Implicit volition and stereotype control

Goals are mental representations that vary in accessibility and operate within goal systems. The implicit nature of goal activation and pursuit is shown here to make goals effective not merely at overturning the influence of an activated stereotype on how people respond to members of stereotyped groups, but effective at implicitly controlling the activation of stereotypes in the first place. In a set of experiments examining chronic egalitarian goals, faces and names of members of stereotyped groups presented as target stimuli led to the inhibition of stereotypes, as well as to the heightened accessibility of egalitarian goals. A separate set of experiments illustrate a similar ability of individuals to control stereotype activation when egalitarian goals are temporarily triggered within a context, rather than being chronically held. Goals that require one to inhibit stereotypic associations to a target can lead to the intended, yet implicit, control of stereotype activation, even when one is not aware the goal is active or being pursued or being regulated.     

Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition

The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and the accompanying conscious feeling of will (Libet et al., 1983; pg. 640). Here, we demonstrate that volitional movement can occur without an accompanying feeling of will. We additionally show that the neural processes indexed by RPs are insufficient to cause the experience of conscious willing. Specifically, RPs still occur when subjects make self-timed, endogenously-initiated movements due to a post-hypnotic suggestion, without a conscious feeling of having willed those movements.     

Effort awareness and sense of volition in schizophrenia

Contemporary experimental research has emphasised the role of centrally generated signals arising from premotor areas in voluntary muscular force perception. It is therefore generally accepted that judgements of force are based on a central sense, known as the sense of effort, rather than on a sense of intra-muscular tension. Interestingly, the concept of effort is also present in the classical philosophy: to the French philosopher Maine de Biran [Maine de Biran (1805). Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée (Tome III), Vrin, Paris (1963)], the sense of effort is the fundamental component of self-experience, the landmark of the exercise of the will. In the present review, after a presentation of the nature and neurophysiological bases of effort sensation, we will examine its possible involvement in the neurocognitive process of agency. We will further focus on delusions of alien control in schizophrenic patients. Experimental data suggest that these patients have an abnormal awareness of effort caused by cerebral anomalies in the frontal and parietal lobes.     

The effect of volition on the stability of bimanual coordination

The authors investigated how the intention to passively perform a behavior and the intention to persist with a behavior impact upon the spatial and temporal properties of bimanual coordination. Participants (N = 30) were asked to perform a bimanual coordination task that demanded the continuous rhythmic extension-flexion of the wrists. The frequency of movement was scaled by an auditory metronome beat from 1.5 Hz, increasing to 3.25 Hz in.25-Hz increments. The task was further defined by the requirement that the movements be performed initially in a prescribed pattern of coordination (in-phase or antiphase) while the participants assumed one of two different intentional states: stay with the prescribed pattern should it become unstable or do not intervene should the pattern begin to change. Transitions away from the initially prescribed pattern were observed only in trials conducted in the antiphase mode of coordination. The time at which the antiphase pattern of coordination became unstable was not found to be influenced by the intentional state. In addition, the do-not-intervene set led to a switch to an in-phase pattern of coordination whereas the stay set led to phase wandering. Those findings are discussed within the framework of a dynamic account of bimanual coordination.     

定位非洲哲学

作者通过把"有没有非洲哲学"这一问题改为"在这一所在之处所做的哲学是什么样"这一问题,来回答"非洲哲学"的合法性以及建立的可能性。作者认为,"非洲哲学"这一概念并不应当从空间性的角度去理解,因此他提出了"所在之处"与"所在性"这组概念,并提供了一系列相关的概念集,以此来重述非洲哲学的图景。在他看来,这种重述并非只适用于"非洲哲学",其根本上关乎着"哲学"这一概念本身的意义,关乎着普遍性和特殊性、真理性和地方性之间最根本的张力,关乎着我们应当如何做哲学的基本反思。     

Exploring links between career adaptability,work volition,and well-being among Turkish students

The present study examined how the four components of career adaptability (concern, confidence, control, curiosity; Savickas & Porfeli, 2012) related to life satisfaction and the degree to which life meaning and work volition mediated these relations. In Study 1, scores from the Work Volition Scale–Student Version was validated with a sample of Turkish undergraduate students. In Study 2, with a new sample of Turkish students, all four components of career adaptability were found to significantly correlate with life satisfaction. Structural equation modeling revealed that life meaning and work volition each served as significant mediators between concern, control, and life satisfaction. Additionally, in the full mediation model, none of the adaptability components significantly related to life satisfaction. These findings suggest that concern and control over one's career may link with greater life satisfaction due, in part, to an increased sense of control in career decision making and increased life meaning.     

Locating and Representing Pain

Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experientialism, pain is essentially an experience, and its bodily location is illusory. According to the second, perceptualism or representationalism, pain is a perceptual or representational state, and its location is to be traced to the part of the body in which pain is felt. Against this second view, the cases of phantom, referred and chronic pain have been marshalled: all these cases apparently show that one can be in pain while not having anything wrong in her body. Pain bodily location, then, would be illusory. I this paper I shall defend the representational thesis by presenting an argument against experientialism while conceding that the appearance/reality distinction collapses. A crucial role in such identification is played by deictics. In reporting that we feel pain here, the deictic directly refers to the bodily part as coinciding with the part as represented. So, pain location is not illusory. The upshot is that the body location is part and parcel of the representational content of pain states, a representation build up from the body map.     

When moving without volition: implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects

The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied. Participants made temporal judgements concerning a key press and a tone, while they learned to consider themselves as the cause of the effect or not. Results showed that implied self-causation (vs. no implied self-causation) increased temporal binding. Since intrinsic motor cues of movement were absent, these results suggest that sensory evidence about the key press caused binding in retrospect and in line with the participant's sense of being an agent.