Owning It

What is the distinction, if any, between who we are as people and what we believe and how we practice as psychoanalysts? For me, art played a vital affirmation that there was a world full of larger ideas and feelings in contrast to the desiccated environment my parents had created. From grade school, through my training as an analyst to the present, art has not only elucidated who I am but expanded my sense of being a creative individual. From the procession of viewing art and engaging with it, to making and acquiring art pieces, the discovery was not only that I owned these pieces but that their impact challenged the ‘who’ I thought I was if I was willing to own up to it. The information that informs our personal beliefs and practice in psychoanalysis comes from such an openness to new experiences from many directions in our daily lives, and challenges who we believe we are. Art adds to analytic knowledge, not by giving us an interpretation for our lives, but by stimulating the genuinely creative process of self-reflection.     

A thought on the nature of psychoanalytic theory

In this paper I suggest that much of recent experiment in analytic theory, even widely diverse approaches, has a common denominator the problem of the conceptual vacuum created by the shift away from a central creative position of the idea of psychic mechanisms. I try to illustrate, by comparing theories of Bion and George Klein, that this movement seems to point in the direction of considering now what is uniquely psychoanalytic about our theories. I content that what is unique about psychoanalytic theories is that they are involved in the experiential core-function of the applied science by becoming internalized and used symbolically to aid the analyst inwardly to endure persecutory anxiety and loss of the sense of objective reality, and so maintain the analytic position.     

Subjective education in analytic training: drawing on values from the art academy

Abstract: Kernberg and others have observed that psychoanalytic education has tended to promote the acquisition of theoretical knowledge and clinical technique within an atmosphere of indoctrination rather than of exploration. As a corrective, he proposed four models that correspond to values in psychoanalytic education: the art academy, the technical trade school, the religious seminary and the university. He commended models of the university and art academy to our collective attention because of their combined effectiveness in providing for the objective and subjective education of candidates: the university model for its capacity to provide a critical sense of a wide range of theories in an atmosphere tolerating debate and difference, and the art academy model for its capacity to facilitate the expression of individual creativity. In this paper, I will explore the art academy model for correspondences between artistic and analytic trainings that can enhance the development of the creative subjectivity of psychoanalytic candidates. I will draw additional correspondences between analytic and artistic learning that can enhance psychoanalytic education.     

How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? *

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN‐account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context‐sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context‐sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context‐sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.     

PROBLEMS WITH LEWIS' ARGUMENT FOR THE IDENTITY THEORY

David Lewis presented a celebrated argument for the identity theory of mind. His argument has provided the model for the program of analytic functionalism. He argues from two premises, that mental states are analytically tied to their causal roles and that, contingently, there is never a need to explain any physical change by going outside the realm of the physical, to the conclusion that mental states are physical. I show that his argument is mistaken and that it trades on a crucial ambiguity in the second premise. He argues for a weaker version of that premise and then uses a stronger version in the argument. The weaker version of that premise will not allow the inference and the stronger version is contested in the dialectical context. In general then this strategy for providing analytic reductions will not be guaranteed to succeed.     

A Comprehensive Picture of the Decidability of Mereological Theories

The signature of the formal language of mereology contains only one binary predicate which stands for the relation “being a part of” and it has been strongly suggested that such a predicate must at least define a partial ordering. Mereological theories owe their origin to Le?niewski. However, some more recent authors, such as Simons as well as Casati and Varzi, have reformulated mereology in a way most logicians today are familiar with. It turns out that any theory which can be formed by using the reformulated mereological axioms or axiom schemas is in a sense a subtheory of the elementary theory of Boolean algebras or of the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras. It is known that the theory of partial orderings is undecidable while the elementary theory of Boolean algebras and the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras are decidable. In this paper, I will look into the behaviors in terms of decidability of those mereological theories located in between. More precisely, I will give a comprehensive picture of the said issue by offering solutions to the open problems which I have raised in some of my papers published previously.     

Methodology in aesthetics: the case of musical expressivity

A central method within analytic philosophy has been to construct thought experiments in order to subject philosophical theories to intuitive evaluation. According to a widely held view, philosophical intuitions provide an evidential basis for arguments against such theories, thus rendering the discussion rational. This method has been the predominant way to approach theories formulated as conditional or biconditional statements. In this paper, we examine selected theories of musical expressivity presented in such logical forms, analyzing the possibilities for constructing thought experiments against them. We will argue that philosophical intuitions are not available for the evaluation of the types of counterarguments that would need to be constructed. Instead, the evaluation of these theories, to the extent that it can succeed at all, will centrally rely on inferential, non-immediate access to our subjective musical experiences. Furthermore, attempted thought experiments lose their methodological function because no proper distinction can be drawn between the persons figuring in the thought-experimental scenario and the evaluator of the scenario. Consequently, some of the central contributions to what is generally understood to be analytic philosophy of art are shown to represent a form of aesthetic criticism, offering much less basis for rational argumentation than is often thought.     

The “death of freud”; and the rebirth of free psychoanalytic inquiry

The relevance of Grunbaum's recent critique of psychoanalytic theory is explored as it relates to relational/interpersonal theories. Griinbaum finds no scientific evidence for repression, the cornerstone of psychoanalysis. I argue that studies demonstrating the effects of motivated, unconscious processes are beginning to emerge in psychological research. This research, as well as interpersonal theory, refers to these processes as dissociated, not “repressed.”; I agree with Griinbaum that scientific validation of psychoanalytic theories of the mind, personality, and change cannot be gleaned from case studies alone. In relational theories the analytic situation is admittedly “contaminated”; with the analyst's participation by its very nature. There is beginning to be support for some relational hypotheses, but measures to validate these hypotheses are only now being developed. Grunbaum's criticisms have come at a time when the convergence between relational theories and theories in social/clinical psychology makes it more likely that relational hypotheses will be articulated in a more precise manner by researchers, if not by analysts.

The issues of the difficulty of measuring unconscious processes and the quest for knowledge seemingly beyond human limitations are addressed. Psychoanalysis is not only less than scientific, but more encompassing, in that it is also a creative activity that cannot be understood through science alone.

Science is not enough, nor art: In this work patience plays a part [Goethe].

The most beautiful and deepest experience a man can have is the sense of the mysterious.... To me it suffices to wonder at these secrets and to attempt humbly to grasp with my mind a mere image of the lofty structure of all that there is [Albert Einstein, quoted in Pagels, 1985].     

Psychology and Culture: Back to the Future?

Psychology has a poor record in addressing cultural phenomena. One response is to turn to ancient concepts from local traditions and to use these as alternative analytic categories to explain behavior. However, there are problems with such an approach. These concepts will be read from the vantage point of the present and interpreted differently so as to propose different diagnoses (and solutions) for contemporary social problems. As an alternative, rather than using ancient resources as analytic categories in the explanation of behavior, we could instead examine how they are used as categories of practice as people actively make sense of their social context and themselves. Attending to such contemporary ‘lay’ usage (and the contestation it entails) allows for a more dynamic conception of cultural processes than is typical in psychology. More generally, I believe that it is possible to use our psychological constructs so that we can see the distinctive particularities of the phenomena before us in new and interesting ways, and in ways that respect their cultural specificity. This claim is illustrated through reference to recent work using the concept of social identity to illuminate aspects of Hindu pilgrimage.     

PCR技术的传奇诞生与发展

通过介绍ＰＣＲ技术富有传奇色彩的诞生和发展过程以及它对分子生物学乃至整个生命科学界产生的巨大作用,可以看到分子生物学的发展和进步时刻离不开创造性思维,其中的每一项新发明和新理论都是创造性思维的外现或物化,充分体现出它是科学技术革命的先导。作为分子生物学工作者,对现阶段的专业理论和技术不能盲从,只有善于思考、勤于动手、富于创新,才能在分子生物学这片创造性思维的沃土上实现人生价值,迎接新的生命科学世纪的到来     

“What If” Dimensions of the Analytic Field: Imagination,Object Vitality,and Psychic Growth

This paper considers the role of imagination in the context of Bionian Field Theory. Expanding on Hanna Segal’s idea of “what if” dimensions of the analytic process, it is argued that “what if” states engage evocative and vital aspects of objects. They set up particular tensions in the analytic field that trigger “imaginative work.” The processes at work share many similarities with the artist’s creative process. For this reason, William Kentridge’s reflections on his own creative process are used to elucidate “imaginative work” as an esthetic, creative and agentive process. Three case fragments are used to illustrate some of these ideas in the clinical setting.     

The specificity of the generality problem

In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will argue that the examples that Bishop presents pose no such problem for some theories. I will illustrate the exempt theories by describing how an evidentialist view can account for the justification in the examples without having any similar problem. It will be clear that other views about justification are likewise unaffected by anything like the generality problem.     

'Paradoxical' Mood Effects on Creative Problem-solving

Two studies examined the influence of various affective states on creative problem-solving. In Study 1, individual differences in mood were measured using an adjective checklist immediately prior to task performance. Insight problems were then employed to measure creative problem-solving. Performance was compared with that obtained for analytic problem-solving tasks that were included as contrast variables. Results showed that positive mood led to significantly poorer creative problem-solving performance. No link was found between negative mood and general arousal. Performance on the contrasting analytic problem-solving tasks was negatively related to anxiety, but not to positive or negative mood states. In Study 2, the procedure was followed with the addition of experimentally induced mood states. The results obtained in Study 1 for mood ratings were replicated. In the induced mood conditions, negative mood significantly facilitated creative problemsolving performance relative to induced neutral mood, which in turn was better than the control condition. The poorest performance was obtained in the positive mood condition. The results are discussed in the context of contrasting theories of the relationships between mood and problem-solving performance.     

Evil acts not evil people: their characteristics and contexts

Abstract: The problem of evil has vexed philosophers and theologians for centuries and anthropologists, sociologists, psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists in more recent times. Numerous theories have been proposed but there is still little agreement on such basic questions as the nature of evil, what constitutes and motivates an evil act, and how we resolve conflicts between individuals and groups in which evil acts are being committed. I am proposing that evil should be used as an adjective, and not as a noun. As such it should be employed to qualify acts of persons rather than their character. This change would enable us to eschew foundational explanations of evil and, therefore, to examine evil acts in their contexts and so better discern their nature and motivation. I will contend that evil acts begin when an individual makes, or members of a group make, assertions about the ‘naturalness’ of their own acts and, correspondingly, the ‘unnaturalness’ of the acts of others. I will suggest that this results from the anxiety that ensues when they cannot adequately signify their experience of these acts. When this occurs, those so treated are dispossessed of their ‘personhood’, allowing members of the ‘natural’ group to violate their ‘boundaries' with impunity. These violations can range from the relatively innocuous such as being ignored to the extreme such as genocide. I am asserting that all these acts should be termed evil as they derive from the same semiotic process of ‘naturalizaton’. I will discuss ways of preventing individuals or groups from embarking on the process of ‘naturalization’ and describe the types of contexts that might reduce or eliminate the commission of evil acts by those already engaged in their perpetration. To demonstrate these ideas I will use examples from my personal experience, from analytic theory and from the ‘troubles' in Northern Ireland.     

Goldman and the foundations of social epistemology

This essay argues that Alvin I. Goldman's truth-linked theory of group knowledge (veritism) omits individual components of social cognition, that all group based theories of knowledge lead to scepticism, and that if any sense is to be made of social knowledge, it must be done on individualist lines. I argue that Goldman's veritism can be reconstructed by adopting a reliabilist theory,social reliabilism. And I argue that Goldman's objections to a particular sort of consensualism are not telling. So there are now two plausible and competing theories of social knowledge-social reliabilism and consensualism.I am grateful to Keith Lehrer and Alvin Goldman for their criticisms of previous drafts of this paper.     

Relative truth and the first person

In recent work on context-dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call ‘first-person-based genericity’, a form of generalization that is based on an essential first-person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a first-personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display.     

Motivation: Sic Transit Gloria?

Sic transit gloria—so passes away the glory once accorded to motivation as a central focus of psychoanalytic theory and practice. How and why? That is the subject of this paper. I will track the ups and downs of motivation historically and its current replacement by the attention correctly afforded to relationships across a spectrum of contemporary theories. I will then take up my proposal of five motivational systems embedded in an intersubjective context and consider critiques of the proposal from different vantage points. Despite waning interest, motivation remains an intrinsic component of psychoanalysis.     

Discussion: The Analyst's Involvement in the Creative Aspect of Analysis

Recent formulations on the psychology of creativity in the analytic context, such as Albert Rothenberg's “homospacial thinking,” Arnold Modell's “unconscious metaphoric thought,” and Thomas Ogden's “transformational thinking,” are discussed. These concepts enable previously unconnected experiences to be combined within the mind, while emphasizing interpersonal imaginative processes such as identification and empathic knowledge; the dual cognitive features of these formulations permit awareness of the complexity of feelings in oneself and others, essential for psychoanalytic creativity. Further, the articles in this issue are synthesized, highlighting the importance of the analyst making creative (new and valuable) use of his or her entire life experience, feelings, attitudes, and fantasies in treatment. From this dicussion, it is evident that the analyst's creative use of self should be more systematically incorporated into psychoanalytic theory of technique.