Investigations in spontaneous discounting

Oppenheimer’s (2004) demonstration that causal discounting (when the presence of one cause casts doubt on the presence of another) can happen spontaneously addressed the standing concern that discounting was an artifact of experimental demands, but these results could have resulted from memory inhibition. The present studies rule out this alternative using the same surname frequency estimation paradigm. In Study 1, individuals discounted surname familiarity even when it could be attributed to semantic meaning; in Study 2, participants under cognitive load discounted less; in Study 3, participants who were promised a prize for accuracy discounted more. All three results conform to a spontaneous causal discounting account better than to the inhibition alternative.     

Do Measures of Executive Functioning and Manipulation of Ego Depletion Predict How University Students Discount Probabilistic Gains and Losses?

Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses.     

Magnitude effect contributes to the domain specificity in delay discounting

Discounting is a useful framework for understanding temporal choices. A person who prefers $50 immediately over $100 in 1 month exhibits a higher discount rate than a person deciding to wait for the higher payoff. Although previous research shows that discount rates are domain-specific, we propose an alternative to the domain specificity account. We suggest that differences in discounting alternatives across various domains may result not so much from the domains' nature per se but from differences in perceived attractiveness of the discounted alternatives. We replicated that an illustrative study evidencing domain specificity in discounting (Experiment 1) showed that people's subjective values of the payoffs in domains discounted in this experiment were different (Experiment 2) and used a novel method to match the attractiveness of the available alternatives across domains (Experiment 3). Finally, Experiment 4 showed that when matching was applied, the domain effect disappeared. We conclude that a magnitude effect can, at least partially, explain domain specificity in delay discounting.     

Greater delay discounting among girls,but not boys,with ADHD correlates with cognitive control

Cognitive neuroscience models suggest both reward valuation and cognitive control contribute to reward-based decision-making. The current study examined the relationship between cognitive control and delay discounting (i.e., choosing smaller, immediate over larger, delayed rewards) in a large sample of boys and girls diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; N = 95) and typically developing control children (TD; N = 59). Specifically, we examined performance on multiple measures of cognitive control (i.e., Go/No-Go task, Stop Signal task, and Spatial Span task) and delay discounting (i.e., Classic Delay Discounting and Real-Time Delay Discounting tasks), as well as the relationship between these measures. Results indicated that sex moderated the effects of group on task performance. Specifically, girls with ADHD, but not boys with the disorder, exhibited atypical delay discounting of real-time rewards. Results from correlational analyses indicated that delay discounting and cognitive control were not significantly correlated in the overall sample. Multiple regression analyses demonstrated that among girls with ADHD poorer spatial working memory and inhibitory control predicted greater real-time discounting. Collectively, findings provide support for distinct patterns of cognitive control and delay discounting among school-aged girls and boys with ADHD. Additionally, findings suggest that among girls with ADHD, those who exhibit relatively poor working memory and inhibitory control might be a particularly vulnerable subgroup with the greatest propensity to exhibit maladaptive decision-making.     

Belief-based and covariation-based cues affect causal discounting.

Causal discounting occurs when the perceived efficacy of a putative cause is reduced by the presence of a stronger causal candidate. Previous studies of causal discounting have defined the strength of causal candidates in terms of the degree to which the cause and the effect covary (e.g., Baker, Mercier, Vallee-Tourangeau, Frank, & Pan, 1993). In contrast, in the present study, causal strength was defined in terms of both covariation- and belief-based cues. Seventy-two participants made causality judgments for a fictional causal candidate both in isolation and when paired with either a stronger or a weaker cause. The results demonstrated that the degree to which a causal candidate is discounted depends not only on the degree to which an alternative cause covaries with the effect, but also on whether the alternative is a believable or unbelievable candidate. Indeed, it was observed that a highly believable alternative will produce the discounting effect, even if it is a weaker covariate than the original candidate. These findings suggest the need to incorporate both belief-based and covariation-based cues into models of causal attribution.     

Delay discounting of qualitatively different reinforcers in rats

Humans discount larger delayed rewards less steeply than smaller rewards, whereas no such magnitude effect has been observed in rats (and pigeons). It remains possible that rats' discounting is sensitive to differences in the quality of the delayed reinforcer even though it is not sensitive to amount. To evaluate this possibility, Experiment 1 examined discounting of qualitatively different food reinforcers: highly preferred versus nonpreferred food pellets. Similarly, Experiment 2 examined discounting of highly preferred versus nonpreferred liquid reinforcers. In both experiments, an adjusting-amount procedure was used to determine the amount of immediate reinforcer that was judged to be of equal subjective value to the delayed reinforcer. The amount and quality of the delayed reinforcer were varied across conditions. Discounting was well described by a hyperbolic function, but no systematic effects of the quantity or the quality of the delayed reinforcer were observed.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Discounting in causality and covariation judgements

In two experiments, humans were asked to judge the strength of a moderate contingency between a cue and an outcome in the presence of a second strong contingency between another cue and the outcome. The first experiment replicated the discounting effect whereby a strong contingency causes subjects to reduce or discount judgements of a moderate contingency. This experiment used a video-game procedure in which subjects camouflaged a tank to make it safe from mines. The second causal cue was the presence or absence of a spotter plane. Experiment 1 also ruled out the possibility that judgements might be determined by the number of co-occurrences of the cue and outcome as opposed to the level of contingency. The second experiment used an abstract scenario in which discounting was demonstrated when subjects were asked to judge the relationship between the occurrence of geometric objects. The instructions were neutral to discourage causal hypotheses. These results support the notion that judgements result from associative or connectionist processes and not from a two-step cognitive retrospective process in which an estimate of covariation is calculated between cue and outcome and then in a second step this information is used in a normative manner when a decision is made.     

Impression valence constrains social explanations: the case of discounting versus conjunction effects.

Discounting refers to a reduction in explanation plausibility in light of another explanation, whereas conjunction effects refer to an increase in plausibility of explanations judged in combination rather than in isolation. Explanation compatibility moderates these effects, such that discounting is greater for incompatible explanations and conjunction effects are greater for compatible explanations. Three experiments examined whether this effect reflects perceptions regarding (a) the prior statistical association of causal factors, (b) the sharing of common causal mechanisms, or (c) coherence with regard to global impressions. Results indicated that impression valence predicts and also directly influences discounting and conjunction effects independent of covariation and mechanism, underscoring the pervasive impact of impressions on attributions.     

Understanding microworlds

Little is known about how individuals understand change in complex systems. In the natural world, for instance, the effects of change need to be understood in terms of two-way (interdependent) causal processes. Based on subject's ratings of the causal likelihood that a given change will yield a target effect and on subjects' ratings of the impact of a given change on specified populations in a microworld, White (1997, 2000) argued that individuals in fact understand change in terms of one-way causal processes and assume that causal effects decline with distance from the source of the change. An alternative view is that the ratings reflect individuals' mental simulations of change as elicited by the tasks. Experiments 1 and 2 confirm that such ratings are task dependent and that individuals make no general assumption that causal effects decrease with distance. Experiment 3 shows that when required to explain a pattern of change in the size of a population individuals can construct two-way causal explanations consistent with this mental simulation proposal.     

A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning

There are two accounts describing causal conditional reasoning: the probabilistic and the mental models account. According to the probabilistic account, the tendency to accept a conclusion is related to the probability by which cause and effect covary. According to the mental models account, the tendency to accept a conclusion relates to the availability of counterexamples. These two accounts are brought together in a dual-process theory: It is argued that the probabilistic reasoning process can be considered as a heuristic process whereas the mental models account can be seen as its analytic counterpart. Experiment 1 showed that the two processes differ on a temporal dimension: The variation in fast responses was best predicted by the variation in likelihood information, while the variation in slow responses was best predicted by variation in counterexample information. Experiments 2 and 3 validate the override principle: The likelihood conclusion can be overwritten when specific counterexamples are retrieved in time. In Experiment 2 both accounts were compared based on their difference in input. In Experiment 3 we used a verbal protocol analysis to validate the dual-process idea at the output level. The data of the three experiments provide converging support for framing the two reasoning accounts in a dual-process theory.     

物质成瘾领域延迟折扣研究中的外部效度问题

物质成瘾者的跨期决策缺陷已被大量使用金钱延迟折扣任务的研究所证实。然而近年来, 来自金钱延迟折扣任务变式(成瘾物质延迟折扣任务、性延迟折扣任务和跨类别延迟折扣任务)的发现表明, 在物质成瘾领域的延迟折扣研究中单一使用金钱延迟折扣任务存在一定的局限性。首先, 物质成瘾者对金钱的延迟折扣水平可能并不能完全代表其对成瘾物质、性和其它自然奖赏的延迟折扣水平; 其次, 仅使用单一延迟折扣任务可能存在对物质成瘾者跨期决策过程的过度简化; 最后, 金钱延迟折扣任务较其变式对物质成瘾者的一些临床特征不够敏感。未来研究应进一步丰富、拓展物质成瘾领域的跨类别延迟折扣研究, 并对可能影响跨期决策的时间因素进行深入探索。     

Judgement frequency, belief revision, and serial processing of causal information

The main aim of this research was to study the cognitive architecture underlying causal/covariation learning by investigating the frequency of judgement effect. Previous research has shown that decreasing the number of trials between opportunities to make a judgement in a covariation learning task led to a higher score after an a or d type of trial (positive cases) than after b and c trials (negative cases). Experiment 1 replicated this effect using a trial-by-trial procedure and examined the conditions under which it occurs. Experiment 2 demonstrated a similar frequency of judgement effect when the information was presented in the form of contingency tables. Associative or statistical single-mechanism accounts of causal and covariation learning do not provide a satisfactory explanation for these findings. An alternative belief revision model is presented.     

Discounting in preschoolers: effect of type of reward agent

The effect of type of reward agent on children's discounting was examined. In Study 1, 49 preschool children were told two stories illustrated with small dolls and toys. Subjects discounted intrinsic interest in toy A when a "big, mean brother" told a sibling that if he played with toy A he could play with toy B. Discounting did not appear when the reward agent in the story was the child's mother, which is the typical outcome in previous research with young children. Studies 2 and 3 suggested that the combination of a negative valence and a particular social role/status accounted for the effect of the big, mean brother of Study 1. More specifically, neither a "big brother" nor a "mean mother" as reward agents elicited a significant amount of discounting. The results suggest that social knowledge guides the application of the discounting schema.     

Diagnostic reasoning with circumstantial evidence

Individuals often evaluate hypotheses about the cause of particular events on the basis of circumstantial evidence. This article describes a quantitative model of belief revision with circumstantial evidence. The model assumes that subjects revise belief on the basis of a cascaded reasoning process that combines beliefs about three premises—the association of a clue and a possible cause, and forward and backward implications of the clue—to revise belief in a causal hypothesis. Subjects in three experiments solved fictional murder mysteries, reporting on each trial a subset of the beliefs specified by the model. Experiment 1 demonstrates that the model provides a good account of the reasoning process, over several contexts in which clues are evaluated. Subjects appear to develop causal models that affect the interpretation of clues. Experiment 2 provides further evidence on the development of causal models and compares the present model with a model based on Bayes' theorem. Experiment 3 is a control experiment which demonstrates that the belief assessments used in Experiments 1 and 2 do not alter the process of belief revision. Tests of subjects' memory for suspect-clue associations provide further support for the hypothesis that subjects develop causal models of the true cause and demonstrate the contrast between reasoning with currently available information and retrospective access to the facts on which belief revision is based. The present view is compared with other theories of causal thinking and belief revision.     

Discounting of food,sex, and money

Discounting is a useful framework for understanding choice involving a range of delayed and probabilistic outcomes (e.g., money, food, drugs), but relatively few studies have examined how people discount other commodities (e.g., entertainment, sex). Using a novel discounting task, where the length of a line represented the value of an outcome and was adjusted using a staircase procedure, we replicated previous findings showing that individuals discount delayed and probabilistic outcomes in a manner well described by a hyperbola-like function. In addition, we found strong positive correlations between discounting rates of delayed, but not probabilistic, outcomes. This suggests that discounting of delayed outcomes may be relatively predictable across outcome types but that discounting of probabilistic outcomes may depend more on specific contexts. The generality of delay discounting and potential context dependence of probability discounting may provide important information regarding factors contributing to choice behavior.     

Comparing Delay Discounting Rates When Using the Fill-in-the-Blank and Multiple-Choice Methods

Several methods have been devised to measure delay discounting. The present study recruited university students to complete a delay-discounting task involving five different outcomes (finding a dating partner, free cigarettes, winning $100,000, being owed $100,000, and obtaining one's ideal body image) that was administered using either the fill-in-the blank (FITB) or multiple-choice (MC) method. Results showed that the different administration methods sometimes produced significantly different rates of discounting, the direction of which differed by outcome. Hyperbolic discounting and the area under the discounting curve were nearly always significantly correlated when the FITB method was used but were never significantly correlated when the MC method was used. Discounting across the five outcomes produced a two-factor solution when the FITB data were factor analyzed. The MC data were described by a one-factor solution. The present results illustrate that procedural variables have a potentially profound impact on delay-discounting data, and generalizing from studies on delay discounting should be done with caution until those variables are fully understood.     

愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响：确定感和控制感的中介作用

本研究基于评估倾向理论, 通过3项实验考察了特定负性情绪(愤怒)对延迟折扣的影响, 并探究确定感和控制感评估倾向在这一关系中的作用。实验1考察愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响, 结果发现, 愤怒组被试的延迟满足倾向显著强于恐惧组和控制组。实验2采用实验因果链设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 愤怒情绪可以有效增强个体的确定感和控制感(实验2a), 同时确定感和控制感能够增强个体的延迟满足倾向(实验2b)。实验3采用中介测量设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中起完全中介作用。本研究结果表明, 当个体进行跨期决策时, 体验到与确定感和控制感有关的偶然愤怒情绪会增强其延迟满足倾向。本研究对探究特定负性情绪对个体延迟折扣的影响具有一定的启示意义。