Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions

Many people insist that their commitments to certain values (e.g. love, honor, justice) are absolute and inviolable - in effect, sacred. They treat the mere thought of trading off sacred values against secular ones (such as money) as transparently outrageous - in effect, taboo. Economists insist, however, that in a world of scarce resources, taboo trade-offs are unavoidable. Research shows that, although people do respond with moral outrage to taboo trade-offs, they often acquiesce when secular violations of sacred values are rhetorically reframed as routine or tragic trade-offs. The results reveal the peculiar character of moral boundaries on what is thinkable, alternately punitively rigid and forgivingly flexible.     

A bad taste in the mouth: gustatory disgust influences moral judgment

Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought.     

Moral reframing: A technique for effective and persuasive communication across political divides

The political landscape in the US and many other countries is characterized by policy impasses and animosity between rival political groups. Research finds that these divisions are fueled in part by disparate moral concerns and convictions that undermine communication and understanding between liberals and conservatives. This “moral empathy gap” is particularly evident in the moral underpinnings of the political arguments members of each side employ when trying to persuade one another. Both liberals and conservatives typically craft arguments based on their own moral convictions rather than the convictions of the people they target for persuasion. As a result, these moral arguments tend to be unpersuasive, even offensive, to their recipients. The technique of moral reframing—whereby a position an individual would not normally support is framed in a way that is consistent with that individual's moral values—can be an effective means for political communication and persuasion. Over the last decade, studies of moral reframing have shown its effectiveness across a wide range of polarized topics, including views of economic inequality, environmental protection, same‐sex marriage, and major party candidates for the US presidency. In this article, we review the moral reframing literature, examining potential mediators and moderators of the effect, and discuss important questions that remain unanswered about this phenomenon.     

In vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood: The Jewish view

This paper examines the legal, moral, ethical, and Jewish religious issues involved inin vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood. Also briefly discussed are the topics of artificial insemination and sex organ transplants. Jewish views on these subjects are based on the cardinal principles that life is of infinite value, that human life is sacred, and that the divine license to heal granted to the physician carries with it certain well-defined obligations and restrictions.     

Psychology out of the laboratory: the challenge of violent extremism

The idea that people inevitably act in accordance with their self-interest on the basis of a calculation of costs and benefits does not constitute an adequate framework for understanding political acts of violence and self-sacrifice. Recent research suggests that a better understanding is needed of how sacred values and notions of self and group identity lead people to act in terms of principles rather than prospects when the two come into conflict. Perhaps the greatest challenge is to better understand how sacred causes and moral imperatives diffuse through a population and motivate some (usually small) segment of it to commit violent actions. The challenge to psychology is to adopt an interdisciplinary focus drawing on a range of research methods and to become bolder in its choices of study populations if it is to be relevant to real-world problems.     

A Royal Road to Consequentialism?

To consequentialise a moral theory means to account for moral phenomena usually described in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, in a consequentialist framework. This paper seeks to show that all moral theories can be consequentialised. The paper distinguishes between different interpretations of the consequentialiser’s thesis, and emphasises the need for a cardinal ranking of acts. The paper also offers a new answer as to why consequentialising moral theories is important: This yields crucial methodological insights about how to pursue ethical inquires.     

人们何以能够“舍生取义”?基于保护性价值观认知神经机制的解释

保护性价值观是一种拒绝与其他任何价值相互交易, 尤其拒绝与经济价值进行交易的观念。近些年来的认知神经科学研究证据表明, 人们之所以可以为了坚守保护性价值观, 表现出“舍生取义”的行为(如对抗利益诱惑甚至放弃生命), 一方面在于保护性价值观是以一种道义主义的绝对规则方式进行表征和建构的, 这使得人们较少进行利弊权衡; 另一方面, 由于保护性价值观与自我和道德认同过程紧密相关, 使得其被主观赋予了最高价值。未来研究中, 可以在借鉴保护性价值观的研究范式基础上, 开展对中国人核心价值观的实证研究探讨, 关注其文化差异问题, 并进行正确价值观的干预和正确引导的应用实践研究。     

解释水平视角下的道德判断

道德判断对社会合作有重要意义。近20年来涌现出大量对道德判断的研究。经典的社会直觉模型和双加工模型已经不足以解释所有的研究发现。近年来,解释水平理论为道德判断的研究提供了一个新的视角。通过文献梳理发现,基于解释水平理论的道德判断研究可以分为两难的道德判断研究和一般的道德判断研究。两难的道德判断研究已经有了较为一致的结论,但是一般的道德判断研究还存在争议。解释水平影响道德判断的深层原因可能是通过关注点影响道德判断的标准。未来的研究可以着眼于跨文化研究和深层机制的剖析,为解释水平视角下的道德判断研究提供更多的实验证据,加深人们对道德判断的理解。     

Some Versions of the Number Problem Have No Solution

This article addresses Taruek’s much discussed Number Problem from a non-consequentialist point of view. I argue that some versions of the Number Problem have no solution, meaning that no alternative is at least as choice-worthy as the others, and that the best way to behave in light of such moral indeterminacy is to let chance make the decision. I contrast my proposal with F M Kamm’s nonconsequentialist argument for saving the greatest number, the Argument for Best Outcomes, which I argue does not follow from the premises it is based on.     

Mapping the moral domain

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.     

From car use reduction to ride-sharing: The relevance of moral and environmental identity

Car use contributes significantly to environmental pollution, leading people to rethink their transport habits. Previous studies on car use reduction relied on established theories related to values and self-regulation to examine this decision. In this paper, we offer an alternative approach and examine the intention to reduce car use through the prism of identity theory, and propose environmental and moral identities, together with environmental concern, as the main antecedents to the importance of car use reduction and intention to reduce car use. Further, we consider ride-sharing intention as an outcome of the decision to reduce car use. The proposed conceptual model is tested on a sample of consumers from the United Kingdom using an online consumer panel. The results offer partial support for the influence of moral identity, environmental identity, and environmental concern on the importance to reduce car use and intention. The links among the importance of and intention to reduce car use, along with ride-sharing intentions, are supported. Finally, managerial implications are discussed, and future research directions are suggested.     

Normativity and Judgement: David Papineau

This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made possible by naturalist views of truth, that is, views which do not presuppose normativity in explaining truth.     

道德动机动态系统理论：一种道德发展的新科尔伯格取向

在科尔伯格道德认知发展阶段理论、动态系统理论和自我决定理论基础上,Kaplan提出了道德动机的动态系统理论,把道德动机界定为认知和情绪成分自我组织和自我调节的动态发展过程。该理论有其特定的提出背景、基本观点和主要内容,并且具有一定的实证证据支持。未来研究应着力解决道德认知与情绪的关系、环境因素的影响、横断研究与纵向研究的结合以及研究工具的完善等问题。     

The Moral Nature of Psychotherapy

Although psychotherapists are aware that psychotherapy is a value-laden practice, they do not generally appreciate that psychotherapy is necessarily based on moral values. Conceptions of moral values as attitudes regarding the well-being of others and of human enterprises as actions based on reasoned choices or values are presented. The nature of psychotherapy as a moral enterprise is shown through an examination of two views of theory. Theories, the typical basis for guiding and justifying practice, either contain moral values or require them as assumptions necessary for practice. Implications for the teaching and presentation of forms of psychotherapy are briefly discussed.     

Characteristics of Environmental Ethics: Environmental Activits' Accounts

This article describes a qualitative investigation of environmental ethics as construed by environmental activists. Twenty-nine participants responded in writing to open-ended questions on their definitions of an environmental ethic, how they expressed and experienced this moral orientation in their lives, and what sustained it. Four major themes emerged. First, ethical consideration of the natural environment pervaded morality, values, and private and public life. Second, emotional or spiritual experiences, or personal fulfillment, were important for many. Third, there was disagreement on the relationships among environmental principles, intentions, and behaviors, as well as the necessity of prescribing specific behaviors. Finally, there were diverse views on the role of humanitarian concerns in an environmental ethic. These themes are discussed in terms of parallels to religious experience, motivations for an environmental ethic, and implications for nonenvironmental realms of ethics and justice.     

The psychology of the unthinkable: taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals

Five studies explored cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to proscribed forms of social cognition. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that people responded to taboo trade-offs that monetized sacred values with moral outrage and cleansing. Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that racial egalitarians were least likely to use, and angriest at those who did use, race-tainted base rates and that egalitarians who inadvertently used such base rates tried to reaffirm their fair-mindedness. Experiment 5 revealed that Christian fundamentalists were most likely to reject heretical counterfactuals that applied everyday causal schemata to Biblical narratives and to engage in moral cleansing after merely contemplating such possibilities. Although the results fit the sacred-value-protection model (SVPM) better than rival formulations, the SVPM must draw on cross-cultural taxonomies of relational schemata to specify normative boundaries on thought.     

Moral duties of parents and nontherapeutic clinical research procedures involving children

Shared views regarding the moral respect which is owed to children in family life are used as a guide in determining the moral permissibility of nontherapeutic clinical research procedures involving children. The comparison suggests that it is not appropriate to seek assent from the preadolescent child. The analogy with interventions used in family life is similarly employed to specify the permissible limit of risk to which children may be exposed in nontherapeutic research procedures. The analysis indicates that recent writers misconceive how certain moral principles, such as respect for personal autonomy, require us to act toward children. The results are also used to assess proposed federal regulations on research with children.     

Cognitive biases in moral judgments that affect political behavior

Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (which people are willing to impose on others regardless of the consequences) and protected values (PVs, values protected from trade-offs). I present evidence against the idea that voting is expressive, i.e., that voters aim to express their moral views rather than to have an effect on outcomes. I show experimentally that PVs are often moralistic. Finally, I present some data that citizens’ think of their duty in a parochial way, neglecting out-groups. I conclude that moral judgments are important determinants of citizen behavior, that these judgments are subject to biases and based on moralistic values, and that, therefore, outcomes are probably less good than they could be.     

绿色消费的许可效应：绿色让我们更不道德？

绿色消费属于道德范畴,消费者在助推绿色社会发展中的作用日益受到重视。然而,绿色消费会降低指定性道德约束或增强禁止性道德选择,消费者会变得不再绿色甚至自私(如享乐、撒谎或偷窃),这便是绿色消费的许可效应。从时间维度上来说,绿色消费许可效应的产生包括启动效应-绿色消费-许可效应三个阶段。有关该效应的理论解释是道德自我调节。从根本上来说,化解该效应需要消费者养成绿色生活方式,它包括两个路径：一方面,从绿色行为到绿色自我,抽象化表征行为,将绿色行为与自我概念相连接,采用自下而上加工方式实现;另一方面,从绿色自我到绿色行为,基于价值观-行为一致性原则,会促进个体产生更多绿色消费以及节俭和利他,采用的是自上而下加工。文章最后指出未来一些研究方向。     

Natural Compatibilism,Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.