Bentham’s binary form of maximizing utilitarianism

Jeremy Bentham is often interpreted as defending a satisficing, rather than maximizing, version of utilitarianism, where an act is right as long as it produces more pleasure than pain. This lack of maximization is surprising given Bentham’s maximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Against the satisficing interpretation, I argue that Bentham consistently defends a maximizing version of utilitarianism, where an act’s consequences are compared to those of not performing the act. I show that following this version of utilitarianism requires that one realizes the greatest happiness for all affected individuals.     

An experimental analysis of satisficing in saving decisions

Uncertainty of one’s future is the essential problem of saving decisions. Unlike previous experimental studies, we capture this crucial uncertainty by a scenario-based satisficing approach. Decision makers first form aspirations for a few relevant scenarios, and then search for consumption plans guaranteeing these aspirations. Our aim is to investigate whether agents make satisficing choices and, if so, how satisficing relates to optimality. We find that satisficing allocations can be reached easily when aspirations are incentivized, although aspiration levels are rather far from what optimality suggests.     

Maximization and Search for Alternatives in Decision Situations With and Without Loss of Options

Maximizing tendency has been associated with greater accumulation of choice alternatives prior to selection of a preference. It is not known whether this search behavior extends to situations in which accumulation of new choice alternatives comes with the potential loss of existing ones. In Study 1, we replicate the original finding of greater accumulation of choice alternatives, using a computer‐based laboratory task. We then provide evidence, in Studies 2 and 3, that when potential loss of existing options is incorporated into the task, maximization is associated with less rather than more search for additional options. Maximization components of decision difficulty and alternative search, but not high standards or satisficing, explain this behavior. Other task measures are also collected, but few maximization‐related differences are observed. The findings support an interpretation of maximizers as decision makers who are as concerned with the potential loss of existing options as with the loss of undiscovered future ones. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Survey Satisficing Biases the Estimation of Moderation Effects

Survey satisficing in online data collection biases the estimation of treatment effects in many ways. Extending the findings of a previous study, which demonstrated that satisficing biased the estimation of main treatment effects, this study also shows that satisficing distorts the estimation of moderation effects. Targeting Japanese adults’ attitudes toward food, this study tests how the effect of country of production (Japan vs. China) is moderated by preexisting ethnocentric attitudes. The results show that while nonsatisficers predictably adjust their attitude toward food based on their preexisting ethnocentric attitude, satisficers stick to their initial stereotypical response. That is, the theoretically predicted moderation effect was observed among nonsatisficers, but not among satisficers, which indicates that satisficing biases not only the estimation of a treatment effect but also that of a moderation effect.     

Implicit Person Theories and Change in Teacher Evaluation: A Longitudinal Field Study

Adopting a longitudinal field study, this paper investigates whether entity theorists (students who believe human attributes are fixed) are less likely than incremental theorists (students who believe human attributes are malleable) to change their evaluations of a teacher in accordance with his behavioral changes. An instructor exhibited some forgetful behaviors in the first half of a course, and ceased doing so in the second half. Consistent with our hypothesis, incremental theorists adjusted their perceptions of the instructor. They rated him as less forgetful accordingly at the end of the course than at the middle. Entity theorists, however, did not show this change. With improved ecological validity, this study extends previous laboratory studies to teacher evaluation.     

Gambling primates: reactions to a modified Iowa Gambling Task in humans,chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys

Humans will, at times, act against their own economic self-interest, for example, in gambling situations. To explore the evolutionary roots of this behavior, we modified a traditional human gambling task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), for use with chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and humans. We expanded the traditional task to include two additional payoff structures to fully elucidate the ways in which these primate species respond to differing reward distributions versus overall quantities of rewards, a component often missing in the existing literature. We found that while all three species respond as typical humans do in the standard IGT payoff structure, species and individual differences emerge in our new payoff structures. Specifically, when variance avoidance and reward maximization conflicted, roughly equivalent numbers of apes maximized their rewards and avoided variance, indicating that the traditional payoff structure of the IGT is insufficient to disentangle these competing strategies. Capuchin monkeys showed little consistency in their choices. To determine whether this was a true species difference or an effect of task presentation, we replicated the experiment but increased the intertrial interval. In this case, several capuchin monkeys followed a reward maximization strategy, while chimpanzees retained the same strategy they had used previously. This suggests that individual differences in strategies for interacting with variance and reward maximization are present in apes, but not in capuchin monkeys. The primate gambling task presented here is a useful methodology for disentangling strategies of variance avoidance and reward maximization.     

Is Genuine Satisficing Rational?

There have been different interpretations of satisficing rationality. A common view is that it is sometimes rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when one does not know that it is the best option. But there is available a more radical view of satisficing. On this view, it is rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when a better option is known to be available. In this paper I distinguish between two possible interpretations of ‘genuine’ satisficing, a de re and a de dicto interpretation. I then argue that while de re genuine satisficing is always irrational, de dicto genuine satisficing might be rationally permissible. In fact, de dicto genuine satisficing does not appear to be covered by existing accounts of satisficing behaviour.

Health and well-being

Eudaimonistic theorists of welfare have recently attacked conative accounts of welfare. Such accounts, it is claimed, are unable to classify states normally associated with physical and emotional health as non-instrumentally good and states associated with physical and psychological damage as non-instrumentally bad. However, leading eudaimonistic theories such as the self-fulfillment theory and developmentalism have problems of their own. Furthermore, conative theorists can respond to this challenge by dispositionalizing their theories, i.e., by saying that it is not merely the realization of one’s values that is non-instrumentally good for one, but that the disposition to realize one’s values is also non-instrumentally good for one. This approach, properly elaborated, can accommodate the idea that, in many cases, states normally associated with physical and psychological health (or unhealth) are non-instrumentally good (or bad). It also preserves the many well-known advantages of conative theories.     

Must Theorising about Adaptive Preferences Deny Women's Agency?

Critics argue that adaptive preference (AP) theorists misrepresent oppressed people's reasons for perpetuating their oppression. According to critics, AP theorists assume that people who adapt their preferences to unjust conditions lack the psychic capacities that would allow them to develop their own normative perspectives and/or form appropriate values. The misrepresentation is morally problematic, because it promotes unjustified paternalism and perpetuates colonial stereotypes of third‐world women. I argue that we can imagine a conception of AP that is consistent with acknowledging agency in people who perpetuate their oppression. I offer a weak perfectionist conception of AP that is consistent with recognising agentic capacities in the oppressed. On my conception, APs are preferences incompatible with an agent's basic wellbeing that formed under unjust conditions — and that an agent would reverse upon exposure to better conditions. My conception encourages respectful treatment of the oppressed without requiring us to abandon the feminist political goals the notion of AP is meant to serve. It helps us identify real‐world preferences that are problematically adapted to oppressive conditions and offers an account of why they seem not to be women's ‘true preferences’.     

Judging a Book by its Cover: The Influence of Implicit Self‐Theories on Brand User Perceptions

Do people judge others based on the brands they use? Prior research finds evidence to this effect, yet we argue this phenomenon is far from universal. Drawing on research on implicit self‐theories, we find that only entity (but not incremental) theorists are prone to judging people based on their brand use (Studies 1 and 2). We show that entity theorists infer that people use brands to signal who they are to others, thereby forming perceptions of these people based on the personality of the brands they use, but incremental theorists are reluctant to make inferences about brand users’ signaling motives (Studies 3, 4, and 5). When tendencies to make signaling inferences are reduced, entity theorists no longer judge people based on their brand use (Studies 3 and 4). Furthermore, even incremental theorists judge people based on their brand use when given the information that their brand use is not driven by situational forces, but is potentially driven by a signaling motivation (Study 5).     

Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)

In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the relevant defenses of theism are committed to the appropriateness of, not satisficing, but motivated submaximization. When one submaximizes with motivation, one aims at the optimum but accepts the good enough because of a countervailing consideration. When one satisfices, one aims at the good enough and chooses the good enough because it realizes her aim at the good enough. While commitment to the appropriateness of satisficing may be a significant liability, commitment to the appropriateness of motivated submaximization is not.     

Sequent-Calculi for Metainferential Logics

Studia Logica - In recent years, some theorists have argued that the clogics are not only defined by their inferences, but also by their metainferences. In this sense, logics that coincide in their...     

The Tyranny of the Enfranchised Majority? The Accountability of States to their Non-Citizen Population

The debate between legal constitutionalists and critics of constitutional rights and judicial review is an old and lively one. While the protection of minorities is a pivotal aspect of this debate, the protection of disenfranchised minorities has received little attention. Policy-focused discussion—of the merits of the Human Rights Act in Britain for example—often cites protection of non-citizen migrants, but the philosophical debate does not. Non-citizen residents or ‘denizens’ therefore provide an interesting test case for the theory of rights as trumps on ordinary representative politics. Are they the ultimate success story of the human rights framework? Or was Michael Walzer correct to describe government of denizens by citizens as a modern form of ‘tyranny’? This paper argues that neither liberal rights theorists nor democratic republicans provide a coherent response to the existence of denizens. Liberal rights theorists overstate the extent to which a politically powerless status can secure individual rights, while democratic republicans idealise the political process and wrongly assume that all those affected by laws are eligible for political participation. The paper outlines an alternative model for assessing the accountability of states to their non-citizen population, informed by the republican ideal of non-domination. It identifies gaps in state accountability to denizens–such as where there is inadequate diplomatic protection—and argues that these gaps are particularly troubling if their exit costs of leaving the state are high.     

Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities

Many theorists claim that the reactive emotions, even in their private form, are communicative entities. But as widely endorsed as this claim is, it has not been redeemed: the literature lacks a clear and compelling account of the sense in which reactive attitudes qua private mental states are essentially communicative. In this paper, I fill this gap. I propose that it is apt to characterize privately held reactive attitudes as communicative in nature because they, like many paradigmatic forms of communication, have representational content and the function of evoking uptake of this content in a recipient.     

Causal grounds for negative truths

Among truthmaker theorists it is generally thought that we are not able to use the entailment principle (i.e. the principle according to which truthmaking distributes across entailment) to ground negative truths. But these theorists usually only discuss truthmakers for truth-functional complexes, thereby overlooking the fact that there are non-truth-functional complexes whose truth values are not solely determined by the truth or falsity of their atomic propositions. And once we expand the class of truths that require their own bespoke truthmakers to also include these, there is no reason to exempt negative truths from grounding. For given that truthmaking is closed under entailment and every negative truths is entailed by some non-truth-functional complex or other, any resources rich enough to ground the truth of the latter will do the same job for the former.     

Can Implicit Theory Influence Construal Level?

Beliefs about stability and change are captured by individuals’ implicit theories. Incremental‐theorists believe that human traits and world‐dispositions are malleable and can change through effort, whereas entity‐theorists believe that human traits and world‐dispositions are fixed. In this research we find that the implicit theory an individual holds influences an important aspect of the cognitive process, namely, the level of construal at which information is processed. In three studies we demonstrate that, compared to entity‐theorists, incremental‐theorists adopt a more abstract level of information construal, and the increased cognitive flexibility afforded by an incremental‐theory mindset explains this effect.     

Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically Heuristic?

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect.     

内隐人格理论对他人印象加工策略的影响

从表征状态与他人知觉信息加工方式两个角度探讨了内隐人格理论对他人印象加工策略的影响。首先采用自编的童话情境测验对120名被试的内隐人格理论进行维度分析, 甄选出持不同内隐人格理论的被试(实体论42人、渐变论48人)。随后使用错觉关联效应的实验范式, 要求两类被试(持不同内隐人格理论及其指向性情境)对他人行为信息进行判断, 记录自由回忆和频率估计的差异值。结果发现：持不同内隐人格理论的个体在知觉他人时采用不同的信息加工方式。实体论者通常采用启发式加工, 渐变论者通常采用分析式加工。实体论者在进行启发式加工时, 通过对他人行为信息的即时性判断形成他人印象; 渐变论者在进行分析式加工时, 对他人行为信息进行记忆性判断, 最终依赖情境信息形成他人印象。     

Between Insensitivity and Incompleteness: Against the Will Theory of Rights

This paper recasts an old objection to the will theory in the light of recent attempts to defend that theory, notably by Nigel Simmonds and Hillel Steiner. It enlists the idea of duties of care—effectively restrictions over legal officials’ discretionary exercise of powers—to form a dilemma for such theorists: either legal officials’ discretion over powers is restricted by duties of care for the unempowerable, or it is not. If their discretion is unrestricted, then the will theory is insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, in virtue of the fact that these lives are viewed as not meriting direct normative consideration. If, on the other hand, their discretion is restricted by duties of care, then the will theory has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify them. It is therefore incomplete as a theory of rights.     

Multi-attribute sequential search

This article describes empirical and theoretical results from two multi-attribute sequential search tasks. In both tasks, the DM sequentially encounters options described by two attributes and must pay to learn the values of the attributes. In the continuous version of the task the DM learns the precise numerical value of an attribute when she pays to view it. In the threshold version the DM learns only whether the value of an attribute is above or below a threshold that she sets herself. Results from the continuous condition reveal that DMs tended to terminate their searches too early relative to the optimal policy. The pattern reversed in the threshold condition: DMs searched for too long. Maximum likelihood comparisons of two different stochastic decision models showed that DMs under both information conditions performed in ways consistent with the optimal policies. Those offered continuous-valued attribute information did not, however, spontaneously degrade this information into binary (acceptable/unacceptable) form, despite the theoretical finding that satisficing can be a very effective and efficient search strategy.