Investigating the output monitoring component of event-based prospective memory performance

The goal of this study was to augment the standard event-based prospective memory paradigm with an output monitoring component. That component involves memory for past actions and, in the context of prospective memory, is largely responsible for repetition and omission errors. The modified paradigm also provides an index of what people believe to be true concerning their past prospective memory performance. More elaborate prospective responses decreased forgetting that an intention had been fulfilled, whereas contextual change increased forgetting. In Experiments 1-3, people often reported that they had fulfilled an intention on a previous occasion when they actually had not, but distinctive responses reduced that error in Experiment 4. Therefore, people's beliefs about their past performance can influence the incidence of repetition and omission errors in event-based prospective memory tasks.     

Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings.     

Reality monitoring and metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder

The present study investigated general reality monitoring ability, and selective reality monitoring ability for anxiety relevant actions in a group of individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and a group of non-anxious controls. In addition, reality monitoring confidence was assessed, as well as specific meta-cognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence (by means of the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ)). No differences were found between both groups in actual reality monitoring ability. Unlike previous studies, the reality monitoring task included actions that were related to the individual concerns of the OCD patients and were ideographically selected. Nevertheless, no differential reality monitoring effect was observed for the anxiety relevant stimuli. Data from the MCQ, however, revealed that OCD patients had less overall confidence in their memory for actions and their reality monitoring ability. Analysis of the confidence ratings of the reality monitoring task showed that this reduced confidence was restricted to the neutral actions. No differences were observed for patients that reported low or high frequencies of checking behaviour. The whole of these data do not support memory deficit models of OCD, but are in line with recent emphasis on the importance of memory confidence and other meta-cognitive beliefs in OCD.     

The use of safety behaviours to manage intrusive memories in depression

Cognitive models of clinical disorders conceptualise cognitive and behavioural safety-seeking behaviours as central to symptom persistence because they prevent disconfirmation of key maintaining beliefs. Despite growing evidence of the role of negative beliefs about intrusive memories in depression, it remains unclear why such beliefs persist. Accordingly, we examined whether safety behaviours in response to unhelpful beliefs about intrusive memories might play a role in their maintenance. Eighteen high dysphoric (i.e., BDI-II12) individuals who reported an intrusive negative autobiographical memory in the past week completed a battery of measures about their memory, associated negative beliefs and safety behaviours adopted in response to their beliefs. The most commonly endorsed beliefs reflected themes of wanting to control memories (e.g., ‘I should be able to rid my mind of this memory’) and self-deprecation about experiencing them (e.g., ‘Because I can’t control this memory, I am a weak person’). The beliefs prompted a range of safety behaviours, with cognitive distraction being the most common. The findings demonstrate that safety behaviours are common in response to maladaptive beliefs about intrusive memories. Treatment developments in this area are needed, and should incorporate strategies to challenge beliefs about memories, reduce the use of safety behaviours, and promote processing of intrusive memories.     

Aging,memory loss,and Alzheimer’s disease: What do refugees from the former Soviet Union think?

ABSTRACT

Since the mid-1970s, approximately 700,000 émigrés from the former Soviet Union (FSU), most of Jewish descent, settled in the United States. Now, 25 or more years post-emigration, they have “aged in place” in the United States, but their values, beliefs, and attitudes about growing old, memory changes, and Alzheimer’s disease remain grounded in their earlier life experiences. Based on findings from a study of the social and cultural factors affecting beliefs about Alzheimer’s disease, aging, and memory loss, this article examines how past life experiences, the immigration experience, and cultural values affect Russian-speaking refugees’ beliefs and views about aging, memory loss, and Alzheimer’s disease.     

Free Will,Foreknowledge, and Future‐Dependent Beliefs

Recently, a time‐honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: (A) if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on (A). This argument is interesting in itself, for it is independent of a number of assumptions about the nature of God that have played an essential role in the classical defense of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, the argument enables us to identify a difficulty compatibilists encounter when employing (A) to block incompatibilism.     

Randomness in retrospect: Exploring the interactions between memory and randomness cognition

People tend to believe that sequences of random events produce fewer and shorter streaks than is actually the case. Although this error has been demonstrated repeatedly and in many forms, nearly all studies of randomness cognition have focused on how people think about random events occurring in the present or future. This article examines how our biased beliefs about randomness interact with properties of memory to influence our judgments about and memory for past random events. We explore this interaction by examining how beliefs about randomness affect our memory for random events and how certain properties of memory alter our tendency to categorize events as random. Across three experiments, we demonstrate an interaction between randomness cognition and three well-established but distinct properties of memory: (1) the reconstructive nature of memory, (2) primacy and recency effects, and (3) duration neglect. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

What I Was Doing Versus What I Did: Verb Aspect Influences Memory and Future Actions

ABSTRACT— This research examined whether describing past actions as ongoing using the imperfective aspect (rather than describing them as completed using the perfective aspect) promotes memory for action-relevant knowledge and reenactment of these actions in a future context. In Experiment 1 , participants who used the imperfective aspect to describe their strategy on a prior interpersonal task were more likely to use this strategy on a later task than were participants who used the perfective aspect to describe their prior strategy. Experiment 2 demonstrated that describing behaviors on a task using the imperfective rather than the perfective aspect increased willingness to resume that task by improving memory for task contents. The last two experiments showed that the effects of the imperfective aspect on memory decayed over time and that the imperfective aspect facilitated performance of a future behavior only when the described past behavior was relevant to the future behavior. Thus, the effects of aspect are moderated by memory decay and are behavior-specific.     

The “soap opera” effect in story recall

When people learn a series of actions of a character, their memory is strongly influenced, we suggest, by beliefs about that character’s motives. Motives serve as schema for deciding the meaning of the actions, their importance, and their interconnections. In two experiments, subjects read and later remembered some dull activities of a character. Experimental subjects knew what this character was worrying about (e.g., an unwanted pregnancy); control subjects did not. Recall and recognition showed that motive subjects distorted many of the colorless events to be motive relevant. Although the motive schema helped connect the disparate actions, it interfered with accurate recording and recall of the details.     

The identity function of autobiographical memory: time is on our side

Autobiographical memory plays an important role in the construction of personal identity. We review evidence of the bi-directional link between memory and identity. Individuals' current self-views, beliefs, and goals influence their recollections and appraisals of former selves. In turn, people's current self-views are influenced by what they remember about their personal past, as well as how they recall earlier selves and episodes. People's reconstructed evaluations of memories, their perceived distance from past experiences, and the point of view of their recollections have implications for how the past affects the present. We focus on how people's constructions of themselves through time serve the function of creating a coherent--and largely favourable--view of their present selves and circumstances.     

Input/Output Logics

In a range of contexts, one comes across processes resembling inference, but where input propositions are not in general included among outputs, and the operation is not in any way reversible. Examples arise in contexts of conditional obligations, goals, ideals, preferences, actions, and beliefs. Our purpose is to develop a theory of such input/output operations. Four are singled out: simple-minded, basic (making intelligent use of disjunctive inputs), simple-minded reusable (in which outputs may be recycled as inputs), and basic reusable. They are defined semantically and characterised by derivation rules, as well as in terms of relabeling procedures and modal operators. Their behaviour is studied on both semantic and syntactic levels.     

Beliefs about Memory as a Mediator of Relations between Metacognitive Beliefs and Actual Memory Performance

The goal of the present study was to investigate relationships between personal beliefs about memory, metacognitive beliefs, and actual memory performance. One hundred thirty-seven participants' (aged 20 to 60 years) metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Metacognition Questionnaire (MCQ-30), memory beliefs were measured using the Personal Beliefs about Memory Instrument (PBMI), and an episodic memory task was used to measure actual memory performance, memory predictions, and postdictions. Younger adults had lower scores on the positive beliefs subfactor of the MCQ-30, higher scores on retrospective change and control subfactors of the PBMI, and outperformed middle-aged adults on recall and recall postdiction. Path analysis showed that individuals' beliefs about memory mediate the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and actual memory performance. Specifically, low lack of confidence (or less worry) in one's own memory and attentional capabilities was related to higher memory performance and positive personal beliefs regarding specific memory ability mediated relationship.     

Seeing Things Unseen: Fantasy Beliefs and False Reports

Whereas past research has demonstrated that children's beliefs about the real world can influence their memory for events, the role of fantasy beliefs in children's recall remains largely unexplored. We examine this topic in 5- and 6-year-olds by focusing on how belief in a familiar fantasy figure, namely the Tooth Fairy, is related to children's memory for their most recent primary tooth loss. Although children who fully believed in the reality of the Tooth Fairy provided more voluminous and complex accounts than those with less strong beliefs, they also provided the most fictitious reports, frequently characterized by claims of hearing or seeing the Tooth Fairy. Belief in the Tooth Fairy did not affect the accuracy of children's reports of the mundane elements of their tooth loss, and many fantastic claims were linked to real events. Exposure to seemingly tangible evidence of the Tooth Fairy's existence was associated with the provision of fantastic claims.     

Adult recollections of earliest childhood dreams: a cross-cultural study

In two studies, Caucasian and Asian college students recalled their earliest memory of a dream, and they provided information about behaviours and beliefs associated with dreaming. Consistent with previous research on childhood amnesia, participants rarely recounted dreams that occurred before age 3. In Study 1, the mean age of the earliest dream memory was 14 months earlier for Caucasians than for Asians. In Study 2, more Asians than Caucasians were unable to remember a childhood dream. Dream-related behaviours and beliefs also differed markedly across cultures. Compared to Asians, Caucasians reported talking more frequently with parents about their dreams in childhood, receiving stronger parental encouragement to share dreams, and feeling more comfortable doing so. Caucasians also reported sharing their dreams with others more frequently in adulthood and they assigned greater value to their dreams. Most Caucasians but few Asians consented to the researchers' request to send parents a questionnaire concerning the participant's childhood dreams. The results support the social interaction explanation for autobiographical memory development, in which parent-child conversations about the personal past contribute to memory accessibility.     

Long ago it was meant to be: the interplay between time, construal, and fate beliefs

Fate means that an event was meant to be, that is, predetermined by prior unseen forces. Most people believe in fate, which seems at odds with similarly pervasive beliefs that alternative past actions would have brought about different circumstances (i.e., counterfactual beliefs). Two experiments revealed that construal level accounts for the relative plausibility of fate versus counterfactual explanations. Construal was manipulated in Experiment 1, such that goal pursuits framed in abstract ("why?") as opposed to concrete ("how?") terms heightened fate but not counterfactual attributions. Extending this finding, Experiment 2 showed that fate judgments were higher for temporally distant than recent past events, an effect mediated by construal perceptions. Neither counterfactual nor luck judgments varied with temporal distance. These findings help to explain how individuals explain complicated yet meaningful life events while extending the reach of Trope and Liberman's (2003) construal-level theory.     

Adult recollections of earliest childhood dreams: A cross-cultural study

In two studies, Caucasian and Asian college students recalled their earliest memory of a dream, and they provided information about behaviours and beliefs associated with dreaming. Consistent with previous research on childhood amnesia, participants rarely recounted dreams that occurred before age 3. In Study 1, the mean age of the earliest dream memory was 14 months earlier for Caucasians than for Asians. In Study 2, more Asians than Caucasians were unable to remember a childhood dream. Dream-related behaviours and beliefs also differed markedly across cultures. Compared to Asians, Caucasians reported talking more frequently with parents about their dreams in childhood, receiving stronger parental encouragement to share dreams, and feeling more comfortable doing so. Caucasians also reported sharing their dreams with others more frequently in adulthood and they assigned greater value to their dreams. Most Caucasians but few Asians consented to the researchers' request to send parents a questionnaire concerning the participant's childhood dreams. The results support the social interaction explanation for autobiographical memory development, in which parent–child conversations about the personal past contribute to memory accessibility.     

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.     

Memory for "mean" over "nice": the influence of threat on children's face memory

Adults remember faces of threatening over non-threatening individuals. This memory advantage could be indicative of a system rooted deeply in cognitive evolution to track and remember individuals who have been harmful in the past and therefore might be harmful again. Conversely, adults may have learned through experience that it pays to be vigilant. In the present research, we investigated whether attention to threatening individuals is privileged in young children's face memory. In Experiment 1, preschool-age children showed a face recognition memory advantage for individuals who were said to have committed harmful rather than helpful actions. In a further experiment, children did not selectively remember individuals who were described as the recipients of these actions, suggesting that the memory enhancement was produced by threat rather than negative valence. Together, these findings provide evidence for an early-developing system for remembering threatening individuals, consistent with an evolutionary account of its origins.     

My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.     

Adults' Efficacy and Control Beliefs Regarding Memory and Aging: Separating General from Personal Beliefs

This study examined beliefs about memory in 307 18-93 year-old community-dwelling adults. Two new questionnaires, the General Beliefs about Memory (GBMI) and the Personal Beliefs about Memory (PBMI) Instruments, were used to compare and contrast beliefs about memory in the general population of adults from beliefs about one's own memory. Both questionnaires used a graphic rating scale format to obtain more refined responses. The GBMI showed that, on average, all age groups perceived the average adult as experiencing curvilinear decline over the adult life span for multiple aspects of memory, with the greatest changes believed to occur after age 40. Beliefs about different specific types of memory were consistent with lay beliefs and with empirical results regarding aging and memory (e.g., memory for names was perceived to decline more rapidly than memory for faces). In contrast to earlier studies, small but significant age differences between young, middle-aged, and older respondents regarding beliefs about rates of memory aging were identified. Results for the PBMI indicated that personal beliefs were strongly related to, but distinct from, general beliefs. Older adults believed themselves to be lower in memory efficacy, to have declined more than younger adults, and to have less personal control over memory, as in earlier research.