Eight good questions for developmental epistemology and psychology

My reply to eight good questions arising from commentary is an elaboration of my main argument that there are parallels in the epistemologies of Frege and Piaget and that these parallels have distinctive implications for developmental psychology. The eight questions are: (i) was Piaget really an epistemologist? (ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological? (iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity? (iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism? (v) what is the relation between thinking and thought? (vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow? (vii) how are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought? (viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought? These questions are productive, and can be developed.     

Primitive religious thought and the evolution of religion

In an article in this journal about the ideas of Levy-Brühl, Don Wiebe reviewed ideas from anthropology to argue that there is indeed a primitive mentality, and that mythopoeic religious thought is an instance of this mentality. Wiebe ends by declaring religious thought generally to be mythopoeic. The anthropological literature does support well Wiebe's thesis that primitive thought is primitive, in particular those studies which use Piaget's theory of cognitive development as a guide for interpreting primitive and other thought styles. But Piaget's theory can be extended to interpret other stages of culture and thought. This aids in recognizing that religious thought develops in stages also, from primitive folktales to archaic complex myths, and then to classical rationalized theologies and most recently to symbolic theologies.     

Harré on Piaget's Sociological Studies

Piaget's Sociological Studies is largely taken up with questions of sociology, epistemology, moral, political and legal theory. Roughly, these are by-passed in Harré's (2000, this journal) interpretation of Piaget's social account. Our critique is in two parts. In the first part, we explain the basis of our disagreement with Harré's interpretation of six specific issues. These are Piaget's model of social exchange, sociology, concept of egocentrism, response to Wallon, psycho-social parallelism, distinction between the concrete and the abstract. In the second part, we challenge two central theses invoked in Harré's review, namely (A) all psychological activity is a joint activity, and (B) any society is based on irreducible differences in psychological activity. We have tried to set the record straight as far as Piaget's social account is concerned. Harré's review shows a general lack of acquaintance with Piaget's account and our aim has been to compensate for this.     

Discussion: The Analyst's Involvement in the Creative Aspect of Analysis

Recent formulations on the psychology of creativity in the analytic context, such as Albert Rothenberg's “homospacial thinking,” Arnold Modell's “unconscious metaphoric thought,” and Thomas Ogden's “transformational thinking,” are discussed. These concepts enable previously unconnected experiences to be combined within the mind, while emphasizing interpersonal imaginative processes such as identification and empathic knowledge; the dual cognitive features of these formulations permit awareness of the complexity of feelings in oneself and others, essential for psychoanalytic creativity. Further, the articles in this issue are synthesized, highlighting the importance of the analyst making creative (new and valuable) use of his or her entire life experience, feelings, attitudes, and fantasies in treatment. From this dicussion, it is evident that the analyst's creative use of self should be more systematically incorporated into psychoanalytic theory of technique.     

Frank Lloyd Wright's Fallingwater: A Case Study in Inside-the-Box Creativity

This article traces the development of Frank Lloyd Wright's Fallingwater, perhaps the most famous private dwelling in the world, as a case study in creative thinking. It has been reported that Wright conceived the house in one creative leap when he first visited the site. Wright supposedly did nothing further on the house until 9 months later, when he produced complete plans in 2 hours.This story can be taken as support for the claim that creative products come about through “outside-the-box” thinking, in which the creator goes far beyond the present to produce something completely new. However, examination of the historical record supports a model of creative thinking that assumes that creative products—even extraordinary products such as Fallingwater—come about in small steps firmly founded on the past, in this case the early work of Wright and of other architects. It is not necessary to postulate any extraordinary form of thinking to understand the development of Fallingwater. This case study thus supports others in providing evidence for the conclusion that creative thinking involves inside-the-box thinking: ordinary thought processes, operating on a rich database, bringing about extraordinary results.     

Motivation and creativity: Toward a synthesis of structural and energistic approaches to cognition

Cognitive scientists who model creative thinking on computers claim that the ability of their programs to replicate the discovery of scientific laws (e.g., Kepler's third law from Brahe's data) means that creative thinking in humans is nothing but problem solving of the kind computer heuristics use. This claim is shown to be a mystification based on a misunderstanding of creativity, on unrealistic replications of the initial conditions present at the inception of creative processes, and on a misleading identification of rationality with complex human thought processes. Some of the implications of such mystification for understanding thought processes in general are reviewed.     

Inside the Creative Sifter: Recognizing Metacognition in Creativity Development

The parallels between cognitive development and creativity are neglected in the literature. Piaget's information transformations are personalized, meaning individual constructions can involve creativity. Vygotsky's work considers the implications and interactions of social influences, conventions, and personal implications for creative development. The Cognitive‐Creative Sifting Model is proposed to focus attention on these and other connections between cognitive development and creativity. Other common methods of assessing creativity are compared to the proposed model. It is argued that the model provides a foundation to evaluate individual creative potentials more holistically. Specifically, the conceptual elements of metacognition are described and their role in the development of creativity is suggested. It is argued that future researchers should pay particular attention to the interaction effects metacognition has with traditional measures of creativity focused on ideation and product evaluation.     

From Piaget's Epistemic Subject to Pascual-Leone's Metasubject: Epistemic Transition in the Constructivist—Rationalist Theory of Cognitive Development

The explanation of the transition from one epistemic theory to another is an important part of Piaget's genetic epistemology. It is argued that this epistemic transition leads to a retrodictable orthogenetic tendency toward optimizing equilibration. The objective of this paper is to establish a relationship between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject and to demonstrate that the postulation of the latter can be considered as an epistemic transition between two constructivist—rationalist theories, which leads to the development of a theory with greater explanatory power. Epistemic transition in this paper refers to a progressive problemshift (cf. Lakatos, 1970), between the theories of Piaget and Pascual-Leone. Piaget builds a “general model” by neglecting individual differences, that is, studies the epistemic subject, whereas Pascual-Leone by incorporating a framework for individual difference variables, studies the metasubject—the psychological organization of the epistemic subject. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate that Pascual-Leone's theory of constructive operators is a model of the psychological organism (the metasubject), which is at work inside Piaget's epistemic subject. Finally, it is concluded that the greater explanatory power of Pascual-Leone's theory can be interpreted as an epistemic transition between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject.     

The Facilitative Effects of Ambiguous Figures on Creative Solution

Empirical studies of creativity emphasize the importance of ambiguity advantage in idea generation and creative problem‐solving. This study examined whether ambiguous figures could directly induce a mind‐set that would transfer to the creative problem‐solving. In Experiment 1, we examined whether presentation of ambiguous figures would influence participants' performance in alternative uses tasks, and the results showed that prior exposure to ambiguous figures significantly enhanced participants' performance in the dimension of fluency, flexibility, and originality than those exposed to non‐ambiguous figures; in general uses tasks, there were no significant difference in the reaction time and originality between the ambiguous figure condition and non‐ambiguous figure condition. In Experiment 2, the facilitative effect of ambiguous figures on creative thinking was further examined with creative story generation tasks that demand more mental effort and increased cognitive load. Results showed that creativity of stories generated in ambiguous figure condition was scored significantly higher than those in non‐ambiguous figure condition. The current research extends our understanding of the facilitative effect of ambiguous figures on creative problem‐solving.     

The Role of Metalinguistic Awareness in the Reading Comprehension of Sixth and Seventh Graders

If reading is viewed as an active cognitive process, then the understanding and evaluation of written material may depend somewhat on the reader's cognitive ability. Furthermore, developmental changes in cognitive ability may be related to changes in reading behavior. This article provides a brief overview of Jean Piaget's theories of cognitive development; characteristics of the formal operational thought period (approximately ages 11‐14) are particularly emphasized. Finally, several studies which have attempted to determine the relationship between formal thought and reading behavior are described and discussed.     

Updating the Baldwin effect : The biological levels behind Piaget's new theory

In 1964, Conrad Waddington (1905–1975) presented a paper in Geneva that led to an internal reassessment of the biological underpinnings of Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) theory. This in turn resulted in an overhaul of the theoretical framework upon which his stage theory of child development had been based, including his appeals to James Mark Baldwin's (1861–1934) “circular reaction.” In addition to leading to the emergence of what has elsewhere been called “Piaget's new theory,” this renovation also resulted in the update of the famous “Baldwin Effect.” Because aspects of the subsequent framework are of contemporary significance, this essay will review some of the work leading up to those updates. In reaching behind the translations to trace the sources of the arguments to which Piaget appealed, the resulting examination fills some of the gaps found in the secondary literature without quibbling over the “correct” English interpretation of translated French terms. We also go beyond how Piaget's writings have been understood in English and extract some useful additional ideas from his sources, including how to conceive of the social context in which development takes place. We see as a result how Waddington and his colleagues, including Paul Weiss (1898–1989), provided a constructive “existence proof” for the formal hierarchy of levels that Piaget had come to by other means.     

On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Heidegger Backwards: White's Time and Death ∗

In Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude, Carol White pursues a strange hermeneutic strategy, reading Heidegger backwards by reading the central ideas of his later work back into his early magnum opus, Being and Time. White follows some of Heidegger's own later directives in pursuing this hermeneutic strategy, and this paper critically explores these directives along with the original reading that emerges from following them. The conclusion reached is that White's creative book is not persuasive as a strict interpretation of Heidegger's early work, but remains extremely helpful for deepening our appreciation of Heidegger's thought as a whole. Most importantly, White helps us to understand the pivotal role that thinking about death played in the lifelong development of Heidegger's philosophy.     

Epistemological principles for developmental psychology in Frege and Piaget

My main aim is to identify and discuss parallels between the epistemologies of Gottlob Frege and Jean Piaget. Although their work has attracted massive attention individually, parallels in their work have gone unnoticed. My discussion is in four parts and covers psychologism and epistemology; five epistemological criteria in Frege's rational epistemology under an AEIOU mnemonic, namely autonomy, entailment, intersubjectivity, objectivity and universality; the elaboration of these same criteria in Piaget's developmental epistemology; their implications for developmental psychology and epistemology. One main conclusion is that the same criteria fit both Frege's and Piaget's epistemology. A second conclusion is that Piaget's developmental epistemology can be regarded as an elaboration of Frege's rational epistemology in each of these five respects on both methodological and substantive grounds. Both conclusions are compatible with non-psychologism, which was accepted by both Frege and Piaget.     

From qualitative differences to a continuum of development: commentary on Leslie Smith's epistemological principles for developmental psychology

In his article Epistemological principles for developmental psychology Leslie Smith helps to re-open some of the key issues Piaget explored through his genetic epistemology. Smith shows the important parallels between logician Gottlieb Frege's understanding of rational thought, and the way in which Piaget developed such notions in his own theory. But while Frege's theory helps set the parameters for whether thought can be judged as rational, or if it even should be judged as rational, it also shows the logicians' disdain for exploring anything resembling development of rationality. Thus Frege might have an important, but necessarily mediated impact on the field of human development. Piaget's carefully crafted theory of epistemological development potentially serves as such a mediating device. It can be argued that Piaget crafted together arguments of logicians such as Frege, and epistemologists such as Lévy-Bruhl, to develop his extraordinary achievement of a genetic epistemology that leads to an understanding of the human condition. One of Piaget's accomplishments was to develop a continuum out of the logicians' dichotomy between non-logical and logical in which the non-rational flows into the rational.     

Transcendence as a Subset of Evolutionary Thinking: A Darwinian View of the Creative Experience

The states of transcendence and affective discontinuities as features of the creative act are posited as analogous to Darwin's theory of evolution. The intellectual essence of Darwin's argument is that randomness processed through a selection system yields purpose. Some recent studies suggest this process holds true for profound acts of creativity. Darwin's two criteria for change, randomness and a system of recognition, are examined in application to the creative act. The argument is made that extraordinary creative people use a specific selection process coupled with the ability to de-structure or randomize their mental environment. Finally, techniques are proposed to structure a creative recognition system and to de-structure the input that is processed to enhance creative results. Considerable research into creativity has been concerned with transcendent thinking, the sudden discontinuous pattern shifts that lead to wonderful new insights. Three schools of thought have attempted to explain and resolve this discontinuity. Overton and Newman (1982) describe two of these. There is the reductionist view taking the position that all creative thinking can be explained by continuous processing. Discontinuity is treated merely as a behavioral or affective phenomenon since by nature pre-conscious algorithms are unavailable for systematic inquiry. The organismic view, on the other hand, takes the lofty position that transcendence is a function of indeterminacy: ideas actually operate in earthly terms but are post-Newtonian in nature. That is, transcendent states are delocalized concepts operating beyond the tangible limitations of space and time. Attempts to measure these phenomena are doomed to the same outcome as the proverbial killing of the goose that laid the golden egg. McCarthy (1993) has recently attempted to reconcile the above positions by arguing that the answer may well be found in the field of quantum physics and elementary particle research. She proposes that nature is a duality. Creative insight and transcendence come about through the superposition of two realities, one which is “boundary-free”; the other a more conscious process which is hierarchal and “boundary-laden.” Presented here is a reductionist point of view asserting that what we consider to be transcendence — the mystical nature of creativity — is not only sequential but a subset of the evolutionary process as set forth by Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species (1859). Further, the principles of Darwin's theory may be applied to speed and improve the creative process both for individuals and groups. Other researchers in the field (Campbell, 1960, Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992, Gruber& Davis, 1988, Kantorovich, 1993; Simonton, 1988), have invoked evolutionary thinking to explain the creative process. However, this argument looks at the two properties of evolution necessary for its function and shows how in highly creative people they may operate differently.     

La pensée post-formelle en gérontagogie ou l’après-Piaget

Jean Piaget, one of the most influential theorists in developmental psychology, assumed that formal thought, characterized by the development of an individual's logical capacities, was the last stage of adult thinking. According to Piaget's theory, adults undergo an unavoidable decline in their intellectual functions after formal thought. However, here we review how the brain evolved, describing its main structures, and examining each cerebral hemisphere's specific functions. Evidence is also provided for the production of new neurons and new connections between them, forcing a revision of old theories about the decline of intellectual functions in the elderly. We then consider Jones’ theories X and Y, and the different definitions of intelligence (fluid vs. crystallized, and qualitative vs. quantitative), and how these perspectives have influenced the way we see intelligence. Evidence supporting the addition of another stage, named post-formal thought, is examined in the context of gerontagogy. Dialectical thought characterizes this stage, and developing wisdom is its main goal. We examine the two basic principles of dialectical thought, namely the principle of contradiction and the principle of relativity of everything. It is suggested that the learning of wisdom should be the focus of future university programs to educate the elderly.     

James and Carnap on philosophical systems and the role of temperaments

The relationship between American pragmatism and logical empiricism is complicated at best. The received view is that by around the late 1930s or early 1940s pragmatism had been replaced, supplanted, or eclipsed by the younger and more logic-oriented form of empiricism developed in interwar Vienna. Recently, however, this picture has been challenged, and this paper offers further reasons for thinking that the received view is inadequate. Through a critical examination of William James's Pragmatism and “The Sentiment of Rationality” and Rudolf Carnap's “Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language” and other works, the paper builds a case for the existence of a rather striking correspondence between the work of one of pragmatism's most vaunted figures and the thought of logical empiricism's most famous advocate. Not only were both philosophers interested in what might be called metaphilosophy or the psychology of philosophy, both held very similar deflationary views.     

Narrative and Paradigmatic Thinking Styles in Creative Writing and Journalism Students

How do creative writing students and journalists differ in their thinking styles? To investigate this question, 81 undergraduate participants (41 creative writing students and 40 student journalists) were asked to write sentences in response to a series of photographs. Their responses were then scored according Bruner's theory of Narrative and Paradigmatic thought. In addition, these students were assessed on the NEO Personality Inventory — Revised (Costa & McRae, 1992) to measure personality, the Work Preference Inventory, College Student Version (Amabile, 1995) to measure motivation, and the Mental Self‐Government Thinking Styles Inventory (Sternberg & Wagner, 1991) to measure a different theory of thinking styles. As hypothesized, creative writers scored significantly higher than journalists on Narrative thought, but an interaction occurred on Paradigmatic thought. Male journalists significantly outscored male creative writers, but a non‐significant trend in the opposite direction was observed for females; these results stayed significant when personality and motivation factors were controlled.     

Experimental Studies of Children's Learning

This article compares John Dewey's theory of inquiry with Jean Piaget's analysis of the mechanisms implied in the increase of knowledge. The sources for this paper are Dewey's studies on logic and the theory of inquiry and Piaget's historical-critical and psychogenetic investigations. Three major conclusions result from the comparison: first, there are significant convergences between the two theories; second, Piaget's developmental analysis makes explicit what is programmatic in Dewey's investigations; and, finally, Piaget is incorrect in characterizing Dewey's pragmatism as a method that does not meet the criteria of intelligent activity.     

The Necessity of Thinking Historically – Heidegger After Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the turning that occurs within the work of Martin Heidegger. In particular it seeks to reveal it as a turning that takes place within the notion of history as it is elaborated by Heidegger in the difference between Nietzsche and Hölderlin, that is, in the difference between philosophy and poetizing. It locates the necessity for such a turning in Heidegger's dissatisfaction with his own thinking up to the early 1930s (as suggested in his Black Notebooks). In particular the paper focuses on Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche over the question of nihilism in the hope of drawing out the different approaches of each thinker in trying to think this problem historically, and how this confrontation helps move Heidegger's thought towards a more poietical way of thinking. The paper concludes that Heidegger, in seeking to distinguish his thought from that of Nietzsche's, not only owes a debt to Nietzsche but that Heidegger's non-public texts of the late 1930s and early 1940s are also formally indebted to him.