Children's understanding of reputations

In the present study, the authors investigated age differences in children's understanding (a) that a person's behavior may contribute to the formation of a shared opinion within the peer group and (b) that origins of a reputation can be direct or indirect. The authors read stories in which a target character engaged in either prosocial or antisocial interactions with peers to children in kindergarten, 2nd, and 4th grade. They then asked the children to judge how various peers viewed the target character. Children's explanations indicated that children in all of those age groups understood that firsthand experience influenced peers' opinions, and by 2nd grade, children understood that indirect experience or gossip also might have contributed to an individual's reputation.     

A graphic measure for game-theoretic robustness

Robustness has long been recognized as an important parameter for evaluating game-theoretic results, but talk of ‘robustness’ generally remains vague. What we offer here is a graphic measure for a particular kind of robustness (‘matrix robustness’), using a three-dimensional display of the universe of 2 ×  2 game theory. In such a measure specific games appear as specific volumes (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, etc.), allowing a graphic image of the extent of particular game-theoretic effects in terms of those games. The measure also allows for an easy comparison between different effects in terms of matrix robustness. Here we use the measure to compare the robustness of Tit for Tat’s well-known success in spatialized games (Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books; Grim, P. et al. (1998). The philosophical computer: Exploratory essays in philosophical computer modeling. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press) with the robustness of a recent game-theoretic model of the contact hypothesis regarding prejudice reduction (Grim et al. 2005. Public Affairs Quarterly, 19, 95–125).     

Belief in God: A game-theoretic paradox

Conclusions The Belief Game is a two-person, nonzero-sum game in which both players can do well [e.g., at (3, 4)] or badly [e.g., at (1,1)] simultaneously. The problem that occurs in the play of this game is that its rational outcome of (2, 3) is not only unappealing to both players, especially God, but also, paradoxically, there is an outcome, (3, 4), preferred by both players that is unattainable. Moreover, because God has a dominant strategy, His omniscience does not remedy the situation, though - less plausibly - if man possessed this quality, and God were aware of it, (3, 4) would be attainable.How reasonable is it to use the device of a simple game to argue that nonrevelation by God, and nonbelief by man, are rational strategies? Like any model of a complex reality, the Belief Game abstracts a great deal from the problem that confronts the thoughtful agnostic asking the most profound of existential questions. Yet, to the degree that belief in God is seen as a personal question, conceptualized in terms of a possible relationship one might have with one's Creator, it seems appropriate to try to model this relationship as a game. The most difficult question to answer, I suppose, is, if God exists, what are His preferences in such a game?I have argued that He would first like to be believed, but at the same time not reveal Himself. These goals, in my opinion, are consistent with the role He assumes in many biblical stories, although this is not to say that the Bible offers the final word on philosophical and theological matters in the modern world. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a logical place from which to start, and the clues it offers on God's preferences seem not contradicted by contemporary events.Of course, the Belief Game supposes that God not only has preferences but makes choices as well. To many people today - myself included - these choices are not apparent. But if He does make them, and in particular chooses not to reveal Himself, I think the Belief Game helps us to understand why nonrevelation is rational. Furthermore, it gives us insight into why, given this choice by God, our own reasons for believing in Him - in a game-theoretic context - may be rendered tenuous.     

A review of experiments in explicit bargaining

Bargaining was defined as a situation where: (1) there are two or more parties with divergent interests, (2) the parties can communicate, (3) mutual compromise is possible, (4) provisional offers can be made, and (5) the provisional offers do not fix the tangible outcomes until an offer is accepted by all sides. The typical bargaining paradigm is described. Next the limitations of general theories of bargaining are discussed. The results of relevant experiments are then reviewed and evaluated. Particular attention is given to the effects of general bargaining predispositions, the payoff system, the social relationship between the bargainer, his opponent and significant others, situational factors, and bargaining strategy.     

A game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice

I will characterize the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice game-theoretically. That is, I will introduce games whose solutions are the utilitarian and maximin distributions respectively. Then I will compare the rules by exploring similarities and differences between these games. This method of comparison has been carried out by others. But I characterize the two rules using games that involve bargaining within power structures. This new characterization better highlights the ethical differences between the rules.     

Effects of teacher feedback on the reputations and peer perceptions of children with behavior problems

We explored whether teacher feedback modified children's preferences and perceptions of a target child with behavior problems. First- and second-grade children (M age = 7.8 years) viewed a videotape of a target actor presented as having a liked, average, or disliked reputation. A second videotape depicted a teacher's verbal responses to the target's behavior as (a) positive, (b) neutral-salient, or (c) corrective. Both salience and valence of teacher feedback were assessed. Main effects of feedback and reputation indicated that feedback had at least minimal effects at each level of the target's reputation. Teacher feedback is discussed with respect to its effects on perceptions of behavior versus affective responses toward behavior-problem children. A significant interaction showed that when combined with a liked reputation, positive and neutral-salient feedback conditions increased the salience and positive evaluation of the target child, thus illustrating the importance of considering nonevaluative teacher attention in combination with children's reputational status.     

Dyadic processes of disclosure and reciprocity in bargaining with communication

We offer a study revealing the mechanisms through which communication helps actual bargaining behavior outperform economic predictions. The possibility of individually strategic behavior in the presence of private information leads to game‐theoretic predictions of less than full efficiency. We present a one‐stage, simultaneous offers bargaining game in which buyers and sellers have independent, privately held valuations for the item being sold (i.e. a bilateral auction with two‐sided private information). In three communication treatments, parties are: (a) allowed face‐to‐face communication prior to submitting offers; (b) allowed written communication prior to submitting offers; or (c) allowed no‐communication prior to submitting offers. When parties are allowed pre‐play communication, we find nearly full efficiency (98%). We examine two systematically predictable aspects of dyadic interaction—disclosure and reciprocity—to explain how negotiators achieve this efficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attributions restore consistency in bargaining with liked/disliked partners

The experiment deals with the impact of self-esteem and liking for the partner on the attribution of agreement and deadlock in bargaining. Fifty-eight male and 70 female students played the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information eight times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. In fact in four games a computer program simulated the partner. Combining an experimental variation of liking (liking—disliking), own costs (low, high), partner costs (low, high) the experiment followed a 2×2×2 repeated measures design. As predicted by a path model from balance theory (a) failure (deadlock) was attributed more to the partner and less to self than success (agreement), (b) success was attributed more to the liked than the disliked partner, whereas failure was attributed more to the disliked than the liked partner.     

Evaluability of outcomes in ultimatum bargaining

In bargaining, two components are important for assessing the utility of a decision outcome: self-interest and fairness. Each of these components corresponds to a comparison of possible outcomes—an interpersonal comparison for fairness, and an intrapersonal comparison for self-interest. We propose that the relative weights these components receive in ultimatum bargaining depend on their evaluability. In two studies, we show that varying the evaluability of these components influences the reactions of recipients towards the offer. Moreover, we show that the relative importance of fairness as well as the perceived fairness of the offer mediate between the evaluability of these components and acceptance rates. Results are discussed in relation to other findings on outcome and procedural framing effects in social decision-making.     

Effects of alternatives in coalition bargaining

A critical factor in bargaining and coalition formation is the alternative outcomes of the bargainers if an agreement cannot be reached. In some situations bargainers have individual alternatives while in other situations their alternatives must be negotiated with others. The purpose of this study was to contrast the effects of one-person and two-person alternatives on coalition outcomes. The second purpose of the study was to contrast the predictions of four theories of coalition formation: bargaining theory, equal excess model, Shapley value, and a special case of equity theory. The results indicate that one-person alternatives enhance the bargaining strength of the stronger players more than two-person alternatives. The predictions of the equal excess model and the Shapley value were more accurate than the predictions of bargaining theory and equity theory. However, the greater accuracy of the equal excess model and the Shapley value may be restricted to situations in which the bargainers have one-person rather than two-person alternatives.     

On fairness and learning agents in a bargaining model with uncertainty

The emergence of fair divisions in a repeated bargaining game is investigated in a computational model. Individuals of human societies often appeal to some norm of fairness in situations where an agreement over the division of a surplus is required. The employed framework consists of players alternating offers that describe possible ways to share a certain commodity. The players are allowed a limited number of offers to reach an agreement; if they fail to agree, the player who made the first offer, the lucky player, wins the whole lot at stake. Uncertainty is introduced in the process by randomly choosing the lucky player at the beginning of each iteration. In the experiments, the players acquired strategies by employing a variant of Q-learning, a reinforcement learning algorithm. Experiments were performed with different configurations of utility functions on the players’ preferences in taking actions in risky situations. Analysis of the results shows that the game theoretical model of a single shot of the bargaining game used in the experiments closely matches the outcomes obtained in the simulated framework, despite the differences in the quality of the players, who are assumed to be fully rational in the theoretical model. Learning agents that are timid toward risky situations manage to acquire strategies that lead to fair outcomes when playing against each other, but find themselves in a disadvantageous position when confronting bolder types.     

Motivation in an asymmetric bargaining situation : A cross-cultural study(1)

Canadian and East Indian dyads played a temporally limited bargaining game with a two by five payoff matrix. There were three experimental conditions: (a) Equality condition: each player had an equal range of possible payoffs, (b) Topdog condition: each player ostensibly had a larger payoff range than the other, and (c) Underdog condition: each player ostensibly had a smaller payoff range than the other. The actual payoff range was identical across players and conditions. Canadians were more cooperative in the Topdog condition than in the Underdog condition whereas for the Indians, there was evidence that the opposite was the case. Among the Indians in the Underdog condition, a dominance-submission order apparently formed which may reflect the rigid social hierarchy in Indian society.     

Uniqueness and symmetry in bargaining theories of justice

For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal of bargaining theories of justice.     

The role of individual bargaining behavior in the pay setting process: A pilot study

A model of initial salary detemination for professional and managerial employees is developed. That part of the model which concentrates on the role of employee salary negotiation behaviors and attitudes was investigated using a sample of 117 individuals. Significant variance in salary bargaining attitudes and behaviors was found; attitudinal and demographic differences between negotiators and non-negotiators were determined. Additionally, negotiating behavior was found to be positively related to salary, but only slightly related to salary growth.     

A reputation for success (or failure): the association of peer academic reputations with academic self-concept, effort, and performance across the upper elementary grades

The associations between children's academic reputations among peers and their academic self-concept, effort, and performance were examined in a longitudinal study of 427 students initially enrolled in Grades 3, 4, and 5. Assessments were completed in the fall and spring of 2 consecutive school years and in the fall of a 3rd school year. Peer academic reputation (PAR) correlated moderately strongly with teacher-rated skills and changed over time as a function of grades earned at the prior assessment. Path-analytic models indicated bidirectional associations between PAR and academic self-concept, teacher-rated academic effort, and grade point average. There was little evidence that changes in self-concept mediated the association between PAR and effort and GPA or that changes in effort mediated the association between PAR and GPA. Results suggest that peers may possess unique information about classmates' academic functioning, that children's PARs are psychologically meaningful, and that these reputations may serve as a useful marker of processes that forecast future academic engagement and performance.