Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent?

Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013 Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817–838.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”     

Can infants' object concepts be trained?

Decades of research and debate on the origins of object permanence in infancy have contrasted various types of learning with possible innate contributions. A recent paper by Johnson et al. adds a new perspective to this debate by reporting that even very brief training periods can dramatically influence infants' persisting object representations. Such training studies have the potential to constrain 'nature versus nurture' debates in novel ways, although important challenges remain.     

Are most of our concepts innate?

Fodor has argued that, because concept acquisition relies on the use of concepts already possessed by the learner, all concepts that cannot be definitionally reduced are innate. Since very few reductive definitions are available, it appears that most concepts are innate. After noting the reasons why we find such radical concept nativism implausible, I explicate Fodor's argument, showing that anyone who is committed to mentalistic explanation should take it seriously. Three attempts at avoiding the conclusion are examined and found to be unsuccessful. I then present an alternative way around Fodor's nativism; I maintain that concepts at a given level of explanation can be semantically primitive, yet at least partially acquired if some of the conditions at a lower level of explanation that are responsible for the concept's presence are themselves acquired.Thanks are due to Jerry Samet and to Bob Shope for detailed and very helpful comments. I am also indebted to Ned Block, Susan Carey, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Thomas Kuhn, Georges Rey, and Bob Stalnaker for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions on an earlier work, out of which this essay evolved.     

Prototypes of the “natural” concepts discovery

In works of Eleanor Rosch “natural” concepts was introduced that reflect a high correlated structure of features of objects of the external world. Prototypes of the “natural” concepts are clearest cases of objects that reflect this highly correlated structure. The same high correlated structure manifested in the “natural” phenotypical classification. To formalize this highly correlated structure, we define a special type of probabilistic causal relations and then probabilistic formal concepts as a cyclically connected probabilistic causal relations. Based on these definitions, we developed a method of prototypes discovery and illustrate it on the example of digits’ prototypes discovery.     

Renewing Medicine’s basic concepts: on ambiguity

Background

Edmund Pellegrino lamented that the cultural climate of the industrialized West had called the fundamental means and ends of medicine into question, leading him to propose a renewed reflection on medicine’s basic concepts, including health, disease, and illness. My aim in this paper is take up Pellegrino’s call. I argue that in order to usher in this renewal, the concept of ambiguity should take on a guiding role in medical practice, both scientific and clinical. After laying out Pellegrino’s vision, I focus on the concept of normality, arguing that it undergirds modern medicine’s other basic concepts. I draw on critiques by scholars in disability studies that show the concept of normality to be instructively ambiguous. Discussing the cases of Deafness and body integrity identity disorder (BIID), I argue that if medicine is to uphold its epistemic authority and fulfill its melioristic goals, ambiguity should become a central medical concept.

Methods

In this theoretical paper, I consider how central concepts in the philosophy of medicine are challenged by research on experiences of disability. In particular, the idea that medical knowledge produces universal truths is challenged and the importance of historical, cultural, and otherwise situated knowledge is highlighed.

Results

I demonstrate how experiences of disability complicate dominant theories in the philosophy of medicine and why medical practice and the philosophy of medicine should make ambiguity a central concept.

Conclusions

If medical practitioners and philosophers of medicine wish to improve their understanding of the meaning and practice of medicine, they should take seriously the importance and centrality of ambiguity.

     

Molyneux’s question and the individuation of perceptual concepts

Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of perceptual concepts. My main concern in this paper is to argue – against Evans, Campbell, and a number of other contemporary philosophers – that a test of the sort Molyneux envisioned, at least if carefully designed and administered, can indeed be a crucial experiment for the claim that we deploy the same perceptual concepts when identifying shapes by sight and by touch. I will explore some implications of this argument for a theory of recognitional concepts. And I’ll try to trace out some unhappy consequences of various alternative views.     

Can repetition avoidance in randomization be explained by randomness concepts?

Summary A randomness concept hypothesis of repetition avoidance in socalled randomization tasks was studied. The alternative hypothesis proposed is the control hypothesis, which claims that repetition avoidance is caused by the attempts of the subjects to avoid perseveration. Three sequential response production tasks (number randomization, tone randomization, and production of a pleasing tone sequence), one randomness-judgement task, and four perseveration measures were presented to the subjects. Repetition avoidance was found in all three production tasks, including the tone productions in the pleasing condition. Correlations of the randomness judgements with repetition avoidance were generally not found. There was only slight evidence of correlations between the perseveration measures and repetition avoidance. The results suggest that randomness concepts do not contribute to repetition avoidance to any great extent. The control hypothesis is proposed to explain the results.     

Emergence and reduction in chemistry: ontological or epistemological concepts?

In this paper I argue that the ontological interpretation of the concepts of reduction and emergence is often misleading in the philosophy of science and should nearly always be eschewed in favor of an epistemological interpretation. As a paradigm case, an example is drawn from the philosophy of chemistry to illustrate the drawbacks of “ontological reduction” and “ontological emergence,” and the virtues of an epistemological interpretation of these concepts.     

Husserl’s appropriation of the psychological concepts of apperception and attention

In the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl thematizes the surplus (Überschuß) of the perceptual intention whereby the intending goes beyond the partial givenness of a perceptual object to the object as a whole. This surplus is an apperceptive surplus that transcends the purely perceptual substance (Gehalt) or sensed content (empfundene Inhalt) available to a perceiver at any one time. This surplus can be described on the one hand as a synthetic link to future, possible, active experience; to intend an object is to intend it as it would appear if we were to have an exhaustively synthetic explication of it. This perceptual apperceptive surplus is, on the other hand, distinguished from the surplus that categorial form represents over the perceptual sense data. In this paper I show how the apperceptive surplus can also be understood as a synthetic link to past experience that is passively operative in any present perception. The synthetic link to both past and possible experience is a link to non-actual perceptions. Links to non-actual experience are despite their non-actuality nevertheless genuinely intentional in that they enter into the sense of any actively constituted object understood as a unity of sense. Key to this interpretation is an explanation of how Husserl appropriated the key concepts of attention and apperception from psychologists of his day, such as Stumpf and Wundt.     

“Prototypes” and “fuzziness” in the logic of concepts

Prototypes and fuzziness are regarded in this paper as fundamental phenomena in the inherent logic of concepts whose relationship, however, has not been sufficiently clarified. Therefore, modifications are proposed in the definition of both. Prototypes are defined as the elements possessing maximal degree of membership in the given category such thatthis membership has maximal cognitive efficiency in representing theelement. A modified fuzzy set (m-fuzzy set) is defined on aclass (possibly self-contradictory collection) such that its core (the collection of elements with full membership) is aset (self-consistent collection) comprising the finite set of the prototypes. In this scheme of recursive representation the possibility of contradictions, which has been proven to be inevitable in the logic of concepts, islocalized. Finally a related model of the brain's pattern recognition mechanism is briefly summarized.     

Why are artificial polymorphous concepts so hard for birds to learn?

Stimulus sets defined in terms of artificial polymorphous concepts have frequently been used in experiments to investigate the mechanisms of discrimination of natural concepts, both in humans and in other animals. However, such stimulus sets are frequently difficult for either animals or humans to discriminate. Properties of artificial polymorphous stimulus sets that might explain this difficulty include the complexity of the individual stimuli, the unreliable reinforcement of individual positive features, attentional load, difficulties in discriminating some stimulus dimensions, memory load, and a lack of the correlation between features that characterizes natural concepts. An experiment using chickens as subjects and complex artificial visual stimulus sets investigated these hypotheses by training the birds in discriminations that were not polymorphous but did have some of the properties listed above. Discriminations that involved unreliable reinforcement or high attentional load were found to approach the difficulty of polymorphous concept discriminations, and these two factors together were sufficient to account for the entire difficulty. The usual kind of artificial polymorphous concept may not be a good model for natural concepts as they are perceived and discriminated by birds. A RULEX account of natural concept learning may be preferable.     

Why are artificial polymorphous concepts so hard for birds to learn?

Stimulus sets defined in terms of artificial polymorphous concepts have frequently been used in experiments to investigate the mechanisms of discrimination of natural concepts, both in humans and in other animals. However, such stimulus sets are frequently difficult for either animals or humans to discriminate. Properties of artificial polymorphous stimulus sets that might explain this difficulty include the complexity of the individual stimuli, the unreliable reinforcement of individual positive features, attentional load, difficulties in discriminating some stimulus dimensions, memory load, and a lack of the correlation between features that characterizes natural concepts. An experiment using chickens as subjects and complex artificial visual stimulus sets investigated these hypotheses by training the birds in discriminations that were not polymorphous but did have some of the properties listed above. Discriminations that involved unreliable reinforcement or high attentional load were found to approach the difficulty of polymorphous concept discriminations, and these two factors together were sufficient to account for the entire difficulty. The usual kind of artificial polymorphous concept may not be a good model for natural concepts as they are perceived and discriminated by birds. A RULEX account of natural concept learning may be preferable.     

Scope of linguistic influence: does a classifier system alter object concepts?

Whether and to what extent conceptual structure is universal is of great importance for understanding the nature of human concepts. Two major factors that might affect concepts are language and culture. The authors investigated whether these 2 factors affect concepts of everyday objects in any significant ways. Specifically, they tested (a) whether the system of grammatical categorization by classifiers influenced the conceptual structure of speakers of classifier languages, and (b) whether Westerners organized object concepts around taxonomic relations whereas Easterners organized them around thematic relations, as proposed by R. E. Nisbett (2003). The relative importance of 3 types of relations--taxonomic, thematic, and classifier--for Chinese and German speakers was tested using a range of tasks, including categorization, similarity judgment, property induction, and fast-speed word-picture matching. Some support for linguistic relativity as well as for the cultural-specific cognition proposal was found in some tasks, but these effects were miniscule compared with the importance of taxonomic and thematic relations for both language-culture groups. The authors conclude that the global structure of everyday object concepts is strikingly similar across different cultures and languages.     

The ‘redefinition of death’ debate: Western concepts and western bioethics

Biomedicine is a global enterprise constructed upon the belief in the universality of scientific truths. However, despite huge scientific advances over recent decades it has not been able to formulate a specific and universal definition of death: In fact, in its attempt to redefine death, the concept of death appears to have become immersed in ever increasing vagueness and ambiguity. Even more worrisome is that bioethics, in the form of principlism, is also endeavouring to become a global enterprise by claiming neutrality. It appears that the discourse within both disciplines have similarly manipulated the boundaries of death to include the “dying”. This paper argues that the redefinition of death debate in biomedicine reveals a concept of personhood which is profoundly western in origin and which is in accordance to the concept adhered to within principlism. Biomedicine and bioethics do not appear to acknowledge the limitations of their own world view and hence lack an understanding of their applicability and appropriateness in diverse social and cultural contexts; a situation which adds credence to claims as to the hegemonic and imperialistic nature of all such global enterprises. Ms. Jones is an intensive care clinical nursing specialist. Dr. Kessel is a public health physician and medical ethicist.     

Does testing with feedback help grade-school children learn key concepts in science?

Testing effects have been well-established across a variety of studies involving school-age children. Specifically, children's test performance improves when they are given the opportunity to practice retrieval prior to the final test as compared to when practice involves only study. The current investigation focused on the influence of testing with feedback on fifth graders’ learning of science concepts. Across two experiments, 65 students studied twenty key concept definitions. After study, the definitions were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: control, test only, study only, and test plus feedback. Concepts assigned to the latter three conditions were presented again (either for test only, study only, or test plus feedback) during two separate sessions, and a final test was administered during a separate session. At the final test, students were asked to provide the definition for each of the twenty key concepts. Final test performance was best for definitions that had been tested with feedback, followed by recall for those that had only been tested or only restudied, with lowest performance for those that did not receive additional practice. Despite multiple sessions spaced across several days, however, performance for all conditions was low, which may have resulted from the ineffective use of feedback. In summary, testing followed by feedback can boost younger students learning of science concepts, but mastery will require the use of other strategies as well.