When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness

Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors benefit from displaying confidence, confident but inaccurate advisors receive low credibility ratings. However, Study 2 shows that when feedback on advisor accuracy is unavailable or costly, confident advisors hold sway regardless of accuracy. People also made less effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors; interest in buying advisor performance data decreased as the advisor’s confidence went up. These results add to our understanding of how advisor confidence, accuracy, and calibration influence others.     

The discovery of pluralistic ignorance: An ironic lesson

In recent years, an increasing number of social and behavioral scientists have begun to pay serious attention to pluralistic ignorance, the shared false ideas of individuals about the sentiments, thoughts, and actions of others. Most of these researchers are unaware of the original effort to investigate these patterns of cognitive error and, consequently, misunderstand, as did the original investigators, some of the implications of their own work. The discovery of this important social phenomenon by Floyd H. Allport and his students, Daniel Katz and Richard L. Schanck, and how their preoccupation with individual characteristics and their relative neglect of social characteristics led them to underestimate the value of their discovery, is discussed. Allport's original interest in pluralistic ignorance and how he and Katz documented it empirically are presented, as is a review of Schanck's research extending their analysis.     

Creativity in Context: The Ecology of Creativity Evaluations and Practices in an Artistic Craft

The present article reports a study on the use of a multiple feedback methodology for creativity evaluation in the case of Romanian Easter eggs. Four groups of evaluators —i.e. ethnographers, priests, art teachers and folk artists—all members of professional communities relevant for this particular folk art participated in the study. They almost unanimously appreciated ‘traditional’ wax decorated eggs as highly creative for their designs, aesthetics and the hard work and talent they require but opinions diverged when commenting on the creativity of other types of Easter eggs. At a more general level, two broad evaluation patters were found, corresponding to whether respondents participate or not in decoration practices. Identifying these patterns comes to reinforce the idea that creativity evaluations, as well as creative activity, are rooted in the social and cultural contexts of the participants and these contexts share important similarities but also marked differences.     

Beyond risk and ambiguity: Deciding under ignorance

In this study, we examined the neural basis of decision making under different types of uncertainty that involve missing information: ambiguity (vague probabilities) and sample space ignorance (SSI; unknown outcomes). fMRI revealed that these two different types of uncertainty recruit distinct neural substrates: Ambiguity recruits the left insula, whereas SSI recruits the anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral inferior parietal cortex, and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex. The finding of unique activations for different types of uncertainty may not necessarily be predicted within the reductive approach of modern theories of decision making under uncertainty, because these theories purport that humans reduce more complicated uncertain environments to subjectively formed less complicated ones (i.e., SSI to ambiguity). The predictions of the reductive view held only for ambiguityaverse individuals and not for ambiguity-tolerant individuals. Consequently, theories of decision making under uncertainty should include individual tolerance for missing information and how these individual differences modulate the neural systems engaged during decision making. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Narrowing the Creativity Gap: The Moderating Effects of Perceived Support for Creativity

This article examines the role of 3 types of perceived support for creativity in moderating the relation between creative self-efficacy and self-perceived creativity. The findings suggest significant interaction effects for perceived work-group support and supervisor support, but not for perceived organizational support. This study is among the first to (a) examine the importance of perceived support for creativity in unlocking creative potential and increasing creativity in organizations and (b) use interaction terms in structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate moderator effects in an applied research setting. These results imply that organizational interventions focused on training supervisors and work-group members to support creativity in the workplace may be more effective than broader and less focused interventions at the organizational level.     

Assessing the impact of policy analysis: The functions of usable ignorance

Conclusion Policy analysis is a specialized intellectual activity that affects and is affected by the exercise of power, rule, and authority in knowledge systems. The organized complexity of this system, formed by the interpenetration of tangled knowledge functions which appear as a river delta, raises doubts about the appropriateness of policy impact as a standard of accountability for policy analysts. The typical practice of “random medition” may be replaced with forms of “systematic mediation” which, directed towards the investigation of rival hypotheses about the policy impact of policy analysis, enlarges the scope of usable ignorance. The strategy of usable ignorance, supplemented by recommendations in areas of agenda setting, managing pragmatic validity, and methodology development, is a way to begin dealing with the organized complexity of the knowledge system in which policy analysts work today. Reprinted with permission from Dunn, W.N., & Kelly, R.M. (Eds.) (in press). Advances in policy studies since 1950: Vol. 10. Policy studies review annual. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.     

Facial appearance and judgments of credibility: the effects of facial babyishness and age on statement credibility

Researchers have found that facial appearance influences social judgments. For example, evidence has shown that facial babyishness and age affect perceivers' impressions of the stimulus person's veracity. In this experiment, the researchers examined whether these variables also influenced the credibility attributed to written statements purportedly made by these people in addition to several topics of interest in deception-detection research. Undergraduates (N = 270) were presented babyfaced or mature-faced photographs that depicted a child, an adult, or an older individual, in addition to a written truthful or deceptive statement purportedly made by the person in the photograph. Results showed that, as predicted, when the statements were accompanied by babyfaced pictures, participants tended to judge them as truthful, but only if the pictures did not depict children. Also, when the statements were accompanied by childen's pictures, participants tended to judge them as deceptive, but only if the pictures depicted a babyish face. Overall detection accuracy was close to chance and did not correlate with either judgmental confidence or with the respondents' estimated lie-detection accuracy. However, confidence and estimated ability were significantly correlated. Also, more confidence was placed in judgments of truthfulness than in judgments of deceptiveness. Respondents' truth bias and the existence of a veracity effect in the diverse experimental conditions were examined as well.