Theory-based bias correction in dispositional inference: The fundamental attribution error is dead,long live the correspondence bias

Social psychological research has repeatedly shown that perceivers draw correspondent dispositional inferences from observed behaviour even when this behaviour was highly constrained by situational factors (i.e., the correspondence bias). Even though this phenomenon has been proposed to be multiply determined, the most common explanation is still that perceivers ubiquitously consider situational factors to have little impact on human behaviour (i.e., the fundamental attribution error). The present chapter offers a critical analysis of the available empirical evidence on the correspondence bias from the perspective of theory-based bias correction. It is concluded that the correspondence bias results from a number of different processes associated with the application of perceivers' causal theories about situational influences on human behaviour. However, there is no evidence for the assumption that the correspondence bias is due to causal theories implying that situational factors have little impact on human behaviour. Theoretical and empirical implications are discussed.     

Dispositional attribution: multiple inferences about motive-related traits

This research views dispositional inference as a process whereby perceivers integrate multiple inferences about a target person's motives and traits. The findings suggest that although perceived motives may stimulate extra attributional processing (S. Fein, 1996), the content of the inferred motive is important as well. Perceivers learned about situational forces implying that a target person had free choice, no choice, or an ulterior motive for helpful behavior. Inferences about the target's helpfulness differed depending on whether the target's behavior was attributed to an obedience motive (no-choice condition) or to a selfish motive (ulterior-motive condition). In general, inferences about motives were more predictive of dispositional inferences than were global causal attributions (to situational vs. dispositional forces) or base rate assumptions.     

Implicational schemata and the correspondence bias: on the diagnostic value of situationally constrained behavior

Drawing on G. D. Reeder's (1993) schematic model of dispositional inference, it is hypothesized that perceivers' tendency to draw correspondent dispositional inferences from situationally constrained behavior (i.e., the correspondence bias) can be due to the application of schematic assumptions about trait-behavior relations (i.e., implicational schemata) within the process of situational adjustment. Applied to attitude attribution, situational adjustment is hypothesized to follow an implicit theory of ability, implying that only authors with a corresponding attitude are able to write a persuasive essay toward a given position. Results from 6 experiments offer converging evidence for this hypothesis. Implications for a sufficient understanding of the processes that lead to the correspondence bias are discussed.     

Causal attribution and dispositional inference: Evidence of inconsistent judgments

Two experiments examined whether individuals who ascribe the disparity in the performances of two actors to situational constraints adequately adjust their dispositional inferences to reflect their own perceptions of causality. Using the quiz-game format of L. D. Ross, T. M. Amabile, and J. L. Steinmetz (1977, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 485–494), the effects of the subjects' awareness of the role-determined, self-presentation advantage of the questioner on their dispositional inferences concerning the quiz-game participants are noted. It is hypothesized that subjects who indicated full awareness of the determining force of the situation would nevertheless draw more favorable dispositional inferences about the questioner than about the contestant. The prediction is confirmed. Although the situationally aware subjects rate the questioner and contestant more similarly than do the other subjects, they still rate the questioner higher in knowledge, memory, and education. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that increasing the salience of the subjects' assessment of the situational advantage of the questioner does not eliminate the disparity. It is proposed that the fudamental attribution error represents more a failure to adjust trait inferences for causal attributions than a misperception of causality. Implications concerning the relationship between knowledge of causality and social judgment and the utility of the distinction between “perceived causality” and “higher order causal inferences” are discussed.     

Inferences about actions performed in constraining contexts: Correspondence bias or correspondent inference?

Prior studies of the correspondence bias reveal a tendency for people to base inferences on behaviors they observe, even when these behaviors are highly constrained by the social context in which they occur. Three processes may combine to sustain this effect: (a) an insufficient adjustment of initial estimates caused by the fundamental attribution error (FAE); (b) the reliance on intuitive estimates of the prevalence of traits, attitudes, and other dispositional characteristics in the general population; and (c) the assumption that few situations are so coercive that they negate all freedom of choice. These processes were differentiated in a modification of the Jones-Harris paradigm. Participants estimated a particular attitude's prevalence in the general population before reading an essay written under either high or low choice conditions and taking a probable or improbable position. Inferences were consistent with prior probabilities when the essay expressed a highly probable opinion and consistent with behavior when the essay expressed an unlikely opinion. These results suggest that perceivers make inferences by estimating the probability that the observed behavior reflects a dispositional characteristic and then revising their prior estimates of the probability of that characteristic accordingly. Thanks are extended to William R. Pope for his assistance in all phases of this research, and to Karl Kelley, Joel Cohen, Catherine Lewis, Chris Wetzel, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

The dispositional inference strikes back: situational focus and dispositional suppression in causal attribution

The authors propose that correction of dispositional inferences involves the examination of situational constraints and the suppression of dispositional inferences. They hypothesized that suppression would result in dispositional rebound. In Study 1, participants saw a video of either a free or a forced speaker. Participants shown a forced speaker later made stronger dispositional inferences about a 2nd, free speaker than control participants did. Study 2 provided evidence for higher rebound among participants who reported trying harder to suppress dispositional inferences during the 1st video. In Study 3, participants were asked to focus on situational constraints or to avoid thinking about the speaker's characteristics. Only the latter instructions led to a dispositional rebound. These data support the view that the correction of dispositional inferences involves 2 processes that lead to distinct consequences in subsequent attribution work.     

Inferences about actions performed in constraining contexts: Correspondence bias or correspondent inference?

Prior studies of the correspondence bias reveal a tendency for people to base inferences on behaviors they observe, even when these behaviors are highly constrained by the social context in which they occur. Three processes may combine to sustain this effect: (a) an insufficient adjustment of initial estimates caused by the fundamental attribution error (FAE); (b) the reliance on intuitive estimates of the prevalence of traits, attitudes, and other dispositional characteristics in the general population; and (c) the assumption that few situations are so coercive that they negate all freedom of choice. These processes were differentiated in a modification of the Jones-Harris paradigm. Participants estimated a particular attitude's prevalence in the general population before reading an essay written under either high or low choice conditions and taking a probable or improbable position. Inferences were consistent with prior probabilities when the essay expressed a highly probable opinion and consistent with behavior when the essay expressed an unlikely opinion. These results suggest that perceivers make inferences by estimating the probability that the observed behavior reflects a dispositional characteristic and then revising their prior estimates of the probability of that characteristic accordingly. Thanks are extended to William R. Pope for his assistance in all phases of this research, and to Karl Kelley, Joel Cohen, Catherine Lewis, Chris Wetzel, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Inferences about the morality of an aggressor: the role of perceived motive

The research investigated perceivers' inferences about the morality of target persons who engaged in aggressive behavior. Across several experiments, inferences about the morality of an aggressor were based more on the perceived motives of the target than on the presence of facilitating situational forces. For example, when a target's aggression was facilitated by personal rewards for aggression (instrumental aggression), perceivers inferred more negative motives and attributed lower morality to the target than when the target's aggression was facilitated by situational provocation (reactive aggression). The results suggest that perceived motives play an important role in dispositional inference and pose a problem for models that focus primarily on perceived causality, assumptions about base rates (consensus), or diagnosticity.     

Processing alternative explanations of behavior: correction or integration?

Three experiments investigated how activation of knowledge about situational forces affects discounting in dispositional inference tasks. Each experiment varied a different knowledge activation factor--salience, accessibility, or specificity of situational information. In addition, all 3 experiments varied situational demands and cognitive load. The results showed that cognitive load eliminated discounting when situational information was low in salience, accessibility, or specificity. However, when situational information was more salient, accessible, or specific, it produced strong discounting effects even when perceivers were under cognitive load. These results are discussed in terms of correction and integration models of dispositional inferences from behavior.     

Suspicion of ulterior motivation and the correspondence bias

Three studies examined the hypothesis that when perceivers learn of the existence of multiple, plausibly rival motives for an actor's behavior, they are less likely to fall prey to the correspondence bias than when they learn of the existence of situational factors that may have constrained the actor's behavior. In the first 2 studies, Ss who learned that an actor was instructed to behave as he did drew inferences that corresponded to his behavior. In contrast, Ss who were led to suspect that an actor's behavior may have been motivated by a desire to ingratiate (Study 1), or by a desire to avoid an unwanted job (Study 2), resisted the correspondence bias. The 3rd study demonstrated that these differences were not due to a general unwillingness on the part of suspicious perceivers to make dispositional inferences. The implications that these results have for understanding attribution theory are discussed.     

Intuitions about situational correction in self and others

People's attributional phenomenology is likely to be characterized by effortful situational correction. Drawing on this phenomenology and on people's desire to view themselves more favorably than others, the authors hypothesized that people expect others to engage in less situational correction than themselves and to make more extreme dispositional attributions for constrained actors' behavior. In 2 studies, people expected their peers to make more extreme dispositional inferences than they did themselves for a situationally constrained actor's behavior. People's expectation that they engage in more situational correction than their peers was diminished among Japanese participants, who have less desire to view themselves as superior to their peers (Study 3), and among participants who were led to view dispositional attributions more favorably than situational attributions (Study 4).     

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

Explaining misattribution

In explaining the attributional error researchers have to explain subjects’ negative behavior. They tend to explain it in internal dispositional terms of personal need or ego weakness. But even if they explain it in situational terms, it remains questionable to what extent they themselves make an attributional error. Are they liable to the self-excepting fallacy, or are they forced to avoid a choice between situational and dispositional terms in explaining misattribution? This problem definitely has certain consequences for the evaluation of the explanatory power of attribution theory as a theory.     

When stereotypes get in the way: stereotypes obstruct stereotype-inconsistent trait inferences

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that people spontaneously make trait inferences while observing the behavior of others. The present article reports a series of 5 experiments that examined the influence of stereotypes on the spontaneous inference of traits. Results consistently showed weaker spontaneous trait inferences for stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information than for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-neutral information. Taken together, the current results suggest that specific spontaneous trait inferences become obstructed by inhibitory processes when behavior is inconsistent with an already activated stereotype. These findings are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance processes and recent models of attribution in social judgment.     

Judging others in the shadow of suspicion

Previous research has found that when perceivers have reason to be suspicious of the motives underlying an actor's behavior, they are likely to draw inferences about the actor's true disposition that reflect a relatively sophisticated style of attributional processing. The present research was designed to examine some of the negative consequences that suspicion can have on perceivers' judgments. In each of the three studies reported, some subjects were made suspicious about the motives of an actor on the basis of contextual information surrounding the actor's behavior, rather than the behavior itself. Results of these studies suggest that, particularly when perceivers believe that the actions or motives of the actor could affect them, suspicion may cause perceivers to see the actor in a more negative light, even if the perceivers are not convinced that the actor's behavior was indeed affected by ulterior motives.The authors thank Patrick Carver and Gilbert Fein for their assistance with the stimulus materials for Study 1, and Jessica Cross, Thomas Tomlinson, and Amy Elmore for their assistance with Studies 2 and 3.     

Social inference and individual differences in aggression: Evidence for spontaneous judgments of hostility

This research examined the hypothesis that aggressive vs. nonaggressive individuals differ in their spontaneous trait inferences, i. e., inferences made without any conscious intention of inferring characteristics of an actor. We anticipated that spontaneous processing conditions would be more revealing of aggressive/nonaggressive differences than would conditions that prompt deliberate inference processes. We used a cued-recall paradigm. Aggressive and nonaggressive subjects were instructed to memorize sentences that were open to either hostile or nonhostile interpretations. Sentence recall was then cued by either hostile dispositional terms or by words that were linked semantically to the element of the sentences. Within the spontaneous inference condition, semantic cues prompted twice as much recall as hostile cues among nonaggressive subjects, whereas dispositional cues aided recall more than semantic cues among aggressive subjects. As predicted, within the delinerate inference conditions there were no aggressive/nonaggressive differences. The nature of spontaneous vs. deliberate inferential processes and the advantages of spontaneous inference paradigms for testing predictions about schema-based processing in aggression are discussed. © 1995 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

“Meaningful” social inferences: Effects of implicit theories on inferential processes

Perceivers’ shared theories about the social world have long featured prominently in social inference research. Here, we investigate how fundamental differences in such theories influence basic inferential processes. Past work has typically shown that integrating multiple interpretations of behavior during social inference requires cognitive resources. However, three studies that measured or manipulated people’s beliefs about the stable versus dynamic nature of human attributes (i.e., their entity vs. incremental theory, respectively) qualify these past findings. Results revealed that, when interpreting others’ actions, perceivers’ theories selectively facilitate the consideration of interpretations that are especially theory-relevant. While experiencing cognitive load, entity theorists continued to incorporate information about stable dispositions (but not about dynamic social situations) in their social inferences, whereas incremental theorists continued to incorporate information about dynamic social situations (but not about stable traits). Implications of these results for how perceivers find meaning in behavior are discussed.