现象学的存在论意义和生存论根基

在海德格尔那里,现象学已从“先验现象学”转变为“存在论的现象学”,这就是现象学的“存在论转向”。这种转向最为突出地表现在海德格尔对胡塞尔现象学的“三个重要发现”的存在论意义的揭示和生存论根基的追问上:1.胡塞尔把意识的意向性作为最后的根据,海德格尔则强调此在的生存论结构的超越性对一切意识行为和实践行为的意向性的奠基作用;2.与胡塞尔把感性直观作为范畴直观的最后根据不同,海德格尔认为无论是感性直观还是范畴直观都不具有源始性,因为它们都奠基于此在的“存在之理解”,都只有在生存论的“理解”的基础上才是可能的;3.与胡塞尔强调本质或范畴的先天性不同,海德格尔把先天与后天的区别最终归结为存在与存在者的“存在论区别”。     

《书》、《诗》中"哲"义小考

《尚书》和《诗经》中有“哲”观念，旧释或为“智慧”，或为“智慧之人”。仔细考察则会发现，“哲”在上述文献的不同篇章中分别表示神圣意志、帝王的聪明才智、社会人群的聪明才智。其内涵的扩大，可能意味着上述不同篇章文献完成于不同时代；其内涵的变迁，则反映了“哲”观念在西周早期、中晚期、春秋时期的变化。     

汉传佛教慈善事业的理论来源及其实践模式

佛教慈善事业是大乘佛教修行方法之一。大乘佛教福慧双修的理论,强调修福是第一位的修行。一个人只有满足了物质生活的最低需求(福报),才能追求精神需求(智慧)。汉传佛教是大乘佛教中国化的产物,在2000多年的发展史上,始终强调福慧双修的信仰特色。     

浅论《诗经》中"上帝"意象的心理学意义

在《诗经》这一我国最早的诗歌总集中,蕴涵极为丰富的宗教信息。本文从荣格分析心理学的角度分析了《诗经》中表征上帝意象的四个象征:天、帝、神和祖,并探究了《诗经》中的上帝意象为个人内在心灵服务的心理学意义。     

从《确信之书》看巴哈伊教的渊源

被巴哈欧拉誉为“诸书之王”的《确信之书》,是巴哈伊教最重要的圣典之一。本文从四方面论述了《确信之书》产生的社会历史背景和这部圣典的基本内容,着重论述了巴哈伊信仰关于如何获得上帝及其先知的真知以及如何理解和认识上帝天命的统一性的问题。作者认为,尽管巴布的《白阳经》和巴哈欧拉的《确信之书》都与什叶派教义信仰有关,但从它们成书之日起就已预示了一个全新的、独立的世界宗教在东方地平线上的诞生。正确理解新兴宗教与传统宗教的联系与区别,有助于人们从历史和发展的观点来认识人类错综复杂、千变万化的宗教现象。     

《成唯识论》的美学意蕴

《成唯识论》的哲学本位埋设两大主题:法相与法果。在法相谱系中,以触为核心的一系列心所所表现的心理现象沾溉了与审美体验相类似的思维胚胎,具备可能萌发审美体验论的逻辑生长点。另外,法果的本质是一种绝对的美。审视法果就是审美,审视法果之美中涵摄两条根本线索:直观人的美和领略佛的美。     

河图洛书探源

河图洛书究竟为何物,历化学者解说大相径庭。本文主要就其汉以前的渊源作了初步探讨,提出它始见于先秦古籍,是某些企图改朝换代的“圣人”们的有意伪造之物,汉儒称其为八卦九畴并附会《周易》,宣扬灾异思想,汉代方士也假托河图洛书编纬图,主要内容是与“经天验道”、推算吉凶有关的卜筮数术,目的在于为改朝换代制造“天书”、“祥瑞”,以神话自已。     

《史记·老子列传》中的老子世系考辨

根据<史记·老子列传>中的老子世系并结合先秦及汉代史料,不能推导出太史儋为老子的结论.老子世系并非为太史儋所有,即使太史儋确实是五千言<老子>的作者.     

The Meaning of Lives and the Meaning of Things

Meaning in life is an important aspect of human well-being and motivation. But as the notion of ‘meaning in life’ is not easily assimilated to that of semantic meaning, it is difficult to define. While meaning in life is standardly discussed in terms of meaningful ways of living, I here take the alternative approach of discussing the meaningfulness of things for agents. I claim that such meaningfulness, or significance, consists in the ways in which things invite agent-relevant responses. Meaningfulness in that sense is important for understanding, not just meaning in life for mature human beings, but also meaning for children, meaning in the arts, the continuity between ‘mere’ living and living meaningfully, and the connection between meaning in life and semantic meaning.     

王弼易学解经体例探源

易学是<周易>诞生之后对<周易>经传进行阐释的研究学科,由两个部分组成:一是解易观,即解释<周易>的指导思想;二是解易体例,即历代易学者以不同的方式来解经,以其解易方式的积累来显示某种系统的原则,故将其称为解易体例.这两个部分如同硬币的正反面不能分开存在一样,解易观均溶入在解易体例部分,解易体例体现解易观.研究某个易学家应将它们澄清条理化,先分析其解经体例的条目如何,然后再分析其解易观如何,而后可明显看出他的易学在易学史上占据怎样的地位.尤其是在研究王弼时更应如此,因为他的解易观,既有古文经学派的义理与象数的因素,也有玄学的因素,不能一概而论,而如此的两种解易观均自然体现于其<周易注>特有的各种解易体例中.尽管如此,迄今研究王弼易学,由于拘泥于王弼是义理易学的创始者的成见,很少有人探讨其来源如何,而只是偏重于王弼易学内容如何.探讨王弼解易体例来源如何,能明显得出其易学与前代易学的关系,从而判别‘创始者'的称号之妥当与否.本文将对<周易注>提出的体例中哪个是继承前代的,哪个是自己创新的问题,作一粗略分析.     

Need for Meaning,Meaning Confusion,Meaning Anxiety,and Meaning Avoidance: Additional Dimensions of Meaning in Life

Two aspects of meaning in life have drawn much attention in previous research: presence of meaning and search for meaning. We proposed four additional aspects concerning individuals’ thoughts and feelings about meaning in life: need for meaning, meaning confusion, meaning avoidance, and meaning anxiety. We developed items to measure these dimensions. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the data fit the factors well. Convergent and discriminant validities of the four dimensions were demonstrated though their distinct patterns of correlations with other variables, such as personality traits, need satisfaction, personal aspirations, life satisfaction, anxiety and depression. Moreover, cluster analysis revealed that individuals could be divided into meaningful groups according to these dimensions, with each group demonstrating unique psychological features. Implications for future studies on meaning in life are discussed.     

Wittgenstein on the Experience of Meaning and the Meaning of Music

On the basis of some ideas of Wittgenstein’s, an argument is presented to the effect that the ability to feel or to experience meaning conditions the ability to mean, and is thus essential to our notion of meaning. The experience of meaning, as manifested in the “fine shades” of use and behaviour, is central to Wittgenstein’s late conception of meaning. In explicating the basic elements involved here, I first try to clarify the notion of feeling and its relationship to meaning, emphasising its central role in music as explanatory of its use in language. The feeling of words, in this sense, is an objective feature of their meaning and use, and should be distinguished from feelings as psychological processes or experiences that may accompany the use of words. I then explain its philosophical significance by arguing that word‐feeling, and the “experience of meaning,” are basically instances of Wittgenstein’s general conception of aspect and aspect‐perception, which are important elements in his later conception of meaning and of thought. The nature of this experience is explicated in terms of grasping internal relations and relevant comparisons, which is manifested in a “mastery of a technique,” or “feeling at home” in a certain practice. In this sense, I argue, the ability to experience the meaning of a word is essential to the very intentionality of our thought and language. The ability to experience meaning is also a precondition for using words in a “secondary sense,” which is of great significance in itself. I conclude by pointing to the application of these notions of understanding, feeling and experience, as well as their explication in terms of comparisons, internal relations and mastery of technique, to music, where they are so apt and natural.     

Life Meaning and Sign Meaning

Abstract

Philosophers once dismissed questions about meaning in life as conceptually confused. Only language and related phenomena, it was thought, can have meaning; thus, to ask about the meaning of life is to misapply the concept. Recent work by Susan Wolf, Thaddeus Metz, Aaron Smuts, and others has brought new attention and respectability to the topic. However, while talk of life meaning is no longer considered nonsense, most theorists continue to assume that such talk has nothing to do with meaning in the ‘sign’ sense that applies to language. In this paper I argue that this assumption is not well justified and that reflection on the example of Sherlock Holmes's life can help us to see why.     

Obscuring Desire: A Special Pattern of Male Adolescent Masturbation,Internet Pornography,and the Flight From Meaning

The sexual development of adolescent boys is closely tied to masturbation. Erotic fantasies are used to work through conflicts concerning sexuality and gender. These fantasies may be extended, enriched, and socialized through a variety of means, including interactions with peers, various cultural means, and pornography. Adolescents also commonly defend against awareness of these conflicts by denying their significance and conceptualizing them as mere stimulants or concomitants of physiologic arousal. Internet pornography provides a particularly powerful means by which some adolescents can disguise or obliterate the meaning of personal masturbation fantasies and so be spared the anxiety associated with the fantasies and their conflicted meaning.     

Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language

I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein.     

Five Perspectives on the Meaning of Meaning in the Context of Clinical Practices

What is meaningful in life? This is a question many individuals ask at least once in their lifetime. Many researchers have also asked this question, and a large body of literature seems to answer in theoretical and academic terms. But what is the meaning of meaning in clinical practice? That is, what is the role of meaning in psychotherapy, recovery, and positive mental health? And how could meaning in life be addressed in practices: What clinical competencies are needed? To answer these and other questions, a broad panel of researchers and practitioners met at the world conference of the International Network for Personal Meaning (INPM) in Toronto in July of 2016. A passionate debate followed, particularly on the question of the meaning of meaning in clinical practice. In this article, five panel members—Mick Cooper, Clara Hill, Robert Neimeyer, Kirk Schneider, and Paul Wong—elaborate their perspective on these two questions. At the end of the article, the moderator, Joel Vos summarizes, their differences and agreements, and suggests a pluralistic, multidimensional perspective on meaning for practitioners. Despite some fundamental differences, the authors report many similar perspectives on the meaning of meaning in clinical practice and on clinical competencies. This debate could be used as an example of how practitioners could also converse with their clients; the process of exploring the question, “What does meaning mean to you here and now, in our therapy room?” could be meaningful in itself.