If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

You Can't Take It With You: The Translation of Memory Across Development

ABSTRACT— Despite evidence for memory skill early in development, the evidence reviewed here shows that early-acquired memories, in rats and humans, are frozen in time. That is, in the absence of opportunities for updating, early memories are only expressed via responses or words that were available at the time of encoding. We discuss the theoretical importance of these findings and their potential clinical and forensic implications.     

You Can't Be Serious!

Abstract

Jim Cotter frames this paper in the form of a one-sided conversation with Michael Vasey about two particular phrases that Vasey was responsible for in the current Anglican liturgy. The first comes from the baptismal rite and talks of the candidate submitting themselves to Christ as Lord. By reference to marriage and other liturgical contexts, Cotter asks whether this is an appropriate image for the twenty-first century, especially in the light of the debate about sexual abuse. The second phrase is taken from the Easter liturgy and talks of light invading the darkness. Once again Cotter challenges the military implications of this language and the negative associations that such a phrase gives to ‘darkness’ Cotter makes a call for far more careful reflection on the use of language in worship and offers a number of alternative suggestions of his own.     

You Can't Always Get What You Want: Infants Understand Failed Goal-Directed Actions

ABSTRACT— At what age do infants understand that goals exist independently of the actions that result from them? Exploring infants' understanding of failed intentional actions—when the goal of the action is unfulfilled and thus not apparent in the actor's movements—is a critical step in answering this question. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we assessed when infants understand that a failed intentional action is goal directed and whether an understanding of successful intentional actions (actions that do overtly attain their goals) precedes an understanding of failed intentional actions. Results demonstrated that 10- and 12-month-olds recognized the goal directedness of both successful and failed reaching actions. Eight-month-olds also recognized the goal directedness of successful actions, but not of unsuccessful attempts. Thus, by the end of the 1st year of life, infants possess an impressive understanding of intentional action, and an understanding of failed intentional actions follows an earlier understanding of successful ones.     

Why You Can't Kick the Bucket as You Slowly Die: Verbs in Idiom Comprehension

Idiomatic phrases differ in their degree of analyzability. Some idioms are highly decomposable with their parts independently contributing to their overall figurative meaning (e.g. pop the question) while other idioms are nondecomposable with parts that do not contribute to their idiomatic meaning (e.g. kick the bucket). Nonetheless, even the parts of nondecomposable idioms might have a role in determining what they specifically mean. For example, the verb kick, in kick the bucket implies a quickness or suddenness to the death such that kick the bucket means to die suddenly rather than to die slowly. We report the findings of three experiments showing, in different ways, how the action of the verb contributes to the overall figurative meaning for some nondecomposable idioms. Together, these studies suggest that even nondecomposable idioms are not truly frozen as, at least, part of their overall figurative meanings are shaped by the particular verbs used in these phrases.     

What I Talk About When I Talk About Teaching and Learning

In this text I discuss two events in which I learned something important about life and about education in order to formulate in a precise manner two propositions for my pedagogical creed. In focus for both are the interrelatedness of theory and life. The stories are told through the lenses of Emmanuel Levinas’s and Jacques Rancière’s thinking, but the stories also are shown to be essential in my understanding of their thinking. The first story is about learning ethics as a consequence of meeting an old man on a remote island and the second story is about teaching, when a young girl in a situation of war taught me something important about political life. In a final section I discuss briefly what those theoretical/practical experiences and memories bring to my understanding of education.     

You Can't Get There from Here: Identifying Process Routes to Replication

All too often the reports of our community research and action are presented in an ahistorical and decontextualized fashion focused more on the content of what was done than on the process of how the work was done and why. The story of the university-community partnership and the family literacy intervention that was developed illustrates the importance of several key process variables in project development and implementation. More specifically, the role of the social-ecological context, prehistory, personality, self-correction, and unexpected serendipitous events are discussed. If, as community psychologists, we are serious about conducting our work in the most efficient and effective manner possible, if we truly wish to make our work available for replication, and if we seek to develop standards of "best practice" that are meaningful, our communication regarding process must shift from the anecdotal to a position of central importance.     

The More You See It, the More You Know It: Memory Accessibility and Sexual Harassment Judgments

The influence of the availability of personally known and media known sexual harassment victims and harassers on perceptions of social sexual workplace conduct was examined. Male and female full-time workers evaluated two videotapes that depict sexual harassment in the workplace. Results indicated that perceived likelihood of harassment and discrimination increased as participants recalled more examples of harassment victims whom they personally knew. In some instances, recall of victims in the media had a similar influence. As predicted, the influence of availability was stronger for men than for women. Similar findings resulted from the analyses of the unwelcomeness, severity, and pervasiveness of the conduct; however, legal standard, gender, or case often moderated this relationship. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Let's Not Talk About It: Commentary on Michael Shoshani (Rosenbaum's) Dare to be Human

As an outsider, I found myself engaged and at times mystified as I wondered about the unasked and the unspoken in Michael Shoshani (Rosenbaum's) portrayal of an analysis in his book Dare to Be Human. While conceding that every therapy and every representation of therapy must touch on some issues and omit others, and that at times intimate experience can be deadened by conversation, I was curious about the ways Shoshani (Rosenbaum) appeared at times to retreat from talking with his patient about certain areas of relatedness, particularly about varieties of possible erotic transferences. While Dr. Shoshani (Rosenbaum) makes a case for the therapeutic value of the unsaid, I wonder whether in this relationship talking about this complex area might have been a means to further joint attention and an opportunity for co-inquiry and collaboration around significant subject/object and subject/subject forms of relatedness. I ask whether talking about experience may enliven and deepen mutual experience rather than deaden it, by limning mutuality and difference, and nurturing curiosity about process and relationship.