Prior expectancy and behavioral extremity as determinants of attitude attribution

In an experiment on attitude attribution, subjects were instructed to estimate the “true attitude” of a target person after reading an essay in which he took one or the other side of a controversial issue (legalization of marijuana). Four independent variables were manipulated: the direction of the essay (pro- versus anti-legalization), its extremity (strong versus weak), freedom to choose position versus assignment to position (choice versus no choice), and prior expectancy (expect pro versus expect anti). All experimental predictions were confirmed by the results. When the essay was strong: (1) attitudes were attributed more in line with behavior under choice than under no choice conditions; (2) even under no choice conditions, the target person was seen as believing to some extent in the arguments of his essay; (3) the role of choice was especially prominent when the position of the essay was unexpected. In both strong and weak essay conditions, (4) the behavior was ignored in favor of prior expectancy in no choice conditions, but a contrast effect was observed in the choice conditions. When the essay was weak: (5) subjects attributed the opposite attitude under no choice conditions; under choice conditions, the weak essay was construed as moderate endorsement. As in previous experiments, there was considerable variability in those conditions in which the target person wrote an essay under no choice instructions endorsing the position he presumably opposed. In a second experiment, attempting to determine what produced this variability, it was found that subjects with generalized expectancies of internal control (Rotter, 1966) were more sensitive to variations in choice than were subjects whose expectancies were externalized. Under no choice conditions, “internals” were more inclined to ignore the essay and go by their prior expectancies in attributing attitude; “externals” seemed more impressed by the essay itself.     

Cognitive schemas and thought as determinants of attitude change

It was hypothesized that thought would result in greater attitude polarization than distraction and that this effect would be more pronounced with better developed schemas (naive theories) for thinking about the attitude object. In Study 1, it was reasoned that persons have better developed schemas (e.g., implicit personality theories) for thinking about individuals than for thinking about groups. In Study 2, it was reasoned that men have better developed schemas for thinking about football and women have better developed schemas for thinking about women's fashions. In both studies, the hypothesis was significantly confirmed.     

Interpersonal determinants of attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior

In a test of predictions derived from an identity-analytic model of self-presentational behavior, individuals who privately endorsed positive or negative attitudes about sexual behavior were asked to deliver a prosexuality speech while alone, while watched by observers, or while being watched by observers who questioned the morality of the subject’s actions. Subsequent attitude measures indicated that the subjects who initially adopted negative attitudes justified their behavior by expressing more favorable attitudes about sexuality, but only when no audience witnessed their speech. When an audience was present, these individuals emphasized their lack of choice. In contrast, subjects who privately endorsed positive attitudes publicly expressed less favorable attitudes when their morality was challenged by the observers. These findings suggest that attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior (a) stems from private image-maintenance needs as well as public self-presentational concerns, and (b) is sometimes designed to secure an image of morality as well as an image of consistency.     

Salience of initial attitude,magnitude of incentive,and attitude change in a forced compliance paradigm

To examine the application of interpersonal simulation findings to cognitive dissonance and incentive theories of attitude change in the forced compliance paradigm, 60 Ss were paid 50 cents or $2.50 to write counterattitudinal essays with salient or nonsalient initial attitudes. Findings showed that the larger incentive yielded greater change for salient pretest attitudes but that the smaller incentive led to more change of nonsalient pretest attitudes. Measures of error in attitude recall and a correlational analysis between pretest, posttest, and recalled attitudes were also consistent with Bem's (1967) hypothesis of isomorphism between the attributions of Ss and observers. It is proposed that remaining simulation data reported in the cognitive dissonance/self-perception controversy may identify additional parameters of attitude changes in forced compliance experiments.     

Counselor and client personality as determinants of counselor expectancy effects

Seventy-eight students enrolled in summer-session college courses were randomly assigned to serve either as counselors or as clients for a 20-min, role-played peer counseling session. All of the subjects completed a battery of standardized personality measures. Each counselor interacted with two clients. Prior to the sessions, the counselor was led to believe that one of the clients was especially introverted and that the other client was especially extraverted. Dependent measures were based on clients' change scores on a mood adjective rating scale administered before and after the peer counseling sessions. Analyses showed that counselors who were more successful at biasing their clients in the direction of their expectancies (a) scored higher on measures of Dogmatism, Nurturance, and Social Recognition, (b) scored lower on Impulsivity, and (c) were more likely to be women. Clients who were more susceptible to counselor bias scored higher on the Self-Monitoring Scale, the Self-Monitoring Other-Directedness subscale, and Social Recognition. These results are discussed in light of previous research and their implications for research on interpersonal expectancy effects.     

Personalism and cognitive labels as determinants of attitude attribution

An experiment was conducted to test hypotheses derived from Jones and Davis’ (1965) theory of correspondent inferences in conjunction with research on emotional misattribution effects. Subjects were informed that they had ingested either a stimulant or a tranquilizer (label). They then read an emotional, counterattitudinal essay which was written either personally for them or for another subject (personalism). The primary dependent variable was the attitude on the issue in question attributed to the author of the communication. The results showed that the subjects who read the more personal communication made more extreme attributions concerning the attitude of the author of the essay than did the subjects who read the less personal communication. In addition, subjects who were informed that they had received a tranquilizer made more extreme attitude attributions than subjects who were informed that they had received a stimulant. The implications of the results of the experiment for Jones and Davis’ principles of personalism and hedonic relevance are discussed.     

Outcome expectancy,locus of attribution for expectancy,and self-directed attention as determinants of evaluations and performance

Are internal versus external attributions of responsibility for prior outcomes important determinants of subsequent performances? or is their effect limited to influencing the affective and evaluative experiences that are associated with the task outcomes? Recent theoretical statements appear to differ on this issue. The present study examined the question, while at the same time testing the influence of self-directed attention on the process under investigation. Subjects attempted a series of mazes in collaboration with an ostensible cosubject (actually a confederate). The pair experienced either three consecutive sucesses or three consecutive failures. Subjects were led to perceive the responsibility for these outcomes as residing primarily with themselves or primarily with their partner. Self-focus was manipulated (by a mirror) prior to attempting a fourth maze and completing a set of rating scales. Success-condition subjects performed better on the fourth maze in the mirror's presence than in its absence, whereas failure-condition subjects tended to perform more poorly in the mirror's presence than in its absence. The manipulation of internal versus external attributions did not influence behavior, but did influence subjects' affective and evaluative reactions to themselves and their partner. Discussion centers on the relationship between these findings and other recent findings in the areas of attribution and achievement-related behavior.     

Belief similarity and attitude similarity as determinants of interpersonal attraction

It was predicted that attraction would be a function of both attitude similarity and belief similarity, but that attitude similarity would have the greater influence. In Expt I, 60 subjects were presented with strangers that were either similar or dissimilar on attitude and on belief. Attraction was a positive function of both attitude similarity (p < .05) and belief similarity (p < .01). Experiment II replicated and extended Expt I with the addition of a 50% similar group for both attitude and belief. Attraction was a positive linear function of both attitude similarity (p < .001) and belief similarity (p < .02); departure from linearity was not significant. Attitude similarity also had greater effects on other aspects of interpersonal evaluation than belief similarity. The results were discussed in terms of the locus of reinforcement of attitude similarity and of belief similarity.     

Persuasive argumentation and social comparison as determinants of attitude polarization

Several of our studies indicate that persuasive-arguments theory by itself is an adequate explanation of polarization. Sanders and Baron (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1977, 13, 303–314) criticize this research. More generally, they contend that both argumentation and comparison are involved, “with persuasive arguments facilitating the shifts motivated by social comparison.” We feel that their critique is unconvincing. Relevant portions of the standard literature are reviewed to demonstrate that social comparison is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for polarization. Finally, we speculate about how persuasive-arguments theory could be extended to argument-poor settings (e.g., Asch's line comparison situation).     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

Guessing, expectancy and autonomous change

An attempt was made to test the hypothesis that changes in memory of the kind ascribed by Gestalt theory to autonomous processes are due, not to changes in the memory trace, but to non-random guessing. Judgements of difference between original and recognition figures are shown to be related to guesses as to what these differences are likely to be, but the relation is not such that it can be predicted from a simple guessing hypothesis.