A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: what is distinctive of ‘conscious’ phenomena.     

A Plantingian Pickle for a Darwinian Dilemma: Evolutionary Arguments Against Atheism and Normative Realism

Two of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments are Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism and Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Atheism. In the former, Street appeals to evolutionary considerations to debunk normative realism. In the latter, Plantinga appeals to similar considerations to debunk atheism. By a careful comparison of these two arguments, I develop a new strategy to help normative realists resist Street's debunking attempt. In her Darwinian Dilemma, Street makes epistemological commitments that ultimately support Plantinga's structurally similar argument. If Street succeeds in debunking normative realism, I argue, then she also succeeds in debunking atheism. But atheism is a suppressed premise of the Darwinian Dilemma as well as a commitment of almost all normative anti‐realists. If Street's argument entails theism, then the Darwinian Dilemma is internally incoherent and should be abandoned by almost everyone. 1     

Bad bootstrapping: the problem with third-factor replies to the Darwinian Dilemma for moral realism

Philosophical Studies - Street’s (Philos Stud 127:109–166, 2006) “Darwinian Dilemma” is a well-known epistemological objection to moral realism. In this paper, I argue that...     

A Realist Sexual Ethics

A very liberal sexual ethics now holds sway in Western culture, such that mutual consent alone is widely seen as morally legitimizing almost any sexual activity between adults. It is further commonly assumed by both philosophers and nonphilosophers that arguing for some alternative to liberal sexual ethics requires appeal to ethical commands specific to some religious tradition or other. The purpose of this paper is to challenge that assumption by suggesting some purely naturalistic and independently‐plausible premises that can be used to argue for a much more conservative system of sexual ethics than is widely accepted today.     

Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value

Adopting a dispositional theory of value promises to deliver a lot of theoretical goodies. One recurring problem for dispositional theories of value, though, is a problem about nonconvergence. If being a value is being disposed to elicit response R in us, what should we say if it turns out that not everybody is disposed to have R to the same things? One horn of the problem here is a danger of the view collapsing into an error theory—of it turning out, on account of the diversity of agents' relevant dispositions, that nothing is really a value, since nothing is disposed to elicit R in everybody. Alternatively, there is a danger of an objectionable fragmentation of value, according to which there is no such thing as a value simpliciter, but only values_me and values_you, values_us and values_them. I advocate a de se relativist version of a dispositional theory of value. If we go for this sort of de‐se‐ified dispositional theory, we get to keep our theoretical goodies, but we avoid the problem of nonconvergence that leads to a danger of either collapse into an error theory, or else talking‐past, and a loss of common subject matter.     

A Dilemma for Calibrationism

The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I argue, has the implausible consequence that, in a wide range of cases, calibrationism is the only constraint on rational belief. The second version, in addition to having some puzzling consequences, is unmotivated. At the end of the paper I sketch a possible solution.     

A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism

Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer the rule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions. Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems, rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by the rule-consequentialists.     

A Dilemma for Eternalists

Philosophia - In this discussion I argue that, given the possibility of travel to the past, eternalists face a dilemma. They must choose between fatalism and the denial of an intuitive claim about...     

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.     

哲学的价值论转向

一 何谓哲学的价值论转向 所谓"哲学的转向"就其实质而言,应该包含三个方面的含义.其一,是指哲学研究中的某一问题被凸现为哲学研究的核心问题;其二,是指被凸现的这一问题为思考研究其它问题提供了一种新的视角;其三,也是最深层的,是指一种哲学研究的价值取向、立场和方法的转换.     

走出价值相对主义

价值相对主义的理论失误和实践危害,使大多数价值哲学论者都力图克服之。新康德主义的形式先验主义的思路,舍勒的实质先验主义的思路,布伦坦诺的经验直觉主义的思路,培里的现代经验主义的思路,都是克服价值相对主义的不同尝试,都有其合理因素。但由于它们各自理论的缺陷,使之难以真正克服价值相对主义。我们认为,以实践为基点去理解价值的本质,应用唯物辩证的方法去说明价值的相对性与绝对性,才能走出价值相对主义。     

The Asymmetry of Causality: A Realist Solution

How do we distinguish between cause and effect? The main argument of this paper is that if a realist account of the meaning of causal statements is adopted, then two clear distinctions between cause and effect emerge. By realist account is meant conceiving a cause as something with a power to act. Since a realist approach to causality is not widely accepted among philosophers, two arguments against a realist approach to causality are countered. The asymmetry of causality is defended against the claim that physics, in the main, describes a symmetrical universe.     

学科与学说:价值研究的层面

哲学价值问题的研究,开拓了我国哲学基础理论的新领域,其意义正在得到越来越多人的关注.作为一个"业内人士",我感到价值研究所带来的,应该不仅仅是对新问题、新概念、新范畴的关注和兴趣,更是一种新的哲学方向、新的思维方式、研究方式的探索,甚至还包括学风和学品的反思与升华.     

Predicted Outcome Value and Uncertainty Reduction Theories A Test of Competing Perspectives

This research tests several contrasting predictions from uncertainty reduction and predicted outcome value theories. Pairs of college classmates engaged in initial conversations with one another on the first day of classes. Research participants then reported on each pair's behavior during these conversations and their reactions to their partner and relationship. With few exceptions, predicted outcome value theory proposals were consistently supported by the results of this investigation. However, results failed to support uncertainty reduction theory's original axioms and theorems when predicted outcome value was taken into account. These findings are interpreted as strongly supporting the predicted outcome value perspective and its claim that uncertainty reduction processes are subservient to outcome maximization goals in initial interactions.     

论医务社会工作中的价值观冲突和伦理困境

医务社会工作遵循着社会工作专业的一般价值观和伦理守则,并在此基础上,发展出其特有的价值观和职业伦理。对医务社会工作实践中的价值冲突和伦理困境及解决这些难题的指导原则等问题进行探讨,以期使医务社会工作者对工作实践中可能遇到的相关问题有初步的认识,并为他们在行动决策时提供参考和借鉴。