Luck’s Extended Reach

Something is a matter of luck if it is beyond our control. In this paper, I argue for the primary thesis that luck can undermine varieties of obligation, such as moral and prudential obligation, as well as judgments that are best from an agent’s own point of view. Among the considerations invoked to defend this thesis is a prevalent form of libertarianism, event-causal libertarianism. Arguments for the primary thesis that call on event-causal libertarianism raise concerns with this variety of libertarianism.     

Is Consequential Luck Morally Inconsequential? Empirical Psychology and the Reassessment of Moral Luck

Philosophical discussions of the phenomenon that has come to be known as ‘moral luck’ have either dismissed it as illusory or touted it as the evidence for doubting the probative value of our commitment to certain widely avowed views concerning interpersonal assessments of responsibility. In this discussion, we present a third, distinctive interpretation of the moral luck phenomenon. Drawing upon empirically robust results from psychological studies of judgment bias, we argue that the phenomenon of moral luck is demonstrably not illusory. What we suggest, however, is that the phenomenon ought not to be taken to countenance doubts about the standards generally taken to be regulative of assessments of interpersonal responsibility. Rather, its significance lies in foregrounding certain generally unacknowledged obstacles we face in the process of conclusively applying general valid moral standards in making specific judgments of responsibility and desert.¹     

What's So Egalitarian About Luck Egalitarianism?

Luck egalitarians typically hold that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. In this paper I want to address two complaints against standard luck egalitarianism that do not question responsibility‐sensitivity (or ‘luck‐ism’). The first objection says that equality itself lacks inherent non‐instrumental value, and so the luckist component ought to be attached to a different pattern, say prioritarianism (thus producing ‘luck‐prioritarianism’). The second objection also endorses luckism but worries that luck egalitarianism as conventionally formulated is committed in fact to neutralizing not just brute luck but also option luck. And this would mean, among other things, compensating unsuccessful gamblers, which is something many egalitarians find counterintuitive. My aim is to show that there is a way for luck egalitarianism to meet both criticisms; that it can maintain its egalitarian credentials while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of compensating unsuccessful gamblers. To do so, I propose, we ought to understand luck egalitarianism as resting on the disvalue of being arbitrarily worse off compared to others. In addition, I suggest, the badness of luck egalitarian inequality – that of arbitrary disadvantage – has both an inter‐personal and an intra‐personal dimension.     

No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology

Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luck (modal and probabilistic ones) and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky.     

More Than Mazel? Luck and Agency in Surviving the Holocaust

The canonical explanation for how Jews survived during the Holocaust involves some form of luck. To explore and deepen an understanding of episodic moments of luck, this article presents and discusses survivor Jerry Rawicki's close calls with death during the Holocaust. The first author examines Jerry's perspective as a survivor and her own perspective as a collaborative witness to his stories, as well as how these stories fit together within the broader literature about luck and survival. She suggests possible consequences of regarding luck as the sole explanation of survival and contends that agency and luck can go hand in hand even under oppressive structural conditions, such as the Holocaust. She concludes by reflecting on why Jerry and she might understand survival differently and on the importance of considering both positions in compassionate collaborative research.     

What Is Unfair about Unequal Brute Luck? An Intergenerational Puzzle

Philosophia - According to Luck egalitarians, fairness requires us to bring it about that nobody is worse off than others where this results from brute bad luck, but not where they choose or...     

Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections.     

‘SUERTE’ (Luck): Spirituality and Well-Being in El Alto, Bolivia

This paper addresses the importance of faith and the consequent resort to supernatural forces to acquire a sense of well-being in a poor neighbourhood in the city of El Alto, Bolivia. Religious beliefs and practices have provided an important idiom for the expression of aspirations and the pursuit of ideals. The social role of emotions and its effect on well-being have been widely investigated in anthropology, especially in relation to issues of solidarity, feelings of confidence, and a sense of full personhood and empowerment (Barbalet 2001; Turner 2002; Bendelow and Williams 1997). The importance of faith is emphasised in my ethnography, showing how people’s loyalty to their notions of self-worth and the cosmological order is essential for their sense of fulfilment and empowerment. Thus, faith principles are fundamental to shed light on ideas of what people identify as well-being and fulfilment. My informants believe that luck can be controlled and changed by treating the spirits better. It can be bought and acquired by asking for protection from the spiritual forces living in the Bolivian plateau. Luck is inextricably connected with ideas of protection, destiny control and future aspirations. Bad luck is a moment of passage that leads to good luck. However, this is not a simple process. It requires a complex involvement of people, who carefully have to invest their time and money in changing their situation through various cultural practices of divination and control of destiny. Unless you are a breech baby, you are not born lucky, but you become so if you invest your resources in nourishing the forces that support the world. In exchange, these forces will assure and control an individual’s luck, freeing him/her from evil eye and envy-major sources of ill-being. This can be achieved through a ritual performed by a yatiri—local shaman, or other means, such as participating and dancing in a religious celebration in honour of a patron saint or engaging in regular acts of faith. The paper is based on ethnographic research carried out in Senkata, a poor neighbourhood in the city of El Alto, between November 2003 and November 2004. I spent 12 months in Bolivia in order to collect data for my Phd thesis. My methodology was mainly based on participant observation, informal conversations and a few formal interviews.     

How Much of What Matters Can We Redistribute? Love,Justice, and Luck

By meeting needs for individualized love and relatedness, the care we receive deeply shapes our social and economic chances and therefore represents a form of luck. Hence, distributive justice requires a fair distribution of care in society. I look at different ways of ensuring this and argue that full redistribution of care is beyond our reach. I conclude that a strong individual morality informed by an ethics of care is a necessary complement of well‐designed institutions.     

As Luck Would Have It: Thomas Hardy’s Bildungsroman on Leading a Human Life

In this essay, I demonstrate the value of the Bildungsroman for philosophy of education on the grounds that these narratives raise and explore educational questions. I focus on a short story in the Bildungsroman tradition, Thomas Hardy’s “A Mere Interlude”. This story describes the maturation of its heroine by narrating a series of events that transform her understanding of what it means to lead a human life. I connect her conceptual shift with two paradigms for leading a human life. One stresses the exercise of distinct human capacities like agency and autonomy, whereas the other stresses human vulnerability to fate or moral luck. I conclude by offering important reasons for educators to adopt the later paradigm over the former.     

How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?

Imagine a two‐person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y, producing an income gap between them of Y. Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y, since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the Boring Problem poses a deep problem for standard luck egalitarianism. To counter it, luck egalitarianism needs to be recast as a baseline‐relative theory. This new version of luck egalitarianism is then put to work against some significant problems that have been encountered by luck egalitarianism: Saul Smilansky's “Paradox of the Baseline,” the “Partiality Worry,” and the “Pluralism Worry.” But baseline‐relative luck egalitarianism is not without problems of its own.     

How Loving are You Willing to Be? Empathic Interpretations of Fallibility,Capability, and Luck in Psychotherapy

This article addresses possibilities for more empathic interpretations in the clinical situation. Using both clinical case material and mythical allegories, the author, a psychotherapist and philosopher, considers the interrelated themes of human capability, fallibility, luck, and compassion within the context of clinical circumstances, especially in relation to intractable compulsive disorders. While addressing the implications of deterministic and indeterministic assumptions regarding human nature, the author attempts to show how human capability is subject to fallibility and how both are dependent on the workings of luck. Clinical material is then used to elucidate and illustrate more empathic ways of relating both to patients in particular and our fellow human beings in general. A new interpretive framework is also introduced to facilitate and to suggest ways to more compassionately understand, interpret, and respond to patients' own struggles for well being.