Kālīghāṭ and the Fashioning of Middle-Class Modernities

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The upper middle classes have worked over the past century to transform the Hindu temple from a symbol of “backwardness” to a symbol of the...     

The Soteriology of Role-Play in the Bhagavad Gītā

I will here apply the classical Indian model of the dramatic actor as a methodology for interpreting the soteriological psychology of the Bhagavad Gītā, paying special attention to the usefulness of this approach for clarifying K???a's rationale in showing his divine form in Chapter 11. I argue that the Gītā advocates creative role-play as both the means and the end of liberation. Further, while K???a's teachings can be understood in terms of orthodox Hindu soteriologies that have in view an overcoming of the emotions, I argue that K???a looks to transform Arjuna into an ‘athlete of emotion’, much like traditional Indian-based training methods do for theatrical actors.     

The Significance of Three Errors in the First Chapter of Bhagavadgītā

The recognition of three errors in verses 1.10, 11, and 36 of Bhagavadgītā and the truth behind it is essential to grasp the beginning of the tread of thought developed by Vedavyāsa from the first to the last verse of the entire text spanning over 18 chapters. Generally, only the first error in verse 1.10 has received recognition, but as soon as the error is recognized there was attempt either to interpret the verse violating its syntax and semantics to make its meaning consistent with epic facts or to redraft the verse taking it as an error of a copyist, who has exchanged Bhīṣma with Bhīma and vice versa while copying the original. But, the attempt to remove the errors by interpretation or redrafting makes the interpreters ignore the significance of the errors in development in the argument and the readers become blind to the logic of thought as it is developed in Bhagavadgītā spanning over the entire text of Bhagavadgītā.

     

The Arabico-Islamic background of Al-Fārābī's logic

This paper examines al-Fārābī's logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background and attempts to conceptualize what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī's main problems and goals, I shall attempt to reformulate the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) in terms of the ontological and formal characteristics that Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussed the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of AL, I will further propose three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī's logic, in terms of which I will attempt to redefine it: the logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle's logic could be built upon AL, which has a nature contrary to logic. The present paper also contributes to examining our traditional research habits in Arabic studies.     

On the Coherence of Dignāga’s Epistemology: Evaluating the Critiques of Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarā?i. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend.     

Prāmāṇyavāda in the Text Tātparyaṭīkā and Pariśuddhi

In the thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśapādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi which marked the inception of the Navya- Nyāya School. It was from this time that the works of the Nyāya beginning with the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, and ending with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī as well as Udayana’s Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi came to be designated as Prācīna-nyāya. We have elaborated the arguments of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana in order to support and prove the extrinsic nature of pramāṇa. In this paper, we have also shown that they have added extra strength to the views of the former Māsters—their predecessors by declaring that the inference (which is advanced by Bhāṣyakāra) is purged of fallacies of all sorts in the field of the validity of pramāṇa.

     

Theodicy in a Deterministic Universe: God and the Problem of Suffering in Vyāsatīrtha’s Tātparyacandrikā

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The classical traditions of Vedānta in India explored the problem of why an omnipotent being like God would permit sentient beings to suffer in His...     

Role Ethics or Ethics of Role-Play? A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Ethics of Confucianism and the Bhagavad Gītā

Both Confucianism and the Bhagavad Gītā emphasize the moral authority of social roles. But how deep does the likeness between these ethical philosophies run? In this essay I focus upon two significant points of comparison between the role-based ethics of Confucianism and the Gītā: (1) the interrelation between formalized social roles and family feeling, and (2) the religious dimension of moral action. How is it that Confucians ground their social roles in family feeling, while the Gītā emphasizes rupture between role and sentiment? Furthermore, are we to understand Confucianism as presenting a social philosophy that eschews religious concerns, whereas the Gītā denies the moral significance of family feeling in lieu of obtaining soteriological freedom? Examining the aesthetic and religious dimensions of the ethics of Confucianism and the Gītā clarifies a key distinction that both views implicitly make, albeit for divergent reasons: the difference between living one’s roles and playing one’s roles.     

Some Reflections on the Meaning of Dīkṣā in Kerala According to Mātṛsadbhāvatantra

International Journal of Hindu Studies - One of the most important Hindu Tantric rites is known as dīk?ā, an initiation that grants access to mystical knowledge. This initiation...     

Forms of gnosis in Sulamī's Sufi exegesis of the Fāti&art1;a

This paper will look at the Sufi interpretations of Sūrat al-fāti&art1;a found in the early mystical Qur'an commentary known as the &art2;aqā'iq al-tafsīr by the well known Sufi, Abū ^c Abd al-Ra&art1;mān al-Sulamī (d. 1021). The Sufi tafsīr of this sūra will be read not only as a compilation of early mystical interpretations of the Qur'an, but also as a unique work by Sulamī himself. A close reading of the various Sufi authors' interpretations set out by Sulamī will show how his own positions concerning the fundamental Sufi concept of ma^crifa come about.     

The Forgotten Consort: The Goddess and Kāmadeva in the Early Worship of Tripurasundarī

International Journal of Hindu Studies - This article examines continuities between the Hindu Tantric tradition of Tripurasundarī, which later came to be known as ?rīvidyā, and...     

Kāma,Preman, and Bhakti in Śrīdhara’s Commentary on Kṛṣṇa and the Gopīs in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Although the Bhāgavata Purāṇa presents an innovative soteriology of emotion that explicitly identifies kāma as the gopīs’...     

Duty and Sacrifice: A Logical Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Vedic Injunctions

The Mīmā?sā school of Indian philosophy has for its main purpose the interpretation of injunctions that are found in a set of sacred texts, the Vedas. In their works, Mīmā?sā authors provide some of the most detailed and systematic examinations available anywhere of statements with a deontic force; however, their considerations have generally not been registered outside of Indological scholarship. In the present article we analyze the Mīmā?sā theory of Vedic injunctions from a logical and philosophical point of view. The theory at issue can be regarded as a system of reasoning based on certain fundamental principles, such as the distinction between strong and weak duties, and on a taxonomy of ritual actions. We start by reconstructing the conceptual framework of the theory and then move to a formalization of its core aspects. Our contribution represents a new perspective to study Mīmā?sā and outlines its relevance, in general, for deontic reasoning.     

Nagarjuna’s no-thesis view revisited: the significance of classical Indian debate culture on verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī

The aim of this essay is to clarify Nāgārjuna’s use of the term pratijñā (thesis) in verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV) as situated in its contemporaneous thriving debate culture. In contrast to the standard formulation, which interprets the term pratijñā as a reference to the thesis of ?ūnyatā (emptiness) proffered by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, an examination of the debate culture in, and leading up to, second-century CE India shows that the term pratijñā refers to the first of five steps within the Nyaya five-membered syllogism as it functions within a vita??ā form of debate. Through an examination of the context in which this verse was written, the association made between Nāgārjuna’s use of pratijñā in the VV and ?ūnyatā within other texts becomes dislodged, thereby demonstrating the inadequacy of the standard formulation and the need for a revised understanding of the intent of the VV.