From intrapsychic to ecological theories in social psychology: Outlines of a functional theory approach

Social psychology is facing a major developmental task, which is not primarily one of achieving larger data samples and stricter significance testing. What is needed, rather, is an improvement in logic of science and powerful theorizing. The starting point of this article is a critical appraisal that the intrapsychic concepts (motives, attitudes, and explicit and implicit goals) that are the major focus of social–psychological theories lack in explanatory power because they are too close to the effects (actions, judgments, and decisions) they are intended to explain. To overcome this apparent weakness (compared with neuroscience or genetics), it is proposed that more powerful theories should relate social cognition and behavior to more distant variables in the environment. A functional analysis reveals that intrapsychic processes are multiply predetermined by extrapsychic, environmental constraints. The theoretical value and fertility of the proposed ecological functionalism are illustrated with reference to three areas of empirical research: sampling approaches to understanding biases in judgment and decision making; strategic influences on priming effects within a functional analysis of adaptive behavior; and the impact of verbal and symbolic communication constraints on the construction of attributions, stereotypes, and culture. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ageing- and dementia-friendly design: theory and evidence from cognitive psychology,neuropsychology and environmental psychology can contribute to design guidelines that minimise spatial disorientation

Cognitive Processing - Many older people, both with and without dementia, eventually move from their familiar home environments into unfamiliar surroundings, such as sheltered housing or care...     

Judgment theory and school psychology

This article reviews criticism of research on judgmental biases in cognitive psychology and suggests caution in applying the findings of this research to research in school psychology. Additionally, it provides suggestions regarding the potential of theory in cognitive psychology to reconcile discrepant findings in selected research on special education decision making.     

Social action theory for a public health psychology

Many illnesses can be prevented or limited by altering personal behavior, and public health planners have turned to psychology for guidance in fostering self-protective activity. A social theory of personal action provides an integrative framework for applying psychology to public health, disclosing gaps in our current understanding of self-regulation, and generating guidelines for improving health promotion at the population level. A social action view emphasizes social interdependence and interaction in personal control of health-endangering behavior and proposes mechanisms by which environmental structures influence cognitive action schemas, self-goals, and problem-solving activities critical to sustained behavioral change. Social action theory clarifies relationships between social and personal empowerment and helps explain stages of self-change.     

Group psychology and the structural theory: a revised psychoanalytic model of group psychology.

It has been my aim in this paper to revise the existing psychoanalytic theory of group psychology in accordance with current structural concepts. The need for fundamental revision in the existing theory of group organization is demonstrated by its restriction to an oedipal paradigm, which cannot account for the regression to an oral paradigm of group organization during group formation. Freud's explanation of regression in crowds is reviewed. The limitations inherent in Freud's topographic and narcisistic models are demonstrated; irreconcilable contradictions are shown to exist between the two theories. A structural model of group psychology that is free from internal contradictions and provides a unifying explanation for both regression and merging in the crowd is developed. As a consequence of these revisions it is possible to conceptualize preoedipal organizations of group structure in addition to the oedipal paradigm proposed by Freud.     

Selectivity in probabilistic causality: Where psychology runs into quantum physics

Given a set of several inputs into a system (e.g., independent variables characterizing stimuli) and a set of several stochastically non-independent outputs (e.g., random variables describing different aspects of responses), how can one determine, for each of the outputs, which of the inputs it is influenced by? The problem has applications ranging from modeling pairwise comparisons to reconstructing mental processing architectures to conjoint testing. A necessary and sufficient condition for a given pattern of selective influences is provided by the Joint Distribution Criterion, according to which the problem of “what influences what” is equivalent to that of the existence of a joint distribution for a certain set of random variables. For inputs and outputs with finite sets of values this criterion translates into a test of consistency of a certain system of linear equations and inequalities (Linear Feasibility Test) which can be performed by means of linear programming. While new in the behavioral context, both this test and the Joint Distribution Criterion on which it is based have been previously proposed in quantum physics, in dealing with generalizations of Bell inequalities for the quantum entanglement problem. The parallels between this problem and that of selective influences in behavioral sciences are established by observing that noncommuting measurements in quantum physics are mutually exclusive and can therefore be treated as different levels of one and the same factor.     

A probabilistic model of theory formation

Concept learning is challenging in part because the meanings of many concepts depend on their relationships to other concepts. Learning these concepts in isolation can be difficult, but we present a model that discovers entire systems of related concepts. These systems can be viewed as simple theories that specify the concepts that exist in a domain, and the laws or principles that relate these concepts. We apply our model to several real-world problems, including learning the structure of kinship systems and learning ontologies. We also compare its predictions to data collected in two behavioral experiments. Experiment 1 shows that our model helps to explain how simple theories are acquired and used for inductive inference. Experiment 2 suggests that our model provides a better account of theory discovery than a more traditional alternative that focuses on features rather than relations.     

Risk-sensitive foraging theory and operant psychology.

Hastjarjo, Silberberg, and Hursh (1990) have presented data on the foraging behavior of rats and discussed it in terms of risk-sensitive foraging theory. Because risk-sensitive foraging theory is comprised of several different models, it does not lead to general predictions about when an organism should prefer a foraging option with high variance to a foraging option with low variance. Any comparison of data with the predictions of the theory must be based on an appropriate model. I draw attention to various experiments that are potentially relevant to the results reported by Hastjarjo et al. and show how the time period over which the organism must survive can influence a model's predictions about risk sensitivity.     

Rape and evolutionary psychology: a critique of Thornhill and Palmer's theory

In this article, we present a critical evaluation of Thornhill and Palmer's [(2000). Rape: a natural history. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.] evolutionary theory of rape. This theory attempts to explain rape in terms of evolutionary theory and asserts that rape is either directly or indirectly associated with inherited mechanisms that increased our ancestors' reproductive success. We first provide an introduction and overview of some of the fundamental concepts in the field of evolutionary psychology (EP) and then summarize the major elements of Thornhill and Palmer's theory. Thornhill and Palmer offer two main lines of argument in support of their theory — a positive and a negative argument. The positive argument involves the development of an explicit case for the coherency, scope, empirical adequacy, and explanatory depth of their evolutionary account of rape. The negative argument relies upon refuting what Thornhill and Palmer call the “standard social science model” (SSSM) of rape. The present paper advances some general criticisms of Thornhill and Palmer's theory and then specifically addresses both their positive and negative arguments. We conclude that Thornhill and Palmer have not established that their evolutionary theory of rape is a better theory than social science explanations. At best, their argument presents a strong case for the important, but not exclusive, role of biological factors in the etiology of rape and gender relationships. At this point in time, there are too many unanswered questions concerning the nature of the relevant adaptations and the contribution of environmental and cultural factors to conclude that evolutionary theories are sufficient to explain sexual aggression.