Visual sensing IS seeing: why "mindsight," in hindsight, is blind

Faced with the surprising failure to notice large changes to visual scenes (change blindness), many researchers have sought evidence for alternative, nonattentional routes to change detection. A recent article in Psychological Science (Rensink, 2004) proposed a new, nonsensory "mindsight" mechanism to explain the finding that some subjects on some trials reported sensing the presence of a recurring change before they could explicitly identify it and without having a localizable visual experience of change. This mechanism would constitute a previously unknown mode of seeing that, as Rensink suggested, might be akin to a sixth sense. Its existence would have radical implications for the mechanisms underlying conscious visual experience. Provocative claims merit rigorous scrutiny. We rebut the existence of a mindsight mechanism by supporting a more mundane explanation: Some subjects take time to verify their initial conscious detection of changes.     

Failures to see: attentive blank stares revealed by change blindness

Change blindness illustrates a remarkable limitation in visual processing by demonstrating that substantial changes in a visual scene can go undetected. Because these changes can ultimately be detected using top-down driven search processes, many theories assign a central role to spatial attention in overcoming change blindness. Surprisingly, it has been reported that change blindness can occur during blink-contingent changes even when observers fixate the changing location [O'Regan, J. K., Deubel, H., Clark, J. J., & Rensink, R. A. (2000). Picture changes during blinks: Looking without seeing and seeing without looking. Visual Cognition, 7, 191-212]. However, eye blinks produce a transient disruption of vision that is independent of any associated changes in the retinal image. We determined whether these 'attentive blank stares' could occur in the absence of blink-mediated visual suppression. Using a flicker change-blindness paradigm we confirm that despite direct attentive fixations, obvious scene changes often remain undetected. We conclude that change detection involves object or feature based attentional mechanisms, which can be 'misdirected' despite the allocation of spatial attention to the position of the change.     

Differential effect of distractor timing on localizing versus identifying visual changes

When visual changes are accompanied by visual transients, such as in the case of saccades, eye blinks, and brief flickers, they often go unnoticed; this phenomenon is called change blindness (Rensink, R. A. (2002). Change detection. Annual Review of Psychology 53, 245; Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (1997). Change blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1, 261). Change blindness occurs even when the position of visual transients does not cover the location of the change (as in the 'mudsplash' paradigm) (O'Regan, J. K., Rensink, R. A., & Clark, J. J. (1999). Nature 398, 34). By using a simplified mudsplash display, the present study investigated whether change blindness depends on (a). the timing of visual transients, and (b). the task that observers perform. Eight Gabor elements with random orientations were presented. One element (target) was rotated 45 degrees clockwise or counterclockwise without a temporal gap. High contrast visual transients, not overlapping with the elements, appeared at various times with respect to the target change. Observers reported where the change was (change localization), or in which direction the target rotated (change identification). Change localization was impaired primarily when the onset of the transient was at or after the change. In contrast, change identification was impaired mainly when the transient preceded the change. These results suggest that change localization and change identification are mediated in part by different mechanisms.     

Visual sensing without seeing

Abstract— It has often been assumed that when we use vision to become aware of an object or event in our surroundings, this must be accompanied by a corresponding visual experience (i.e., seeing). The studies reported here show that this assumption is incorrect. When observers view a sequence of displays alternating between an image of a scene and the same image changed in some way, they often feel (or sense) the change even though they have no visual experience of it. The subjective difference between sensing and seeing is mirrored in several behavioral differences, suggesting that these are two distinct modes of conscious visual perception.     

Encoding 'regular' and 'random' sequences of views of novel three-dimensional objects

When we look at an object as we move or the object moves, our visual system is presented with a sequence of different views of the object. It has been suggested that such regular temporal sequences of views of objects contain information that can aid in the process of representing and recognising objects. We examined whether seeing a series of perspective views of objects in sequence led to more efficient recognition than seeing the same views of objects but presented in a random order. Participants studied images of 20 novel three-dimensional objects rotating in depth under one of two study conditions. In one study condition, participants viewed an ordered sequence of views of objects that was assumed to mimic important aspects of how we normally encounter objects. In the other study condition, participants were presented the same object views, but in a random order. It was expected that studying a regular sequence of views would lead to more efficient recognition than studying a random presentation of object views. Although subsequent recognition accuracy was equal for the two groups, differences in reaction time between the two study groups resulted. Specifically, the random study group responded reliably faster than the sequence study group. Some possible encoding differences between the two groups are discussed.     

Species difference in the timing of gaze movement between chimpanzees and humans

How do humans and their closest relatives, chimpanzees, differ in their fundamental abilities for seeing the visual world? In this study, we directly compared the gaze movements of humans and the closest species, chimpanzees, using an eye-tracking system. During free viewing of a naturalistic scene, chimpanzees made more fixations per second (up to four) than did humans (up to three). This species difference was independent of the semantic variability of the presented scenes. The gap–overlap paradigm revealed that, rather than resulting from the sensitivity to the peripherally presented stimuli per se, the species difference reflected the particular strategy each species employed to solve the rivalry between central (fixated) and peripheral stimuli in their visual fields. Finally, when presented with a movie in which small images successively appeared/disappeared at random positions at the chosen presentation rate, chimpanzees tracked those images at the point of fixation for a longer time than did humans, outperforming humans in their speed of scanning. Our results suggest that chimpanzees and humans differ quantitatively in their visual strategies involving the timing of gaze movement. We discuss the functional reasons for each species’ employing such specific strategies.     

The effects of scene inversion on change blindness

In two experiments, participants searched for a difference between two views of a scene. In Experiment 1, the authors extended the change-blindness findings from previous work by R. A. Rensink, J. K. O'Regan, and J. J. Clark (1997), which used an experimenter-induced global transient, to a less artificial situation in which participants searched for a difference in a pair of photographic images presented simultaneously. To examine the idea that meaning-driven endogenous orienting was responsible for the previously observed advantage for changes in center-of-interest items, the authors inverted half of the image pairs. The advantage for center-of-interest items was replicated with upright displays, but it was completely eliminated by inversion, strongly supporting the role of meaning-driven endogenous orienting in this task. With flickering displays (Experiment 2), the center-of-interest effect was completely unaffected by inversion. The authors suggest that when change blindness is induced via flicker, scene modifications are typically found by stimulus-driven rather than by meaning-driven processes.     

The Effects of Scene Inversion on Change Blindness

In two experiments, participants searched for a difference between two views of a scene. In Experiment 1, the authors extended the change-blindness findings from previous work by R. A. Rensink, J. K. O'Regan, and J. J. Clark (1997), which used an experimenter-induced global transient, to a less artificial situation in which participants searched for a difference in a pair of photographic images presented simultaneously. To examine the idea that meaning-driven endogenous orienting was responsible for the previously observed advantage for changes in center-of-interest items, the authors inverted half of the image pairs. The advantage for center-of-interest items was replicated with upright displays, but it was completely eliminated by inversion, strongly supporting the role of meaning-driven endogenous orienting in this task. With flickering displays (Experiment 2), the center-of-interest effect was completely unaffected by inversion. The authors suggest that when change blindness is induced via flicker, scene modifications are typically found by stimulus-driven rather than by meaning-driven processes.     

Object representations are biased toward each other through statistical learning

The visual system is remarkably efficient at extracting regularities from the environment through statistical learning. While such extraction has extensive consequences on cognition, it is unclear how statistical learning shapes the representations of the individual objects that comprise the regularities. Here we examine how statistical learning alters object representations. In three experiments, participants were exposed to either random arrays containing objects in a random order, or structured arrays containing object pairs where two objects appeared next to each other in fixed spatial or temporal configurations. After exposure, one object in each pair was briefly presented and participants judged the location or the orientation of the object without seeing the other object in the pair. We found that when an object reliably appeared next to another object in space, it was judged as being closer to the other object in space even though the other object was never presented (Experiments 1 and 2). Likewise, when an object reliably preceded another object in time, its orientation was biased toward the orientation of the other object even though the other object was never presented (Experiment 3). These results demonstrated that statistical learning fundamentally shapes how individual objects are represented in visual memory, by biasing the representation of one object toward its co-occurring partner. Importantly, participants in all experiments were not explicitly aware of the regularities. Thus, the bias in object representations was implicit. The current study reveals a novel impact of statistical learning on object representation: spatially co-occurring objects are represented as being closer in space, and temporally co-occurring objects are represented as having more similar features.     

Accessing long-term memory representations during visual change detection

In visual change detection tasks, providing a cue to the change location concurrent with the test image (post-cue) can improve performance, suggesting that, without a cue, not all encoded representations are automatically accessed. Our studies examined the possibility that post-cues can encourage the retrieval of representations stored in long-term memory (LTM). Participants detected changes in images composed of familiar objects. Performance was better when the cue directed attention to the post-change object. Supporting the role of LTM in the cue effect, the effect was similar regardless of whether the cue was presented during the inter-stimulus interval, concurrent with the onset of the test image, or after the onset of the test image. Furthermore, the post-cue effect and LTM performance were similarly influenced by encoding time. These findings demonstrate that monitoring the visual world for changes does not automatically engage LTM retrieval.     

On the Failure to Detect Changes in Scenes Across Brief Interruptions

When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: The changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced “change blindness”, four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations at the early stages of visual processing are inherently volatile, and that focused attention is needed to stabilize them sufficiently to support the perception of change.     

Sound induces perceptual reorganization of an ambiguous motion display in human infants

Adults who watch an ambiguous visual event consisting of two identical objects moving toward, through, and away from each other and hear a brief sound when the objects overlap report seeing visual bouncing. We conducted three experiments in which we used the habituation/test method to determine whether these illusory effects might emerge early in development. In Experiments 1 and 3 we tested 4‐, 6‐ and 8‐month‐old infants’ discrimination between an ambiguous visual display presented together with a sound synchronized with the objects’ spatial coincidence and the identical visual display presented together with a sound no longer synchronized with coincidence. Consistent with illusory perception, the 6‐ and 8‐month‐old, but not the 4‐month‐old, infants responded to these events as different. In Experiment 2 infants were habituated to the ambiguous visual display together with a sound synchronized with the objects’ coincidence and tested with a physically bouncing object accompanied by the sound at the bounce. Consistent with illusory perception again, infants treated these two events as equivalent by not exhibiting response recovery. The developmental emergence of this intersensory illusion at 6 months of age is hypothesized to reflect developmental changes in object knowledge and attentional mechanisms.     

A bias to detail: how hand position modulates visual learning and visual memory

In this report, we examine whether and how altered aspects of perception and attention near the hands affect one’s learning of to-be-remembered visual material. We employed the contextual cuing paradigm of visual learning in two experiments. Participants searched for a target embedded within images of fractals and other complex geometrical patterns while either holding their hands near to or far from the stimuli. When visual features and structural patterns remained constant across to-be-learned images (Exp. 1), no difference emerged between hand postures in the observed rates of learning. However, when to-be-learned scenes maintained structural pattern information but changed in color (Exp. 2), participants exhibited substantially slower rates of learning when holding their hands near the material. This finding shows that learning near the hands is impaired in situations in which common information must be abstracted from visually unique images, suggesting a bias toward detail-oriented processing near the hands.     

The development of change blindness: children's attentional priorities whilst viewing naturalistic scenes

Change blindness describes the surprising difficulty of detecting large changes in visual scenes when changes occur during a visual disruption. In order to study the developmental course of this phenomenon, a modified version of the flicker paradigm, based on Rensink, O’Regan & Clark (1997 ), was given to three groups of children aged 6–12 years and to a group of adults. This paradigm tested the ability to detect single colour, presence/absence and location changes of both high and low semantic importance in a complex scene. Semantically important changes were detected more quickly and accurately than less semantically important changes, by all age groups, indicating that children had the same attentional priorities as adults. Older children achieved more efficient and accurate detection of changes than younger children and reached almost adult level at 10–12 years old. These improvements parallel age‐related developments in attention and visual perception.     

Some consequences of visualization in pattern identification and detection

The goal of this study was to establish some of the conditions under which mental imagery facilitates or interferes with the identification and detection of visual patterns. In Experiment 1, subjects identified simple bar patterns presented at orientations 90 degrees apart under normal viewing conditions. Their reaction times were shorter when they had imagined seeing the patterns in advance at the same orientation, but were longer when they had imagined seeing the patterns at orientations that were in-between those of the actual presented patterns, relative to baseline conditions in which they were instructed not to imagine the patterns. In Experiment 2, where the subjects had only to detect the target patterns without identifying them, there was no effect of image formation or image-target alignment. In Experiment 3, where the detection task was repeated but where the target exposure duration was reduced, imagery significantly interfered with detection. In contrast to the results of Experiment 1, reaction time and error rate in this case were greatest when the imagined patterns were perfectly aligned with the target patterns. These findings demonstrate that whether imagery facilitates or interferes with performance on a visual task depends on the nature and difficulty of the task and on how closely the imagined and presented patterns correspond.     

Quantity judgments of auditory and visual stimuli by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Many species can choose between two visual sets of stimuli on the basis of quantity. This is true when sets are both visible, or are presented one set at a time or even one item at a time. However, we know comparatively little about how well nonhuman animals can compare auditory quantities. Here, three chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) chose between two sets of food items when they only heard each item fall into different containers rather than seeing those items. This method prevented the chimpanzees from summing the amount of visible food they saw because there were no visual cues. Chimpanzees performed well, and their performance matched that of previous experiments with regard to obeying Weber's law. They also performed well with comparisons between a sequentially presented auditory set and a fully visible set, demonstrating that duration of presentation was not being used as a cue. In addition, they accommodated empty sets into these judgments, although not perfectly. Thus, chimpanzees can judge auditory quantities in flexible ways that show many similarities to how they compare visual quantities.     

Measuring any conscious content versus measuring the relevant conscious content: Comment on Sandberg et al.

Sandberg et al. show that the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) scale is sensitive compared to confidence ratings and wagering in detecting accurate perception. They go on to argue that the PAS scale is hence a sensitive measure of conscious perception compared to confidence ratings, a claim disputed here. The fact that some visual content is conscious does not entail that the visual content relevant to making a discrimination is conscious. For example, if one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square. When PAS and confidence ratings come in conflict, we suggest that it is confidence ratings that more reliably indicate the conscious status of contents allowing discrimination.     

Consequences of display changes during interrupted visual search: rapid resumption is target specific

Visual search can be resumed more rapidly following a brief interruption to an old display than it can be initiated on a new display, pointing to a critical role for memory in search (Lleras, Rensink, & Enns, 2005). Here, we examine how this rapid resumption is affected by changes made to the display during the interruption of search. Rapid resumption was found to depend on the prior presentation of the target, not merely the distractor items (Experiment 1), and was unaffected by the relocation of all distractor items (Experiment 2). Further, whereas changes to response-irrelevant features of the target did not eliminate rapid resumption (Experiment 3), changes to response-relevant features did (Experiment 4). These results point to the target specificity of rapid resumption and are consistent with reentrant theories of visual awareness.     

Picture object recognition in an American black bear (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ursus americanus</Emphasis>)

Many animals have been tested for conceptual discriminations using two-dimensional images as stimuli, and many of these species appear to transfer knowledge from 2D images to analogous real life objects. We tested an American black bear for picture-object recognition using a two alternative forced choice task. She was presented with four unique sets of objects and corresponding pictures. The bear showed generalization from both objects to pictures and pictures to objects; however, her transfer was superior when transferring from real objects to pictures, suggesting that bears can recognize visual features from real objects within photographic images during discriminations.     

Visual mental image generation does not overlap with visual short-term memory: A dual-task interference study

Visual mental imagery and working memory are often assumed to play similar roles in high-order functions, but little is known of their functional relationship. In this study, we investigated whether similar cognitive processes are involved in the generation of visual mental images, in short-term retention of those mental images, and in short-term retention of visual information. Participants encoded and recalled visually or aurally presented sequences of letters under two interference conditions: spatial tapping or irrelevant visual input (IVI). In Experiment 1, spatial tapping selectively interfered with the retention of sequences of letters when participants generated visual mental images from aural presentation of the letter names and when the letters were presented visually. In Experiment 2, encoding of the sequences was disrupted by both interference tasks. However, in Experiment 3, IVI interfered with the generation of the mental images, but not with their retention, whereas spatial tapping was more disruptive during retention than during encoding. Results suggest that the temporary retention of visual mental images and of visual information may be supported by the same visual short-term memory store but that this store is not involved in image generation.