论“信则有，不信则无”的真谛——关于净土存在的揭示

净土的有与无(存在与不存在)是与人们对它的信与不信相联系的。因为人们以信乐为基,而行愿到一定程度之后才能感受到净土的存在。否则,人们自始至终都没有相信过,更没有修行过,人们当然就领略不到净土的庄严和净土的存在。因为,即使它存在,那也只是诸佛的存在,同人们自己是没有必然联系的,因为那毕竟不是人们自己的净土。     

You Can't Get Away with Murder That Easily: A Response to Timothy Mulgan

Abstract

Some works of literature are compromised because their authors get the facts wrong. In other works deviations from the facts don’t seem to matter, and authors quite legitimately make things up. This paper gives an account of the various ways in which matters of fact can make a difference to the aesthetic value of works of literature. It concludes by showing how this account can be applied in determining when a concern with matters of fact is an important part of literary criticism and when it is merely pedantic.     

Intuition,Foundationalism and Explanation – a Response to Mounce

Wittgenstein's scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive behaviour have been both difficult to interpret and controversial, not least because they may seem to incline towards forms of explanation that elsewhere he eschewed. Nevertheless, they are of importance in philosophy, not least because they bear upon age‐old questions of foundationalism and concept‐formation. In a recent Discussion Note in this journal (Mounce, Philosophical Investigations, 2016, 39: 385–390), H. O. Mounce is not only attracted by but also champions such explanation – though he finds Wittgenstein's own “explanations” inadequate in important respects, as evidenced in his misguided criticisms of Moore in On Certainty and in his behaviouristic remarks on the roots of the “cause and effect” language‐game. In this response, I try to identify the philosophical roots of this attraction and the points at which Mounce's account departs from the elucidatory and non‐explanatory path established by Wittgenstein.     

If You Want to Do Something About Your Own Craziness, Have Your Own Experiential Sessions

If a person is troubled by worries or fears about being crazy, out of one's mind, psychotic, the person can learn to have one's own experiential sessions aimed at two goals. One is to undergo a deep-seated, qualitative change toward becoming the person one is capable of becoming. The related other goal is to be free of the worrisome, fearful scenes or situations of being crazy, out of one's mind, psychotic. An illustration is given of how to achieve these goals by having one's own experiential session.     

Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like This Paper Better If You (Believe You) Chose to Read It!

Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post‐choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

If You Can Replicate the Handedness-Immune Disorder Effect, the More Power to You

Bryden, McManus, and Bulman-Fleming′s (1994) meta-analysis of studies examining the Geschwind-Behan-Galaburda hypothesis indicates that the original data set supports the hypothesis significantly more than the body of replication attempts. We present data on 2256 subjects that clearly fail to support the hypothesis and describe practical and statistical reasons suggesting why the original data cannot be easily replicated. A power analysis suggests that to find the effect in a general sample, one should plan to have 17,000 to 40,000 subjects.     

How to Be a Substantivalist Without Getting Shifty About It*

According to substantivalism, spacetime points and regions are real entities whose existence is not dependent on matter. In this paper, I motivate and defend a version of substantivalism which takes the totality of spacetime as fundamental, and show how this position avoids certain problem cases, in particular the objection from static Leibniz shifts, and better conforms to how we think about space in physics. I argue that, even though the static Leibniz shifts do not show ordinary substantivalism is committed to in‐principle undetectable physical structure (pace Dasgupta (2015a)), they do indicate something problematic about the modal profile of space‐time and its constituents. While the problem is modal, the solution cannot be solely a matter of revising the substantivalist's modal claims. Rather, I argue, the substantivalist must revise her background ontology of space‐time. I show how this can be done by developing substantivalist theory that rejects this picture in favor of an alternative ontology of space‐time in the spirit of priority monism.     

If It's Difficult to Pronounce, It Must Be Risky

ABSTRACT— Low processing fluency fosters the impression that a stimulus is unfamiliar, which in turn results in perceptions of higher risk, independent of whether the risk is desirable or undesirable. In Studies 1 and 2, ostensible food additives were rated as more harmful when their names were difficult to pronounce than when their names were easy to pronounce; mediation analyses indicated that this effect was mediated by the perceived novelty of the substance. In Study 3, amusement-park rides were rated as more likely to make one sick (an undesirable risk) and also as more exciting and adventurous (a desirable risk) when their names were difficult to pronounce than when their names were easy to pronounce.     

You Can't Lose What you Ain't Never Had: A Reply to Marquis on Abortion

Philosophical Studies -     

要朝普陀山,先朝补陀寺论--从《募修明州补陀寺塔》谈起

本文考证了浙江普陀山与宁波补陀寺(即现在的七塔寺)的关系,认为由于特殊的历史原因和地理位置,使普陀山与补陀寺成为中国佛教史上的一个特例,即明代的禁海政策,促使普陀山的佛教外迁,宁波的补陀寺因此有了发达的时机。同时也给普陀山附近因地理位置而突显的招宝山以及该山的宝陀寺带来了转机,使之和补陀寺一起成为普陀山观音道场的象征。这种现象说明佛教在社会中始终是变化的,它有着不同的形式和内容。文中还对七塔寺的历史做了简明的探讨,指出人气的聚散对一个寺院的发展有着重要的意义,七塔寺的历史就证明了这一点。     

More Thinking About Gender: A Response to Julie A. Nelson

Nelson argues the best we can hope for in a nonsexist society is to revalue those feminine qualities that have previously been devalued. I argue that those qualities are the result of a sexist construction of gender categories, and that a nonsexist society would have no reason to preserve them.     

The Role of Theory and Research in the Practice of Cognitive-Behavioral Couple Therapy: If You Build It,They Will Come

Cognitive-behavioral couple therapy (CBCT), while empirically validated and highly efficacious, does not always have positive results for couples. One factor that may limit the efficacy of this intervention is the way in which therapists are trained to provide this type of therapy. More specifically, there is a need for therapists to gain a solid foundation in CBCT theory in order to maximize treatment results. This paper presents an argument for why an understanding of theory is necessary for therapists in treating couples. Then, this paper presents our training model and how we integrate theory into our training of both graduate student therapists and more experienced clinicians. We take the stance that “if you build it, they will come.”     

A Puzzle About the Agnostic Response to Peer Disagreement

The paper argues that the view to the effect that one should suspend judgment in the face of a disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer results in a puzzle when applied to disagreements in which one party is agnostic. The puzzle is this: either the agnostic party retains her suspension of judgment, or she suspends it. The former option is discarded by proponents of the agnostic response; the latter leads the agnostic response to undermine itself.