Interest in entering helping activities and self-disclosure to three targets on the Jourard self-disclosure scale.

Jourard's 40-item Self-disclosure Questionnaire was administered to 50 students in a training and selection program for a quasi-counseling position and 52 randomly selected students. Subjects indicated past disclosures to three target persons, parents, best friend, and stranger. Results indicated: highest disclosures were reported to best friends, lowest to strangers; subjects interested in the quasi-counseling position reported more disclosure than subjects not interested in this position; females reported more disclosure than males only to strangers.     

Shyness in self-disclosure mediated by social skill

The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of Shyness and Social Skills on Self-disclosure. Three scales, the Trait Shyness Scale, the Scale of Social Skill, and the Self-disclosure Questionnaire were administered to 443 university students. Scores on Shyness were highly negatively correlated with those on Social Skills and moderately negatively correlated with Self-disclosure. Furthermore, Self-disclosure scores correlated positively with Social Skills. Separate factor analyses of the Shyness and Social Skills scales yielded four and two factors, respectively. Findings suggest that shy people may have low interpersonal skills and thus, they may hesitate to engage in self-disclosure.     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition--"relative meta-accuracy"--has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2).     

Nominal analysis of “variance”

Nominal responses are the natural way for people to report actions or opinions. Because nominal responses do not generate numerical data, they have been underutilized in behavioral research. On those occasions in which nominal responses are elicited, the responses are customarily aggregated over people or trials so that large-sample statistics can be employed. A new analysis is proposed that directly associates differences among responses with particular sources in factorial designs. A pair of nominal responses either matches or does not; when responses do not match, they vary. That analogue to variance is incorporated in the nominal analysis of “variance” (Nanova ) procedure, wherein the proportions of matches associated with sources play the same role as do sums of squares in an anova . The Nanova table is structured like an ANOVA table. The significance levels of the N ratios formed by comparing proportions are determined by resampling. Fictitious behavioral examples featuring independent groups and repeated measures designs are presented. A Windows program for the analysis is available.     

The Intention–Behavior Gap

Bitter personal experience and meta‐analysis converge on the conclusion that people do not always do the things that they intend to do. This paper synthesizes research on intention–behavior relations to address questions such as: How big is the intention–behavior gap? When are intentions more or less likely to get translated into action? What kinds of problems prevent people from realizing their intentions? And what strategies show promise in closing the intention–behavior gap and helping people do the things that they intend to do?     

Reid’s Account of the “Geometry of Visibles”: Some Lessons from Helmholtz

Drawing on work done by Helmholtz, I argue that Reid was in no position to infer that objects appear as if projected on the inner surface of a sphere, or that they have the geometric properties of such projections even though they do not look concave towards the eye. A careful consideration of the phenomena of visual experience, as further illuminated by the practice of visual artists, should have led him to conclude that the sides of visible appearances either look straight, in which case their angles appear to approximate Euclidean measures, or their angles do not appear to approximate Euclidean measures for straight line figures, in which case their sides do not look straight.     

Moral Desert, Fairness and Legitimate Expectations in the Market

Do people morally deserve what they earn in the market? More specifically, can people legitimately claim to deserve what they earn in the market in a way that counts against redistributing those earnings? As most liberal political philosophers do, I argue that the answer is no. Unlike many of these philosophers, however, I do not focus on whether or not people can be deserving. Instead, I focus on the relationship between social institutions and moral desert, and advance two claims. First, in the market, desert claims are undermined by the very nature of the market even if people can be deserving in general. Second, part of the intuition that motivates accounts of moral desert may be explained instead with reference to a principle of fairness that demands the fulfillment of people's legitimate expectations as to what they will receive, and this principle places much weaker restrictions on redistributive policies than do claims of moral desert.     

Révéler son humanité ? L’autorévélation du thérapeute à la lumière de la recherche empirique

Self-disclosure, which consists in revealing personal information about oneself to one's client, could be a beneficial therapeutic technique. There are yet many definitions of this concept. However, empirical research shows that self-disclosure may be favourably perceived by clients and that it could influence how they perceive their therapist. Moreover, it could positively influence treatment outcome. Self-disclosure about immediate feelings in the therapy and about the therapist–client relationship would be particularly effective in resolving problematic events by enabling feelings to be expressed and accepted and by providing clients with interpersonnal learning. Several authors finally advise using this technique infrequently, about moderately intimate but relevant themes in relation to the therapy, examining each client's specific needs, and always with the intention of helping them or improving the therapeutic relationship.     

On Primoratz's Definition of Terrorism

ABSTRACT In “What is terrorism?” Igor Primoratz defines ‘terrorism’ as “the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.” I argue that this definition needs to be modified (1) by requiring that the harm or threat be to persons other than those intimidated, (2) by including aims which do not concern action, and (3) by distinguishing terrorists who know they are terrorists from those who do not.     

Some reflections on the two psychologies of love

The mainstream view of love is that it is a state that arises from people mutually reinforcing each other or providing benefits to each other Yet careful quantitative analyses of imaginative thought patterns of people in love or in a state of affiliative arousal reveal themes of dialogue, commitment, and harmony rather than of mutual benefits It is suggested that asking people about love leads them to give causal explanations for the state which psychologists have elaborated into the theory that love is a response to having one's needs met Imaginative experiences characteristic of the state of being in love on the other hand may be different because they are primarily right brain mediated and do not share in the causal, instrumental type of reasoning characteristic of left brain conscious thinking Such conceivably right brain mediated experiences in TATs are more closely associated than presumably left brain mediated self-reports are with such physiological measures as evoked scalp potentials, neurohormone concentrations, and immune functions A vew of love that takes both self-report (left brain) and fantasy (right brain) measures into account does a better job of predicting affiliative behavior than does a view that relies solely on one or the other of the two types of measures     

Why do people like bicycling? Modeling affect toward bicycling

Studies show that the way an individual feels about bicycling – the degree to which they like bicycling – is an important predictor of whether or not they bicycle. But why do some people like bicycling and others don’t? This study explores factors that may influence an individual’s liking of bicycling, or more formally, their bicycling affect. We analyze a rich dataset from a cross-sectional survey of residents of six small U.S. cities using an ordered logit model. Results show that bicycling behavior has the strongest association with liking bicycling, with bicycling constraints following as the second most important factor. Individual cognitions, including perceptions and normative beliefs, also play important roles in predicting bicycling affect. Individual measures of the physical environment do not correlate with liking of bicycling, but the perception that biking to various destinations is safe does. Social environment factors influence liking of bicycling as well. Longitudinal research is needed to better understand the reciprocal relationship between bicycling affect and bicycling behavior as well as the effect over time of factors such as the physical environment. Nevertheless, this study offers an initial understanding of the potential determinants of bicycling affect that provides a starting point for further research as well as direction for the development of policies for getting more people on bicycles.     

People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth

Although people lie often, and mostly for self-serving reasons, they do not lie as much as they could. The “fudge factor” hypothesis suggests that one reason for people not to lie is that they do not wish to self-identify as liars. Accordingly, self-serving lies should be more likely when they are less obvious to the liars themselves. Here we show that the likelihood of self-serving lies increases with the probability of accidentally telling the truth. Players in our game could transmit sincere or insincere recommendations to their competitors. In line with the fudge factor hypothesis, players lied when their beliefs were based on flimsy evidence and did not lie when their beliefs were based on solid evidence. This is the first demonstration of a new moral hypocrisy paradox: People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth.     

Procedural justice and the hedonic principle: how approach versus avoidance motivation influences the psychology of voice

The authors investigate the relation between the hedonic principle (people's motivations to approach pleasure and to avoid pain) and procedural justice. They explore whether approach or avoidance motivation increases the effect that people feel they were treated more fairly following procedures that do versus do not allow them an opportunity to voice their opinion. Experiments 1 and 2 reveal that these procedures influence procedural justice judgments more strongly when people conduct approach motor action (arm flexion) than when they conduct avoidance motor action (arm extension). Experiment 3 indicates that individual-difference measures of participants' approach motivations predicted procedural justice judgments following voice versus no-voice procedures. The authors conclude that people's motivational orientations stimulate their fairness-based reactions to voice procedures.     

Normative goals and the regulation of social behavior: The case of respect

The rational actor model has a long and successful history of explaining human motivation across several disciplinary fields, but its focus on material self-interest fails to explain the many courtesies that people extend to each other and the frequent sacrifices they make on a day-to-day basis. What promotes this pro-social behavior—in particular trust in other people? I argue that interpersonal trust is supported by normative goals, in that people trust others, even complete strangers, because of a sense of what they ought to do, by social rules and obligations they feel they must follow. In particular, people feel they must respect the character of the other person, constrained to act as though the other individual is an honorable human being, irrespective of what they may privately believe. I describe how respect underlies trust in economic games as well as pro-social behavior in other social settings. This focus on normative goals, such as respect, suggests that people do not always act in alignment with their expectations, regulate themselves in terms their actions rather than possible outcomes of those actions, and choose pro-social action not out of desire to benefit others as much as a simple acquiescence to situational demands.     

Meta-insight: do people really know how others see them?

Although people can accurately guess how others see them, many studies have suggested that this may only be because people generally assume that others see them as they see themselves. These findings raise the question: In their everyday lives, do people understand the distinction between how they see their own personality and how others see their personality? We examined whether people make this distinction, or whether people possess what we call meta-insight. In 3 studies, we assessed meta-insight for a broad range of traits (e.g., Big Five, intelligent, funny) across several naturalistic social contexts (e.g., first impression, friends). Our findings suggest that people can make valid distinctions between how they see themselves and how others see them. Thus, people seem to have some genuine insight into their reputation and do not achieve meta-accuracy only by capitalizing on the fact that others see them similarly to how they see themselves.     

Religious Belief and Freedom of Expression: Is Offensiveness Really the Issue?

An objection frequently brought against critical or satirical expressions, especially when these target religions, is that they are ‘offensive’. In this article, I indicate why the existence of diverse and conflicting beliefs gives people an incentive to formulate their complaints in the language of offence. But I also cast doubt on whether people, in saying they are offended really mean to present that as the foundation of their complaint and, if they do, whether their complaint should weigh with us. These doubts do not apply to everything we might find offensive; in particular, they do not apply to simple cases of ‘sensory offence’; but they do apply to ‘belief-based offence’. Relying on offence also implies, inequitably, that different faiths should be differently protected depending on their susceptibility to offence; and the faithful themselves should worry about the flimsiness of claims based on ‘bare knowledge’ offence. I propose a principle of respect for beliefs as a differently grounded and more plausible reason for curbing our treatment of others’ beliefs. However, that principle has a limited compass and is hemmed in by the claims of free expression. It is also less suited to dictating the content of law than to influencing our conduct within the law.     

Predictors of intimacy in couples' discussions of relationship injuries: an observational study.

The interpersonal process model of intimacy (H. T. Reis & P. Shaver, 1988) proposes that self-disclosure and empathic responding form the basis of intimate interactions. This study examined this model in 102 community couples who completed intimacy measures following videotaped discussions about relationship injuries occurring both within and outside the relationship. Observational assessments of self-disclosure and empathic responding, as well as their respective components, were related to self-reported ratings of post-interaction intimacy. Men's own disclosure and empathic responding predicted their feelings of intimacy, whereas women's intimacy was predicted by their partner's disclosure and empathic responding. Self-disclosure and empathic responding appear to be important behavioral determinants of intimate feelings, but the manner in which they influence intimacy differs according to gender.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others

Social cooperation often relies on individuals?? spontaneous norm obedience when there is no punishment for violation or reward for compliance. However, people do not consistently follow pro-social norms. Previous studies have suggested that an individual??s tendency toward norm conformity is affected by empirical information (i.e., what others did or would do in a similar situation) as well as by normative information (i.e., what others think one ought to do). Yet little is known about whether people have an intrinsic desire to obtain norm-revealing information. In this paper, we use a dictator game to investigate whether dictators actively seek norm-revealing information and, if so, whether they prefer to get empirical or normative information. Our data show that although the majority of dictators choose to view free information before making decisions, they are equally likely to choose empirical or normative information. However, a large majority (more than 80%) of dictators are not willing to incur even a very small cost for getting information. Our findings help to understand why norm compliance is context-dependent, and highlight the importance of making norm-revealing information salient in order to promote conformity.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.