Can religious arguments persuade?

In his famous essay “The Ethics of Belief,” William K. Clifford claimed “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” (Clifford’s essay was originally published in Contemporary Review in 1877; it is presently in print in Madigan (1999)). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford’s Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade (I take the term ‘religious argument’ to include arguments whose conclusions are either assertions or denials of religious claims). In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call “begging the doxastic question.”~An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument’s conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments.     

Luther's Small and Large Catechisms: Defining and Confessing Christian Faith From the Centre in a Religiously Plural World

Abstract : In this article, the author argues that in his Small and Large Catechisms, which were both written in 1529, Martin Luther centres the Christian faith in a way that others can recognise as authentic and faithful to the Gospel vis‐à‐vis the relativism that is posited as the appropriate Christian articulation of the Gospel in a world of religious diversity. Luther's non‐negotiable centring on God for us in Jesus Christ, through whom God is uniquely and decisively revealed, speaks to the contemporary intra‐Christian and inter‐religious questions. The author finds evangelical and persuasive resonance in Lesslie Newbigin's call to indwell the Christian story and George Lindbeck's argument to attend to the grammar of the faith.     

Formal Logic vs. Philosophical Argument

The wider topic to which the content of this paper belongs is that of the relationship between formal logic and real argumentation. Of particular potential interest in this connection are held to be substantive arguments constructed by philosophers reputed equally as authorities in logical theory. A number of characteristics are tentatively indicated by the author as likely to be encountered in such arguments. The discussion centers afterwards, by way of specification, on a remarkable piece of argument quoted in Cicero’s dialog On Divination and ascribed to Stoic thinkers. The Stoics’ formal theory of inference is summarily referred to in this context, with special emphasis on their basic deductive schemata (‘indemonstrables’), some of them recognizable as links in the overall structure of the quoted argument. The main lines of Cicero’s criticism of the Stoic argument are next commented upon, with emphasis on his implied view as to the requirements of a good argument. Towards the end of the paper, a few considerations are added on the changes in the prevailing style of argumentation conspicuous in the three famous Roman Stoics.     

Humor and the Rebellious Spirit of the Early Adolescent Boy

In my companion article on the making of the reliably religious boy (D. Capps, 2006c) I presented my argument that, whereas the younger boy of three to five is becoming religious as a result of his emotional separation from his mother, the early adolescent boy (age 11–14) has become reliably religious in that he has developed a religious habit of mind, a habit reflected in his embrace of the religions of honor and hope. I presented myself as a case study in this regard. I noted, however, that there is a third form of religion, that of humor, and that it relativizes—and thereby preserves—the religions of honor and hope. I also noted that religion and spirituality are capable of being differentiated. I suggested that my own spirituality took the form of rebellion and that this spirit of rebellion fueled and was fueled by the religion of humor. Employing Freud’s writings on humor, I explain in this article how this works.     

Freud’s Wolf Man: A Case of Successful Religious Sublimation

This article focuses on Freud’s view that the case of Sergei Pankejeff, commonly known as Wolf Man, is an example of an unsuccessful religious sublimation. Freud focuses on the efforts by Sergei’s mother and his nurse to educate him in the Christian faith. He points out that, although these efforts were successful in making him into a piously religious boy, they contributed to the repression of his sexual attraction to his father, the arrest of his psychosexual development, and to an obsessional neurosis reflected in blasphemous thoughts and compulsive acts of religious piety. The authors suggest, however, that there was one feature of his early religious behavior that reflected a successful religious sublimation and explain why it was successful. They conclude that even small children may experience a successful religious sublimation.     

The Moral Laboratory: On Kant’s Notion of Pedagogy as a Science

Following Kant, it is clear that, but probably not completely how we are morally obligated. I will point out that there are three possible ways to struggle for an understanding of how we can be obligated as rational beings and also as ordinary human beings. There is (a) the argument from rational feeling (‘Achtung’), (b) the argument from language, and finally (c) the argument from systematization. Reading the later passages of the ‘Critique of pure Reason’ and following its instructions, we will understand why education has to be founded by the same kind of argumentation as the natural sciences. The systematical analysis of Kant’s analogy between the physical body and the moral obligation will explain the suspected gap between our just rational and our whole selves. The most important part of the demanded bridge will be Kant’s Moral Laboratory.     

Formalization of the ad hominem argumentation scheme

In this paper, several examples from the literature, and one central new one, are used as case studies of texts of discourse containing an argumentation scheme that has now been widely investigated in literature on argumentation. Argumentation schemes represent common patterns of reasoning used in everyday conversational discourse. The most typical ones represent defeasible arguments based on nonmonotonic reasoning. Each scheme has a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate a particular argument fitting that scheme. The project is to study how to build a formal computational model of this scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem argument using argumentation tools and systems developed in artificial intelligence. It is shown how the formalization built using these tools is applicable to the tasks of identification, analysis and evaluation of the central case studied. One important implication of the work is that it provides a foundational basis for showing how other argumentation schemes can be formalized.     

Religious Hatred Laws: Protecting Groups or Belief?

This article examines the issues raised by recent legislation proscribing incitement to religious hatred. In particular, it examines how far arguments for prohibiting racist hate speech apply also to the prohibition of religious hate speech. It identifies a number of significant differences between race and religion. It also examines several questions raised by the prohibition of religious hate speech, including the meaning and scope of religious identity, why that identity should receive special protection, and whether protection should be directed to religious groups as groups or to their individual members. The central argument of the article is that the distinction between protecting religious groups from vilification and protecting their beliefs and practices from criticism—a distinction on which the British Government placed great emphasis in defending its legislation—is unsustainable. That conclusion is supported by the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in cases in which it has upheld the curtailing of freedom of expression for the sake of protecting religion.     

An Oral Proof in a Geometry Class: How Linguistic Tools Can Help Map the Content of a Proof

Recommendations that teachers promote argument and discourse in their mathematics classrooms anticipate researchers' needs for methods for examining and analyzing such talk. One form of discourse is oral arguments, including proofs. We ask: How can we track the development of an oral argument by a teacher and her/his students? We illustrate a method that combines Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and Toulmin's argumentation scheme to examine how speakers logically connect different parts of an argument. We suggest that conjunction analysis can aid a researcher to map the content of a proof that has been constructed in class discussion. Using data from a discussion of a geometry proof, we show that different types of conjunctions enabled the teacher and the students to connect various components of an argument and, also, different arguments. The article illustrates how conjunction analysis can support and deepen what Toulmin's scheme for arguments can reveal about oral discussions.     

Building a System for Finding Objections to an Argument

This paper addresses the role that argumentation schemes and argument visualization software tools can play in helping to find and counter objections to a given argument one is confronted with. Based on extensive analysis of features of the argumentation in these two examples, a practical four-step method of finding objections to an argument is set out. The study also applies the Carneades Argumentation System to the task of finding objections to an argument, and shows how this system has some capabilities that are especially useful.     

Desired,Repeated, Replaced: Power and Loss in Titian’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Noli Me Tangere</Emphasis>

The depiction of larger unconscious symbols, such as popular Gospel themes, can become particularized through the individual experience of the artist. They can express sublimated desires or displaced wishes, disguised like dream-elements in a work of art. Classical Freudian theory explores the process of sublimation and dream-work as two sides of the psychoanalytic interpretation of art. Titian’s Noli Me Tangere represents his efforts to sublimate his sexual and aggressive drives through this Gospel theme. It also suggests his Oedipal feelings of love and competition for his mentor Giorgione, as he anxiously maneuvered to take his mentor’s place. The death of his mentor and his own anxiety are worked out in his art, exemplified by his appropriation of Giorgione’s style and the repetition of Giorgione’s landscapes in Titian’s early work. As Titian reworked and radically changed this painting, he expressed his own ambivalence through this most ambivalent of Gospel scenes.     

Religious Ethics and the Spirit of Undomesticated Dissent

The field of religious ethics contributes to practices of resistance and hope in broader society. In advancing my claim that religious ethics contributes to practices of resistance and hope today, I first tell a story about the changing demographics in the field of religious ethics and why this demographic shift is important. I next focus on womanist religious scholarship as an exemplary discourse in religious ethics and how it has contributed to practices of resistance and hope in the academy and within contemporary society. While a few scholars in JRE over the last 50 years have cited and engaged womanist ethicists like Katie Cannon and Emilie Townes, I want to offer a more explicit argument on how the womanist idea has contributed to practices of resistance and hope. I maintain that womanist religious scholarship embodies the practice of undomesticated dissent and that such dissent might be understood as a contribution to larger humanistic inquiry within the academy. Finally, I briefly consider an objection to my argument through engaging Stanley Fish's claim that the purposes and ends of institutions of higher education should not be oriented toward activism.     

Representation of Argumentation in Text with Rhetorical Structure Theory

Various argumentation analysis tools permit the analyst to represent functional components of an argument (e.g., data, claim, warrant, backing), how arguments are composed of subarguments and defenses against potential counterarguments, and argumentation schemes. In order to facilitate a study of argument presentation in a biomedical corpus, we have developed a hybrid scheme that enables an analyst to encode argumentation analysis within the framework of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST), which can be used to represent the discourse structure of a text. This paper describes the hybrid representation scheme and illustrates its use for investigation of contexts that license omission of elements of an argument. The analyses given in the paper involve reconstruction of enthymemes. Defeasible argumentation schemes serve as a constraint on reconstruction. In addition, the examples illustrate several other types of contextual constraints on reconstruction of enthymemes.     

Strategic Maneuvering through Persuasive Definitions: Implications for Dialectic and Rhetoric

Persuasive definitions – those that convey an attitude in the act of naming – are frequently employed in discourse and are a form of strategic maneuvering. The dynamics of persuasive definition are explored through brief case studies and an extended analysis of the use of the “war” metaphor in responding to terrorism after September 11, 2001. Examining persuasive definitions enables us to notice similarities and differences between strategic maneuvering in dialectical and in rhetorical argument, as well as differences between the role of strategic maneuvering in normatively ideal argument and in actually existing argument. This will avoid the double standard of comparing ideal dialectic with actual rhetoric, or vice versa. The results of the analysis suggest possibilities for a rapprochement between dialectical and rhetorical approaches to argumentation.     

Dworkin and Casey on abortion

This article responds to two important recent treatments of abortion rights. I will mainly discuss Ronald Dworkin's recent writings concerning abortion: his article "Unenumerated rights: whether and how Roe should be overruled," and his book Life's Dominion. In these writings Dworkin presents a novel view of what the constitutional and moral argument surronding abortion is really about. Both debates actually turn, he argues, on the question of how to interpret the widely shared idea that human life is sacred. At the heart of the abortion debate is the essentially religious notion that human life has value which transcends its value to any particular person; abortion is therefore at bottom a religious issue. Dworkin hopes to use this analysis to show that the religion clauses of the First Amendment provide a "textual home" for a woman's right to choose abortion. I wish to scrutinize this suggestion here; I want to probe the precise consequences for abortion rights of such an understanding of their basis. I will argue that the consequences are more radical than Dworkin seems to realize. The other work I will examine here is the important 1992 Supreme Court decision on abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The controlling opinion in that case, written jointly by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, strongly reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, but also upheld most of the provisions of a Pennsylvania statute that had mandated various restrictions on abortion. The justices' basis for upholding these restictions was their introduction of a new constitutional standard for abortion regulations, an apparently weaker standard than those that had governed previous Supreme Court abortion decisions. I think there is a flaw in Casey's new constitutional test for abortion regulations, and I will explain, when we turn to Casey, what it is and why it bears a close relation to Dworkin's reluctance to carry his argument as far as it seems to go.     

A formal account of Socratic-style argumentation

In traditional mathematical models of argumentation an argument often consists of a chain of rules or reasons, beginning with premisses and leading to a conclusion that is endorsed by the party that put forward the argument. In informal reasoning, however, one often encounters a specific class of counterarguments that until now has received little attention in argumentation formalisms. The idea is that instead of starting with the premisses, the argument starts with the propositions put forward by the counterparty, of which the absurdity is illustrated by showing their (defeasible) consequences. This way of argumentation (which we call S-arguments) is very akin to Socratic dialogues and critical interviews; it also has applications in modern philosophy. In this paper, various examples of S-arguments are provided, as well as a treatment of the problems that occur when trying to formalize them in existing formalisms. We also provide general guidelines that can serve as a basis for implementing S-arguments into various existing formalisms. In particular, we show how S-arguments can be implemented in Pollock's formalism, how they fit into Dung's abstract argumentation approach and how they are related to the issue of self-defeating arguments.     

Keepin’ it Real: London Youth Hip Hop as an Authentic Performance of Belief

Abstract

Hip hop is a global cultural phenomenon that encompasses rap music, dance, graffiti art, and fashion as well as particular ways of being. One sub-genre of hip hop is Gospel rap, in which Christian rappers attempt to ‘represent’ the truth of God as a tangible reality, thereby ‘keepin’ it real’. This study investigates how young British Jamaican male adults in the Brixton area of London appropriate hip hop for their own ends. Based on original raps authored and performed by these young people, the research finds that their representations of spiritual reality are influenced by the conventions and boundaries of professional Gospel rap. The study describes how youth incorporate religious hip hop into their everyday lives and argues that in some cases hip hop performance becomes a method for pedagogically reshaping the body, giving religious beliefs an ‘embodied authenticity’.