dilemma in Study 1 and an ultimatum game in Study 2). Feelings of guilt were either experimentally manipulated (Study 1) or assessed via self-report (Study 2) after participants had played one round of a social bargaining game. As predicted, individuals who experienced feelings of guilt (compared to individuals who felt no guilt) after pursuing a non-cooperative strategy in the first round of play, displayed higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of play (even one week later). Results are discussed in terms of an “affect-as-information” model, which suggests that non-cooperating individuals who experience the negative affective state associated with guilt in a social bargaining game may be using this feeling state as “information” about the future costs of pursuing an uncooperative strategy. Because in guilt the focus is on the specific, individuals are capable of ridding themselves of this emotional state through action (Lewis, 1993, p. 570)     

Comfortably Numb: Desensitizing Effects of Violent Media on Helping Others

ABSTRACT— Two studies tested the hypothesis that exposure to violent media reduces aid offered to people in pain. In Study 1, participants played a violent or nonviolent video game for 20 min. After game play, while completing a lengthy questionnaire, they heard a loud fight, in which one person was injured, outside the lab. Participants who played violent games took longer to help the injured victim, rated the fight as less serious, and were less likely to "hear" the fight in comparison to participants who played nonviolent games. In Study 2, violent- and nonviolent-movie attendees witnessed a young woman with an injured ankle struggle to pick up her crutches outside the theater either before or after the movie. Participants who had just watched a violent movie took longer to help than participants in the other three conditions. The findings from both studies suggest that violent media make people numb to the pain and suffering of others.     

Money Doesn’t Stink. Or Does It? The Effect of Immorally Acquiring Money on Its Spending

Building on magical contagion literature, we show that the way in which money is acquired colors the perception of the money itself, and thus affect the way it is spent. In a hypothetical scenario participants who imagined acquiring money immorally (versus morally) experienced more guilt about the way in which they acquired it and spent less of it. Furthermore, in the immoral, but not the moral condition, guilt correlated significantly with spending: the greater the guilt, the less money was spent. We interpret this finding as stemming from individuals?? desire not to handle what they see as ??dirty?? money.     

Effect of opponent type on moral emotions and responses to video game play

This study suggests that fighting against different types of opponents in video games (e.g., human opponents vs. monster opponents) may lead to different emotional responses and moral judgments toward game characters. Based on Bandura's moral disengagement theory, this study proposes that shooting at monster opponents makes game players feel less guilty and judge the player-controlled character as more morally justified. An experiment was conducted in which participants played shooting games with either human opponents or monster opponents. The results show that when playing against monster opponents, participants felt both less ashamed and less guilty, reported enjoying the game more, and judged their character as more justified than participants who played against human opponents.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: Guilt,shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

Blameless Guilt: The Case of Carer Guilt and Chronic and Terminal Illness

My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has, in his view, done all he can. These carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations. Yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness, they nonetheless feel guilty. My aims are threefold: first, to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon; second, to motivate the need to solve that puzzle; third, to give my own account of blameless guilt that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I argue that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care.     

The Gender Heuristic and the Database: Factors Affecting the Perception of Gender-Related Differences in the Experience and Display of Emotions

Two studies investigated the conditions under which people use gender stereotypes about emotion to make judgments about the emotions of self and others. Participants in Study 1 either played or watched a competitive word game (actual game conditions), or imagined themselves playing or watching the same game (hypothetical condition). Participants actually involved in the game made emotion judgments either immediately after the game (online condition) or after a time delay (delayed condition). Both in terms of self-reports of emotional experience and perceptions of the emotional displays of others, gender-related stereotypes had a significant influence on judgments of participants in the hypothetical condition but had no significant influence on online judgments. Furthermore, participants rating their own emotional experiences (after a 1-week delay) exhibited responses consistent with gender stereotypes, whereas participants rating the emotional displays of others (after a 1-day delay) did not show a gender-stereotypic response pattern. Study 2 found that participants rating hypothetical others were more likely to employ gender-related stereotypes of emotion than participants rating themselves were. The results of both studies suggest that people tend to use an emotion-related gender heuristic when they lack a database of concrete situational experiences on which to base their judgments.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: guilt, shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

On Irrational Guilt

A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide a brief review of the explanations of irrational guilt that are compatible with the cognitive theories of emotions, that is, theories that presuppose that there is a causal or a constitutional connection between emotions and cognitive factors, such as judgments, beliefs or thoughts. Following many other reviewers, I found most of the explanations of irrational guilt unsatisfactory, although my reasons for critical conclusions will partly differ from the usual ones. After the review, I will defend a solution according to which it is possible to believe that an act does not have any moral costs and at the same time to have an impression that is has, which explains the guilty feelings.     

Understanding of moral emotions and social exclusion in pre-schoolers and third graders

Abstract

This study examined whether children use information about moral emotions when judging peer exclusion. Japanese pre-schoolers and third graders (N = 110) listened to stories featuring characters who felt happy or sad after engaging in immoral behaviour or avoiding immoral behaviour (pushing a child off a swing and stealing another child’s doughnuts). In study 1, participants judged the extent to which characters who felt happiness, guilt, and pride would be socially excluded. In study 2, participants judged whether characters who felt guilt, no guilt, pride, and no pride would be socially excluded. Participants believed that characters would be socially excluded based on moral emotions. Characters who did not feel guilt or pride were excluded more frequently relative to those who did; however, children found it easier to judge exclusion based on guilt rather than pride, especially in the case of pre-schoolers. Moreover, pre-schoolers had difficulty explaining their reasoning.     

Deceiving suspects about their alibi is equally harmful to the innocent and guilty

A common belief in police officers is that guilty suspects' statements are less consistent than innocent suspects'. This could leave guilty suspects more vulnerable to missing inconsistencies externally induced into their alibis. Source monitoring and cognitive load approaches suggest that untruthfulness rather than guilt should predict proneness to such deception. Manipulating both guilt and truthfulness, we tested these opposing hypotheses. One hundred twenty‐six participants were accused of stealing gift vouchers after wandering about a building. When interviewed several days later, participants rarely detected alterations in their alibi (23–29%). Unexpectedly, for one of three detection measures, untruthful participants detected more manipulations than did truthful participants. Guilt did not moderate detection rates. Manipulations were equally harmful for guilty and innocent suspects, and blindness to the alibi manipulations was not useful for discriminating innocent from guilty suspects. Because blindness effects are easy to elicit in the legal context, techniques that externally induce inconsistencies should be avoided.     

THE MANAGEMENT OF FAILURE EVENTS: SOME CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF ACCOUNTING BEHAVIOR

This study sought to examine the impact upon actors' selection of strategies to manage failure events of several contextual factors: characteristics of the reproacher/actor relationship, communicative goal-orientation of the actors, severity of the failure event, character of the reproach for the failure event, and the actors' degree of expressed guilt. Results indicated that actors elected to make no response when they felt less guilt, when there was no overt reproach, when their instrumental goal (securing honoring) was unimportant, and when the failure event was a severe offense. Concessions were used when the reproachers said nothing or projected a concession, when the offense was severe, when the actors' instrumental goal was important, and when they felt guilty. Actors chose to justify their behavior in high intimate situations where their instrumental goal was less important. Refusal to account was most likely to occur when reproachers used an aggravating reproach form, when actors felt unjustly accused, and when reproachers were dominant. Excuses were fairly uniformly distributed across all contexts.