Freedom, Equality, Minarets

This paper discusses the Swiss minaret ban as a threat to equal citizenship rather than a threat to freedom of religion. The main argument of the paper is that cultural differences can threaten the fair value of equal political participation rights as well as socio-economic ones. These differences are morally troubling despite legitimate emphasis on the need for a shared (political) culture. To ensure that the state treats its citizens as equals with regard to cultural differences requires a form of liberal neutrality which consists of two elements. Equal citizenship requires, first, justificatory neutrality in deciding which matters are legitimate concerns for legislation. It requires also—as a second safeguard—institutional arrangements which ensure that in the process of implementing justificatory neutral decisions the interests of all affected citizens receive a fair hearing. This means that the factors which tend to undermine the equal standing of citizens in society should be counteracted.     

Harmful dysfunction, disorder, disease, illness, and evolution.

Can psychiatric disorders be conceptualized as "harmful dysfunctions" (J. C. Wakefield, 1992a, 1992b, 1999; S. O. Lilienfeld & L. Marino, 1995)? Wakefield's (1992a) central concept of disorder as "harmful dysfunction" is discussed by placing it in the context of a complementary discussion of disease, illness, the sick role, and evolution (D. F. Klein, 1978). S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995) contended that proper biological function cannot be determined. This argument obscures the key significance of involuntary impairment of evolved functions. The claim that the Roschian concept has no counterpart in reality is incorrect and does not support the conclusion that dysfunctions are irreducibly evaluative and therefore arbitrary. J. C. Wakefield's (1999) views in this area are supplemented. The role of monothetic and polythetic categorization, extremal terms, and the concept of normality in nosology is considered. This analysis refutes the implication that deviance and illness are equivalent. The resolution of this debate is practically relevant to emphasizing areas of research investment, such as therapeutics.     

Money Pumps,Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy

In an alleged counter‐example to the completeness of rational preferences, a career as a clarinettist is compared with a career in law. It seems reasonable to neither want to judge that the law career is at least as preferred as the clarinet career nor want to judge that the clarinet career is at least as preferred as the law career. The two standard interpretations of examples of this kind are, first, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete and, second, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate. In this paper, I shall argue that the difference between these interpretations is crucial for the money‐pump argument for transitivity, which is the standard argument that rational preferences are transitive. I shall argue that the money‐pump argument for transitivity fails if preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete but that it works if preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate and rationally required to be complete.     

ETERNITY,TIME, AND SPACE

Abstract. The concepts of space and time are important in physics and geometry, but their definition is not the exclusive prerogative of those sciences. Space and time are important for ordinary human experience, as well as for philosophy and theology. Samuel Clarke, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant, and Albert Einstein are important figures in shaping our understandings of space, time, and eternity. The author subjects their arguments to critical examination. Space is neither an infinite and empty receptacle (Newton) nor a system of relations in the mind (Leibniz). Infinite space and time can be interpreted as expressing God's eternity and omnipresence in relating to the creation (Clarke), but such an interpretation is enhanced by Kant's thinking, to clarify that even though time and space are differentiated in individual events, the whole is at the same time present. Even human experience recognizes this wholeness, and for God eternity is the simultaneous presence and possession of the wholeness. The temporal existence of finite entities is also related to a future participation in God's eternal life. Concepts of contingency are brought into the discussion as well.     

Sentientism, Wellbeing, and Environmentalism

In this article, I wish to explore a plausible alternative to both sentientist ethics and holistic environmental ethics. In particular, I put forward the claim that creatures other than sentient ones have interests and, in virtue of that, moral standing. This thesis is in disagreement with sentientism insofar as it claims that sentience is not a prerequisite for moral consideration. Radical as it may sound, this view does not take us as far as the holism favoured by some environmentalists. In particular, on this view, the interests of collectives such as ecosystems and species are a positive function of the interests of the entities that make them up rather than something of an entirely different kind. Collectives are not the direct object of moral consideration.     

Reasons, practical reason, and practical reasoning

The concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished. Practical reason is characterized both as a capacity whose exercise is largely constituted by a kind of responsiveness to reasons and as governed by certain normative principles; and practical reasoning is described as a kind of mental process in which reasons figure as premises and, from those premises, a practical conclusion is drawn. Much of the paper undertakes two related tasks: to distinguish the main kinds of practical reasoning and the associated criteria of assessment and to formulate some important substantive principles of practical reason. These principles yield criteria of several sorts: logical, inferential, epistemic, and material. On the theory presented, although any (non‐basic) intentional act can be grounded in practical reasoning, the same acts can be performed for the relevant reason(s) without being so grounded, and in either case their rationality depends on adequate support by the reason(s). One kind of reason is commonly thought to be captured by Kantian hypothetical imperatives. The final sections explore what constitutes a hypothetical imperative and what other principles are needed to account for practical rationality. A major conclusion is that in the domain of practical reason, if there are no categorical imperatives, there are no hypothetical imperatives either.     

Stigma,Stereotype, and Self-Presentation

How should we interpret the popular objection that stigmatised subjects are not treated as individuals? The Eidelson View claims that stigma, because of its connection to stereotypes, violates an instance of the general requirement to respect autonomy. The Self-Presentation View claims that stigma inhibits the functioning of certain morally important capacities, notably the capacity for self-presentation. I argue that even if we are right to think that stigma violates a requirement to respect autonomy, this is insufficient to account for the full weight of the charge that stigmatised subjects are not treated as individuals. We need the Self-Presentation View to explain a special threat to agency. I then address the worry that focusing on a concern with being treated as individuals opens the door to the suggestion that treating as superior can be just as morally troubling as stigma. This objection is fatal for the Eidelson View. But the Self-Presentation View has a number of resources for deflating the worry. We should not exclude the possibility of a moral symmetry between some cases of stigma and some cases of treating as superior. Rather, we should provide a nuanced account of the circumstances in which either phenomenon is detrimental for self-presentation.     

Symbiosis,Empathy, Suicidal Behavior,and the Family

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the theoretical concept of symbiosis, as described by Mahler and her co-workers, and its clinical applications in suicidal situations. Symbiosis is defined as both a developmental phase characterized by a lack of differentiation between self and others and a relationship which is contingent upon the family and social network. A disturbed symbiosis is a major component in a suicide attempt. The destructive aspects of symbiosis are traced together with its relationship to empathy and the efforts to both restore and resolve a symbiotic conflict through suicidal behavior. In family therapy a repetition of older symbiotic relationships is frequently observed. These are repeated from one generation to the next in order to keep the old relationship alive. Finally, the practical implications of the concept of symbiosis for assessment and treatment are discussed.     

Music, mourning, and consolation

The attacks of September 11, 2001, prompt a consideration of the role of music in mourning and trauma. The intrapsychic functions of music in the mourning process are explored, as is music as a unique response to trauma and as a special aesthetic expression of a range of affects connected with grief. Also explored is the allied notion of consolation, a topic underdeveloped in the analytic literature.     

Depth,Perception, and Action: Past,Present, and Future

This paper examines how images of depth are employed in the psychoanalytic literature and how they illuminate or obfuscate. It examines as well the price of using familiar terminologies to introduce new ideas, a practice more common in psychoanalysis than in many other disciplines. By obscuring the differences between old ideas and new through using the same terminology for both, the sense of adherence and belonging to the psychoanalytic community is enhanced but the ability to see fully the new possibilities for theory and practice to which these new ideas point is constrained. In elaborating on this point, the paper also considers the differences between a past-centered, archaeological model and a model in which older patterns are perpetuated through their repeated consequences, both intended and unintended. In such a model both action and perception are taken into account, as the aim of analysis becomes not just the patient’s internal world but her lived life.     

Mary,dogma, and psychoanalysis

Why does Mary hold her prominent place in Catholic theology to the extent that five specific dogmas have developed around her? Psychoanalytic theory suggests dogma arises out of the psychic needs of people and psychic needs of people are expressed in dogma. The early views of Erich Fromm, a disciple of Freud, are presented to demonstrate that Marian dogma arose from the psychic needs of the people. The views of both Catholic and Protestant thinkers are presented, as well as theological and psychiatric views.     

Eta,disco, odisco,andF

Two coefficients are proposed for measuring the extent of overlap in distributions as a direct function of the variance between the arithmetic means (“disco” and “odisco”). They are designed to answer such questions as: “Given the value of a numerical variablex, to which population should an individual be assigned so that minimum error would be incurred?” This is just the reverse of the question addressed by ANOVA. These coefficients are shown to be analytic inx and they are related to Pearson's eta and Fisher'sF. Extensions of these coefficients (designed for univariate, one-way discrimination) tok-way and multivariate discriminant analysis and measurement of “interaction” are suggested.     

Ethology,ethogeny, etics,emics, biology,culture: On the limitations of dichotomies

Ethogeny, supposedly patterned on ethology, differs as an approach to human social behaviour in obvious respects. Ethogenists follow an emic research strategy, whereas human ethologists have strongly favoured etic research options. However, recent trends to a broader, evolutionary approach in human ethology suggest that an avoidance or rejection of verbal reports and ethogenic methods merits reconsideration, The distinctions involved in the eticlemic contrast are examined, and compared to Richer's distinction between D- and N-type agreements. It is argued that none of the distinctions are dichotomous. The useful aspects of the distinctions refer to the generality of findings, and the validity of evidence. Bearing these in mind, ethogenic methods have a place in a broader human ethology. So far as validity is concerned, the value of a comparison of information from different sources, such as verbal and non-verbal data, is stressed. So far as generality is concerned, ethogenists may consider this to be very limited because of idiosyncratic cultural factors in the causation of human social action. A reconsideration of the biology/culture dimension in terms of function rather than causation may lead to more optimism in this respect, and be more productive scientifically.     

Concepts,structures, and meanings

Concepts are basic elements of thought. Piaget has a conception of the nature of concepts as informational or computational operations performed in an inner milieu and enabling the child to understand the world in which it lives and acts. Concepts are, however, not merely logico‐mathematical but are also conceptually linked to the mastery of language which itself involves the appropriate use of words in social and interpersonal settings. In the light of Vygotsky's work on the social and interactive nature of children's thinking and the nature of language as an essentially public currency of rule‐governed signs, we are led to reconstrue conceptual mastery as the acquisition of an interactive and interpersonal repertoire of tools which introduces the child to the world of those who educate it. In this way we come to see the elements of mind as constitutively involving that activity in which the determinants of meaning constrain and direct the child's linguistic development.     

Infertility,epistemic risk,and disease definitions

I explore the role that values and interests, especially ideological interests, play in managing and balancing epistemic risks in medicine. I will focus in particular on how diseases are identified and operationalized. Before we can do biomedical research on a condition, it needs to be identified as a medical condition, and it needs to be operationalized in a way that lets us identify sufferers, measure progress, and so forth. I will argue that each time we do this, we engage in epistemic risk balancing that inevitably draws upon values and interests, often including social and ideological values. My main interest here is in the conceptualization of infertility as a disease. Infertility is a rich test case for exploring the interplay between interests and epistemic risk management. There is no uncontested or standardized definition of infertility. The various definitions of it are internally ambiguous and tension-ridden, and in spectacular contradiction with one another. Many interest groups who are invested in framing infertility as a pressing problem deserving of social and medical redress are quick to insist that it is a legitimate ‘disease,’ but they cannot agree on which disease it is, what its symptoms or diagnostic markers are, or even what its basic ontology is. I suggest that there are political explanations for this epistemic mess. Indeed, I contend that there are good scientific and ethical reasons to reduce away the category of ‘infertility,’ especially understood as a scientific or medical category; I argue that we should excise the concept from our research and clinical practices.

     

Conversation,relevance, and argumentation

This paper deals with the explanation the maxim of relevance provides for the way utterances in argumentative discourse follow each other in an orderly and coherent fashion. Several senses are distinguished in which utterances can be considered relevant. It is argued that an utterance can be considered relevant as an interactional act, as an illocutionary act, as a propositional act, and as an elocutionary act. These four kinds of relevance manifest the rational organization of discourse, which is aimed at bringing about mutual alignment between the participants, enabling them jointly to work out certain interactional outcomes that are acceptable to both of them.     

Analytic neutrality, anonymity, abstinence, and elective self-disclosure

Recent contributions to the psychoanalytic literature propose new ways of understanding analytic neutrality, anonymity, abstinence, and self-disclosure. They advocate elective self-disclosure by the analyst as an antidote to the allegedly game-playing quality of transference and resistance analysis. The analytic relationship, they assert, becomes unreal when attempts are made to observe the principles of neutrality and abstinence. Both are seen as ill-conceived because of the irreducible subjectivity and unwarranted authority of the analyst. These relational and interactional views are criticized because (1) they ignore the fact that transference and resistance analysis have from Freud onward been accepted as minimal criteria qualifying a clinical process as psychoanalytic; (2) elective self-disclosure carries metapsychological implications dismissing not only Freud's theory of motivation but motivation as a basic feature of human personality; (3) they do not recognize interpersonal relations as mental events and so do not consider the ego's ability to create intrapsychic representations of object relations; (4) elective self-disclosures within the empathic parameters of the analytic situation are themselves unreal compared to the reality of the patient's experience with other objects. Abstinence and neutrality as ideals facilitate maintenance of an internal holding environment or container for the analyst's countertransference.     

Heidegger,Communal Being,and Politics

There are two critical, but opposite interpretations of Heidegger’s understanding of being as a social ontology. One charges Heidegger with adhering to an anti-social “private irony,” while the other charges him with promoting a “self-canceling” totality. The current essay replies to these two charges with a discussion of Heidegger’s understanding of being as “communal being,” which is implicated both in the early Heidegger’s concept of “being-in-the-world-with-others” and in the later Heidegger’s keyword of Ereignis. It argues that Heidegger’s understanding of being as communal being is neither identical with totalitizing publicness nor the same as voluntaristic egotism. According to Heidegger, both the publicness of das Man and voluntaristic egotism are the real threats to humanity at present. Because of them, we human beings are in danger of being uprooted from the earth upon which we—as communal beings—have already and always dwelled and lived with others from the very beginning of human history.