Altruistic behavior and cooperation: The role of intrinsic expectation when reputational information is incomplete

Altruistic behavior is known to be conditional on the level of altruism of others. However, people often have no information, or incomplete information, about the altruistic reputation of others, for example when the reputation was obtained in a different social or economic context. As a consequence, they have to estimate the other's altruistic intentions. Using an economic game, we showed that without reputational information people have intrinsic expectations about the altruistic behavior of others, which largely explained their own altruistic behavior. This implies that when no information is available, intrinsic expectations can be as powerful a driver of altruistic behavior as actual knowledge about other people's reputation. Two strategies appeared to co-exist in our study population: participants who expected others to be altruistic and acted even more altruistically themselves, while other participants had low expected altruism scores and acted even less altruistically than they expected others to do. We also found evidence that generosity in economic games translates into benefits for other social contexts: a reputation of financial generosity increased the attractiveness of partners in a social cooperative game. This result implies that in situations with incomplete information, the fitness effects of indirect reciprocity are cumulative across different social contexts.     

Social class, solipsism, and contextualism: how the rich are different from the poor

Social class is shaped by an individual's material resources as well as perceptions of rank vis-à-vis others in society, and in this article, we examine how class influences behavior. Diminished resources and lower rank create contexts that constrain social outcomes for lower-class individuals and enhance contextualist tendencies--that is, a focus on external, uncontrollable social forces and other individuals who influence one's life outcomes. In contrast, abundant resources and elevated rank create contexts that enhance the personal freedoms of upper-class individuals and give rise to solipsistic social cognitive tendencies--that is, an individualistic focus on one's own internal states, goals, motivations, and emotions. Guided by this framework, we detail 9 hypotheses and relevant empirical evidence concerning how class-based contextualist and solipsistic tendencies shape the self, perceptions of the social environment, and relationships to other individuals. Novel predictions and implications for research in other socio-political contexts are considered.     

Continuities and Consequences of Interactional Styles Across the Life Course

Behavior patterns can be sustained across the life course by two kinds of person-environment interaction. Cumulative continuity arises when an individual's interactional style channels him or her into environments that themselves reinforce that style, thereby sustaining the behavior pattern across the life course through the progressive accumulation of its own consequences. Interactional continuity arises when an individual's style evokes reciprocal, sustaining responses from others in ongoing social interaction, thereby reinstating the behavior pattern across the individual's life course whenever the relevant interactive situation is replicated. Using archival data from the Berkeley Guidance Study (Macfarlane, Allen, & Honzik, 1954), we present evidence for the operation of these two continuity-promoting processes by identifying individuals who were ill-tempered, shy, or dependent in late childhood and then tracing the continuities and consequences of these interactional styles across the subsequent 30 years of their lives in the domains of work and family. The importance of the sociocultural context in mediating these continuities and consequences is stressed.     

Are they bothered? How the opportunity to damage a partner's reputation influences giving behavior in a trust game

Studies of reputation use in social interactions have indicated that when individuals can acquire a positive or negative reputation, they are motivated to act in a cooperative fashion. However, few researchers have examined how the opportunity to confer this reputation on a partner may influence an individual's behavior in a mixed-motive situation. In the present study, an experiment using a trust-game paradigm indicated that participants felt that they had more control over their partner's reputation when they could leave feedback regarding the outcome of their interaction with their partner. However, the participants would only donate a substantial portion of their initial endowment (i.e., over 50%) when they could leave feedback for a partner and when they felt that their partner was concerned about his or her own reputation. The author discusses these findings in regard to how they might apply to real-world reputation use and how possible future studies may further expand knowledge in this area.     

Significant other primes and behavior: motivation to respond to social cues moderates pursuit of prime-induced goals

Significant others can automatically activate a variety of goals, including goals that significant others have for an individual and the individual's personal goals that are associated with the significant others. Across three studies, this article shows that the effects of significant other primes (i.e., mother, roommate) on behavior depend on individual differences in both personal goals and responsiveness to social cues (i.e., self-monitoring, need to belong). Specifically, individuals who are motivated to respond to social cues assimilate to a goal that their primed significant other has for them, regardless of whether they personally hold the goal. Individuals not so motivated, on the other hand, assimilate to the goal only when it is one that they also personally hold. Implications of these findings for research on the prime-to-behavior relationship and interpersonal goal pursuit are discussed.     

Mere Exposure: A Gateway to the Subliminal

In the mere-repeated-exposure paradigm, an individual is repeatedly exposed to a particular stimulus object, and the researcher records the individual's emerging preference for that object. Vast literature on the mere-repeated-exposure effect shows it to be a robust phenomenon that cannot be explained by an appeal to recognition memory or perceptual fluency. The effect has been demonstrated across cultures, species, and diverse stimulus domains. It has been obtained even when the stimuli exposed are not accessible to the participants' awareness, and even prenatally. The repeated-exposure paradigm can be regarded as a form of classical conditioning if we assume that the absence of aversive events constitutes the unconditioned stimulus. Empirical research shows that a benign experience of repetition can in and of itself enhance positive affect, and that such affect can become attached not only to stimuli that have been exposed but also to similar stimuli that have not been previously exposed, and to totally distinct stimuli as well. Implications for affect as a fundamental and independent process are discussed in the light of neuroanatomical evidence.     

认知资源：解释社会助长效应的新视角

Zajonc和Baron分别提出社会唤醒理论和分心-冲突理论对社会助长效应进行解释,但仍存在一定的不足。研究在两种理论的基础上提出一种基于认知资源的解释观点。通过行为实验和脑电实验对这一观点进行验证,结果发现： （1）行为数据符合社会唤醒理论假设（2）简单任务组比复杂任务组诱发更高的N1波幅。（3）简单任务下,有人在场诱发更高的N1波幅;复杂任务下,有人在与无人组诱发的N1无显著差异。结果提示：他人在场通过改变个体的注意力投入来影响任务的完成效果。研究很好的解释了社会唤醒理论和分心-冲突理论无法解释的盲区,为社会助长效应的研究提供了一个新的视角。     

组织中权力如何促进亲社会行为?责任感知的中介作用

如何善用权力惠及于民既是一个重要的科学问题, 也是一个关键的管理实践问题。以往学者主要关注组织情境中权力对亲社会行为的消极作用, 对积极作用的发生机制尚不清楚。梳理组织中权力正向影响亲社会行为的相关文献, 发现责任感知在权力促进亲社会行为中起中介作用; 掌权者在行使权力时会考虑自身需求、与他人的关系, 以及与组织的关系, 从而增强责任感知, 且不同路径会受个体层面、人际层面和组织层面的潜在因素影响。权力通过责任感知促进亲社会行为的综合模型, 对组织以及掌权者如何善用权力具有重要的启示意义。     

In Defense of Individualism

This paper offers a programmatic philosophical articulation of moral and political individualism. This individualism consists of two main components: value individualism and rights individualism. The former is the view that, for each individual, the end which is of ultimate value is his own well-being. Each individual's well-being has ultimate agent-relative value and the only ultimate values are these agent-relative values. The latter view is that individuals possess moral jurisdiction over themselves, i.e., rights of self-ownership. These rights (along with other rights individuals may come to possess) constrain the manner in which agents may pursue value. For this reason, the articulated individualism is an constrained individualism. Sketches of arguments are offered for both value and rights individualism. And it is argued that the sole legitimate function of legal/political institutions is to further delineate and protect the rights of individuals. However, the paper is also concerned to indicate why this radical moral and political individualism does not have many of the features or implications that are commonly ascribed to it. In this connection, I seek to show how this social doctrine accords with individuals' having concern for the well-being of others, with the emergence of relationships among individuals that have both instrumental and non-instrumental value, with a degree of responsibility for self and others that is often thought to be antithetical to individualism and, in general, with a flourishing of civil order.     

Irrelevant Influences

We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting—not just emotionally, but epistemically. But should they? It can be disturbing to learn that one's beliefs reflect the influence of such irrelevant factors. The pervasiveness of such influence has led some to worry that we are not justified in many of our beliefs. That same pervasiveness has led others to doubt whether there is any worry here at all. I argue that evidence of irrelevant belief influence is sometimes, but not always, undermining. My proposal picks out ordinary, non‐skeptical cases in which we get evidence of error. It says that, in those cases, evidence of irrelevant influence is epistemically significant. It shows how respecting evidence of error is compatible with the epistemic lives we see ourselves living. We are fallible creatures, yes, but we are also capable and intelligent ones. We can recognize and correct for our own error so as to improve our imperfect, yet nevertheless robust, epistemic lives.     

政治技能与自我效能感对职业适应能力的影响——自尊的中介作用

本研究采用问卷调查法, 以492名高校大学生为研究对象,探索政治技能和自我效能感对大学生职业适应能力的影响及自尊的中介作用。结果表明：（1）政治技能和自我效能感对个体的职业适应能力有积极影响。（2）自尊在政治技能和职业适应能力之间,自我效能感与职业适应能力之间起着双重中介作用。     

“追名弃利”：权力动机与社会存在对亲社会行为的影响

目前关于权力动机的研究主要关注权力动机的阴暗面, 但是对权力动机的积极面尚不清楚。本研究从公平与合作行为的角度出发, 分别采用最后通牒博弈和公共物品博弈任务, 探讨不同权力动机水平个体在内隐(眼睛线索)或外显(他人在场)社会存在下的亲社会行为是否不同。结果发现, 在眼睛线索或他人在场条件下, 相对于低权力动机者, 高权力动机者表现出更高的公平与合作水平。然而当没有社会存在线索时, 高低权力动机者的亲社会行为没有显著差异。结果提示高权力动机者出于名誉和地位的策略考虑, 也会表现出积极的亲社会行为。     

Can Luck Egalitarianism Justify the Fact that Some are Worse Off than Others?

According to luck egalitarianism it is bad or unjust if someone is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own. This article argues that there is a tension in standard luck egalitarian theory between justifying absolute and comparative welfare levels. If a person responsibly acts in a way that brings her welfare level below that of others, this is justified according to the theory. However, even if we can say that the person's new welfare level is justified in absolute terms, it is less clear that her now being worse off than others, is justified (a similar idea is explored by Susan Hurley). The reason is that while she has in one sense chosen her (new) welfare level, she has not chosen to be worse off than others. Her relative standing, something with which egalitarians ought to be concerned, is determined by her choices in conjunction with the choices of all others. But no individual controls the choices of all others. Hence, for any one individual it is the case that her relative standing is beyond her control. Some responses to this problem are available. It is doubtful, however, that these are entirely successful.     

Understanding responses to political conflict: interactive effects of the need for closure and salient conflict schemas

Two studies examined the relationship between the need for cognitive closure and preferences for conflict-resolution strategies in 2 different samples of elite political actors. Although research has suggested that high need for closure should be associated with competitiveness, the authors argue that this relationship should be strongest among political actors with a hostile conflict schema, or representation of what a conflict is and how it should be dealt with. The authors provide evidence for this hypothesis using archival survey data on American foreign-policy officials' attitudes toward international conflict at the height of the Cold War (Study 1) and their own data on the relationship between the need for closure and conflict-strategy preferences among samples of activists from 2 political parties in Poland: a centrist party with a reputation for cooperativeness and an extremist party with a reputation for confrontation (Study 2). The broader implications of these findings are discussed.     

宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

自身得失对朋友博弈结果评价的影响：来自ERPs的证据

本研究通过经典的金钱博弈任务, 以FRN和P300为反应指标, 探讨了自身获益或损失对朋友结果评价分别会产生何种影响, 以及这种影响模式是如何受到个体自我建构方式调节的。结果发现, 在自身获益条件下, 观看朋友损益之间的FRN和P300差异不再存在; 在自身损失条件下, 虽然观看朋友输赢之间的P300差异消失了, 但FRN差异依然显著。不仅如此, 无论自身得失, 独立型自我建构启动组在观看朋友损益上的FRN差异均不再显著, 但在自身获益后看到朋友损失能激发更强的P300波幅。本研究结果表明：(1) 对朋友的结果评价模式并非固定不变, 而是会随个体自身所处得失境遇的不同而有所区别; (2) 相对于互依型自我建构启动组, 独立型自我建构启动组在面对朋友的得失时表现得更为冷漠并更具竞争性。     

Self-knowledge and varieties of human excellence in the French moralists

Contemporary accounts of knowing one’s own mental states can be instructively supplemented by early modern accounts that understand self-knowledge as an important factor for flourishing human life. This article argues that in the early modern French moralists, one finds diverging conceptions of how knowing one’s own personal qualities could constitute a kind of human excellence: François de la Rochefoucauld (1613–80) argues that the value of knowing one’s own character faults could contribute to an attitude of self-acceptance that liberates one from the effort of deceiving oneself and others. Madeleine de Scudéry (1607–1701) argues that knowing one’s own character faults could be an incentive for self-cultivation that leads to the development of character traits that are naturally good. Anne-Thérèse de Lambert (1647–1733) concurs with Scudéry’s insight and develops it further. According to Lambert, self-knowledge is crucial for developing character traits that give rise to the natural right of being esteemed by others and, hence, crucial for justified and stable self-esteem.     

婴儿动作理解的研究回顾与展望

婴儿对他人动作意图的正确推理是一种重要的社会认知能力,有利于婴儿根据他人意图来调整自己的行为以适应更好的社会互动.婴儿的这种能力作为一种重要的社会认知根源,对自身的社会反应、心理理论以及语言理解都有重要的影响.但是婴儿是如何获得这种能力的呢?经验论认为是学习的结果,但目的论则认为是婴儿与生俱来的一种能力.两种理论都获得了一些实证支持,目前还没有一致结论.这类研究对具身认知、身心关系的探讨有一定启发作用.     

Judgments of the lucky across development and culture

For millennia, human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individual's own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his or her evaluation, reward, and punishment. In a series of studies, the authors investigated whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first 3 studies demonstrated that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next 3 studies demonstrated that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final 2 studies found that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to M. J. Lerner's (1980) just-world theory and J. Piaget's (1932/1965) immanent-justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes.     

Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowledgement

Six‐year‐old children negatively evaluate plagiarizers just as adults do (Olson & Shaw, 2011), but why do they dislike plagiarizers? Children may think plagiarism is wrong because plagiarizing negatively impacts other people's reputations. We investigated this possibility by having 6‐ to 9‐year‐old children evaluate people who shared their own or other people's ideas (stories). In Experiment 1, we found that children consider it acceptable to retell someone else's story if the source is given credit for their story (improving the source's reputation), but not if the reteller claims credit for the story (steals credit away from someone else). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that children do not consider it bad to lie by giving someone else credit for one's own good story (improving someone else's reputation), but do consider it bad to give someone else credit for one's own bad story (improving one's own reputation at the expense of someone else's). Experiment 4 demonstrated that children think it is equally bad to take credit for someone else's idea for oneself as it is to take someone else's idea and give credit to someone else, suggesting that children dislike when others take credit away from someone else, regardless of whether or not it improves the plagiarizer's reputation. Our results suggest that children dislike plagiarism because it negatively affects others' reputations by taking credit away from them.