意志问题研究述评

意志问题是永恒的人性问题和哲学难题 ,同时也是最受争议、最遭误解的哲学问题之一。近年来 ,我国一些学者开始对这一问题予以关注 ,并作了一些不无意义的探讨。本文对此作一综述 ,以期引起更多识士重视意志问题 ,积极推进我国的意志哲学研究。一、意志研究正成为我国哲学发展的重要新生点在西方哲学史中 ,人们对于意志问题的关注和研究由来已久。由于哲学立场、方法、价值取向等多重局限 ,西方意志理论虽然形态多样并不乏意义 ,但从根本上说 ,它们并不能科学合理地把握意志与存在、意志与实践、意志与人、意志自由与历史必然等关系 ,它们对…     

何谓群体自由

<正>"自由"是一个重要的哲学概念。这一概念自诞生以来,通常被用来对个人或是个人的意志和行动进行描述,例如哲学史上著名的意志自由与必然性的问题,自由主义者为之振臂高呼的言论自由、迁徙自由、结社自由等问题,都是以个人的意志或行动为研究对象的自由问题。然而我们是否也能构想一个     

阿奎那自由意志论的理智转向及其效应

自由意志问题是一个鲜有的由中世纪神学哲学家们正式提出并加以深入探究的纯粹哲学问题,也是一个重大的、备受争议的和影响深远的问题。中世纪几乎每一个重要的神学哲学家都探讨过自由意志问题,阿奎那则是其中最具转折性、综合性、开拓性和创新性的人物。在阿奎那之前,中世纪思想家们的自由意志论主要是在道德视域下、与道德善恶和道德归责等问题联系在一起。阿奎那在继承奥古斯丁主义自由意志论的基础上,综合了亚里士多德的理智选择和波埃修的理智自由意志论等观点,创立了一种完备的理智主义自由意志论,实现了中世纪自由意志论从道德主义向理智主义的转向。这种转向在经院哲学晚期和近代引发了深远效应。     

我“X”故我在 ——读笛卡尔《形而上学的沉思》

一笛卡尔与康德不同:康德把知识与自由意志区分开,认为自由意志超越了人的理解能力。这是康德哲学的最杰出的思想,也是他超出笛卡尔哲学的最关键之处。笛卡尔则并没有像康德那样在思想内部清晰地划定理解与自由意志之间的界限,更没有从自由意志方面来理解康德所说的“自在之物”。后一个思路引出了叔本华和尼采,乃至现当代的欧洲大陆哲学。     

儿童数量表征与数概念的发展特点及机制

对儿童数量表征和数概念的研究是当前数认知领域的两个重点研究方向。我们在这一领域通过理论及实证研究进行了广泛且深入的探索,系统分析了大小数量、符号与非符号数量表征的机制,深入考察了数量表征线索的发展、线性数量表征的发展特点及形成机制等问题;并对数概念的发展及其影响机制、数量表征与数概念的关系进行了理论梳理和实证研究。这些探索为进一步探明数量表征与数概念的发展特点及机制提供了基础。     

最新哲学论文索引

马恩列斯毛邓等哲学思想马克思晚年探索的理性与非理性的转换和统一机制/张奎良//社会科学辑刊,2005.4马克思对德国古典哲学自由精神的继承和发展/许全兴//中共中央党校学报,2005.3马克思主义关于“恶”的历史作用的思想及其内涵/张羽佳//湖北行政学院学报,2005.4马克思实践观的人文意蕴/任皚//哲学动态,2005.8论马克思解放理论的伦理旨趣/杨楹//哲学研究,2005.8认识论与本体论的统一:马克思的实践自由观/王雪冬//天府新论,2005.5《得意志意识形态》中的“交往”概念新论/曹浩瀚//当代世界社会主义问题,2005.2小束手稿的哲学地位———读广…     

论马克思对康德自由概念的感性证明

自由是贯穿整个西方文化的价值目标,是主体之为主体的根据,它发展到德国古典哲学时期已经取得了巨大成果,康德和马克思的自由观就宛如德国近代自由思想的两个点:康德自由概念的核心是自由意志,并且它是纯粹理性的唯一事实,但对它的证明始终是个问题;马克思对康德的"自由"进行了感性证明。     

对康德的道德形而上学基础的追问及存在论意义上的超越

康德的道德哲学与其政治哲学是逻辑一致的,康德认为正义的优先性在于人先天的自由,而自由的主体坚持正义和遵从道德,则在于人的实践理性自身具有的善良意志,康德就这样通过自由、实践理性、善良意志等概念为道德奠定了基础。然而它仍然是先验的、空洞的,唯有从道德是人存在的方式这一存在论的根基处入手,才能理解道德并使其获得自身存在的坚实根基。     

论自由意志的相容性：卡尔纳普与康德

自由意志与决定论的问题历来是哲学史上一个争议不断的问题。在相容论与非相容论的主张之间存在绵延的张力。在自由意志的问题上,康德论述颇丰。他拒斥了对自由的经验性理解,而去其超越性的维度,将自由等同于自由意志并归结到超验物自体的领域。确保了自由意志不被经验沾染的纯洁和崇高,但也造成了人类理智的困境,即自由意志作为超验物自体而言的不可知性。卡尔纳普以逻辑角度经由因果关系的分析力图建构自由意志与决定论的统一。一定程度上是对康德哲学的一种补充。本文试图对康德与卡尔纳普关于自由的问题做一个比较研究。     

道德行为归责的可能性——评聂敏里《意志的缺席——对古典希腊道德心理学的批评》

本文审视了聂敏里《意志的缺席——对古典希腊道德心理学的批评》一文中提出的几个基本观点,即古希腊意志概念的缺席、康德意志概念的优越性、行为之道德属性应归责于意志以及赖尔对意志概念的消解之无效性,并对其各自做了回应。通过进一步的分析和考量,本文提出如下观点:(一)与狄勒"古希腊无意志"一说中所发现的、在古希腊哲学中缺席的意志概念,对应的是康德的自由抉择(Willkür)概念,而非其意志(Wille)概念——康德将道德的善恶归责于自由抉择,而非作为实践理性的意志;(二)康德也认识到了赖尔所批评的身心间因果作用的问题,而重视赖尔所提出的问题,有助于进一步理解康德将意志限制到道德领域的做法。     

BUDDHISM,FREE WILL,AND PUNISHMENT: TAKING BUDDHIST ETHICS SERIOUSLY

In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft compatibilism.” It then turns to a more wide-ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will.     

The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism

Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.     

Moral Psychology of Shame in Early Confucian Philosophy

In Western philosophy and psychology, shame is characterized as a self-critical emotion that is often contrasted with the similarly self-critical but morally active emotion of guilt. If shame is negative concern over endangered or threatened self-image (usually in front of others), guilt is autonomous moral awareness of one’s wrongdoings and reparative motivation to correct one’s moral misconduct. Recently, many psychologists have begun to discuss the moral significance of shame in their comparative studies of non-Western cultures. In this new approach, shame is characterized as a positive moral emotion and active motivation for self-reflection and self-cultivation. If shame is a positive and active moral emotion, what is its moral psychological nature? In this paper, I will analyze shame from the perspective of cultural psychology and early Confucian philosophy. Unlike many Western philosophers, Confucius and Mencius discuss shame as a form of moral excellence. In early Confucian texts, shame is not a reactive emotion of an endangered self but a moral disposition that supports a self-critical and self-transformative process of moral development.     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will

The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in the last decades it has become a matter of scientific investigation. The theoretical and methodological advances in neuroscience allowed very complex psychological functions related to free will (conscious intentions, decision-making, and agency) to be investigated. In parallel, neuroscience is gaining momentum in the media, and various scientific findings are claimed to provide evidence that free will is nothing more than an illusion. Why do neuroscientific findings have such a strong impact on our notion of free will? Does it really matter what neuroscience tells us about free will? Here we critically examine studies in experimental philosophy, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience that attempt to provide an empirical answer to these questions. This overview of the literature demonstrates that inducing disbelief in free will has an impact on folk psychology, social behavior and intentional action.     

When psychology undermines beliefs

This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (ii) can be explained by a psychological mechanism that is (iii) unreliable for the task of believing p; and (iv) any other evidence for belief p is based on rationalization. I will also consider and defend two equally valid arguments for establishing unreliability: the redundancy argument and the argument from irrelevant factors. With this more specific understanding of debunking arguments, it is possible to develop new replies to some objections to psychological debunking arguments from both ethics and philosophy of religion.     

Said Nursi's Moral Philosophy

This article tests the oft-made claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible because of the presumed authoritarianism of religious morality. The article explores the moral philosophy expressed in the early writings of Said Nursi, concluding that by acknowledging individual autonomy and free will and rejecting authoritarianism as inimical to the exercise of conscience, Nursi's moral philosophy lays the groundwork for an Islamic democracy.     

On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno

In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies.     

Strawson’s modest transcendental argument

Although Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was published over fifty years ago and has been widely discussed, its main argument is still notoriously difficult to pin down. The most common – but in my view, mistaken – interpretation of Strawson’s argument takes him to be providing a ‘relentlessly’ naturalistic framework for our responsibility practices. To rectify this mistake, I offer an alternative interpretation of Strawson’s argument. As I see it, rather than offering a relentlessly naturalistic framework for moral responsibility, Strawson actually develops a transcendental argument, which grounds our moral responsibility practices in the practical perspective of social agents. However, the aims of this essay are not purely interpretative. Strawson’s essay continues to have important implications for a number of issues that arise in the contemporary debates that concern free will and moral responsibility. In particular, it puts significant pressure on moral responsibility sceptics like Derk Pereboom [Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] who think that the truth of moral responsibility scepticism has no worrisome implications for our lives with others.