The current status of the psychoanalytic theory of instinctual drives. I: Drive concept, classification, and development

The evolution of Freud's theory of instinctual drives, with the accompanying models of a mental apparatus, is remarkable for its tenacious adherence to addressing the fundamental problems of human psychology, here phrased as the problems of body-mind-environment relationships. The concept of instinctual drives continues to be one of the most pervasive concepts of psychoanalysis, weathering considerable attack over the last several decades, although losing some clarity in the process. I have cited and discussed as basic issues of the concept of instinctual drives: the relationship of observational data and theoretical constructs in psychology; whether our construct of drives is or should be or can be purely psychological; the problem of conceptualizing the ontogenetic origin of mind; the issues of the "force-meaning conjunction" and the problem of psychic energy in psychoanalytic constructs; and the relation of our concept of instinctual drives to the concept of instincts in general. It seems that progress with these fundamental issues might be made by utilizing models that are more homologous with present knowledge in related fields than is Freud's reflex arc model of the nervous system, in order to build a better drive construct within the framework of psychoanalysis. The classification of instinctual drives remains a problem. Clinically, aggression seems to be a factor in conflict, very much like sexuality. Despite widespread acceptance of the idea of aggression as simply parallel to sexuality in all respects, there are major discrepancies. Perhaps aggression cannot be viewed as a drive after all; perhaps our drive construct needs to be modified to accommodate aggression. Certainly, controversy in this area has interfered with the production of good clinical studies which could begin to increase our understanding of aggression and its place in the human personality. The psychoanalytic theory of drive development has probably undergone less change in the last forty years than other aspects of drive theory, although careful observational work has led to alterations of our views of the age of onset of genital awareness, of female sexual development and function, and of the latency period. This is the conclusion of the first of two papers examining the post-Freud development of the theory of instinctual drives in psychoanalysis. The companion paper follows on p. 402 of this issue of The Psychoanalytic Quarterly.     

Drives and objects - notes on the change of drive theory

Freud’s drive theory has been questioned since the 1940s when Fairbairn created a metaphor of the mind that is not based on the tripartite model and drive theory. His work inspired others to elaborate on the significance of internal object relationships. According to the object relation theory, internal object relations are dynamic structures capable of generating meanings and action. Consequently, two distinct metapsychologies were created.The aim of this article is to show how the interaction of theories has initiated revisions of classic drive theory. Freud’s concept of drive and three synthesizing viewpoints between the two perspectives are discussed. Otto Kernberg addresses affects as a primary motivational system; the mother–infant relationship organizes affects to drives. Joseph Sandler adheres to classic drive theory but proposes that the ego’s attempt to protect the mind against psychic pain is as important as drive derivatives in motivating the mind. Laplanche proposes that the unconscious of the care-giving adult is the crucial factor for the constitution of an infant’s unconscious and drives. For Freud and Klein, drive is inherent. Contemporary writers, like Loewald and Laplanche, conceive drive as a function of the mind that is born out of the same matrix of interaction with the other elements of the mind.     

Surviving in absence--on the preservative and death drives and their clinical utility

This paper offers a new theoretical and clinical look at the death drive in connection with the preservative drive. The author elaborates the flaws she sees in Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and reformulates the transition between Freud's first drive theory and his second one within an implicit object relations theory. Simultaneously with this revised version of drive theory, a structural theory for the realm of healthy self- and object preservation and for pathological or deadened self and object parts is developed, including the devastating effects of trauma. Clinical material from an extended psychoanalysis shows how these concepts can help us understand these patients' absence and "deadness" and rethink the technical challenges they provide.     

The current status of the psychoanalytic theory of instinctual drives. II: The relation of the drive concept to structures, regulatory principles, and objects

There has been and continues to be some degree of failure to recognize the effects of the introduction of the ego-id-superego model on the drive construct. In particular, some of the criticisms of drive theory fail to take cognizance of the structural position of drives. Drives, as an aspect of id, are more clearly separated from behavior conceptually than many discussions imply. Drive energy is a different concept from drive. Especially in the area of the governance of drives by the regulatory principles of mental functioning some improvement in clarity and utility seems possible through the use of different, more sophisticated models. Difficulties in the concept of objects appear to underlie considerable controversy in psychoanalysis today. I have here attempted to clarify the concept of drive objects, as a step in resolving the broader issues.     

Object Relations,Affects, and Drives: Toward a New Synthesis

This paper summarizes my efforts to develop a contemporary psychoanalytic theory of drives, integrating this theory with contemporary affect theory and with psychoanalytic object relations theory. It proposes, in essence, that affects are the primary motivations of behavior, that they include a fundamental communicative function in the infant/caregiver relationship, and that it is the integration of, respectively, positive and negative affects that will crystallize libido and aggression as supraordinate motivational systems or drives. At the same time, insofar as peak affect states organize the internalization of the relationship between self and objects in the form of affect-invested self and object representations, affects are also contributing fundamentally to the organization of an internalized world of object relations, eventually consolidated in the tripartite structure of the mind.

This proposed interrelationship of affects, self- and object representations, and drives rejects the assumption of incompatibility of drive theory and object relations theory and provides potential bridging functions with the neurobiology of affects.     

We are driven

Is metapsychology out-or in again? Is it a millstone tied around our necks-or is it an intriguing Freudian witch whom we can even dance with? Is the concept of drives an outmoded oddity-or an indispensable companion, inspiring our understanding of the patient's material and even opening new windows for further development? Can we proceed with the concept of structures and object relationships alone -or do we need the concept of drives in order to understand what these object relationships are all about? The author clearly opts for the second option in each of these pairs of alternatives. Musing on the sophisticated metapsychology debate that unsettled psychoanalysis in the United States for many years, she reviews some of the most frequently quoted objections to the concept of drives. Further, she offers an introduction to modern drive theory with the new duality of sexual and preservative drives, as well as a different concept of aggression, and explains how drives relate to structures-specifically, to the representations of self and object.     

The development of the drive object concept in Freud's work: 1905-1915

In 1905 Freud established the idea of an object of an instinctual drive as the basic object concept of psychoanalysis. He also introduced the derivative concepts of object directedness, object choice, and object finding. While taking these steps he simultaneously deemphasized the importance of drive objects in sexual life, contradicted himself on whether drives are autoerotic or object-directed in infancy, and made incompatible statements about whether or not object choice occurs before puberty. Freud's clinical work, reflected especially in the major case reports and a series of papers on fantasy, led to an apparent recognition of complexity in the mental life of children far greater than had been described earlier. The increased attention to and appreciation of mental content in childhood especially augmented Freud's understanding of the role of drive objects, object directedness, and object choice in infancy. This, in turn, led him to postulate a sequence of organizations of sexual life, named according to the zonal drive source plus the mode of object directedness, a process of theory development that continued through 1924. Object choice and, to a lesser extent, object directedness are concepts derived from and dependent upon the concept of drive object. Both require, however, explanatory constructs besides drive constructs. In 1915 Freud defined the term "object" in the context of stating his drive theory. Freud used the term object with several new modifying words during this decade. No new object concept was introduced, however, in this work, although some steps in that direction appeared to be in progress.     

The problem of real trauma and the future of psychoanalysis

Abstract

Contemporary psychoanalysis emphasizes the role of “real” trauma, as it is well shown by recent sociological and theoretical developments (such as Kohut's Self psychology, object relation theory, renewed interest in Ferenczi's and Sullivan's contributions, etc.). To understand more clearly these developments, the author traces again the steps laid down by Freud in building the psychoanalytic edifice. The renewed interest in the environment, in real traumas, and in the vicissitudes of object relations could be a “paradigm change” in psychoanalysis: a return to Freud's original seduction theory. This development is seen as related to the difficulties of Freud's drive theory.     

精神分析客体关系革命的折衷进路:英国独立学派评述

自精神分析学诞生以来,其发展进路经历了自我革命、客体关系革命、自体革命、关系革命和神经科学革命。英国独立学派是客体关系革命的主要发起者和中间力量,它诞生于20世纪40年代英国精神分析学会内部的“论战”,并在规模以及精神分析理论和技术方面都取得重大发展。独立学派的精神分析师以开放和折衷的态度批判性地汲取各种现存的精神分析观点,形成不同于克莱因学派的客体关系思想,并表现出独立性、开放性、关系性和真实性的内涵与特征。温尼科特、费尔贝恩和巴林特是独立学派的主要代表人物,他们各自建构出独特的客体关系理论,促使精神分析范式从一元驱力模式转向二元客体关系模式,推动了客体关系理论的深入发展,奠定了后续精神分析发展的基石。     

The contribution of ego psychology to understanding the process of termination in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy

Ego psychology is presented as an integrated psychoanalytic developmental theory, including a theory of object relations. The process of termination is employed as one of the many possible illustrations of the usefulness of this theory. Termination is regarded as a process that pervades the treatment from the outset, rather than as the final phase of treatment only, because the treatment process, whether psychoanalysis or psychotherapy, includes continuous promotion of ever-increasing autonomy. Ideally, by the time termination proper takes place, maximum autonomy has been attained. To the definition of autonomy as intersystemic, involving relative independence of the ego from the drives (and from the super-ego), an object-relations dimension is added which extends that definition to include an intrasystemic consideration--namely, relative independence of the self-representation from the object representations. Especially in the treatment of the borderline conditions is the intrasystemic factor cogent because borderline states are characterized by varying degrees of incompletely differentiated self- and object representations. The objective, in the psychoanalysis of neurosis, where self- and object constancy already exist to a large degree, is ego autonomy in the intersystemic sense. In the psychotherapy of the borderline conditions, the objective is greater differentiation of the self-representation from the object representations.     

Über die Bindung an die inneren Objekte

Sandler sees the possibility of constructing a bridge between attachment theory and psychoanalysis by extending the concept of motivation to involve now a primary need for attachment. Attachment to the object is the basis for the existential feelings of safety and well-being. Connections to the development of internal object relationships and to unconscious phantasy are discussed. Consequences for psychoanalytic countertransference are shown.     

To Be Is to Betray: On the Place of Collective History and Freedom in Psychoanalysis

This paper explores an open frontier between psychoanalysis and critical theory, the relations between subjective experience and collective history. Its drive is a concern with the question of freedom: How might contemporary psychoanalysis help us think about freedom? How could it, as a practice, help us to be free? On the theoretical level, the paper follows the critique of psychoanalysis offered by Foucault and Adorno, particularly the latter's close reading Ferenczi in Negative Dialectics and his notion of “the spell.” I employ their critique in order to articulate the dilemma psychoanalysis faces vis-à-vis the notion of freedom in social context. I argue that, unlike traditional psychoanalytic discourse, relational psychoanalysis can address this dilemma in a generative way. I find this prospect in the readiness of relational psychoanalysis to realize the potential inherent in the psychoanalytic setting: the creation of a mutually constituted intersubjective space. I tell the story of a young woman for whom love seems impossible, and of a psychoanalytic expedition that finds her ability to love being held hostage. I suggest that what appears in one register as gender and sexual trouble appears in another as a dilemma of attachments and loyalties: my patient's ability to love is spellbound, trapped in a subjective-collective no man's land between her desire to be for herself and the unconscious demands of collective heritage. I argue that for psychoanalysis to be a practice of freedom, it must address the ways in which subjective experience answers to social forces and collective history. I question in this context the relations between freedom, guilt, and responsibility. Re-engaging Adorno, I agree that selfhood may always involve a guilty betrayal of others but argue against him that we must allow this guilt to be reconciled with living. I suggest, in conclusion, that theory is the bearer of collective responsibility.     

Defensive projection, superimposed on simplistic object relations, erodes patient-provider relationships in high-risk pregnancy: an empirical investigation

In an attempt to illustrate the relevance of psychoanalytic theory and research to behavior medicine, an empirical investigation was conducted of females treated at a high-risk pregnancy specialty clinic (N = 58). Drawing from psychoanalytic object relations theory, it was hypothesized and confirmed that use of projection as a defense mechanism during pregnancy, superimposed on simplistic object relations, predicted an erosion of patient-provider relationships during the pregnancy/postdelivery period. Findings are interpreted through the perspective of mentalization, pertaining to individuals' ability to understand the mental states of self and others, specifically under significant stress. Implications for psychoanalytically oriented assessment and treatment, and for the rift between psychoanalysis and research, are discussed.     

The four psychologies of psychoanalysis and their place in clinical work

Clinical psychoanalysis has led to the development of four conceptually separable perspectives on the functioning of the human mind. These are referred to herein as the psychologies of drive, ego, object relations, and self. Their clinical relevance is explored by applying them to issues regarding evenly hovering attention and the mutative factors in psychoanalysis. Those two areas, in turn, are seen to undergo an expansion when viewed from the perspective of each of the four psychologies.     

Reaching out for the object in the process of meeting

Reaching out for an object has been broadly discussed within psychoanalysis using the term 'object-seeking'. This article develops the idea that it is a fundamental feature of human beings to reach out for objects in order to survive and/or to gain vitality. Self-love, which is a derivative of object love, is not possible to achieve in a developmental manner without a sufficient phase-specific emotional response to the subject’s object seeking. In terms of psychoanalytic methodology, the present article represents a tradition (e.g. Tähkä) of renewal related to the classique approach, which is a more passive psychoanalytic technique (e.g. Freud and Winnicott). This traditional psychoanalytic methodology is complemented with a more active technique in order to be therapeutically efficient – especially in the treatment of individuals who are not primary neurotic. The four psychoanalytic schools (drive, object relations, ego and self-psychology) are integrated in a patient’s authentic attempt to reach out for the developmental object in the process of meeting.     

Variations of the past. Reflections on memory in contemporary psychoanalysis

In Jewish thought, contradictory positions may be legitimate. This is seen in Freud´s position in relation to tradition and memory: remembrance is valuable, but so is a movement forward. The main claim of this paper is that psychoanalysis in this respect has changed. While in especially the early Freudian position, one could see a stress on the importance of going back to earlier times, object relation theory mainly stresses the importance of facilitating new functions. This change has been especially clear during the last two decades. As cases of example, the use of neurocognitive models in psychoanalysis as well as Fonagy’s theory are discussed. The consequences of the shift from a bidirectional to a unidirectional, forward-looking, psychoanalysis, are discussed.     

PSYKOANALYTISKT ORIENTERAD PSYKOTERAPI

The increasing discourse of the concept of intersubjectivity in modern psychoanalysis has pushed the interest in the intrapsychic and its emphasis on drive and object into the background. Authors who wish to avoid a one-sided focus on intersubjectivity usually subscribe to a dual dimensional approach, taking both perspectives into account. In this article, the analytic situation is described not in two, but in three dimensions, the analytic function constituting a third dimension necessary for the interplay between the other two dimensions. Focusing on the analyst's position, the author presents a model that consists of (1) the-analyst-as-subject, (2) the-analyst-as-function, and (3) the-analyst-as-object. The analytic function is understood to be invested with a particular form of desire and it is argued that the asymmetry between this desire of the analyst and the desire of the analysand is a central characteristic of the analytic situation.     

A view of aggression in phobic states

This article attempts to apply a theory of aggression as motivation to overcome obstacles to the understanding of phobic states and their formation. The role of aggression in the genesis of phobic conditions is discussed, and the traditional analytic view of aggression as instinctual drive is contrasted with a motivational approach. The motivational view offers the advantage of a clearer understanding of the stimulus contexts, representational connections, and both real and imaginary object connections that are lacking in the more traditional understanding of aggression as a biological drive.     

The drive revisited: Mastery and satisfaction

Starting from the theory of the libido and the notions of the experience of satisfaction and the drive for mastery introduced by Freud, the author revisits the notion of the drive by proposing the following model: the drive takes shape in the combination of two currents of libidinal cathexis, one which takes the paths of the ‘apparatus for obtaining mastery’ (the sense‐organs, motricity, etc.) and strives to appropriate the object, and the other which cathects the erotogenic zones and the experience of satisfaction that is experienced through stimulation in contact with the object. The result of this combination of cathexes constitutes a ‘representation’, the subsequent evocation of which makes it possible to tolerate for a certain period of time the absence of a satisfying object. On the basis of this conception, the author distinguishes the representations proper, vehicles of satisfaction, from imagos and traumatic images which give rise to excitation that does not link up with the paths taken by the drives. This model makes it possible to conciliate the points of view of the advocates of ‘object‐seeking’ and of those who give precedence to the search for pleasure, and, further, to renew our understanding of object‐relations, which can then be approached from the angle of their relations to infantile sexuality. Destructiveness is considered in terms of “mastery madness” and not in terms of the late Freudian hypothesis of the death drive.